The return of Donald Trump to the White House marks a pivotal shift in the global geopolitical and geo-economic landscape, with profound implications for international relations, particularly between Europe and China. During Trump’s first term, his policies escalated tensions between the United States and China, reshaping global trade and investment flows and placing intense pressure on European policymakers to align with the U.S. strategy towards Beijing.

As Trump embarks on a second term, Europe faces a more significant challenge in balancing its strategic autonomy and economic ties with China, its second-largest trading partner, against its traditional alliance with the United States. The ramifications for Europe could be substantial, including a decline in exports to the U.S., a rise in Chinese imports, and growing economic uncertainty. This context raises critical questions: How will Trump’s policies influence the future of European-Chinese relations? Will U.S. escalation push Europe closer to China? To what extent can Europe achieve strategic independence under increasing American pressure? What possible scenarios might shape the tripartite relations between Washington, Brussels, and Beijing?

This paper aims to analyze the economic and geopolitical variables governing European-Chinese relations under Trump’s second presidency and explore future scenarios for this engagement, considering challenges from increased American pressure, ideological differences, and strategic disparities between the parties.

Background and Context

This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and the European Union, a relationship that has seen significant development through joint efforts to expand areas of cooperation and enhance mutual understanding. Despite the challenges faced in this relationship, it has continued along a path of peaceful cooperation based on mutual interests. China has become the world’s second-largest economy, benefitting indirectly from the EU’s role in supporting this journey through technological exchange and market openings. In return, the EU has capitalized on the vast Chinese market, strengthening trade and investment ties, and leading to economic integration that has made their relationship a key element of the global economy.

This cooperation is grounded on three main pillars: first, the political consensus stemming from the absence of direct geopolitical conflicts between the two parties; second, economic cooperation based on mutual benefit, which serves as the primary driver of relationship sustainability; and third, an approach of “agreeing to disagree,” allowing both sides to navigate their ideological differences without affecting their partnership.

However, despite these strong foundations, European-Chinese relations today face unprecedented challenges due to shifts in the global balance of power and changes in the international system. The U.S. unilateral containment policies towards China, alongside the war in Ukraine, have prompted the EU to adopt a more geopolitical perspective, as reflected in policies aimed at “de-risking” and reducing dependence on China, leading to the politicization of economic relations and fostering uncertainty in the business milieu.

Recent developments may open a new window for Chinese-European rapprochement. With Trump’s return to the presidency and his escalating aggressive stance towards both China and the EU, Brussels and Beijing may find themselves facing shared challenges that necessitate a reevaluation of their strategic options. Trump perceives China as a strategic adversary and the EU as an economic competitor, possibly reinstating strict tariffs and economic sanctions on both sides, compelling Europe to reconsider its commitment to U.S. policies.

In this context, China might emerge as a more attractive partner for the EU, particularly if ongoing U.S. pressure threatens European economic interests. While Europe strives for “strategic independence,” coordination with China could provide a broader maneuvering space, especially given the need for alternative markets and new investments to offset any losses stemming from potential escalation with Washington.

Drivers of Chinese-European Convergence

Several strategic and economic factors propel the Chinese-European rapprochement, as China seeks to strengthen its presence in European markets through the Belt and Road Initiative, while Europe aims for balance in its international relations and reduced reliance on the U.S., amid rising trade, technological, and security challenges that are reshaping the global geopolitical landscape. Key drivers of convergence between the two parties include:

Protectionist Policies The protectionist policies adopted by U.S. President Donald Trump pose significant concerns for both Europe and China, having escalated trade tensions during his first term and raising fears of renewed challenges to the global economy. Trump’s intention to impose new tariffs on goods from the EU, justified by what he considers “unfair” trade practices, despite not detailing specific goods or tariffs, highlights the precarious nature of transatlantic trade. During his first term, he put a 25% tariff on European products and a 10% tariff on aluminum, triggering a retaliatory trade war wherein the EU imposed tariffs on American goods valued at $6 billion.

