The circumstances surrounding the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria raise complex questions about the potential for ISIS to exploit rapid political and security developments to rebuild its ranks and restore its influence in the country. Given the complexities of the Syrian landscape, concerns regarding a resurgence of ISIS are particularly significant for many local and international stakeholders. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned on December 9, 2024, about the group’s attempts to take advantage of the current situation to enhance its capabilities and establish safe havens in the region. Concurrently, the Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Mazloum Abdi, noted on December 6, 2024, that ISIS elements have begun to increase their activity in the Syrian desert.
Despite the U.S. Central Command announcing on December 9, 2024, the launch of dozens of airstrikes on ISIS targets in central Syria to undermine the group’s attempts to exploit the current conditions, fears persist regarding ISIS’s potential to capitalize on intensifying security crises in Syria if active forces fail to address political fluidity and ensure the country’s unity without falling into multi-front conflicts.
Risk Factors
Fears regarding the resurgence of ISIS activity in Syria increase in light of the Assad regime’s collapse, which can be discussed through the following variables:
Challenges in Securing ISIS Prisons and Camps: Syria hosts a number of prisons and camps that hold ISIS members and their families who had been active before the group’s defeat by the international coalition in 2019. This heightened security concerns about the potential for the group to rebuild if security measures over these bastions falter. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the al-Hol camp in Hasakah, northeastern Syria, houses at least 65,000 individuals from ISIS families, mostly women and children. Additionally, thousands of ISIS family members live in the Roj camp on the Iraqi border and the Ain Issa camp in Raqqa, while prisons in Hasakah, such as Gweiran, Shaddadi, and Derik, contain thousands of dangerous ISIS members; this creates a ticking time bomb in an unstable environment.
Concerns Surrounding the Future Influence of the SDF: The majority of ISIS prisons and camps are located in areas controlled by the SDF, the military wing of the predominantly Kurdish autonomous administration in northeastern Syria. The complexities of dealing with the SDF are influenced by several variables, notably the extent to which the United States maintains its prior commitments to support this faction amid the new dynamics of the Syrian scene, as well as the limits of Turkish actions towards the self-administration, which Ankara considers an extension of the PKK, designated as a terrorist organization. Moreover, the future direction of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly known as al-Nusra Front, towards the SDF in case of conflicting interests could affect stability in northern Syria.
On a related note, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights announced on December 9, 2024, that 26 Kurdish forces were killed in the town of Manbij in the northeastern Aleppo province following an attack by local factions supported by Turkey. In this context, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan welcomed the evacuation of Manbij from what he termed “terrorists” on December 10, 2024, coinciding with media leaks from a source in the Syrian armed opposition about an agreement between Washington and Ankara to clear the city of Manbij of the SDF.
In light of the above, if there is consensus among influential forces to oust the SDF without strict arrangements that consider the country’s security, ISIS strongholds could become a variable in political maneuvers in the coming phase, posing a threat to security in the broader Middle East.
Potential Boost to ISIS’s Financial Network: The presence of ISIS strongholds in oil-rich areas of northeastern Syria may encourage the organization to exploit the current turmoil to enhance its financial capabilities. Between November 16 and 30, 2024, the group conducted 10 attacks in Syria, an increase of about 40% over the number of attacks in the first half of November 2024, focusing on targeting oil trucks passing through SDF-controlled areas, according to “Janes” intelligence reports.
Furthermore, the expansion of ISIS’s financing networks, particularly the Khorasan branch in Afghanistan, may provide the dormant cells in Syria with the necessary reinforcements to strengthen the influence of the “Wilayat al-Sham” to capitalize on the region’s resources. A report from the U.S. Treasury Department in February 2024 indicated that Khorasan had established a network of loyalists in Turkey to facilitate funding for its elements and support attacks in targeted areas.
Challenges Posed by Prison Breaks in Armed Faction-Controlled Areas: The potential opening of some Syrian prisons in areas controlled by armed factions led by HTS poses a security challenge due to the chaotic environment and the lack of prior scrutiny in release processes. Consequently, the likelihood of dangerous terrorist and criminal elements being released among the recently liberated batches affects state security, and ISIS may exploit these conditions to encourage dormant cells to replicate the prison break incident in Hasakah that occurred in January 2022. ISIS spokesperson Abu Hudhayfa al-Ansari called for operations to storm the prisons housing its members in a March 2024 speech.
