The coup led by Assimi Goïta and his military colleagues on August 18, 2020, against the late civilian president of Mali, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, marked the beginning of a new phase of military coups in West and Central Africa. It also constituted a setback for the democratic path that the continent had begun accumulating through the election of several presidents via the ballot box.
Only nine months passed after the ousting of Keïta, and the selection of their former comrade in military attire, retired Colonel Bah Ndaw, as president, when they once again turned against him, and his deputy, Assimi Goïta, took power.
Mirroring the rapid spread of viruses in Africa — as witnessed with the Ebola virus in late 2013, the coronavirus in 2020, and monkeypox in 2024 — the virus of military coups proliferated.
In mid-September 2021, Mamadi Doumbouya and his colleagues overthrew the Guinean president, Alpha Condé, less than a year after his controversial election for a third term. Condé’s first election in 2010 had marked the first democratic transition of power in the country.
About five months before the Guinean coup, news broke in Chad of the mysterious death of the country’s president, Idriss Déby Itno, officially reported to have been killed on the battlefield by rebels. Following this, his son, General Mahamat Déby, took over as transitional president in April 2021, a move the African Union likened to a military coup.
The trend of military coups continued in several other countries. In January 2022, Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiiba and his colleagues ousted Burkina Faso’s President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, and eight months later, Captain Ibrahim Traoré and others overthrew the colonel president.
The contagion of coups reached Niger on July 26, 2023, when the military overthrew civilian President Mohamed Bazoum after more than two years in power, following a transition of power from the civilian president, Mahamadou Issoufou, who ruled the country for two presidential terms.
Barely a month after Bazoum’s ousting, the military in Gabon overthrew President Ali Bongo Ondimba after announcing his victory for a third term, thus ending his rule that began in 2009, following the death of his father, Omar Bongo, who spent 42 years in power.
Extending Transitional Phases and Entrenching Military Rule
Military council leaders in Africa appear in no hurry to hand over power to civilians after seizing it by force. Some have extended their rule, while others aim to do so, and some remain in power amid elections that opposition groups claim were tailored to fit their interests.
In Mali, a dialogue called by the ruling military council, boycotted by many political parties and civil society organizations, concluded in May 2024 with several proposals, including an extension of the transitional phase for a period ranging from two to five years.
The transitional phase officially ended on March 26, 2024, after the transitional president, Assimi Goïta, signed a decree on June 6, 2022, extending the transitional process for 24 months starting from March 26, 2022.
In Burkina Faso, participants in a national dialogue agreed to extend Captain Ibrahim Traoré’s rule for an additional five years starting July 2, 2024, and they also agreed to change his title from transitional president to president of Burkina Faso.
As for Niger, where the ousted president still languishes behind bars and military leaders are set to trial him, the transitional president, General Abdourahamane Tiani, has defined the transitional period as three years, of which over a year has already passed. Still, it is not unlikely that Niger will follow the same path as its neighbors and allies in the Sahel Alliance, Mali and Burkina Faso.
Similarly, in Niger, the ruling military council in Guinea Conakry set the transitional period at three years before theoretically returning to elected civilian authority. While the council has not specified when this period will commence, it has been over three years since the coup against President Alpha Condé, and no official announcement has been made about extending the transitional period. However, Guinea’s Prime Minister, Amadou Ori Ba, stated in an interview that “2025 will be a suitable year to complete the entire process,” indicating an end to the transitional path and organizing presidential elections.
The transitional phase in Gabon is among the shortest, set for two years. However, the transitional prime minister, Raymond Ndong, did not rule out, in a previous interview, the possibility of a “slight” extension if necessary. If this scenario occurs, it would eliminate the exception, and General Brice Oligui Nguema’s country would have followed the same trend of extension.
Chad is an exception regarding the end of the transitional phase, as General Mahamat Idriss Déby became president after organizing presidential elections in May 2024. However, before this, he had extended his transitional presidency twice, first for two years, coming after 18 months of the young general taking over from his father.
On October 8, 2022, another national dialogue was concluded, lasting several weeks, which resulted in extending the transitional period for two years, dissolving the military council, and allowing its members, including President Mahamat Déby Itno, to run for the presidential elections.
