In his book “Three Dangerous Men,” defense expert Seth Jones posits a critical idea that the United States is wholly unprepared for the future of global competition. While Washington focused on building fighter jets, missiles, and conventional combat capabilities, its main rivals—Russia, Iran, and China—increasingly embraced unconventional warfare, which included cyberattacks, the use of proxy militias, propaganda, espionage, and disinformation to undermine American power.
The author provides insights into three pioneers of unconventional warfare in Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing who adapted American methods and made substantial gains without waging a traditional war. These figures are Russian Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov, the late Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, and Chinese Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia.
Each of these men dedicated their careers to studying American power and devised various techniques to avoid a conventional or nuclear war with the United States. Gerasimov oversaw the revival of Russian unconventional warfare, including attempts to undermine the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections. Soleimani was highly effective in expanding Iranian influence in the Middle East to the extent that Washington targeted him in an assassination operation. Zhang Youxia represents the most concerning challenge, as China possesses greater power and capabilities at its disposal.
Drawing on interviews with dozens of U.S. military officials, diplomats, and intelligence agents, as well as hundreds of documents translated from Russian, Persian, and Mandarin, Jones illustrates how America’s adversaries have tarnished its reputation and seized territory around the world. Rather than standing against such authoritarian regimes, the United States has largely abandoned the type of information, covert operations, intelligence, and economic and diplomatic engagements that previously helped win the Cold War.
Gerasimov and the Russian Expansion:
The Russian military intelligence unit tracks one of Moscow’s most influential leaders, General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Gerasimov graduated from the Higher Tank Command School in Kazan in 1977, a time when the prospects for a conventional and nuclear war with the United States diminished due to exorbitant costs and fears of nuclear holocaust. Instead, under Gerasimov’s leadership, the Soviet Union resorted to “active measures” to compete with the superpower, targeting the American interior with tactics such as deception, forgery, and lobbying groups, used in conjunction with traditional espionage to weaken the United States and expand Moscow’s influence.
For years, American and European intelligence agencies have been increasingly alarmed by Russian activities, as Russian military and intelligence agencies seized Crimea through unconventional means, initiated a war in Eastern Ukraine with the help of separatists, collaborated with Hezbollah and other forces in Syria, executed hacking operations and electoral interference against U.S. presidential elections, and deployed private military contractors in nearly thirty countries across four continents.
Soleimani and the Iranian Rise:
The author begins by providing a synopsis of Qassem Soleimani, who was born in the impoverished city of Rabor on March 11, 1957. After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Soleimani joined the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He rose to prominence with the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan, causing clear concern in Iran. During this period, the United States and Iran found common ground against a shared enemy (the Taliban), and the U.S. engaged in direct negotiations with the Iranians as part of the Geneva Initiative, which included Iran, the U.S., Italy, Germany, with the United Nations as the convenor.
In early 2002, U.S.-Iran relations deteriorated significantly for two reasons. The first was President George W. Bush’s statement categorizing Iran, along with North Korea and Iraq, as states sponsoring terrorism and producing weapons of mass destruction. The second reason revolved around al-Qaeda, where Iran, under Soleimani’s direction, employed an asymmetrical approach and chose to work with al-Qaeda to balance the greater threat from the United States.
This marked the beginning of Iran’s clear unconventional war against the United States, initiated by the American invasion of Iraq, which Jones described as a gift from the U.S. to Iran—Soleimani seized the opportunity to support Iraq’s Shiite majority and target vulnerable American forces. Iran capitalized on American miscalculations. Similarly, Soleimani expanded Iranian influence throughout the region in direct competition with the U.S. and its allies, through Iranian proxies.
When Donald Trump assumed the U.S. presidency in 2017, he shifted his focus to Iran. The following year, Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal and reimposed sanctions as part of a “maximum pressure” campaign. By 2020, senior officials in Trump’s administration concluded that the benefits of killing General Qassem Soleimani outweighed any potential risks, as Soleimani was drastically expanding Iran’s power and influence through a network of militias in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and other countries.
Youxia and Chinese Influence:
One of the three dangerous men is Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of China, and one of China’s senior military officers with combat experience. Unlike Valery Gerasimov and Qassem Soleimani, Zhang lacked a charismatic personality. Born in July 1950 into a distinguished family, he was the son of a significant influential official in the Communist Party. In May 1969, Zhang joined the Chinese Communist Party—a crucial step for rising within the Chinese military.
Alongside the Chinese president and other Chinese leaders, Zhang helped oversee Beijing’s campaign against the U.S., which included misinformation, espionage to steal some of the U.S.’s most advanced technologies, waging economic war, expanding Chinese maritime influence, and controlling territory using militias and other paramilitary forces.
