Turkey and the ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’: From Solidarity to Feeling Threatened

Politically, Turkey has stood by the Palestinians since the onset of the aggression against Gaza, issuing sharp criticisms towards “Israel” and Netanyahu’s government, including accusations of terrorism and genocide against the Palestinians, along with some punitive measures related to trade relations primarily.

However, the continuation of the war for nearly a year and the increasing possibility of it evolving into a regional war involving multiple parties has led to Turkish officials sensing direct or indirect threats directed towards Ankara.

This paper explores the determinants of the Turkish stance on the Israeli aggression, specifically towards Netanyahu and his government, and its perspective on recent regional developments, including the possibility of a comprehensive regional confrontation, its implications for Turkey’s position, the repercussions on some of its key issues, and potential threats it may face.

Between Condemnation and Mediation Turkey has had a position on all the wars launched by “Israel” against the Gaza Strip previously, oscillating between condemning the aggression and attempting to play a mediatory role, especially as most of those wars occurred during periods of coldness and a decline in Turkish-“Israeli” relations (in the years 2008, 2012, and 2014). The Turkish stance peaked during the “Pillar of Defense” war in 2012 when then-Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu entered Gaza with then-Egyptian Prime Minister Hisham Qandil, taking a high-profile political stance that helped end the war within days. In contrast, during the Battle of “Sword of Al-Quds” in 2021, Turkey was attempting to normalize and improve its relations with “Israel,” leading to a largely conventional stance that drew some criticism.

In the ongoing war against the Gaza Strip, attention turned to Turkey, which is one of the few countries with good relations with Hamas, especially since the war followed the resumption of diplomatic relations and the exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and “Israel,” and after Erdogan’s meeting with Netanyahu in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2023, where they discussed the need to develop bilateral relations, particularly in the energy sector.

The Official Stance The official Turkish position on the war has evolved in parallel with the developments on the ground in Gaza. In the initial days following the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation on October 7, Turkish statements focused on calling “all parties” for calm and de-escalation, repeatedly emphasizing the refusal to “target civilians” and demanding the release of “hostages.” Ankara also announced its readiness to play a mediating role or any positive role that could contribute to de-escalating the situation.

This comparatively lower stance compared to Turkey’s positions in previous wars, which appeared to seek balance and drift towards neutrality, can be attributed to several factors, chief among them being the nature of the operation as an “attack within the territory of the State of Israel.” Additionally, its execution occurred in the context of Turkish-“Israeli” rapprochement, which Ankara interpreted as a potential attempt to disrupt this rapprochement, possibly encouraged by Iran. Moreover, Turkey has a negative outlook on any escalation in the region that could destabilize it, impacting the already strained Turkish economy and investment opportunities. It is not unlikely that the Israeli propaganda in the early days (such as targeting civilians, beheading children, burning corpses, and sexual assaults) had a relative influence in this context.

As the ground war began, accompanied by repeated massacres and actions classified as war crimes, such as targeting civilians and infrastructure, cutting off water and electricity, and preventing aid entry, the tone of Turkish statements intensified to condemn the Israeli aggression as “state terrorism” and to deny the designation of terrorism on Hamas, alongside announcing the suspension of dealings with Netanyahu, whom they hold responsible for the actions of the occupying forces in Gaza.

This shift was supported not only by the Israeli massacres but also by significant internal popular pressure in Turkey, overwhelmingly supportive of the Palestinians, alongside the positions of opposition parties, particularly conservative ones such as the Welfare Party and the Future Party, which see the Justice and Development Party as a competitor among the conservative segment. The imminence of local elections and the prominence of the Gaza aggression in the electoral campaign, coupled with clarity regarding the circumstances of the operation on October 7, contributed to this shift.

At this stage, the Turkish position was closer to adopting the Palestinian narrative, placing full responsibility on the occupation, and describing the actions of the occupying forces in Gaza as “genocide.” Turkey also sent several relief convoys, most of which were stationed in Al-Arish on the Egypt-Palestine border, and Turkish hospitals welcomed dozens of Palestinian patients and wounded for treatment. Besides its representation in the joint ministerial committee stemming from the joint Arab-Islamic summit, Turkey proposed the establishment of a mechanism for guaranteeing countries in Palestinian territories, of which it would be a part as one of the parties guaranteeing the Palestinian side.

