The African continent is characterized by military intervention in politics, as evidenced by the phenomenon of coups that have persisted throughout its history. In the last four years alone, Africa has witnessed approximately 14 attempted coups, eight of which were successful. Undoubtedly, the factors that have driven African armies to seize power vary from case to case, but they demonstrate that armies are significant actors in the political life of Africa, either directly (taking power) or indirectly, especially in contexts marked by weak civil authority and societal division.
Military intervention in politics has long been a focal point of study in the field of civil-military relations. In the case of Africa, various explanations have been offered, attributing the phenomenon sometimes to the weakness of modern civil institutions inherited from colonialism, sometimes to divisive cultural structures, and at other times to the failure of development and political modernization policies. A fourth explanation links coups to international conflict over the continent. Over the past two decades, the persistence of coups has also been associated with additional factors, such as the failure of democratic transitions due to electoral manipulation, the increasing role of rebellion and separatist movements, and terrorism, alongside disruptive transformations in the international system.
This paper will introduce the main approaches that have addressed the phenomenon of military intervention in politics in Africa. It posits that military intervention is a global phenomenon, present in most countries, whether democratic or authoritarian, with the difference lying not in the existence of the phenomenon itself but in the level of statehood from one context to another.
Accordingly, the paper will first examine the key approaches discussing military intervention in African politics, especially those explaining the recent wave of coups, through a critical lens aimed at deconstructing these approaches based on their epistemological and political backgrounds. In a second section, we will test the validity of the hypothesis we advocate, which claims that military intervention in politics increases in cases of weak statehood and decreases in instances of strong statehood, using objective indicators to measure statehood, guided by key studies on the phenomenon, particularly those by Georg Sørensen.
First: Military Intervention in Politics: A Critical Approach
Recent studies on military coups in Africa largely converge on various factors that can be distilled into three explanatory theses:
- Linking Coups to Democratic Regression
Democracy has been in decline globally, according to The Economist’s 2023 index; the global average for democracy has fallen to 5.23 on a scale of ten, the lowest level since 2006. Africa is one region where democracy has receded, as evidenced by a troubling decline in the average credibility of elections. Recently, another challenge to the move towards democracy in the continent has emerged, namely evasion of presidential term limits in several countries, particularly those that experienced military coups, asserting that these issues are “two sides of the same coin.”
Several arguments could underscore this connection, as fourteen African leaders have maintained power for over two presidential terms. This trend has been observed since 2015 and intensified after 2020. Eight African countries have experienced military coups that led to the suspension or disruption of constitutional governance. Notably, military authorities evade commitment to relinquishing power or establishing a specified transitional period, and in some cases, they do not adhere to announced timeframes for transferring power to civilians, as seen in Mali.
Proponents of this thesis assert that unconstitutional measures taken by civil authorities (such as evading term limits) or constitutional amendments for the sake of prolonging rule (as occurred in Gabon) produce other unconstitutional measures, namely military coups. However, this does not imply that military coups in this context are merely a correct and reformist reaction; individuals who executed coups in Chad, Gabon, Sudan, and Zimbabwe were part of the system itself or its allies, suggesting a continuity of the same regime, albeit in different forms.
It is worth noting that around thirty out of fifty-four African countries operate without constitutional constraints on presidential tenure. For those fourteen leaders evading designated term limits in recent years, the average duration in office reached sixteen years, which could extend to twenty-six years if accounting adjustments are made in favor of maintaining the same regime, as seen in Algeria and Burundi.
This means linking coups to evasion of term limits or non-adherence to them, where previously established in the constitution, may not provide a strong enough rationale to explain the recent wave of coups in Africa. The cases of Mali and Niger reinforce this counter-argument; in both instances, the coups were justified by the need to halt democratic processes under the guise of deteriorating security and stability, rather than failure to adhere to constitutional or term limit stipulations.
- Weak Military Professionalism
Coups can be explained by a strong inclination among armies to seize power due to a lack of professionalism and training. In this context, Colonel Émile Ouedraogo’s study provides an insightful interpretation of the relationship between diminished professionalism in armies and their inclination to topple civil authority. This thesis draws from the writings of Samuel Huntington, which Colonel Ouedraogo sought to revive in his attempt to understand the recent wave of coups in Africa.
Professionalism implies the subjugation of the military to democratic civil authority, loyalty to the state, commitment to political neutrality, and a moral institutional culture. These principles are embodied in values that characterize the behavior of a professional soldier, such as discipline, integrity, honor, commitment, service, sacrifice, and duty. These values thrive within an organization with clear mission goals, authority lines, accountability, and protocol.
Military education serves as the primary channel for instilling principles of professionalism and democratizing values, particularly fostering the rule of law, especially in conflict situations. Recruitment systems and promotion regulations aim to achieve the same goal. The more principles of merit, competence, transparency, and neutrality are reinforced during recruitment and training at military academies or throughout career progression, the more the military institution can institutionalize its professionalism, thereby strengthening democratic principles in civil-military relations.
