Trump’s Message: Expected Scenarios for Iran’s Return to Nuclear Negotiations

In 2003, former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami sent a letter to then-US President George W. Bush, urging him to resolve all contentious issues between the two sides, but Bush ignored the response. A similar situation occurred in reverse when US President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei during his first term in 2019, delivered by then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, which Khamenei deliberately chose to ignore.

However, Trump’s recent message to the Iranian leader in March 2025, urging him to engage in discussions for a new agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, might not meet the same fate as the 2019 message due to significant changes in the internal, regional, and international circumstances surrounding Tehran.

Increasing Pressures:

Recently, several important indicators related to the Iranian nuclear file have emerged, representing pressures on Tehran in this regard. The most notable are as follows:

Details of Trump’s Message to Khamenei: President Trump sent a direct message to Khamenei, and although the official details of the message have not been disclosed, multiple sources indicated that it calls for Iran to reach a new agreement aimed at reducing its nuclear program. Sources also state that Washington has demanded that Tehran cease supplying militias and proxies in the region, whether to Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, or Iraqi armed factions, giving Tehran two months to comply with these demands in exchange for lifting sanctions and ending its isolation. Otherwise, the alternative would be the option of military action. Unlike what transpired before the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (nuclear agreement) in 2015, Trump deliberately announced the message, revealing some details before it reached Tehran.

This served two purposes: first, to pressure Tehran by putting the ball in its court and placing it in a reactive position to make an urgent decision in response, lest it appear as the party rejecting negotiations, which could justify escalatory measures later, and second, to diverge from the approach of former President Barack Obama, who sent secret messages to the Iranian side and adopted a gradual negotiation approach that eventually led to the 2015 agreement, which Trump has labeled the worst ever.

Trump’s sending of the message to Khamenei at a time when the latter made statements rejecting negotiations with Washington reflects a US desire to explore Iran’s true intentions on the matter or even to embarrass the Iranian leadership, given that the Supreme Leader in Iran holds the keys to resolving strategic issues, including the Iranian nuclear file.

Threatening the Use of the “Trigger Mechanism”: The disagreements between Iran and the European troika (Britain, France, and Germany) have intensified, aligning completely with the US position towards Tehran, which imposes further pressure on Iran that previously exploited the distinction between the US and European stances to its advantage.

In this context, the UN Security Council held a closed session on March 12, 2025, to discuss the Iranian nuclear escalation as a means to threaten that any of the European troika countries could activate what is known as the “trigger mechanism,” which would automatically reinstate the UN sanctions that had been imposed on Iran before the signing of the nuclear agreement in 2015. This action requires only the approval of one country from the European troika member states in the Security Council, and a potential veto from Russia or China would not halt the mechanism, according to Resolution 2231, which serves as the international framework for the nuclear agreement.

The Western powers are aware that the mechanism for enforcing international sanctions on Iran will expire on October 18, 2025, marking the end of the effects established by the nuclear agreement signed in 2015 and UN Resolution 2231. Thus, they threaten to resort to this mechanism to compel Iran back to the negotiations. Trump has instructed the US representative to the UN, prior to the Security Council session, to collaborate with Washington’s allies to reactivate this mechanism as part of the “maximum pressure” policy Trump adopted against Iran since February 2025.

Potential US-Russia Thaw: The potential rapprochement between the United States and Russia, which surfaced in discussions held between delegations led by both countries’ foreign ministers in Riyadh on February 18, 2025, and further consultations among experts in Istanbul on February 28, 2025, adds pressure on Iran. While the main goal of these discussions is to bring an end to the Russia-Ukraine war, the Iranian nuclear program is also part of the talks, as confirmed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Iran’s primary concern regarding this potential rapprochement stems from two possibilities: first, that the Russians might leverage the Iranian nuclear file in exchange for gaining some advantages in Ukraine, which has sparked significant anxiety among various Iranian circles given the deep-rooted mistrust between Iran and Russia; second, that a resolution to the Ukrainian crisis could leave Tehran isolated against a bloc that may include the United States, Russia, and Europe.

Strengthening the Seriousness of the Military Option: Despite the military escalations that occurred twice between Israel and Iran in 2024, signaling that military engagement had become a viable option for dealing with Iran, recent developments suggest that this option is now more on the table than ever.

