Tigray Crisis: Local Implications and Regional Consequences

The Tigray crisis reflects the legacy of ethnic conflict in Ethiopia following the end of the long imperial reign, intertwined with the history of ancient and modern Ethiopia. Since Abiy Ahmed took power in 2018, Ethiopia has presented a unique case in Africa, particularly regarding the economic and developmental progress made in Addis Ababa, serving as a model of African ascent towards achieving sustainable development. Despite being a landlocked country in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia attracted international investors, witnessing a surge in foreign interest.

However, the nation suffers from military and political conflicts, most notably highlighted by the military clash in the Tigray region between the Ethiopian federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). This conflict has raised concerns of a civil war in Ethiopia centered around constitutional interpretations of governance and the democratic transition of power, with potential repercussions on neighboring countries, particularly Sudan, Somalia, and South Sudan. The ongoing conflict is also likely to halt Ethiopia’s economic renaissance and hinder the substantial investment returns from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, particularly after the failure of regional settlement efforts among Cairo, Addis Ababa, and Khartoum.

This paper employs a causal tracking mechanism to analyze the roots of the conflict in Ethiopia, especially post-1970s. Ethiopia has been plagued by military coups and ethnic strife among its diverse ethnic groups, alongside a reevaluation of the Tigray people’s identity, addressing their historical context and political demands, while forecasting the future implications of the current conflict with the Ethiopian regime, and presenting a series of scenarios for the future of the Ethiopian political landscape.

Roots of Conflict in Ethiopia: From Monarchy to Ethnic Federalism

Modern Ethiopia, or “Abyssinia” as it is formerly known, is an ancient state and one of the oldest civilizations recorded in human history. Ethiopia’s historical might and dominance in the Horn of Africa emerged following the rise of the empires of Menelik I and II. In the late 19th century, “Ethiopian emperors,” particularly Menelik II (1889-1913), launched expansionist wars against local populations aided by European colonial powers during their invasions of Africa, before and after the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. These conflicts resulted in seizing neighboring regions and annexing western Somalia and the Harar region under the administration of the Ethiopian Empire, which were part of what was known as the “Islamic Adal Sultanate.”

Ethiopia’s political cultural legacy has been marked by sudden fluctuations until the swift demise of the last monarchy in 1974, when a military coup ousted Emperor Haile Selassie, the last ruler of Ethiopia.

That year, Ethiopia transitioned into a republic led by the military, with Mengistu Haile Mariam, a mid-ranking officer, exerting strong control until 1991, when his forces were defeated after a bloody civil war against a coalition named the “Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front” (EPRDF), primarily composed of the TPLF, the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization, the Amhara National Democratic Movement, and the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement.

After the coalition took power, the TPLF dominated the country’s administrative apparatus, with its leaders occupying around 90% of high-ranking military positions, and members of this ethnic group also monopolizing roles in state-managed civil enterprises, a phenomenon that persisted strongly from 1994 until 2018.

Returning to the legacy of conflict in Ethiopia, modern Ethiopia is seen as an extension of the Abyssinian Empire that ruled the region from 1855 to 1955, having expanded following World War II to include the Horn of Africa and Eritrea. The Amhara ethnic group dominated this empire, which governed approximately 80 different ethnic groups, making the Amharic language the state language and promoting Orthodox Christianity as the official religion, spreading Amhara culture across territories that included various Ethiopian ethnicities.

However, the Amhara (Ethiopian) empire faced contradictions and challenges in establishing a new governing system in the latter half of the 20th century, following the liberation of most African nations from colonial powers. Despite Emperor Haile Selassie’s attempts to transition Ethiopia from feudalism to a modern state, the administrative apparatus remained in the hands of the nobility, given their historical position as a ruling class, until the military coup occurred.

These historical accumulations and ethnic struggles led to liberation movements, with “liberation” and “freedom” becoming key terms in describing the armed fronts and movements in Ethiopia, such as the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). In the Somali region, movements like the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) emerged as expressions of the dominant idea of liberating from the feudal system. However, the Amhara elite, aligned with the imperial system, believed in reforming the system and viewed revolting against it as a threat to the unity and geography of Ethiopia, producing conflicting ideas and complex memories within a populace burdened by a legacy of political conflicts and social grievances.

