With the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, the “National Resistance Front” was established under the leadership of Ahmad Massoud, aiming to overthrow Taliban rule. Since then, Afghanistan has witnessed a notable escalation in offensive activities between the Taliban and the resistance, characterized by direct strikes targeting Taliban elements. The most recent incident occurred on October 26, 2024, when the National Resistance Front announced via a post on X, its responsibility for an attack on the home of Taliban Intelligence Minister Rashid Munib in Kunduz. This indicates an increasing intensity of armed opposition to the Taliban, raising questions about the future of this escalation between the two parties.
It is noteworthy that the “National Resistance Front” primarily attracts support from ethnic Tajik communities, alongside increasing backing from the Hazara and Uzbek ethnic groups. This reflects a growing discontent among non-Pashtun ethnic groups, who feel marginalized under Taliban rule. The National Resistance includes former members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, with the head of foreign relations for the National Resistance Front, Ali Meysam Nazary, estimating the number of its members to be over 5,000. This has enabled the resistance to expand into southwestern Afghanistan and northern regions, encompassing nearly 20 Afghan provinces.
Resistance Activities
The current activities of the National Resistance Front indicate a rise in the intensity of military operations, as the front seeks to overthrow the Taliban regime, which has failed to gain international support or unify Afghans around it. The following are key strategies employed by the resistance against the Taliban:
Intensifying Attacks Against the Taliban: The National Resistance Front and its allied groups have focused on ramping up attacks on Taliban officials, military targets, and infrastructure. Reports indicate that they carried out over 200 successful operations from January to August 2024, with increasing focus on urban centers, particularly assassination operations, bombings, and mortar strikes. A notable attack occurred on February 26, 2024, when National Resistance forces fired mortars at the military section of Kabul International Airport, demonstrating their capability to strike in highly secured areas.
Geographical Expansion of Operations: The National Resistance Front has seen a significant geographical expansion of its presence; operations, which were initially concentrated in Panjshir and Andarab, have extended to northern provinces such as Badakhshan, Takhar, and Balkh, and even urban areas like Kabul. This shift indicates a move from rural guerrilla tactics to direct confrontations, complicating the Taliban’s governance process, as the resistance focuses on conducting operations in mountainous regions and valleys, particularly in areas resisting Taliban authority.
Attracting External Support and Regional Sympathy: Tajikistan serves as a logistical hub for the National Resistance Front, facilitating some external coordination. While no government entity has publicly pledged material support to the resistance, regional actors maintain indirect engagement, particularly India, which views the resistance as a potential competitor to Taliban influence and its Pakistani extensions. The Afghan diaspora and former government officials provide political and financial support, albeit amid limited international backing for the resistance.
It is also noteworthy that the National Resistance Front, led by Ahmad Massoud, is considered the only credible opposition force against the Taliban. His father, Ahmad Shah Massoud, was a prominent insurgent fighting against the Soviets in the 1980s, before being assassinated by Al-Qaeda two days before the September 11, 2001 attacks. Currently, the resistance aims to leverage previous Western support for its fighters to expand international backing, especially as the United States and its allies seek to withhold international recognition of the Taliban.
Politically Promoting the Front Abroad: Capitalizing on limited external support, the National Resistance has sought to expand its political presence in Central Asia and Europe, attempting to counter the spread of Taliban influence. Ali Meysam Nazary, during his visit to Washington in August 2024, noted that Al-Qaeda established nine new terrorist camps in Afghanistan, indicating the Taliban’s increasing tolerance of terrorist groups, despite their pledges to suppress them. Nazary also characterized the relationship between the Taliban and terrorist groups as “strong,” pointing out that the movement has issued passports to allow foreign terrorist fighters to enter the country.
Establishing Alliances and Military Coordination Among Anti-Taliban Factions: In addition to the National Resistance Front, several anti-Taliban resistant groups and fighters operate in Afghanistan, including the National Islamic Movement and the National Liberation Front of Afghanistan. In this context, the resistance has sought to establish alliances and military coordination with other factions. For example, in May 2024, resistance leaders Ahmad Massoud and General Yasin Zia agreed to coordinate their efforts in the fight against the Taliban regime for three months, as part of their strategy to address deficiencies related to assessments from international and military observers, which indicate that one reason for the weakness of the Afghan resistance is the ongoing rivalry between certain opposition factions.
Creating Advocacy Groups Abroad: The National Resistance Front has initiated the formation of a new lobbying group to strengthen its relations with the United States, as evidenced by disclosures to the Justice Department under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. For instance, Donald Moore, an executive at “US Legal Advisors,” agreed in September 2022 to provide pro bono services to the National Resistance Front.
However, Moore was not the first foreign agent for the National Resistance Front; Massoud contracted the “Sonoran Policy Group” in September 2021 for strategic advisory services, just two weeks after U.S. forces left Afghanistan. This group reported coordinating meetings between Massoud and several U.S. legislators who expressed support for the front.
