What did the first visit of the U.S. Secretary of Defense to Asia bring?

During the last week of March 2025, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth made his first visit to several countries in the Indo-Pacific region since taking office. The tour included Japan, the Philippines, Hawaii, and Guam. According to a statement from the U.S. Department of Defense, the visit featured meetings with senior military leaders in these countries to strengthen alliances and partnerships aimed at achieving a “free and open Indo-Pacific” vision, as well as enhancing regional security.

Intense Competition:

This tour comes amid a rapid escalation of several regional developments in the Indo-Pacific, which can be summarized as follows:

1. Competing Military Showcases: China conducted a series of live-fire military exercises ranging from the Taiwan Strait to the Tasman Sea (located in the South Pacific between Australia and New Zealand), relying on “high-efficiency” weapons systems. They also held combat readiness drills with live ammunition in land and air operations near Taiwan, involving the deployment of 45 military aircraft and 14 naval vessels, seen as a test of the United States and its allies’ ability to address military threats and the limits of U.S. support for allies under former President Donald Trump’s administration.

In response, Taiwan deployed military aircraft and naval ships to monitor the situation, while the U.S. was reported to have deployed Typhoon missile launch platforms to a new site in the Philippines (from Laoag Airport to another site on Luzon) to enhance the Philippines’ resilience during confrontations. These platforms can target Russian and Chinese objectives from Philippine territory. This weapon had previously drawn sharp criticism from China and Russia, with the Chinese Foreign Ministry accusing the Philippines in January 2025 of stoking regional tensions and urging it to “correct its wrong practices.”

2. Regional Alignment: The Philippines extended an invitation to India to join what is called the “SQUAD Alliance,” an emerging coalition expanding from the Quad (QUAD), which includes the U.S., Australia, Japan, and India; it primarily aims to counter China’s regional expansion in the Indo-Pacific.

Quad defense officials asserted during their meeting on March 20, 2025, that Chinese presence in the region is concerning. Filipino officials attended the meeting, with Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Romeo Brawner Jr. noting that China’s construction of artificial islands gives it actual control over the entire South China Sea, through which over 50% of global trade passes.

Assurance for Allies:

This visit by the U.S. Secretary of Defense marks the first of its kind in the region since he took office, with the key objectives and outcomes summarized as follows:

1. U.S. Efforts to Assure Allies: Washington aimed to convey messages of reassurance to its allies in the Indo-Pacific amid concerns they have regarding the possibility of the U.S. reducing its security commitments towards them. In a speech to graduates of the Daniel K. Inouye Center for Asian and Pacific Security Studies in Honolulu, the U.S. Secretary emphasized that his country would stand with its allies and partners to deter what he referred to as “Chinese aggression.”

Prior to this, the U.S. Secretary of Defense reaffirmed to his Philippine counterpart in a phone call in February 2025 the U.S. commitment to the 1951 mutual defense treaty between the two countries, stressing its importance in ensuring the security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. They also discussed enhancing cooperation and building the capabilities of the Philippine Armed Forces.

The American Secretary’s visit coincides with the start of the annual “Balikatan” exercises, the largest joint military drills between the Philippines and the U.S., scheduled for April 2025 near the South China Sea. This exercise focuses on enhancing joint operations across all domains, strengthening combat capabilities, and demonstrating a strong bilateral commitment to protecting the territorial integrity of the Philippines.

2. Affirmation of Commitment to U.S. Territories: During his visit, Hegseth reiterated Trump’s administration’s defensive commitments regarding U.S. territories in the Pacific, such as Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, indicating that any attack on them would be viewed as an attack on the U.S. mainland, warranting an “appropriate response.” He stated that his country does not seek war with China but is preparing to counter Chinese threats.

This U.S. commitment comes amid rising discussions about Guam’s future as an American territory, with some residents calling for statehood and an end to colonialism under a United Nations mandate, led by the Chamorro people (the indigenous inhabitants of Guam), considering the declining living standards of the island’s residents. The Secretary discussed the challenges facing the island with Governor Lou Leon Guerrero, including her quest for funding to build a new hospital, estimated to cost around $600 million, to enhance readiness for large-scale casualties from conflicts or natural disasters.

During a military meeting, Hegseth received briefs from military facility leaders and senior commanders in Guam, detailing military capabilities and future growth. The critical importance of Andersen Air Force Base in the Indo-Pacific region was emphasized, alongside the necessity of enhancing military capabilities to bolster deterrence and address potential military threats or confrontations. Concurrently, Hegseth reached an understanding with the President of the Federated States of Micronesia, Wesley Simina, to begin planning and constructing military infrastructure projects valued at $400 million.

3. Strengthening Defense Cooperation with the Philippines: The U.S. Secretary of Defense confirmed ongoing commitments to provide military support and funding to the Philippines amounting to $500 million. This was praised by his Philippine counterpart as a reaffirmation of U.S. commitment to the alliance and the mutual defense treaty. They also agreed to enhance cooperation in information technology and cybersecurity.

During the visit, it was agreed that the U.S. would deploy additional advanced capabilities in the Philippines, including the use of the (Nmesis) anti-ship missile system and high-efficiency unmanned surface vehicles in the aforementioned Balikatan exercises, as well as improve operational interoperability of advanced operations and agree on conducting bilateral training for special operations forces. Both sides announced the formulation of a plan to reestablish deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region through deepening avenues of bilateral cooperation, training, funding, and enhancing U.S. presence.

Additionally, several priority areas for defense industrial cooperation were identified, such as: unmanned systems, munitions and explosive materials components, critical minerals, logistics support, maintenance and repair of ships and aircraft, airspace integration, additive manufacturing (3D printing), production of spare parts and components for military systems.

4. Solidifying Defense Coordination with Japan: The U.S. and Japanese defense ministers agreed to improve coordination between the U.S. military and Japan Self-Defense Forces, alongside enhancing deterrent and response capabilities of the two nations’ alliance, based on the outcomes of a summit between Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and U.S. President Donald Trump in February 2025.

During Hegseth’s visit to Tokyo, an agreement was made to accelerate plans for jointly producing beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles of the AMRAAM type, and to explore cooperation in the production of SM-6 surface-to-air missiles to help alleviate munition shortages. Hegseth requested his Japanese counterpart to facilitate greater access to strategic islands located in the southwestern part of Japan, along the contested East China Sea near Taiwan.

The U.S. Secretary noted that his country began developing its military forces in Japan to establish a “combat” headquarters, considered the first phase of reorganizing U.S. forces in Japan announced under the Biden administration; this would enhance their ability to coordinate operations with Japanese Self-Defense Forces and “keep the adversary guessing” by creating strategic dilemmas in the region.

During his visit to Japan, the U.S. Secretary emphasized that his country would achieve strong and reliable deterrence against any hostile and coercive actions from China in the Indo-Pacific region, with his Japanese counterpart confirming Japan would be at the forefront of any emergencies that could arise in the western Pacific in cooperation with the U.S. Hegseth also stressed the exceptional strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Ongoing Ambiguity:

This visit by the U.S. Secretary of Defense generated some responses and carries implications and meanings that can be summarized as follows:

1. Chinese Criticism: China warned Washington against intervening in what it called “an Asian issue,” cautioning against actions that may disrupt regional stability. The Chinese Foreign Ministry also criticized the characterization of Japan as an “indispensable warrior state” against China, and accused the U.S. of using a “Chinese threat” narrative as a pretext to incite ideological confrontations and inflame conflicts by leveraging some countries in the region to reinforce its regional hegemony.

Chinese media characterized Hegseth’s Asian tour and visit to Japan as a manifestation of the U.S. “carrot and stick” policy aimed at tightly binding Japan to the U.S. geopolitical agenda. They urged Japan to appreciate efforts made towards improving Sino-Japanese relations and to avoid undermining those gains.

2. Ongoing Wariness of Trump’s Policies: Although the tour was primarily aimed at reassuring Washington’s allies about the anticipated policies of the Trump administration, concerns still linger among these allies, particularly given the ongoing ambiguities regarding U.S. spending, where there are fears that the U.S. may push its allies to bear the burden of developing their military capabilities without relying on U.S. support; previously, Trump described the treaty between the U.S. and Japan as “an interesting deal where we have to protect them, but they do not have to protect us.”

During his first term, he also stated that Japan should pay more to host U.S. forces, comments that raised concerns about the potential demand for Japan to increase its military spending allocations, or the possibility of threatening tariffs against its exports. In this context, Philippine Ambassador to the U.S. Jose Manuel Romualdez warned that U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific would not last forever.

3. Exclusion of South Korea from the Visit Agenda: It has been customary for U.S. tours of the region to include a visit to the key ally South Korea; however, it was excluded from Hegseth’s tour due to political turmoil following the declaration of martial law in the country on December 3, 2024, which also led former Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to exclude it from his recent Asia visit.

The exclusion of Seoul from this tour was interpreted as a message to China, which aims to exploit the political turmoil in South Korea to bolster its efforts to support pro-Chinese political forces in the country, according to American circles. Therefore, Washington intentionally included Manila in the new Secretary of Defense’s first visit as a reaffirmation of its confrontational stance against Beijing.

In conclusion, this tour carries numerous implications regarding the U.S. approach towards allies in Asia and the Indo-Pacific, despite potential contradictions in U.S. policies towards them. While U.S. policy is likely to remain uncertain about its future developments, the primary determinant of regional peace prospects will hinge on the movements of regional allies and their balancing of coordination with the U.S. on one hand, and maintaining flexibility and balance with China on the other, to avoid a military confrontation without being compelled to choose one ally over the other at the expense of the latter.