Moreover, Trump also levied a 10% tariff on goods from China, prompting Beijing to retaliate with tariffs on key American goods and initiating investigations into major U.S. corporations such as Google, while also including U.S. companies on its “unreliable entity” list. Concerns over the negative impact on China’s economy due to a decline in exports to the U.S. and reciprocal restrictions on technological supply chains are prevalent, as is the fear of escalating political and diplomatic tensions, particularly with Trump’s continuation of tariff hikes. The interruption of dispute resolution mechanisms within the World Trade Organization further limits China’s options for seeking a favorable ruling against the U.S.

Transatlantic Tensions Relations between the U.S. and Europe saw heightened tension during Trump’s first administration, particularly over NATO issues, the Iran nuclear deal, and customs duties. These tensions are expected to escalate in his second term, particularly regarding security threats, as Trump may exploit the impacts of the Ukraine war to pressure European nations to increase defense spending, going beyond the demands he previously set. This presents a fundamental challenge to transatlantic relations, especially in one of its core areas—shared security.

Concerns are further heightened by Trump’s rhetoric surrounding Europe’s “exploitation” of the U.S. within NATO, which has amplified European worries regarding Washington’s commitment to European security.

Vice President JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 14, 2025, generated considerable controversy, signaling a radical shift in transatlantic relations. Rather than focusing on topics that Europe expected, such as European defense spending and the future conflict in Ukraine, Vance criticized internal EU policies, arguing that the greatest threat to Europe stems not from Russia or China, but from internal challenges.

This speech did not occur in isolation, as it was part of a wider series of changes in U.S. policy towards Europe. U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth previously indicated that Europe could no longer rely on American protection, asserting that Washington would no longer bear the financial burden of ensuring the continent’s security.

Simultaneously, President Trump engaged in direct conversations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, appearing to concede to Moscow’s demands regarding Ukraine, which include preventing Ukraine’s NATO membership and avoiding the deployment of U.S. forces there.

This shift weakens Europe’s position and places it in a difficult situation, as it must engage with Russia without robust American support. It becomes apparent that the Trump administration has adopted an “imperialist” approach towards European allies, expecting them to shoulder greater costs without granting them commensurate political leverage.

Under these pressures, some European nations may find themselves compelled to reassess their relations with China, which presents itself as a strong economic and political alternative capable of supporting European stability independent of U.S. pressures. Moreover, the growing economic ties between Europe and China, particularly in technology, trade, and infrastructure investment, could further enhance this rapprochement, potentially broadening European-Chinese cooperation in areas like free trade, renewable energy networks, and advanced technologies, which could reshape international power dynamics and provide Europe with greater autonomy from American policies.

Transformations in the Global System Under Trump’s second administration, the global system faces the prospect of radical changes that could enhance Chinese-European convergence. Based on Trump’s prior inclinations and record in foreign policy, as well as his statements and policies from his second term to date, Washington under Trump appears to be reverting to a unilateral approach characterized by undermining international organizations, favoring bilateral agreements over multilateral ones, and imposing stringent protectionist policies. This direction may rekindle disputes between the U.S. and Europe, particularly regarding trade and security issues, prompting European countries to seek alternative strategic partners to uphold their economic and geopolitical interests.

If Trump reinstates tariffs on European products, as he has indeed signaled, or threatens to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe and reduce Washington’s commitments to NATO, European nations may find themselves compelled to strengthen their cooperation with China, whether in investment, technology, or unconventional security sectors.

Conversely, China aims to establish a multipolar international system that enhances its role as a key player in global politics and economics, a direction that aligns with the aspirations of certain European nations eager to reduce dependence on the U.S. If Trump maintains his nationalist and populist policies, Europe may gravitate more towards China as a means of preserving balance in its international relations and ensuring economic stability.

As the U.S. potentially steps back from dealing with climate issues, China and Europe are likely to continue leading global efforts to combat climate change. Both consider environmental sustainability a strategic priority, with China aiming for carbon neutrality by 2060, while the EU targets the same by 2050 through initiatives like the European Green Deal.

The alignment in views about the importance of investing in clean energy and reducing fossil fuel dependency creates fertile ground for enhancing cooperation in green technology, such as energy storage, green hydrogen, and innovations aimed at reducing emissions. Under efforts to support the fossil fuel industry, China and Europe are expected to strengthen their partnership in renewable energy as a means of resisting American policies that may ignore environmental considerations.