Emphasis on Security and Economics Over Elections
The military regimes governing Mali and Burkina Faso consider restoring security and stability in their countries to be a priority over conducting elections. They argue that unless voting can occur throughout the countries due to threats from armed groups, the significance of elections is diminished as a large portion of the population would be unable to participate.
This narrative was not present with the leaders of the military councils in Bamako and Ouagadougou when they executed their coups; rather, they vowed to hand over power to civilians and to respect election timelines according to a predetermined agenda. Indeed, Burkina Faso’s transitional president, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, initially pledged in his first interview to return power to civilians within months.
However, the young captain’s tone regarding civilian rule and conducting elections changed in less than a year; he announced in an interview with state television that the elections scheduled for July 2024 “are not a priority, unlike security.” As a result, no date has yet been set for voting.
In Mali, it was also announced that the presidential elections would be postponed with no new date specified, after previously being scheduled for February 2024. The authorities attributed the delay to technical issues related to adopting a new constitution and reviewing the electoral list. However, this had been preceded by the transitional Prime Minister, Choguel Kokalla Maïga, stating in a meeting with diplomats accredited in Bamako that “elections are not a priority.”
While President Assimi Goïta of Mali and Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso consider security to take precedence over conducting elections, Guinea Conakry’s military council leader, Mamadi Doumbouya, believes addressing the country’s economic conditions is the priority. He recently imposed a ban on ministers and senior officials traveling abroad to “rationalize public spending.”
Chad has also followed a similar pattern, declaring a food emergency before organizing elections due to the repercussions of climate change and the Russia-Ukraine war, which have severely impacted N’Djamena’s access to essential grain supplies. These combined factors contributed significantly to the prioritization of security concerns over elections.
President Mahamat Déby successfully extended his transitional presidency twice. Yet, two challenges remained even after organizing elections, indicating they may have merely served as a pretext to evade conducting the vote. The food crisis persisted sharply, especially as the country increased its reception of Sudanese fleeing from war. Security issues also continued to pose a challenge, exemplified by an attack on a military base in the Lake Chad region near the Niger border by the Boko Haram group, resulting in the deaths and injuries of dozens of soldiers— the deadliest incident in four years, comparable to an event during his father’s presidency.
General Presidents and Mechanisms for Extending Transitional Periods
Except for Burkina Faso’s transitional president, Ibrahim Traoré, who holds the rank of captain, the remaining African military council leaders are generals. Some held this military rank before their coups against civilian presidents, while others rose in rank after seizing power by force.
In Mali, a government decision in October promoted the transitional president Assimi Goïta and five of his colleagues, who led two military coups with him, to the rank of generals, following a recommendation from participants in a political dialogue initiated by the transitional authorities months earlier that was widely boycotted by the opposition.
Before Goïta, who became Mali’s third president at the rank of general after two previous late presidents, Moussa Traoré and Amadou Toumani Touré, Guinea’s transitional president, Mamadi Doumbouya, was promoted to the rank of general in January 2024, becoming the third president in Guinea’s history to hold a general’s rank, following Lansana Conté and Sékouba Konaté.
As for the presidents of Niger, Chad, and Gabon, they attained their general ranks before their military coups. Chadian President Mahamat Déby is distinguished as a general and the son of a marshal; in June 2020, the country’s Parliament announced his promotion to the rank of “Marshal” due to his “efforts in combating terrorism.”
Thus, five generals have risen to power in Africa through military coups, in addition to Sudan, where two generals—one transitional president and the other his former deputy—have been in conflict for over a year and a half.
To reinforce their ranks and positions, various leaders have adopted measures primarily focused on gaining the people’s trust as their main source of retention; most coup leaders have risen to power atop popular protests against civilian rulers.
“Sovereignty” has become a common thread among the various measures implemented in this context. For instance, in Mali, the transitional authorities established January 14 as National Sovereignty Day, introduced mining law reforms aimed at ensuring that Malian citizens directly benefit from their country’s natural resources, and initiated a thorough auditing process providing essential data on mining and its socio-economic impacts.
In Niger, several steps have been taken, including renaming streets and squares in the capital, Niamey, after national or regional figures rather than the original names, mostly French, in moves the military council views as consistent with the sovereignty approach adopted since the coup.