Punitive Measures With the ongoing Israeli massacres, the initial decision of the International Court of Justice regarding the genocide lawsuit presented by South Africa, rising pressures from the internal opposition, and the declining fortunes of the Justice and Development Party in local elections due to dissatisfaction among some voters with the government’s stance on Gaza, the government gradually raised its practical stance towards “Israel.”

Erdogan described “Israel” as a “terrorist state,” moving beyond simply holding Netanyahu fully accountable, calling for accountability for the crimes committed against the Palestinians, and canceling a planned visit to “Israel.” Turkey withdrew its ambassador in Tel Aviv for consultations (the latter had earlier withdrawn its ambassadors from Ankara and several Arab and Islamic capitals) and prevented “Israel” from participating in meetings and maneuvers of NATO. The government decided to restrict exports of dozens of goods to “Israel,” subsequently halting all trade dealings with it, despite some reports indicating the continuation of some exports through third countries.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan announced Turkey’s intent to join the South Africa lawsuit, which occurred months later. Erdogan met with the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly and handed over evidence against the occupying army. Security agencies announced the arrest of several spy networks belonging to Mossad within Turkish territory, in collaboration with intelligence services, and a bill was placed on the parliament’s agenda to strip Turkish citizenship from anyone proven to have participated with the occupying army in the fighting in Gaza.

The Threat As Netanyahu’s government escalated its threats towards Lebanon months after the beginning of the aggression against Gaza due to the “support front” initiated by Hezbollah on October 8 of the previous year, the tone of Turkish statements shifted to warning against any escalation or regional confrontation, expressing solidarity with Lebanon against “Israeli” threats.

Turkey traditionally stands against regional escalation for various reasons, primarily because it opens the door for external intervention affecting the events detrimental to the countries and peoples of the region. More importantly, such escalation has negative economic repercussions due to Turkey’s central location and role in international trade (via straits and others) and its economy’s heavy reliance on hot money and foreign investments requiring calm and stability.

Alongside the above, Turkey’s concern regarding any “Israeli” escalation in the region stems from additional reasons related to “Israel’s” international and regional alliance system, namely, the United States and some Western countries, Greece, and “Greek Cyprus.” Greece specifically draws Turkish attention due to ongoing traditional animosity between the two countries, particularly concerning the resources of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean Islands, the Cyprus issue, and what Ankara perceives as relative American bias towards Athens, compounded by defense agreements between Washington and both Athens and Nicosia.

On another front, any potential regional war could encompass several countries and entities with direct geographical, military, or political relations with Turkey, such as neighboring Iran, Syria where Turkish military forces are located, and allied United States forces. This necessitates Turkey adopting positions with highly complex calculations. The hypothetical regional war also poses a concern for Ankara regarding how its repercussions may disrupt the balance in favor of Greece or impose a fait accompli concerning the political project of U.S.-backed Kurdish militias in northeastern Syria.

In light of the aforementioned, with the “Israeli” threats to Lebanon and the subsequent direct targeting of Hezbollah leaders and their stronghold in southern Beirut, alongside ground confrontations in the south, Turkish statements began to reflect an understanding of the threats facing Ankara, rather than merely expressing solidarity with the victims of aggression in Palestine and Lebanon. Erdogan shifted from a narrative defending Hamas as a resistance movement to portraying it as the first line of defense for the Islamic world, calling for its unification against occupation. In response to Israeli officials’ threats to assassinate leaders of the Palestinian movement in several countries, including Turkey, Erdogan reminded them of his country’s military interventions in Libya and the South Caucasus, implying the possibility of similar actions against “Israel,” asserting the necessity for Turkey to be “stronger” to protect itself, in addition to repeatedly announcing the detention of espionage networks linked to Mossad operating within Turkish territory.

Days before the anniversary of the war’s onset, President Erdogan called for using force to end the “Israeli” aggression against both Gaza and Lebanon, warning that the Netanyahu government would target Islamic countries. The Chair of the Turkish Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee and former Vice President, Fuat Oktay, cautioned that escalating “Israeli” aggression against Lebanon could extend into Syria and threaten Turkey.