This ongoing debate and the resultant conflicts formed the basis of the internal strife within Ethiopia, culminating in a federal arrangement comprising 10 federal states. Since the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie, the emergence of an authoritarian regime has typically sparked armed resistance. From the Eritrean independence struggle during Haile Selassie’s era to the armed resistance against Meles Zenawi’s regime—represented by the EPRDF’s coalition of four ethnic fronts—Ethiopia has been no stranger to armed rebellion, with the Tigray conflict serving as a significant example.

The most significant political events in Ethiopia since the 1970s can be summarized as follows:

• Overthrow of Haile Selassie (1930-1974) and End of Monarchy: The Ethiopian empire collapsed due to a series of revolutions and military coups led by Ethiopian fronts in the 1960s and 1970s, alongside student protests that the TPLF emerged from. The Marxist-oriented provisional military administrative council, known as “Derg,” ousted Emperor Haile Selassie on September 12, 1974, establishing a socialist military government. Mengistu Haile Mariam later took control of the military authority, securing funding and support from the Soviet Union to establish a totalitarian regime.

The Derg was accused of executing thousands of “suspected enemies” between 1977 and 1979 in what became known as the “Red Terror.” After effectively silencing dissent, it officially announced a communist constitution in 1987. The establishment of this military regime in Ethiopia was one result of the end of the Abyssinian Empire and the rise of military governance in several African nations.

• Overthrow of the “Derg” Military Regime (1974-1991): The military rule led by Mengistu Haile Mariam ended in 1991, at the hands of rebel forces. Various insurgent groups, including the TPLF and the EPRDF, merged to overthrow Mengistu’s regime, aided by a series of famines and uprisings in Tigray and the Somali-Ethiopian War in 1977, which culminated in the Derg’s collapse.

The EPRDF and OLF formed a transitional government in 1991, while Eritrea declared its independence from Ethiopia a week after the Derg’s fall. The transitional government, after 1992 elections, established a constitutional committee to draft a new constitution. On December 8, 1994, the Constituent Assembly of 547 members proclaimed the current constitution, forming the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, but the TPLF soon distanced itself from the other fronts, systematically excluding them from the political scene with support from the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front.

• Era of Political Opening (Abiy Ahmed, 2018): The TPLF dominated the political apparatus for 24 years, but the situation turned against it after Abiy Ahmed’s rise, prompted by mass protests in the Oromo and Amhara regions, which ultimately pressured Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn to resign.

The ruling coalition selected Abiy Ahmed as prime minister, who faced a fundamental challenge in controlling a TPLF that was the most armed and experienced fighting force with 250,000 fighters, including many leaders of the federal army and Ethiopian intelligence. Consequently, a confrontation ensued as Abiy Ahmed began to dismantle Tigray’s influence over the state, revealing TPLF leaders’ links to corruption over the prior three decades of rule. When Abiy sought to merge the ruling parties from various ethnic backgrounds into a single party, the TPLF rejected this move and retreated to its region, marking the beginning of a significant rift between the TPLF leadership and Abiy Ahmed.

On September 9, 2020, relations between the federal government and the TPLF deteriorated dramatically amid disputes over the scheduling of elections originally planned for June 2020. The Ethiopian federal army subsequently invaded Tigray and defeated the TPLF military insurrection, arresting its leader, Debretsion Gebremichael, in January 2021, and capturing the regional capital, Mekelle.

It is clear that three main actors determine the trajectory and fate of the political system in Ethiopia: the authoritarian individual, feudal bureaucracy, and ongoing revolution. Notably, Ethiopia’s modern history has seen revolutions aimed at total independence from the Ethiopian state and others focused on reforming the governance system while maintaining state integrity. Among the former is the Eritrean revolution, which resulted in Eritrea’s independence in 1993, while ongoing movements like the ONLF and OLF represent the latter.

The types of revolutions aimed at toppling regimes include those led by Mengistu Haile Mariam’s officers that ended Emperor Haile Selassie’s rule, as well as the armed insurgency led by the TPLF and its allied fronts to overthrow Mengistu, and the popular “Ginbot 7” opposition movement against Meles Zenawi’s regime. The third revolution manifested in the mass protests in Ethiopia in 2018 that ushered in Abiy Ahmed’s peaceful ascension to power.

Who Are the Tigrayans? What Do They Want?