The transitional government of Burkina Faso created a food sovereignty fund aimed primarily at providing financial support for actors in agriculture, pastoralism, and fishing, in addition to agricultural and fishing equipment, with the goal of reducing dependency on foreign assistance.
These three countries share a common “sovereignty” factor manifested in expelling foreign forces from their territories, particularly the French, and opening the door to Russian forces.
In Gabon, transitional president Brice Oligui Nguema has adopted “economic sovereignty,” emphasizing its importance in numerous speeches. He asserts that the economic sector is the main key to sovereignty. While he has not taken steps against traditional economic or security partnerships, the young general encourages “unity and joint action to achieve the desired sovereignty.”
In Guinea Conakry, President Mamadi Doumbouya has mandated foreign companies engaged in mining to build bauxite refineries in the country and work on a “fair sharing of revenues,” as he perceives an imbalance between the country’s earnings and its vast reserves of this metal.
In Chad, Mahamat Déby presents himself as a man of the moment, aimed at establishing security across the country. It can be said that “security sovereignty” is the primary challenge for his regime, and the security approach he advocates relies on “innovative and comprehensive measures aimed at involving the Chadian community in combating insecurity.”
Transitional Constitutions: Strengthening “Sovereignty” and Paving the Way for Military Rule
Most current military transitional councils in Africa have moved to establish constitutions that enshrine their concept of sovereignty, allowing them to remain in power legitimately through elections that enable military leaders to run, often resulting in their victory, as occurred in Chad.
Mali was the first to adopt a new constitution—the fourth in the country’s history since 1992—which emphasizes “sovereignty,” lowers the status of the French language from an official language to merely a working language, and grants wide powers to the president, without prohibiting military personnel from running for the presidency.
This constitution was approved by approximately 97% of the voters; however, the Malian opposition contended that it was tailored to the military council’s interests.
In Chad, the ninth constitution in the country’s history since independence from France over six decades ago was approved in late December 2023; this constitution explicitly stipulated in Article 86 that “military leaders have the right to run for the presidential elections, provided they dedicate themselves to this role.” It also reduced the minimum age for candidacy from 40 to 35, seen as favoring President Mahamat Déby Itno and paving the way for his candidacy.
Burkina Faso’s commitment to sovereignty took on another dimension, as its transitional parliament voted on a draft constitutional amendment aimed at changing the national slogan from “Unity-Progress-Justice” to “Homeland or Death, We Will Win,” a motto adopted during the presidency of former leader Thomas Sankara, who has greatly influenced current transitional president Ibrahim Traoré.
While the military councils in Burkina Faso and Niger have not yet established a new constitution, the ruling council in Guinea Conakry presented a draft constitution in late July 2024 consisting of 205 articles that stipulate the separation of powers, the establishment of a Senate, and permit independent candidacy for the presidency.
However, this constitutional proposal sparked some debate among Guineans; some argued that it “grants the transitional president the possibility of running” for presidency, and critics of this project deemed the creation of a Senate “pointless and a drain on the budget.”
In Gabon, where the transitional path seems faster than in other countries that have experienced military coups in recent years, the new constitution issued after the end of the Bongo family’s rule includes provisions enhancing presidential powers by abolishing the office of the Prime Minister. There was no explicit or implicit mention of prohibiting military personnel from running for the presidency.
In contrast, the new constitutional project contains some positive aspects, such as making the president accountable to parliament, which means that impeachment procedures would be accessible in cases of “high treason or violations of the oath or constitution.”
Conclusion
The prospects for current transitional paths in Africa are marked by substantial uncertainty, as they fail to respect the deadlines set by military leaders for retaining power. Several have attempted to extend their terms multiple times. For those who are ready to exit the exceptional phase, many have resorted to various measures aimed at paving the way for their continued rule through elections.
Several factors have contributed to this, including a lack of awareness among many populations in these countries, who often support whoever is in power, whether civilian or military. Moreover, the military leaders in these nations have grounded their visions and public orientations on a key term: “sovereignty,” persuading their populations that they have come to liberate their countries from the dominance of the former colonizer, France.