As a result of the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Central Military Commission approved a core concept for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) known as “the Three Wars.” This included three components: public opinion warfare, which involved using broadcasting, print media, and online efforts to influence domestic and international public opinion in ways that support Chinese interests and undermine its competitors; psychological warfare, designed for military purposes, aimed at undermining enemy morale, dismantling their will to fight, igniting anti-war sentiments among domestic citizens, and increasing international and domestic conflict; and legal warfare, involving the exploitation of international and domestic law to assert the legitimacy of Chinese claims.
Perhaps the most notable example of China’s unconventional war against the United States is the exploitation of the COVID-19 pandemic, wherein Chinese government agents sent texts to Americans on their mobile phones and spread false information on social media, warning that the Trump administration was about to deploy American soldiers to shut the country down. Chinese officials also propagated lies and conspiracy theories on social media, including claims that the American military caused the virus outbreak in Wuhan.
American Countermeasures:
In the conclusion of his book, Jones outlines key steps that the United States must take to change its mindset regarding competition before it is too late. He notes that the United States today is in a period somewhat reminiscent of the early years of the Cold War.
Although U.S. foreign policy is undergoing a catastrophic shift from combating terrorist groups to competing with illiberal powers over the past two decades, the U.S. has the capabilities to combat disinformation, economic coercion, and espionage—as demonstrated during the Cold War. However, Americans need to recognize the need to change competition rules from globalization to technology and from the internet and social media to robotics, artificial intelligence, and nanotechnology.
The author discusses that the principles and objectives guiding U.S. foreign policy should be connected to the country’s democratic values, and American policy must leverage all tools of power, including military, diplomatic, financial, developmental, intelligence, and ideological, as follows:
Align U.S. principles with its foreign policy: The most important step in competition is to reshape U.S. foreign policy based on the foundational principles of the United States, which have been in place since its inception. Current competition largely revolves around a struggle between political, economic, and military systems, considering that China, Russia, and Iran are all non-democratic states that shun free markets and free press. Thus, they aim to undermine American democratic institutions domestically, weaken U.S. power and influence abroad, and spread authoritarian principles worldwide. To overcome this, the U.S. must ensure its foreign policy is consistent with its core principles; for example, liberal democracy should not be imposed through military force to topple regimes.
The other aspect involves a better understanding of how China, Russia, and Iran see the future and recognizing what their goals are, the primary tools they use, exploitable weaknesses, and more. On the flip side, for instance, Beijing invests significant resources in translating and exploring facets of American culture and politics, while the U.S. fails to adequately learn the language of its adversaries, a role compensated for by Confucius Institutes in Beijing in American university campuses. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the vast shortage of translated materials from Chinese to English, significantly impacting the understanding of how Chinese perspectives change over time.
To address this issue, Jones suggests creating an open-source information service with Congressional assistance, focusing on translating materials related to its primary competitors and making them accessible to the public. Additionally, he recommends increasing resources allocated to teaching its diplomats, soldiers, and spies the languages, history, politics, and cultures of China, Russia, and Persia, with a primary focus on China.
Influence Operations – Offense and Defense: The U.S. government lacks a comprehensive campaign or media organization to combat Russian, Iranian, and Chinese propaganda and disinformation, unlike during the Cold War, where the U.S. administration took media campaigns seriously and nearly doubled the budget of the U.S. Information Agency, which was later closed in 1999. Jones argues that effective irregular campaigns require both defensive and offensive operations, as the U.S. needs to conduct offensive media operations against Russia, Iran, and China to bolster American interests and deter adversaries from aggressive actions. This can be achieved by focusing on three key aspects: First, enhance the strengths of American democracy and encourage reforms in Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing. Second, the U.S. and its partners should proactively highlight examples of malicious activity, human rights violations, and corruption by their adversaries. Third, leverage defectors and immigrants from China, Russia, and Iran—including intellectuals and scholars— for media campaigns.
Allies and Partners: Finally, effective competition will not be possible without active support from the United States’ allies and partners. For instance, Australia blocked the purchase of Huawei 5G communications equipment for its national network and has been an outspoken critic of China’s human rights violations and anti-democratic practices, further bolstering the U.S. position. It is logical that the U.S. should train, advise, and assist governmental and non-governmental actors worldwide to counterbalance Russia, Iran, and China.
Source:
SETH G. JONES, THREE DANGEROUS MEN: RUSSIA, CHINA, IRAN, AND THE RISE OF IRREGULAR WARFARE, First Edition, W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., London, 2021.