Dr. Jalal Eddin Mohammed defines the Tigrayans as Semitic Abyssinians, originating from Axum, the first capital of Abyssinia. They constitute about 6% of Ethiopia’s approximately 116 million population, mostly Orthodox Christians, alongside a small Muslim minority known as the “Jibarti,” estimated at around 175,000, accounting for about 4% of Tigray’s total population. The statistical estimates suggest they are a very small minority compared to the Orthodox faithful but are a majority relative to Protestants and Catholics.

Geographically, Tigray is located in northern Ethiopia bordering Eritrea, bounded to the north and northeast by Eritrea, to the west by Sudan, and bordered to the southeast and southwest by the Amhara region and the Afar region. The Amhara region is inhabited by the Afar ethnic group, and the capital is Mekelle.

Due to centuries of oppression and marginalization by the tyrannical royal regimes, Ethiopian ethnicities, including Tigrayans, revolted, especially in the latter half of the past century. The TPLF was among the leading fronts in the revolutionary wave that toppled the imperial regime, adopting a Marxist-Leninist approach that devastated the Ethiopian Empire in the 1960s and 1970s, at a time when the Amhara elite dominated the country.

Some Tigrayan students drew upon the “Nationalities Theory” established by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin to form the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. One of the movement’s leaders, Aregawi Berhe, recounted that the front was established in February 1975 around “a handful of men with four rifles,” driven by an “ethnic-national consciousness stemming from the accumulation of demands from Tigray’s population against successive central authorities in Ethiopia.” The main objective of this front was to secure “the right of self-determination for Tigray within Ethiopia.”

After Haile Selassie’s ousting, the military government of the socialist Ethiopia brutally suppressed various nationalist demands. The well-organized and disciplined Tigray People’s Liberation Front led the fight against the military regime. By the late 1980s, aided by Eritrean rebels, they managed to repel the Ethiopian army and capture substantial military equipment, placing them at the forefront of the armed rebellion against the regime, particularly when various armed groups united under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, led by Meles Zenawi (1955-2012), head of the TPLF.

The TPLF’s success in fighting the military regime stemmed from rallying its supporters around the ideology of Tigrayan nationalism, which provided a more homogeneous motivation, as most of its population shared a single language and faith. The Tigrayan political elite was expected to convince other ethnic movements that the future stability and regional integrity of the country depended on granting these ethnic groups regional autonomy. Additionally, the Tigrayan leadership was not less imbued with the central controlling ideology that had characterized Ethiopian governance since the late 20th century. It also seemed influenced by Marxist-Leninist thoughts, which included the right to national self-determination, encompassing the right to secede.

Military Conflict in Tigray

On November 5, 2020, the political divisions between the leadership of the TPLF and the Ethiopian government under Abiy Ahmed escalated into a full-scale military conflict lasting about a month, during which the TPLF, one of the main components of the former ruling party within the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front coalition, which ruled for 23 years until 2018, was all but annihilated. The causes of the conflict in Tigray are often attributed to a constitutional and political crisis centering on how to manage the democratic transition process after the elections slated for June 2020 were postponed.

Tigrayan leaders also opposed the changes brought about by the Amhara and Oromo revolutions since 2015, which pressured Tigrayan Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn to resign under American and Western pressures, leading to a political struggle between Tigray and the new reformists led by Abiy Ahmed starting in 2018.

Backgrounds and Causes of the Conflict

The deep-rooted background of the conflict regarding Tigray may be tied to Abiy Ahmed, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 following a historic peace agreement with neighboring Eritrea that ended two decades of hostility and military conflict, considered at the time a step towards ushering the Horn of Africa into a new era of stability. However, this agreement incited anger and tension within the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, which held regional power in Tigray. The TPLF considered the peace agreement between Asmara and Addis Ababa in 2018 as an attempt to marginalize Tigray from the Ethiopian political scene, given that the Tigrayan region sees the Eritrean regime as its historical enemy, exacerbating disputes with the federal government.

The main causes of the military conflict in Tigray can be summarized as follows:

Marginalization of the TPLF: Since Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, he initiated a series of political reforms, disturbing stagnant waters to amend the issues that had tainted Ethiopia’s relations with its neighbors, especially Eritrea. He began implementing his political reform promises, both domestically and externally. However, according to observers, his internal policy, aimed at systemic change, garnered him wide popularity following the release of many opposition leaders who had been imprisoned for years, if not decades, particularly during the TPLF’s years in power.