The violent strikes carried out by US forces against Houthi strongholds in various regions across Yemen on the night of March 15-16, 2025, sent serious threat signals to Iran that it might become the next target of the new US administration, especially with the US President warning that Tehran “bears responsibility for every bullet fired by the Houthis and will face severe consequences,” pointing to Iran’s logistical support and full guidance to the Houthis. Additionally, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s attempts to persuade the US administration, under Trump, to attack Iranian nuclear facilities have further bolstered this option, especially given that Tel Aviv has received unconventional weapons from the US, including 100 BLU-109 bunker-buster bombs weighing 875 kilograms each, alongside the Israeli forces conducting maneuvers in the Syrian Golan Heights related to air-drop operations, signaling a potential repetition of such actions should Iranian nuclear facilities be attacked.

Tehran’s Response:

In light of the above, Iran has taken several measures and steps oscillating between escalation and de-escalation, which is typical of its approach. The following are some highlighted actions:

Preparing to Respond to Trump’s Message: Tehran has confirmed it received President Trump’s message through an Emirati intermediary during the visit of Dr. Anwar Gargash, the diplomatic advisor to the UAE’s President, to Tehran, where he handed the message to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Sources indicate that three committees have been formed under the National Security Council: the first for experts to study the message, the second to propose responses, and the third to make a final decision on the response before presenting it to the council, which will in turn present it to the Supreme Leader. This indicates an initial positive response from Iran to the message. While the overt US message imposes pressures on Tehran, it also reflects some relief among certain sectors within Iran, as the US has taken the “first step” toward negotiations with Iran, making further procrastination unjustifiable. Iranian officials have confirmed that a response to Trump’s message will be made in the upcoming period.

Defining the Scope of Negotiations: Tehran has sought to set the scope of potential negotiations with the US; stating on March 10, 2025, that it does not oppose negotiations with the US if their goal is to address military concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program, which implies implicit acceptance on its part to concede enriched uranium and advanced centrifuges without discussing the complete dismantling of this program.

These statements indicate that Tehran is not inclined to negotiate over its missile program or regional role, especially since Khamenei stated on March 21, 2025, that Iran has no proxies in the region. Furthermore, Tehran has expressed a desire for the negotiations with the US to be indirect, with Iranian Foreign Minister suggesting a preference for an European party to act as a mediator, as was the case during previous negotiations. This carries two significances: first, indirect negotiations may spare Tehran direct pressure and threats from Washington; second, the choice of a European party as a mediator implies excluding Russia from playing a potential mediatory role between Washington and Tehran due to distrust in Russian intentions, which some Iranian circles believe contributed to the failure of negotiations during the late President Ibrahim Raisi’s tenure.

Strengthening Alliances with Russia and China: Representatives of Iran, China, and Russia met at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing at the level of deputy foreign ministers—Kazem Gharib-Abadi of Iran, Ma Zhaoxu of China, and Sergei Ryabkov of Russia—to discuss the Iranian nuclear crisis. A statement from the meeting affirmed the rejection of unilateral sanctions imposed on Iran and called for abstaining from using or threatening force while respecting Iran’s right to possess nuclear technology.

This meeting was a response to the Security Council meeting summoned by Western powers, conveying that the Western pressures exerted by the US and the European troika will be met with increased cooperation between Iran, Russia, and China. This collaboration has taken various forms in recent years, the latest being the military drills conducted by the three countries in the Gulf of Oman in mid-March 2025.

Nuclear and Missile Escalation: Recently, Iran has focused on enhancing what is termed as a “central defense line,” which embodies the peaks of its nuclear and missile programs amidst the deterioration of what is known as the “frontline defense,” given the diminishing military capabilities of its regional allies.

The latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency, released in mid-February 2025, indicated that Iran now possesses enough material to produce six nuclear bombs should such a decision be made, with an enriched uranium stockpile of 60% reaching 250 kilograms, while its total inventory of enriched uranium of various percentages reached 8,294.4 kilograms—a number exceeding the limit stipulated in the 2015 agreement by 41 times and deliberately inflated compared to the agency’s previous report on this front.

Concurrently, the Supreme Leader of Iran has directed an increase in the range of ballistic missiles “without pause,” with Khamenei previously setting a range limit of up to 1,000 kilometers while also insisting on improving missile accuracy and revealing numerous new missiles in recent times. These efforts signal Iran’s desire to enhance its leverage as a bargaining chip in the face of Western pressures.