Another critical factor is the undermining of political party roles. In some countries that experienced military coups, political party activities have been suspended, as in Mali, while some military regimes have dissolved dozens of parties under the pretext of failing to meet legal conditions, as occurred in Guinea Conakry. Additionally, some opposition politicians have been arrested or fled abroad for fear of prosecution and detention, further weakening dissenting voices in these countries and strengthening the grip of military rulers.
Moreover, some opposition figures have aligned themselves with the military, as seen in Chad when Saleh Kebzabo took the prime minister’s office following a deal with President Mahamat Déby’s regime, and a similar situation occurred in Gabon with Raymond Ndong.
Although current military rulers are divided between those opposing France and working to expel it militarily and reduce its economic presence by canceling several contracts with its companies operating in these countries—like those in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—and those maintaining a relationship under French auspices while seeking to diversify partners, such as the Chadian president, and others who have not altered their external partnership framework like the leaders of Guinea Conakry and Gabon, “sovereignty” unites them as a mechanism to reinforce the pillars of their authority.
Among the transitional presidents, some focus on “sovereignty” in both political and economic terms, which is reflected in their actions to expel the “new-old colonizer” and untangle agreements with several French mining companies, applicable to Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Meanwhile, others like Chad emphasize “sovereignty” from a security perspective, with the Guinean and Gabonese transitional presidents focusing on the economic aspect of sovereignty.
Such slogans may be effective for a time, but they cannot be relied upon long-term as they quickly erode given the persistent structural crises faced by these nations, which military leaders currently cannot resolve, just as civilians before them were unable to.
These crises are primarily linked to security conditions posing a continuous threat to regime stability and the difficult economic and social situations of the populations, which could shift popular support away from military leaders to protests against them, potentially prompting other military figures to move to execute new coups, thus returning to the same square once again.
References
Mali: Les militaires restent au pouvoir malgré la fin officielle de la période de transition, publié le 28 mars 2024, vu le 26 octobre 2024, https://urls.fr/QkM5am
Niger: le général Tiani promet une transition de trois ans, manifestation de soutien à Niamey, publié le 19 août 2023, Vu le 26 octobre 2024, https://urls.fr/rkI0Ln
Guinée: Les militaires envisagent de rester au pouvoir jusqu’en 2025, publié le 12 mars 2024, vu le 27 octobre 2024, https://urls.fr/YhH2_7
Burkina Faso: le capitaine Ibrahim Traoré en exclusivité, publié le 1 octobre 2022, vu le 28 octobre 2024, https://urls.fr/rfJ3Pc
Mali: pour le premier ministre de la transition, les élections ne sont pas priorité, publié le 10 septembre 2021, vu le 28 octobre 2024, https://urls.fr/GnEHYD
Guinée: Mamadi Doumbouya interdit à ses ministres de voyager à l’étranger, publié le 11 octobre 2024, vu le 28 octobre 2024, https://urls.fr/KVl6vw
Tchad: une attaque de Boko Haram contre une base militaire fait au moins une quarantaine de morts, Publié le 28 octobre 2024, vu le 29 octobre 2024, https://urls.fr/hft1Z2
Guinée, le colonel Mamadi Doumbouya désormais général de corps d’armée, publié le 24 janvier 2024, vu le 31 octobre 2024, https://urls.fr/v3JjKr
Mali: La réappropriation des ressources, clé de la souveraineté nationale, publié le 28 octobre 2024, vu le 04 novembre 2024, https://urls.fr/dRcwJ3
Le Burkina Faso crée un fonds de souveraineté alimentaire, publié le 08 février 2024, vu le 04 novembre 2024, https://urls.fr/qlXrnP
La souveraineté a occupé une place majeure dans le discours d’Oligui Nguema, publié le 18 août 2024, vu le 04 novembre 2024, https://urls.fr/eXpXCB
Guinée: Les compagnies minières sommées du transformer la bauxite sur place, publié le 10 avril 2022, vu le 04 novembre 2024, https://urls.fr/kx4CWD
La vision sécuritaire de Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno: Un Tchad uni et protégé, publié le 27 avril 2024, vu le 04 novembre 2024, https://urls.fr/oRFD-q
Guinée: voici l’intégralité de l’avant-projet de la nouvelle constitution, publié le 30 juillet 2024, vu le 07 novembre 2024, https://urls.fr/csEVUn