His policies also targeted corruption and implicated many government leaders, replacing them with new individuals from the Oromo and Amhara ethnicities. After dismissing Ethiopian army chief General Birhanu Jula (who was Tigrayan), he appointed General Siwara Younis (from Amhara), and named General Adam Mohamed (from Amhara) as Ethiopia’s intelligence chief. It is known that the Oromo and Amhara regions were central to the protests that led to Desalegn’s resignation and Ahmed’s rise to power in 2018.

Following this exclusion and the displacement of Tigrayan symbols and leadership from the political scene, the TPLF leadership felt a sweeping movement aimed at eradicating their presence in the nation’s political fabric, with the sidelining understood as the total exclusion of an entire ethnic group from the Ethiopian scene. This caused repercussions, with the Tigray War being one of the most prominent manifestations.

Constitutional Crisis: According to the Ethiopian constitution, general elections should be held every five years, yet it does not specify the necessary steps if the governing body fails to conduct elections on time due to unforeseen circumstances, as seen now with the COVID-19 pandemic—this has created a political and constitutional precedent unprecedented in Ethiopia’s history. Consequently, the postponement of elections led the nation effectively into a constitutional vacuum and, subsequently, a major political crisis. In a bid to prevent the political fallout of this vacuum, the government, through the deputy attorney general, proposed four measures on April 30, 2020, to resolve the looming constitutional crisis: dissolving parliament, declaring a state of emergency, amending the constitution, and calling for a constitutional interpretation.

On May 5, 2020, parliament adopted the fourth recommendation (constitutional interpretation), with a constitutional review commission recommending on June 6, 2020, extending the terms of parliament members, the federal council, and regional councils by 9 to 12 months. This was approved by the federal council on June 10. Meanwhile, major opposition forces in the country viewed all federal institutions post-October 5, 2020, as unconstitutional and called for a comprehensive national dialogue to find a way out of the crisis. However, Abiy vowed to take decisive actions to maintain stability and continuity, as this constitutional impasse represents part of Ethiopia’s internal dilemma between those rejecting a transitional government and those insisting on the legitimacy of the federal government pursuing security restoration and economic revival.

Election Postponement: The announcement of the postponement of elections originally set for August 2020 became the tipping point for intensified disputes between rival factions, paving the way for constitutional conflicts. Opposition parties accused the prime minister of using the pandemic as a pretext to illegitimately extend his term. The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front condemned the decision as “unconstitutional,” announcing its intention to conduct regional elections unilaterally as scheduled.

The TPLF escalated the crisis by holding elections in the region on September 9, 2020, but the Ethiopian central government refused to allow the electoral commission to oversee them and denied recognition of their results, halting financial transfers to the region and blocking banking transactions between Tigray and other Ethiopian regions. This constitutional dispute has intensified the conflict in Ethiopia, escalating into a raging fire in Tigray since November 2020.

Tigrayan Rebellion Against Authority: The Tigrayan regional government declared its non-compliance with a federal decision to change the southern military command, which is based in the region, comprising leaders sympathetic to the Tigrayan cause against the federal government and Eritrea due to boundary discrepancies and accusations of Eritrean interference in the region. Furthermore, the local government closed its airspace to civilian flights and warned against any military movements toward the region, launching an attack on federal forces on November 5, 2020, which ignited armed conflict and paved the way for the Ethiopian military’s intervention in the region, leading to a temporary government being established in Mekelle and new elections set to choose a new government for the region, thus ending TPLF’s dominance over the Ethiopian system for over three decades.

Ethnic Federalism vs. Unitary Project

The historical and modern conflict in Ethiopia lies in ethnic nationalism and identity, as well as whether the ethnic federal system can provide a stable political environment and economic renaissance. It is evident that the current ethnic federalism has become central to the repeated conflicts since 1974, overshadowed by ethnic identity slogans accompanied by a philosophy of armed struggle that fluctuates in its intensity.