Additionally, rising traditional energy prices due to any future geopolitical crises may prompt Europe to expand its cooperation with China to enhance its energy security, positioning Beijing as a crucial partner in European energy transition projects.

Chinese-European cooperation in the clean energy sector extends beyond technology transfer; it encompasses trade and investment as well. We can expect an increase in Chinese investments in green energy projects within European markets, and European firms may benefit from China’s manufacturing capabilities to produce low-cost technologies supporting Europe’s green transition.

For instance, in recent years, China began exporting advanced lithium batteries to Europe, and Chinese companies have invested in establishing electric vehicle manufacturing plants within Europe to meet the growing demand for sustainable transportation. As Europe continues to focus on phasing out fossil fuel vehicles by 2035, its reliance on China in this sector is expected to increase.

Obstacles to Chinese-European Rapprochement

Despite the numerous opportunities for cooperation, Chinese-European rapprochement faces a complex array of challenges that reflect the strategic, economic, and political divergences between the two parties. Although there are common interests in areas such as trade, investment, and technology, disagreements over several issues—including human rights, unfair trade practices, geopolitical competition, and European relations with the United States—pose significant barriers to strengthening bilateral ties. Additionally, concerns related to supply chain security, interdependence in critical sectors, and tensions in the Indian and Pacific Oceans further complicate this relationship, making the path to cooperation fraught with challenges. Below are the main obstacles and challenges to significantly enhancing rapprochement:

Discrepancies Over Economic and Social Standards Economic and social standards represent one of the key tensions between China and the EU, as the EU relies on an open market economy model rooted in principles of transparency, governance, human rights, and environmental protection. These standards are the cornerstone of European policies, facilitating the creation of a precise regulatory framework aimed at ensuring long-term stability in trade and investment relations in an open market. In contrast, the Chinese model adopts a state interventionist approach to achieve rapid economic growth, which leads to discrepancies in the implementation of governance and transparency standards in economic and social practices. This variance manifests in multiple aspects, including differing policies on intellectual property protection and technology transfer. While the EU places immense importance on stringent standards ensuring protections for inventors and companies, China may adopt more flexible policies focused on accelerating economic growth, even at the expense of certain standards. Discrepancies also extend to social policies, with the EU emphasizing labor rights and environmental protection as integral to production and trade standards, while China prioritizes economic development and social stability, resulting in policy contradictions.

Moreover, differences in legal and regulatory enforcement add to these challenges, as the EU has imposed restrictions recently on some Chinese products based on concerns surrounding “human rights” violations, such as those related to Uyghur labor in the Xinjiang region. China views these actions as interference in its internal affairs, which exacerbates tensions and complicates efforts to reach agreement on economic and social standards. Under the new Trump administration, these differences are likely to magnify, as the U.S. could leverage these disparities to defend its own trade policies, making it more challenging to find common ground for negotiation between the EU and Beijing.

Pressure from U.S.-Atlantic Relationships U.S. foreign policies play a pivotal role in shaping the EU’s stance towards China, especially under the new Trump administration. The U.S. relies on using trade policy tools, such as imposing tariffs as a negotiation tactic, as evidenced by previous experiences during his first term. Trump’s imposition of tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum from the EU resulted in reciprocal trade reactions impacting trade balances and creating uncertainty in international relations.

The pressures from U.S.-Atlantic relations manifest in several dimensions. On one hand, the EU faces increased demands for alignment with U.S. trade and economic policies, as Trump has threatened to impose tariffs on a variety of European goods to pressure partners into conceding certain demands during trade negotiations, placing the EU in a position where it must adjust its stance in accordance with U.S. interests, especially regarding issues like LNG imports and automobiles.

On the other hand, U.S. policies also extend to technical and security fields, with Trump’s administration encouraging allies to impose restrictions on the use of certain Chinese technologies and equipment, particularly in 5G networks. These actions are part of a broader strategy aimed at limiting China’s influence in global markets, thus impacting European nations’ stances, despite some countries adopting a more independent approach, while others align more closely with American policies.