The most prominent statement in this context came again from Erdogan, who indicated that the escalation may not stop at Syria and could reach Turkey, reminding listeners of the short distance separating Turkey from Lebanon. Amid growing discussions about the threats potentially reaching Turkey and Erdogan’s repeated affirmations that his country stands with Lebanon against “Israeli” aggression, the Parliament Speaker, Numan Kurtulmuş, announced the intention to hold a closed parliamentary session with relevant ministers to discuss the situation and the government’s response.

On October 3 of this year, Turkey’s National Security Council held its periodic meeting, chaired by Erdogan, which included a concluding statement that had five points, one of which addressed the war in Gaza and Lebanon. The fourth point of the concluding statement called for continuing and enhancing international efforts “to stop the genocide of the Palestinian people and establish a ceasefire and lasting peace in Palestine,” urging the UN Security Council and responsible actors to act to halt “the Israeli aggressions aimed at expanding its territory towards the Middle East,” confirming that Turkey, as a nation and state, stands by “brotherly Lebanon, its people and government, in the face of inhumane Israeli aggressions,” denouncing the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’ declaration of a person as undesirable in “Israel.”

Conclusion As the anniversary of the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Flood Battle approaches, indicators are increasing for the potential transition to a significant regional escalation that began in Lebanon and may expand to include other countries and parties, notably Iran. This is especially true after the recent Iranian response to the assassination of the head of Hamas’ political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran, as well as the assassinations of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and Revolutionary Guards’ Deputy Commander of Operations Abbas Nilforoushan in Beirut.

Ankara reiterates that American and Western support for Netanyahu directly contributes to his continuation of aggression and the potential expansion of the war. Ankara connects this to other developments that are equally significant and dangerous, such as the accelerating field dynamics in the Russian-Ukrainian war, warning that escalation may not stop at regional borders, firmly asserting its readiness for all possibilities.

In this context, Turkey does not merely warn of potential regional escalation and its consequences but sees itself as being directly and indirectly harmed by the current escalation and potential future developments, given its geographical position, neighborhood, relations, alliances, rivalries, and positions. This self-perception of threat is reinforced by anticipating Greek and Cypriot involvement in one form or another and the possible repercussions on the situation in Syria, as well as direct threats issued by “Israeli” officials, particularly regarding the fate of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein—a threat Ankara interprets, on the level of the individual (Erdogan) as a threat of physical elimination and, on the state level, as a suggestion of chaos and division.

Regardless of the realism of these assessments and how imminent and far-reaching the threat to Turkey may be, they partially explain the limits of the Turkish official position, both verbally and practically, in the current war, which has attempted to align closely with the official Arab stance to a considerable extent, avoiding significant differentiation or criticism. Additionally, Ankara seeks to cooperate as much as possible within the framework of the joint ministerial committee stemming from the joint Arab-Islamic summit in Riyadh and in diplomatic efforts, aid delivery, and relief materials.

That said, it is unlikely that Ankara will adopt a radically different position in the foreseeable future, except for possible measures regarding the Syrian file to mitigate any negative repercussions on its role there, such as working toward political and field de-escalation and seeking to arrange relations with the regime, as well as the possibility of military action against the Syrian Democratic Forces. Outside of that, Turkey’s position is expected to remain largely as it currently stands, with further development of rhetoric and increased engagement in political and legal avenues, especially regarding the genocide issue before the International Court of Justice.

However, there are two developments that may compel Ankara to reconsider the ceiling of its position and its practical steps in the near future. The first is the potential expansion of the war towards a regional confrontation that may involve both Iran and the United States to varying degrees—a development that would force it to take specific positions despite its traditional and pragmatic efforts to maintain a degree of neutrality. The second is the American presidential elections, which could result in Donald Trump regaining the presidency, potentially increasing the likelihood of war against Iran on one hand and leading to American decisions regarding the Euphrates region in Syria on the other; this may prompt Ankara to reposition itself or undertake additional military initiatives in northern Syria to secure its forces there and prevent the Syrian Democratic Forces from exploiting ongoing and potential developments in a manner detrimental to Turkish national security.

Please subscribe to our page on Google News

SAKHRI Mohamed
SAKHRI Mohamed

I hold a Bachelor's degree in Political Science and International Relations in addition to a Master's degree in International Security Studies. Alongside this, I have a passion for web development. During my studies, I acquired a strong understanding of fundamental political concepts and theories in international relations, security studies, and strategic studies.

Articles: 15244

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *