On October 6, 2024, Tunisia will hold its third presidential election since the revolution. However, this election is the first since July 25, 2021, a date that marks a significant shift in the country’s political landscape. On that day, President Kais Saied announced a series of exceptional measures, including the suspension of the constitution, the freezing of parliament, and the dissolution of the government. Through these measures, Saied consolidated all power into his hands, governing the country through presidential decrees that granted him absolute executive and legislative authority, unchecked by any other branch. Subsequently, he formed a government, appointing its head and ministers himself, who operate under his supervision and implement his agenda.
This election comes after three years of Saied’s absolute control over the government, during which he made fundamental changes to the political system and reshaped the country’s political, economic, and social landscape. As a result, the upcoming election is taking place in a context vastly different from previous elections held during the decade of democratic transition between 2011 and 2021. How can we understand the differences between these contexts? And what impact will this have on the elections and their outcomes?
A Confused Constitutional and Legal Context
The presidential election follows the end of President Kais Saied’s first term, which began when he was elected on October 14, 2019, with the support of most political forces in the second round. Like other elections held after July 25, 2021, this election is a legal and constitutional requirement that the ruling system, led by Saied, is committed to fulfilling—but on its terms, according to its standards, and with mechanisms designed to control its process and outcomes.
These elections have been highly controversial and widely criticized, as they were conducted in a manner that deviated from the electoral traditions Tunisia has known since the revolution. Tunisian voters widely boycotted these elections, resulting in unprecedented levels of voter abstention, the likes of which Tunisia has not seen since its independence. After Saied seized power in 2021, a legal consultation was organized, followed by a referendum on a new constitution drafted by the president himself, and then parliamentary elections followed by regional elections. Voter participation in these events was notably low, with some elections seeing participation rates as low as 10%, and the highest turnout being only 25% during the constitutional referendum. Due to widespread abstention and boycotts, elections in many parliamentary districts were not held due to the absence of competing candidates, while other districts saw no competition because there was only one candidate without an opponent.
A large segment of the political class, national organizations, and legal experts consider that the constitutional basis for the upcoming presidential election should be the 2014 Constitution and the electoral law that emerged from it. However, the current ruling system insists on the constitution drafted by Kais Saied in 2022 and the electoral laws derived from it as the basis for the election, arguing that the 2014 Constitution was nullified by the new constitution. Given the almost complete alignment of the electoral commission with the current regime’s choices, policies, and practices, the argument that the annulled 2014 Constitution has no relevance to the elections has gained traction.
In addition to the debate over the constitutional and legal framework for the elections, observers criticize the performance and stance of the Independent High Authority for Elections, accusing it of abandoning its strict and principled defense of its independence and powers in favor of adopting a more lenient position that accommodates the current regime’s desires to influence and control the elections.
Nafaa Haji, the head of “Mourakiboun,” an organization that has monitored elections in Tunisia since 2011, stated that these elections are characterized by opacity regarding their schedule and by the disregard of legal hierarchy by adding candidacy conditions. Haji noted, “There is a legal consensus that the electoral commission cannot add a condition based on its regulatory authority,” emphasizing the need to respect the legal hierarchy, which mandates the supremacy of the constitution, followed by law, and then the regulatory texts specific to the electoral law. According to Haji, the problem with this election is that “new conditions were added in the law based on the 2022 Constitution, concerning nationality, age, and the civil and political rights of presidential candidates.” Therefore, there is a need to “align the 2014 electoral law with the new conditions,” which, in his view, can only be achieved by passing through the House of Representatives, either with a proposal from 10 MPs or a presidential initiative. This is the proper legal procedure agreed upon by experts and organizations involved in elections.
In addition to these irregularities, candidates faced extremely complex procedures in gathering the endorsements required for candidacy. Many believe that these procedures were primarily designed to undermine the chances of many candidates in having their files accepted, even if they managed to collect the legal threshold of 10,000 endorsements, because of the requirement that these endorsements must come from at least ten electoral districts, with no fewer than 500 endorsements in each district.
These new procedures, coupled with certain restrictions, have affected the chances of serious candidates, as evidenced by the election commission’s decision on August 10, 2024, to accept only three candidacy files for the presidential election. These included the candidacy of President Kais Saied, the Secretary-General of the People’s Movement, Zouheir Maghzaoui, who has been a strong supporter of the current president and the July 25th movement, which most political forces consider a coup. The third accepted candidate is parliamentary deputy and businessman Ayachi Zammel, who is an opponent of the July 25th movement. However, Zammel was summoned to appear before an investigating judge just hours after the election commission announced the acceptance of his candidacy, facing charges related to irregularities in collecting endorsements. His campaign’s endorsement collector was arrested and imprisoned, which likely indicates that Zammel will be disqualified from the electoral race, leaving the election almost certain to favor Kais Saied. The election commission faced widespread criticism from the opposition, human rights groups, and legal experts following its announcement of only three accepted candidacies, accusing it of excluding serious candidates to pave the way for Saied to win a second term without competition. Notably, Tunisian courts have issued urgent rulings sentencing certain candidates to prison, along with the lifetime ban from running for the presidency, affecting many candidates who are considered serious contenders against Saied.