Internal divisions within the EU regarding these pressures represent another challenge—differing national stances complicate the EU’s ability to present a unified response to U.S. policies. While countries like Germany and France advocate a more independent approach that seeks to maintain economic ties with China, Eastern European nations tend to align more closely with American policies, increasing the complexity of formulating a joint stance. This internal variation multiplies the pressures on the EU as it grapples with changing American foreign policies.

Diverging Geopolitical Interests The divergence in geopolitical interests between China and the EU adds another layer of complexity to their relationship. Although China is not usually classified as a direct strategic adversary of the EU, there is a growing concern regarding Chinese influence in regions considered strategically significant, such as Africa, Central Asia, and the Balkan region. The Belt and Road Initiative, launched by China in 2013, enhances its regional and global influence by focusing on investments in infrastructure and expanding economic networks, potentially leading to increased economic dependence for some EU member states, particularly those in Eastern Europe.

European positions on this expansion vary as well; some officials advocate for stricter oversight of Chinese investments within the EU to protect economic sovereignty, while others argue that cooperation with China in specific areas could foster joint economic growth. Recent substantial investment agreements between countries such as Serbia and China have raised fears regarding these investments being utilized as tools to bolster Chinese influence in the region.

In the context of the new Trump administration, American pressure could further compel Europe to monitor Chinese investments closely, as Washington may seek to impose additional restrictions on foreign investments in vital sectors within the EU. This situation adds to the geopolitical complexity, where economic interests intersect with security and strategic considerations, thereby placing the EU at a critical juncture in balancing its economic motives with security concerns.

Trade Challenges Economic challenges rank among the most significant obstacles confronting the deepening of relations between China and the EU, as recent years have witnessed an increasing number of trade disputes and protectionist measures from both sides. The EU has taken steps to impose tariffs on imports of certain Chinese goods, like electric vehicles, with some rates reaching up to 45%, citing government support policies afforded to China’s domestic industries as justification. In response, China has enacted similar measures against European products, such as spirits, escalating the trade dispute between the two.

U.S. trade policies further intensify these challenges, with the Trump administration striving to influence European trade policy by pressuring governments to reduce reliance on Chinese products and boosting U.S. exports. Reports suggest that such policies may contribute to greater uncertainty in trade relations, increasing production costs for European firms engaged in global value chains. Firms and investors face challenges linked to fluctuations in reciprocal trade policies, impacting strategic planning and the international competitiveness of the European industrial sector.

Additional challenges arise in the technology sector, where concerns surrounding cybersecurity and technological dependency have prompted some European nations to restrict the use of Chinese technologies and equipment in critical infrastructures, adding complexity to trade disputes. These actions coincide with American policies aimed at limiting the use of specific Chinese technologies, further complicating the trade landscape between China and the EU. This volatile trade environment raises questions about the sustainability of the economic partnership between the two parties amidst evolving trade dynamics and increasing external pressures.

Future Scenarios

The potential scenarios between China and the EU range from limited economic convergence and strategic equilibrium to deeper partnerships or increasing tensions spurred by U.S. pressures. Below, we present an overview of these scenarios:

Scenario One: Comprehensive Agreement (Trump-Europe Deal) In this scenario, following an initial series of tensions between the Trump administration and the EU, a comprehensive economic agreement is reached that reshapes trade relations between the two parties. This deal relies on the U.S. rolling back certain protectionist measures, such as lifting tariffs on European imports, in exchange for European commitments to purchase more American products, particularly in energy, agriculture, and defense industries. Through this agreement, the Trump administration aims for immediate economic gains, whereas Europe views it as a means to avoid an all-out trade war while retaining some independence in its trade relations with China.

For Chinese-European relations, this scenario limits economic convergence, as certain European nations may need to reduce their trade engagement with China as a condition of their deal with Washington. Nonetheless, it is unlikely to affect cooperation in climate issues and renewable energy, given Europe’s commitment to ecological agendas and its need for Chinese partnerships in environmental technology and green energy. However, significant projects, like Chinese investments in European infrastructure, may slow down due to American pressures.

While this scenario has the potential for success, it faces obstacles, primarily the chance that Europe might reject U.S. dictates, especially if they impose strict limits on its relations with China. Furthermore, Trump may be unwilling to offer sufficient concessions, rendering the agreement unattractive to European nations, thus risking its collapse before realization.