Possibility of ISIS Using Israeli Operations Against Syria: The Israeli government has conducted sporadic military strikes against targets deep within Syria and announced on December 8, 2024, the collapse of the 1974 disengagement agreement it had made with Damascus, directing its forces to take control of the Golan Heights buffer zone. In light of these movements, alongside the silence from armed factions, it is likely that ISIS will enhance its media narrative to galvanize its members to expand in Syria, employing methodologies of competition among extremist groups regarding recruitment and carrying out attacks, which may exacerbate the security crisis in the region.
Confrontation Challenges
Countering the resurgence of ISIS is linked to managing political and security conditions in Syria in the near future, which faces significant challenges, including:
The Presence of Dangerous Terrorists in Armed Opposition Factions: French anti-terrorism prosecutor Olivier Christen stated on December 12, 2024, that around 100 French extremists who had been active in Idlib fought alongside armed opposition groups to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Among them, 50 were members of the Omar al-Omsin Brigade while 30 others fought for HTS, in addition to 30 women classified as terrorists. He confirmed that France is closely monitoring their activities and expressed concern over their potential to become a ticking time bomb in the region.
It is noted that Omar al-Omsin, a French national of Senegalese descent, traveled to Syria in late 2012 to join HTS or the al-Nusra Front at that time, later independently founding the Omar al-Omsin Brigade to include French jihadists he convinced to travel to Syria. The U.S. designated him as a terrorist in 2016 after previously being detained by HTS in September 2020 due to internal disputes.
Ambiguity Surrounding HTS’s Ideological Reference: Despite the open political statements made by HTS leader Ahmad Hussein al-Shara (Abu Muhammad al-Julani) during a discussion with CNN on December 7, 2024, the takfiri ideology he previously embraced before announcing his separation from al-Qaeda in July 2016 still looms large. On September 9, 2024, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the active Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin in the Sahel region released a joint statement congratulating the armed factions in Syria on their victory over Bashar al-Assad’s regime, warning them against attempts by ISIS to return and urging them to prepare to face this challenge. The alignment between the armed factions that previously and currently have ties to al-Qaeda regarding countering ISIS does not indicate security as much as it reflects ambiguity regarding any genuine shift in HTS’s doctrine, which will be tested in the upcoming phase.
Concerns about the Nature of New Authority in Syria: On December 9, 2024, Abu Muhammad al-Julani announced the appointment of Mohamed Beshir as the head of the Syrian government until March 2025. Beshir was previously the head of the interim government in Idlib, which was controlled by HTS. The group has been one of the armed factions that has operated since its establishment in January 2012 within secretive formations, whether as an extension of al-Qaeda in Syria or as part of the armed opposition to Bashar al-Assad’s regime, thereby lacking conventional state methodologies, which risks repeating the Taliban’s experience when it seized power in Afghanistan in August 2020, leading to negative security repercussions that contributed to a widening ISIS-Khorasan influence.
Increased Aspirations Among Takfiris to Repeat al-Julani’s Experience: The current political landscape in Syria is dominated by HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani and his allies. The United States and the UK expressed their readiness on December 9, 2024, to remove him from terrorism lists due to recent developments. The U.S. designated al-Julani as a terrorist in May 2013 and offered a reward of $10 million for information leading to his location. Despite his whereabouts being known, Washington approaches the situation pragmatically. These actions impact the ambitions of extremist groups that may seek to follow a similar path, carrying negative implications for regional stability.
Security Complexities
Fears regarding ISIS’s potential resurgence in Syria arise from a complicated security and political landscape. The organization is likely to attempt to exploit current conditions to re-emerge, but the expansion of its strongholds depends on the alignment of influential forces regarding national interest priorities. However, Turkish efforts to undermine the SDF’s influence in northeastern Syria, absent strict security measures, could exacerbate issues related to the return of ISIS.