The armed conflict in Tigray mirrors what remains of the legacy of ethnic systems that were predicated on the dominance of a minority ethnic group (the Amhara) ruling other majority groups, corresponding to a philosophical framework of rulership based on the individual, feudal bureaucracy, and armed revolution. This is why the political philosophy of the revolutionary front posited ethnic federalism as the effective remedy for the country’s past.

However, Abiy Ahmed’s rise to power in 2018 changed both the equation and the political philosophy of Ethiopia, introducing a new governance philosophy known locally as “Medemer” (meaning “together” or “synergy”), which seeks to propose a completely different framework that breaks with ethnic federalism. Abiy argues that ethnic nationalism can coexist with what he terms “civic nationalism,” focusing on individual rights. As a practical step to reform the country’s governance system, Abiy adopted contrasting policies against the laws of the ethnic federal system that prioritize centrality and strengthen it with military force and political alliances.

He initiated a series of reforms, starting with dissolving the EPRDF that had brought him to power and merging its four constituent entities into a single party named the Prosperity Party, but this new policy faced severe political and social backlash, especially from the Tigrayan community represented by the TPLF and in tandem with a rising aversion from the Oromo community that Abiy Ahmed belongs to. These disagreements culminated in protests erupting in the Oromo region after the arrest of Jawar Mohammed, a prominent and popular leader within Ethiopian circles.

The future of political reform transitioning from ethnic federalism to centralized governance remains ambiguous and unclear; rejection from both the Amhara and Oromo communities, not to mention the Tigrayan community towards this new governance direction, complicates the replacement of a system akin to authoritarian centralization with the one left by Meles Zenawi governing the country. Moreover, the hurdles of reform will require more time and flexible policies in engineering a governance system suitable for Ethiopia, whether central or broadly federal along ethnic lines.

Abiy Ahmed continues to assert that the federal system threatens the political future and unity of the country as an economically and politically rising state, both in terms of short-term and long-term internal and external stability.

Dimensions of the Conflict in Tigray and Regional Implications

The military operation to quell the Tigray People’s Liberation Front has raised numerous internal, regional, and international dimensions and implications. Internally, approximately 70,000 people from Tigray have been displaced, with the region being the fifth largest in terms of population and area, with a population estimated at 5,247,005 in the last official count in 2017. The excessive use of force to suppress the Tigrayan rebellion has led to ramifications and regional dimensions that may carry a heavy legacy of trepidation, particularly towards the interim government in Mekelle, which some opposing parties in the region reject.

The internal and regional impacts of the Tigray conflict can be narrowed down to the following:

• Humanitarian Dimension: The number of Ethiopian refugees in Sudan has risen to approximately 71,488, according to official statistics, including 48,181 in the Hamdayet area of Kassala state. However, the humanitarian plight of Ethiopian refugees at the Sudanese border is exacerbated by the lack of suitable shelter. Official reports indicate that there are 1,171 refugees with no accommodation in the border camps. Amnesty International revealed that atrocities and crimes occurred during battles in the region, particularly by Eritrean forces participating in the fighting, systematically targeting hundreds of unarmed civilians in northern Axum on November 28 and 29, 2020, opening fire in the streets and conducting house-to-house raids in a massacre that could reach the level of crimes against humanity. Ethiopian and Eritrean forces committed multiple war crimes in their assault to control Axum. Additionally, Eritrean troops created a chaos-like situation, systematically killing hundreds of civilians mercilessly.

Despite allegations against Ethiopia of committing widespread violations in Tigray, Addis Ababa denies these charges. However, the newly appointed governor of Mekelle, Mulu Nega, implicitly acknowledged the occurrence of assaults and human rights violations in the region amid the all-out war. The humanitarian situation in Tigray and at the Sudanese border remains extremely precarious, as the interim government lacks the trust of the Tigrayan people. Additionally, Abiy’s government has failed to resettle Ethiopian refugees or provide basic living requirements in refugee camps, presenting potential for a humanitarian crisis amid the ongoing health crisis of COVID-19 and a war that has drained Ethiopia’s burgeoning economy.

• Regional Dimension: The countries surrounding Ethiopia have been significantly impacted by the repercussions of the war in Tigray, albeit at varying degrees:
  • Sudan: The conflict in Tigray has led to approximately 100,000 Ethiopian citizens fleeing to Sudan, causing severe damage to Sudan’s already weakened economy. Before this, Sudan was hosting thousands of Eritrean refugees in various camps near the border shared by all three countries (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan), in addition to shouldering the burdens of the Ethiopian internal conflict and border tensions. This strain has been fueled by sporadic armed confrontations between Ethiopian militias and the Sudanese army, potentially threatening regional conflict between the two sides, in addition to the cumulative crisis posed by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam issue between Khartoum and Addis Ababa.
  • Djibouti: Djibouti has been outside the alliance engineered by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed with Somalia and Eritrea, remaining wary of the developments of this alliance as it hasn’t benefitted Djibouti, particularly in its border conflict with Eritrea. Any rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia could potentially drive Djibouti into deeper isolation and more internal tensions. The fierce alliance between Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki raises Djibouti’s concerns regarding its economic ally, Ethiopia, through which more than 90% of Ethiopian trade passes.
  • Somalia: The internal tensions, especially stemming from the conflict in Tigray, prompted the Ethiopian government to withdraw hundreds of its soldiers engaged in African Union peacekeeping forces in southern Somalia, redeploying them to frontline areas, while also arresting dozens of Tigrayan officers among these troops. This threatens efforts to combat radical organizations in southern Somalia and undermines the security of the upcoming electoral headquarters there.
  • Eritrea: Eritrea appears as the main instigator involved in the internal Ethiopian conflict. President Isaias Afwerki’s actions to dismantle the Tigray People’s Liberation Front address his country’s fears that have persisted for nearly a quarter-century, achieving two main objectives: gaining more geographical influence following the annexation of disputed border regions under the 2018 agreement between Asmara and Addis Ababa and ending an era of tensions with the neighboring region and the TPLF that dominated circumstances in that area for decades.
• International Dimension: The international community has increasingly expressed concern over the humanitarian consequences of the war in Tigray. Some countries closely associated with Ethiopia are applying intense pressure on Abiy Ahmed to halt the direct targeting of the Tigrayan ethnicity, which the U.S. describes as “ethnic cleansing.” Consequently, Washington has suspended aid to Ethiopia, encompassing most security sector programs, despite Ethiopian denials of the accusations propagated by international organizations and its ally, the United States.

Abiy Ahmed recognized violations committed by Eritrean and Ethiopian soldiers but stated that the Eritrean government condemned these violations, assuring that investigations are underway to hold accountable the Ethiopian soldiers involved in abuses against civilians in Tigray. Abiy Ahmed’s statements marked the first acknowledgment of Eritrean forces’ participation in the conflict, yet he clarified that these forces would withdraw once Ethiopian troops regained control over the border.

Countries with substantial investments in Ethiopia, like China and France, are increasingly concerned about recent developments. These implications may compel nations currently seeking to develop strategic ties with Addis Ababa to reassess their policies and strategies, recognizing that the region is no longer safe—a concern dominating both Ankara and Moscow, which seek to establish military bases in Eritrea and Sudan and forge economic partnerships with Ethiopia, alongside the European Union’s apprehension about the rise in irregular migration towards Europe, particularly from countries in the region (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia).

The conflict’s implications and dimensions in Tigray appear as an open-ended cycle on all fronts. If Abiy Ahmed does not revert to a policy of openness that previously gained him significant political, local, and regional victories—especially with the Tigrayan community—and fails to provide them with greater reassurance and trust, the current calm in the region may transform into a new storm against the Ethiopian government, potentially reigniting revolutions among the Oromo and Amhara communities, particularly those sympathetic to the young opposition leader, Jawar Mohammed. Additionally, other constitutional disputes about the legitimacy of the current Ethiopian government extend beyond its constitutional term.

Scenarios for the Outcomes of the Conflict in Ethiopia

The military conflict in northern Ethiopia has imposed variables and circumstances on the Horn of Africa, with the political and military implications in Ethiopia seeming to trend toward various scenarios that can be summarized as follows:

• Scenario 1: Ethnic Federalism or Authoritarian Centralism
  In this scenario, modern Ethiopia under Abiy Ahmed may pivot towards an authoritarian model that reinstates individual dominance over the political and administrative framework in Addis Ababa. The prime minister’s philosophy strives to establish a political system based on citizenship rather than ethnic affiliation, which he believes has brought the country to the brink of collapse. Yet, this vision has been challenged by the power dynamics between the center and the peripheries, as the central governance sways towards northern elite interests. Thus, the confrontation between the ethnic federalist movement and the new reformist trend led by Abiy Ahmed may become inevitable over time.
• Scenario 2: Popular Protest Revolution
  The ongoing discontent and political upheaval mark a prevailing theme in modern Ethiopian history, which could repeat anytime. The ramifications of the Tigray military conflict, alongside refugee crises at the Ethiopian-Sudanese border, could spark new armed developments. If new uprisings were to erupt, suppressing them would not offer a viable solution to the rising public anger resulted from alleged rights violations committed by Eritrean and Ethiopian forces.
• Scenario 3: Disintegration and Balkanization
  The Tigray crisis reflects the potential failure of the Ethiopian state due to the consequences of internal political and military conflicts. Analysts have suggested that Ethiopia may fall into disintegration akin to a new Yugoslavia in the Horn of Africa because of complex political, constitutional, and military conditions in Ethiopia. The absence of a negotiating framework and national reconciliation transitioning from ethnic federalism to an alternative governance model—potentially strengthening central authority and sovereignty—could lead to renewed failures. Additionally, conducting elections under current conditions may complicate Ethiopia’s administrative, economic, and security issues and heighten internal tensions, possibly leading to new revolts that could undermine not only Abiy Ahmed’s aspirations but also threaten the stability and security of Ethiopia for years to come.

Conclusion

The issue of democratic transition and peaceful power transfer in ethnically fragmented African societies, particularly those that have suffered under dictatorships, remains an ongoing discussion. Ethiopia’s present state is inextricably linked to its tumultuous past, as half a century of internal turmoil threatens the foundational integrity of the country’s security, economy, and essential political framework. Following popular protests in Addis Ababa and surrounding regions, particularly in the Amhara and Oromo regions, the same scenario may impose itself in the upcoming phase, alongside the consequences of the conflict that has undermined TPLF’s influence. Moreover, the accumulated crises on a regional level, such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and border disputes with Sudan, in addition to internal ethnic conflicts that have recently resurfaced, especially between the Amhara and Afar communities—these factors seemingly usher Ethiopia into multiple crossroads.

During the political and security crises Ethiopia has faced since 1974, the United States has been a behind-the-scenes player, and its role is increasingly relied upon to curtail the political chaos among Ethiopian political factions and ethnic groups. The U.S. has historically served as a strategic ally for Ethiopia, yet shifts in the Horn of Africa and the emergence of major global players like China and France have rendered Ethiopia uncertain, balancing traditional ally interests with the endeavors of new international players, including Turkey and Russia. Thus, the absence of stable internal policies in Ethiopia could herald the re-emergence of old crises, and the onset of new ones no less severe than previous ones.

The future of democratic governance, as opposed to ethnic federalism, in Abiy Ahmed’s vision relies on the magnitude of the risks surrounding it and the extent to which the Ethiopian Prime Minister comprehends these security and political risks. Should the “strong man” not adopt more open policies or facilitate genuine dialogue with opposition leaders and ethnic factions to foster a genuine reconciliation among Ethiopia’s peoples and ethnic groups, internal ramifications will inevitably ensue, adversely impacting Ethiopia’s external policies and threatening its social fabric and economy, which it currently hinges on for renewed revival.

References

• “The Tigray Conflict: Ethiopia’s Civil War and Its Regional Fallout” by Alex de Waal

• “Ethiopia’s Tigray Conflict: Roots, Repercussions, and the Future” by Kjetil Tronvoll

• “War and Peace in the Horn of Africa: The Tigray Conflict in Context” by Martin Plaut

• “Ethnic Federalism and Conflict in Ethiopia: The Tigray Crisis” by Sarah Vaughan

• “The Horn of Africa on Fire: The Impact of the Tigray War” by Gerard Prunier

• “African Regional Security and the Tigray Conflict” by Berouk Mesfin

• “Humanitarian Crisis in Tigray: The Role of International Actors” by Ann Fitz-Gerald

• “Tigray and the Ethiopian State: From Autonomy to Conflict” by Dereje Feyissa

• “Conflict and Survival in Ethiopia: Understanding the Tigray Crisis” by Terrence Lyons

• “From Political Tensions to Armed Conflict: The Tigray Crisis and Its Repercussions” by René Lefort