Three Scenarios:

In light of the above, three scenarios can be discussed regarding the potential shape of the relationship between Iran and the United States regarding the Iranian nuclear program:

Returning to Negotiations: Considering the limited options facing Iranian decision-makers, Trump’s message might push Iranian leadership to study and respond to it positively, leading to Tehran’s acceptance of returning to negotiations.

This is bolstered by statements from US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, indicating that Trump prefers negotiations with Iran, a sentiment echoed by US Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steve Wilkoff, stating that Trump’s goal is engagement with Iran and that there is no need for military action. Additionally, there is an already existing track for discussions between Iran and the European troika, which could be developed by directly or indirectly introducing the US into the negotiations. Various assessments suggest that the statements attributed to the Supreme Leader of Iran regarding abstaining from negotiations with the US are not indicative of a strategic rejection but fall within the space of tactical rejection aimed at strengthening its negotiation position against Western pressures.

The approaching “due date” for the nuclear agreement makes Tehran fearful of the activation of the “trigger mechanism” against it. Notably, returning to negotiations does not imply that the process will be easy or that a comprehensive agreement will be swiftly reached; the nature of the “American conditions” that Trump’s message is expected to encapsulate remains uncertain, alongside the extent of concessions Iran could make. Furthermore, the negotiation process itself could take months or years, as witnessed during over a year and a half of negotiations from April 2021 to September 2022, without yielding anything concrete. However, there is a possibility of reaching common ground from which to build, as occurred with the partial agreement in 2013, which paved the way for a comprehensive agreement in 2015. A mutual understanding between Iran and the US was also brokered regarding prisoner exchanges through Qatari mediation in August 2023, in exchange for approximately $7 billion, which was Iranian money frozen in South Korea—something Iran hoped to build upon until the onset of Operation “Al-Aqsa Flood,” which disrupted these calculations, according to Tehran’s perspective.

Military Strike: Should Iran refuse to engage with Washington’s calls for negotiations, especially if the US insists on dismantling Tehran’s nuclear program entirely or including missile and regional roles in the negotiations, the possibility of a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities may arise, either through the US or by supporting Israel to undertake the task. This is particularly plausible given the diminishing capabilities of Iran’s allied armed groups in the region, which previously worked to raise the costs of any attack against Iran.

Furthermore, Israel has asserted that Iranian air defenses suffered significant degradation during the military strikes it launched against Iran on October 26, 2024, making Iranian airspace vulnerable to future attacks according to this view. Although this option is on the table, Trump has expressed his desire to avoid it, considering the potential for broader conflict in the region. Moreover, a historical perspective on US-Iran relations suggests that even in instances of military confrontations, such as Operation Praying Mantis in 1987, and the Prophet’s Horse in 1988, or even Iran’s downing of the US RQ-170 drone in 2019, hostilities were limited, potentially placing constraints on the broader military strike option.

There is skepticism regarding the effectiveness of a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, as such a move might only postpone its nuclear activities rather than eliminate them entirely.

Stalemate: The current situation between Iran and the United States might continue without negotiations or reaching an agreement, meaning that Washington’s maximum pressure policies against Iran will persist. This has resulted in new sanctions targeting Iran’s oil sector and drone program, as well as sanctioning Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad himself. Washington is also working to activate mechanisms that allow the inspection and interception of Iranian oil tankers at sea, aiming to bring Iranian oil exports to zero, especially given that such exports had regained some strength during the tenure of former President Joe Biden.

Furthermore, the likelihood of the reactivation of UN sanctions against Iran remains, and if Tehran does not respond positively to Western demands, these will be implemented before October 2025. However, this situation may not endure for long; the expiration of the nuclear agreement in October will officially unleash Iran to advance its nuclear program without restrictions, which Israel and Western powers will not allow, potentially leading to military options.

In conclusion, it can be said that Iran may lean toward expressing readiness to return to the negotiation table regarding its nuclear program to avoid further Western and international sanctions while thwarting Israel’s attempts to persuade Washington to carry out military strikes against its nuclear facilities. Additionally, this could send calming messages internally to alleviate the growing poverty and dissent in society due to the sanctions.

Nevertheless, any discussion of a comprehensive agreement seems unlikely at this time given Iran’s refusal to negotiate over its weapons programs or regional role, limiting discussions to nuclear escalations. This may not sufficiently satisfy President Trump, who is keen on reaching a comprehensive deal encompassing all these files; thus, it is likely that both sides will engage in indirect negotiations leading to partial agreements, structured around concessions countering each other—such as Iran’s relinquishing highly enriched uranium in exchange for the lifting of some sanctions by Washington.