Despite appeals court decisions from the Tunisian Administrative Court to reinstate three candidates to the presidential race after the election commission rejected their candidacies, the commission remained firm in its decision. The candidates in question—Abdellatif Mekki, Mondher Zenaidi, and Imad Dimech—were denied participation in the election despite the Administrative Court’s binding and final rulings according to the law, as confirmed by prominent legal experts in Tunisia. On September 2, 2024, the election commission announced that it would not comply with the Administrative Court’s rulings, asserting that it alone has the final say on who is eligible to run. The commission upheld its original decision, which it considered final and unappealable, to accept only three candidates: the current president, Kais Saied; the Secretary-General of the People’s Movement, Zouheir Maghzaoui; and the imprisoned businessman, Ayachi Zammel, who was arrested hours before the commission’s final decision on the candidacies was announced.
The Political Context: A Regime of Individual Rule Established by the 2022 Constitution
The presidential election is being held in a political context where Tunisia is experiencing a state of closure, with political pluralism declining and the role of political parties diminishing to an unprecedented extent. Civil society, including major organizations that played a significant role during the decade of democratic transition—such as the Tunisian General Labor Union, the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights, the Union of Industry and Commerce, and the Bar Association—has been marginalized. The post-July 25, 2021, political system has established an individualistic regime where the president holds all powers. The country has been governed by decrees and orders, and in 2022, a constitution was adopted that resembles a “granted constitution,” with no political or social body involved in its drafting. This constitution imposed an absolute presidential system, with no legislative or oversight role for the parliament.
As president, Saied has pursued his vision of the political scene, based on a reference point that is entirely different from that which underpinned the decade-long democratic transition. He believes that the representative parliamentary system has failed globally. When asked about the role of political parties and the alternative to a political system based on party pluralism, he responded, “Parties came into existence at a certain time in human history, reached their peak in the 19th and 20th centuries, and then, with the revolution in communication and modern technologies, became marginal in the world, in a state of decline. The decline may be prolonged, but their role will certainly end after a few years.” When asked if the abolition of political parties would be among his political reforms, he confidently replied, “No, I will not abolish them. Pluralism will remain until it disappears on its own,” affirming that “the role of parties has ended.”
Indeed, after July 25, 2021, Saied has gradually marginalized political parties, using various means ranging from completely ignoring them and not consulting or dialoguing with them to restricting and demonizing them in the media. The situation reached the point where some parties were frozen, and others faced restrictions resembling a ban, as in the case of the Ennahda Movement, whose offices were closed by order of the Minister of Interior, and all meetings inside them were prohibited. This decision remains in effect today, despite the lack of a judicial ruling to support it. The regime’s targeting of political parties expanded to include the imprisonment of prominent opposition leaders,
such as the head of the National Salvation Front and the Secretary-General of the Democratic Current Party. This was followed by the imprisonment of the head of the Ennahda Movement and former Speaker of Parliament, Rashid Ghannouchi, who was handed a one-year prison sentence by a military court in an exceptional ruling that shocked the country and sparked criticism from human rights organizations and prominent political figures worldwide. Notably, Ghannouchi was imprisoned solely based on an investigation by a security body, and he has not been officially questioned about the charges against him since his imprisonment.
With the complete absence of political parties and independent or opposition figures from decision-making and governance in Tunisia, the political process has become synonymous with the individual vision of the president. Political activity is confined to pro-regime entities and groups, such as the Popular Current, the People’s Movement, and a number of limited parties that emerged after July 25, 2021, all of which support Saied and participate in governance under his leadership.
Therefore, the political environment in which the election is taking place is one of significant political closure, where the political scene is dominated by the regime and its affiliated entities. These entities have been given a monopoly on political activity, at the expense of all other political forces, which have been excluded, marginalized, and persecuted. This environment further strengthens the tendency to monopolize power and perpetuate the current ruling system, as it eliminates the possibility of genuine political competition or the emergence of alternative forces.
An Election with Predetermined Results?
Given the current political context, the upcoming election appears to be more of a referendum than a genuine presidential election. All indications suggest that President Kais Saied will win by a wide margin, as he will be running against candidates who support his political and economic approach. Despite the difficulties facing the ruling system, including the economic and financial crisis, deteriorating living conditions, and rising political discontent, the political and legal context in which this election is taking place limits the possibilities of competition and protest.
Many Tunisians, who have lost confidence in the election commission and the integrity of the election, are expected to boycott the polls. This would result in a repeat of the low turnout seen in previous elections held under the current regime, further diminishing the legitimacy of the election and its results.
Conclusion
The upcoming presidential election in Tunisia, the first since President Kais Saied seized power and ruled with exceptional measures, will take place in an environment vastly different from that of previous elections during the democratic transition period. The legal and constitutional basis for the election is widely disputed, and the political context is characterized by a severe narrowing of political pluralism and the monopolization of power by the ruling regime. These conditions have led many observers to conclude that the election is more of a referendum on Saied’s rule than a genuine political competition. The election is expected to further consolidate Saied’s power, leaving little room for opposition or alternative political forces in Tunisia.