Efforts to Attract Afghan Citizens: Afghanistan faces enormous economic challenges, with over 90% of the population living below the poverty line. This has prompted the resistance to utilize social media to highlight these challenges and delegitimize the Taliban regime. The National Resistance aims to assert its symbolic control over certain areas, like Panjshir, while emphasizing its goals of restoring democracy and women’s rights, in contrast to extremist factions like ISIS-Khorasan.
On August 15, 2024, the front issued a statement marking the third anniversary of the Taliban’s takeover, highlighting human rights violations by the regime to broaden public support for its anti-Taliban activities. In this context, Afghan women are particularly firm in their belief in the armed efforts of the National Resistance to free Afghanistan from the violent, oppressive rule that targets women.
Implications of Activity
The offensive activities of the National Resistance Front have multiple implications, which can be outlined as follows:
Increased Political and Military Pressure on the Taliban: The escalation of resistance activities has forced the Taliban to implement stricter security measures, including deploying additional forces in several provinces. This results in weakened control in some areas and continues to drain Taliban resources, potentially exposing internal divisions within the Taliban ranks, complicating their efforts to consolidate power and govern effectively. Despite commitments made in Doha agreements and by regional organizations, the Taliban has made no notable progress in forming an inclusive government that includes other ethnic communities such as Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Baloch.
Conversely, some experts argue that the Taliban currently faces no serious threats to its political survival. It appears to have successfully overcome significant internal disputes, including the issue of secondary education for women, while the international community lacks the necessary leverage to pressure the Taliban to change its policies toward women, with attention focused on ongoing international crises, giving the Taliban some leeway to operate with minimal external scrutiny.
Exploitation of Resistance Attacks by ISIS: The instability brought about by resistance activities provides ISIS-Khorasan with opportunities to expand its influence. While ISIS remains an adversary to both the Taliban and the National Resistance Front in Khorasan, it may exploit the chaos to launch attacks and recruit disillusioned fighters from both sides. Additionally, the Taliban faces another threat if their efforts to suppress resistance forces detract from confronting ISIS in Khorasan, which would allow the group to bolster its power and could present an opportunity for ISIS-Khorasan to extend its influence throughout Afghanistan.
Taliban Seeking External Support: In response to the rising resistance, the Taliban has intensified its diplomatic efforts to secure support from China and Russia, aiming to obtain financial aid and political recognition while minimizing internal threats. However, internal divisions and international concerns about human rights violations complicate these efforts.
On the other hand, the Taliban enjoys some direct support from China, focusing on its economic interests, such as the Mes Aynak copper project, while also being keen on safeguarding its business interests, particularly Afghanistan’s potential participation in the Belt and Road Initiative. Additionally, China was the first country to appoint an ambassador to Afghanistan under Taliban rule and has entered into oil extraction agreements with the Taliban, while closely monitoring the country’s strategic lithium reserves for Chinese industries. Russia, for its part, views the Taliban as a bulwark against ISIS in Khorasan.
However, this does not mean that the Afghan resistance is receiving any assistance from Washington. The Biden administration has insisted that it will not support armed opposition, viewing the Taliban—at least for now—as partners in combating terrorism, rather than a part of the problem.
Utilization of the Resistance by External Powers: Regional actors may leverage the Afghan resistance to pressure the Taliban; Tajikistan, which maintains ties with the National Resistance Front, has taken a particularly hostile stance toward the Taliban. India holds low-level engagement as part of its strategy to contain Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan, despite Islamabad’s antagonistic stance toward the Afghan Taliban due to the latter’s reluctance to act against the Pakistani Taliban. There is also a possibility that Western intelligence agencies may support the National Resistance Front indirectly, although there are currently no clear signs of this.
Unlike China and Russia, the United States and the European Union have not allowed the Taliban to take control of Afghan embassies within their territories. However, the National Resistance Front may attempt to exploit growing U.S. concerns regarding terrorism threats emanating from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s harsh campaign against women’s rights and presumed political opponents to gain American support for the resistance in the future.
Continuing Humanitarian Crises: The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan has significantly deteriorated since the Taliban seized power in 2021, with over 23 million people needing humanitarian assistance, while around 4 million Afghans suffer from malnutrition, including 3.2 million children. Moreover, displacement due to fighting exacerbates these dire conditions, with basic services like health and education further deteriorating in conflict zones, increasing reliance on humanitarian aid, which is significantly limited, even from countries that support the Taliban. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Beijing has provided only around $49 million in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan since the Taliban took power.
Ongoing Relationships Between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda: The increasing pressure on the Taliban from the National Resistance Front may encourage the continuation of ties between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, with the latter providing support to the Taliban. This hypothesis is strengthened by reports in recent months indicating ongoing activity and expansion of Al-Qaeda within the Taliban, as well as the establishment of new camps for the organization under Taliban rule.
In conclusion, the escalation of activities by the Afghan National Resistance marks a critical turning point in the Afghan landscape. While the resistance has demonstrated increasing operational capability and a wide geographical scope, it also faces significant challenges, including limited international support and the risk of fragmentation among opposition factions, which may hinder its ability to execute large-scale attacks against the Taliban, thus affording the latter some movement to regroup and confront these divided groups, while benefiting from Chinese and Russian support and its effective control over most Afghan territory.