Scenario Two: Limited Economic Convergence In this scenario, Europe and China continue to build relatively strong economic relations but without achieving full strategic partnership status. This arises due to partial American pressures aimed at preventing Chinese-European convergence, or ongoing tensions between the two parties in certain technological and investment areas.

China remains a primary trading partner for Europe, yet European nations may avoid expanding collaboration with China in sensitive sectors such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and communications out of fear of American backlash. However, cooperation in renewable energy and environmental technology continues, as Europe requires Chinese innovation in these fields, notably in developing electric batteries, green hydrogen, and energy storage technologies.

A key factor supporting this scenario is Europe’s desire to maintain balanced relations with both the U.S. and China, leveraging both markets without entering direct confrontations with either. Conversely, while China is eager to deepen ties with Europe, it might prefer a more cautious approach to avoid escalating tensions with the U.S., which could impose additional economic sanctions if it perceives Chinese influence in Europe as excessive.

Despite the opportunities this scenario offers, it encounters obstacles, primarily the possibility of Trump’s administration imposing further restrictions on European firms engaged with China, complicating the economic relationship between the two parties.

Scenario Three: Strategic Balance between Beijing and Washington In this scenario, Europe adopts a balanced approach towards both China and the United States, striving to remain neutral without fully siding with either party. This reflects a growing European desire to enhance strategic independence while avoiding direct confrontations with Washington. However, it also prevents Europe from completely complying with Trump’s demands, thereby maintaining its economic relations with China while mitigating overdependence.

European-Chinese cooperation in renewable energy and environmental technologies continues; however, Europe implements strict controls on Chinese investment, especially in sensitive sectors, including strategic infrastructure, communications, and artificial intelligence. Meanwhile, while Europe maintains its ties with the U.S., it aims to avoid falling into economic and political dependence on Washington by seeking alternative partnerships in Asia and Latin America to diversify its alliances.

This scenario allows Europe to benefit from the two largest economies globally without being forced to choose between them, albeit not without risks. Washington may exert pressure on Europe to adopt a clearer stance against China, whether through economic sanctions or technological restrictions, which could complicate the maintenance of this balance. Additionally, China may attempt to strengthen its presence in Europe beyond traditional economic cooperation, raising concerns among certain European governments and prompting them to limit openness to Beijing.

Scenario Four: The Perfect Storm (Open Trade War between Washington and Europe) In this scenario, the Trump administration adopts a more aggressive stance against Europe by imposing comprehensive tariffs on European products, leading to an open trade war. This conflict may involve restrictions on European investments in the U.S., penalties on companies transacting with China, and U.S. pressures to compel Europe to sever economic ties with Beijing.

Consequently, Europe may be forced to seek alternative trading and investment partnerships, making China an increasingly attractive partner. In this case, Beijing could evolve from a mere economic ally to a key strategic ally for Europe, particularly in sectors subjected to American restrictions, such as semiconductors, renewable energies, and green technologies.

Simultaneously, Europe may respond to American escalation by deepening cooperation with China on energy infrastructure projects and exploring new mechanisms to reduce reliance on the dollar in bilateral trade transactions, potentially leading to radical transformations in the global economic landscape.

While this scenario opens avenues for unprecedented enhancement of Chinese-European relations, it is also deemed unlikely due to significant risks involved, most notably the disintegration of the transatlantic alliance, increasing geopolitical tensions, and potential adverse impacts on both European and American financial markets as a result of the trade war.

Conclusion

As global tensions rise and uncertainty looms over U.S. policies during Trump’s second term, the Chinese-European rapprochement remains contingent upon a blend of shared interests and complex challenges. Though there are opportunities to bolster cooperation, particularly in areas like trade and climate change, structural barriers, strategic divergences, and disputes over international issues render a comprehensive strategic convergence challenging.

However, Europe will remain in a balancing position, swaying between the necessity to protect its economic and security interests with the U.S. and the ambition to enhance its partnerships with China on issues aligned with its long-term agenda. In such a shifting geopolitical environment, the prospects for Chinese-European convergence will rely on both parties’ capacity to overcome disputes and develop more sustainable cooperation mechanisms, independent of the disruptions imposed by American political fluctuations.

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