Conversely, when recruitment patterns tend to be regional, ethnic, or religious, as is evident in some African armies, that breeds deviance within both the military and security forces, establishing a military leadership more loyal to the president than the constitution, making them a constant participant in political conflicts between opposition forces and those in power. Therefore, professionalism and expertise are bolstered through the cultivation of trustworthy civil-military relationships.
However, linking a lack of military professionalism to coups in Africa may not entirely suffice to understand the phenomenon. While it is true that professionalism stands out as a peculiar challenge for African armies due to colonial legacies that positioned suppression of citizens and preservation of regimes as primary objectives for security and military forces—essentially a political mission—this has entrenched military and security forces as actors in political conflicts around power.
It is critical to remember that professionalism is not exclusively an African issue; evidence of this can be drawn from a significant document released in September 2022 by thirteen American defense ministers and chairs of joint chiefs of staff, entitled “Principles of Civilian Oversight and Best Practices for Civil-Military Relations,” in the wake of doubts surrounding the legitimacy of the 2020 presidential elections that resulted in Joe Biden’s victory over Donald Trump, amid the Capitol riot and the unprecedented deployment of U.S. military personnel to the streets.
In summary, the distinction does not only lie in levels of professionalism but also in the strength and balance of institutions, reflective of the robustness of legal and institutional cultures within particular societies.
- The Role of External Actors
Coups are subject to rational calculation, according to researcher Joseph Siegel; ultimately, they result from “calm, objective assessments of benefits versus costs.” The benefits lie in seizing power forcefully and gaining unfettered access to state resources, thus merging power and wealth into one entity. These enticing advantages render coups appealing, while the costs, such as failure or imprisonment, can often be mitigated through strategic military and security arrangements.
In essence, coup plotters seize upon the opportunity for rebellion when they believe that benefits outweigh costs and that they can evade penalties at minimal expense, particularly regarding international relations.
Notably in the African context, international and regional powers play a crucial role in facilitating coups, especially when they accept diplomatic engagement with new military authorities instead of imposing sanctions or boycotting them. In many instances, international powers prioritize their interests over values, treating coups as unfortunate yet natural means of power transfer in a continent like Africa.
According to Siegel, coups persist when they are recognized; conversely, should international and regional actors refuse to acknowledge them, coup leaders find themselves politically isolated, complicating matters further when they are barred from accessing the country’s sovereign financial accounts.
The African Union’s policy of non-intervention falls within this framework, rendering coup leaders in Africa unconcerned about external costs. Since 2000, the AU has demonstrated a form of indifference towards coups, thereby safeguarding military councils from suspension of membership, sanctions, or threats of intervention. Union stances concerning recent coups on the continent have underscored this trend.
This situation allows for the assertion that the rise in coup occurrences reflects a declining readiness among international and regional actors to impose anti-coup rules. Furthermore, some Arab powers, such as the UAE and Egypt, have begun to view coups as opportunities to reinforce their regional influence in East Africa.
In Sudan, the struggle appears intense between supporters of the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces, with both sides seeking to advance their regional ambitions, often at the expense of the security and stability of Sudan. Likewise, Russian military activities through the African Corps (formerly Wagner) align with this view, enhancing Russian influence in the Red Sea’s strategic importance and, more broadly, in Africa, against American and European interests.
Second: Low Levels of Statehood as the Core Issue
The previous three explanations converge on one key issue: the weakness of statehood due to power domination over the state. This means that the state, as a social and institutional construct forming the basis for national consensus and agreement, remains an unfinished project in Africa. Meanwhile, power, as a sphere of competition and conflict, dominates the current landscape. Such is the essence of weak statehood, as articulated by Georg Sørensen.
Weak statehood leads to power domination, whereby a specific faction or elite rules through violence against opposition, allocating advantages, resources, and rents based on loyalty. This situation results in a weakening of the rule of law, civic values, and the common good, fostering conflicts and revengeful values among competing elites. Hence, when opposition elites rise through a coup or other means, they reproduce the same values, perpetuating a cycle of conflict. In such a conflict-ridden environment, where the culture and values of statehood are absent, aspiring forces—whether military or civilian, especially with foreign ties—easily manipulate the constitution and institutions, thus facilitating coups, whether civilian or military or a blend of both.
The fragility of statehood values and culture in Africa reveals itself in three primary dimensions:
- Weak National Integration
The dominance of power over the state encourages the prevailing elite to entrench themselves within tribal, ethnic, or sectarian contexts, rather than seeking broad legitimacy within society at large, thus shifting competition from the realm of power to the societal sphere. Ultimately, this leads to the erosion of national cohesion and integration. This situation reflects the limited political achievements of post-independence states in establishing a cohesive society grounded in citizenship, bound by shared emotional values and a collective identity, despite ethnic, religious, or linguistic diversity. This phenomenon politically indicates the absence of a national project among the ruling elites who have dominated post-independence states in Africa. These elites have relied on violence to monopolize power, sidelining the symbolic and ethical foundations of governance across domains like thought, education, media, and culture. Consequently, they have lost the ability to forge a shared history or establish common symbols carrying similar meaning within the consciousness of the people, solidified through music, arts, and diverse literature.
The impacts of these fundamental disruptions are reflected in two areas:
Firstly, the authorities’ control over state institutions results in prioritizing security and military agencies at the expense of other civil institutions within the state. Secondly, the ongoing affirmation of sub-identities (ethnic, religious, regional…) persists, not solely as a tool for authoritarian rulers’ “divide and conquer” strategy, but as a protective environment for individuals and groups against state violence. This role notably amplifies during rebellions and upheavals, when authority weakens, thereby asserting sub-identities through all available means, including forging alliances with rebel groups or organized crime syndicates. This observation has been noted by German researcher Wolfram Lacher since 2012 and remains actively evident in examining the complexities of relationships between states, tribal affiliations, and organized crime in the Sahel and Sahara region.
- Lack of Effective Institutions
The absence of effective institutions indicates the weakness of the state and its inability to exert control over its entire national territory—land, sea, and air—by formulating and implementing public policies from the center to the region’s peripheries. The lack of efficient and competent institutions underscores the incompleteness of the state-building project, often leading to political power being perceived as a spoils system, wherein policies and institutions are managed for the benefit of a specific faction, ethnicity, or tribal group, rather than for the majority of the community and supported by them.
The consequences of this situation are evident in the diminished legal legitimacy of political institutions in Africa, subsequently eroding their cultural legitimacy and trust from individuals and groups regarding their efficiency. Effectiveness in this context implies a competent, effective, and politically neutral bureaucracy, which serves as an indicator of professional governance as a state apparatus, alongside a political elite capable of mobilizing and leading, while differentiating between the realm of political power struggles—that is permissible and normal—and the realm of consensus around the state, which is necessary and vital.
When the state bureaucracy is weak, it becomes prone to corruption, making it easy for political elites to turn state agencies and institutions into sources of personal wealth, consequently impairing state performance in fulfilling its public functions, such as providing goods and services for all citizens. This leads to two outcomes:
Firstly, individuals turn to alternative entities for protection instead of the state (tribe, ethnicity, sect…), a phenomenon systematically observed in the Sahel and Sahara region. Secondly, the bond of rights and duties between the people and the state weakens, hindering the development and maturation of political loyalty ties that enhance the state’s legitimacy and credibility.
- Lack of a Cohesive National Economy
The weaknesses in national integration, ineffective institutions, and lack of efficiency also affect the economy; African states typically fail to establish a cohesive national economy capable of providing essential necessities for citizens, such as food, medicine, and security. This deficiency often drives the authorities controlling the state to rely on external forces and traditional economies, such as agriculture and raw materials, while they may turn a blind eye to illegal economies like smuggling and narcotics.
Overall, African economies appear unidirectional, relying on exporting primary products in exchange for importing more developed goods. In sub-Saharan Africa, primary products constitute around 80 to 90% of total exports, underscoring substantial structural flaws in the African economic landscape.
Unquestionably, the economies of African states are predominantly characterized as unstructured, fragmented, and unresponsive to societal priorities and needs, compounding the situation where individuals focus on agricultural, pastoral, and raw material economies to barely secure a livelihood. This results in African states being classified as generally economically underdeveloped, as most specialize in primary product production, exhibit a weak industrial sector with outdated tools of production, and struggle with limited capital and minimal foreign investment, alongside escalating debt service burdens. Consequently, national income and per capita income have seen a significant decline, with the United Nations reporting in 2021 that Africa houses 46 of the world’s least developed countries.
Conclusion
In essence, the military coups witnessed across the African continent in recent years, particularly in West, Central, and East Africa, have unveiled several fundamental flaws in the African state. The deficiencies in professionalism and efficacy within the state institutions, including the military, the lack of established traditions in civil-military relations, and the manipulations of external powers, terrorism, and organized crime regarding stability and security in the continent, represent only a handful of manifestations of a larger issue embodied in the weakness of statehood.
Indeed, the state-building project in Africa remains unfinished, with manifestations of this deficiency evident in weak national integration, ineffective and competent institutions, and structural economic flaws lacking modernization, coherence, and consistency. These structural impediments thus far obstruct the advancement of democratic progress and undermine the establishment of the rule of law and citizenship.
It can be said that weak statehood allows external pressures to transform into direct intervention and renders elections—fundamental for any democratic transition—an opportunity for deepening tribal and ethnic conflicts, instead of serving as a chance to rebuild political consensus among elites vying for power. Notably, the period marked by the advancement of democratic movements witnessed two critical developments:
Firstly, it enabled ethnic, tribal, and sectarian groups to become more entrenched, leading to increased ethnic and tribal conflicts. Secondly, it saw the simplification of democracy into elections orchestrated under external pressure from aid donors, often destabilizing security and stability.
Thus, the primary recommendation of this paper is to restore significance to the state as an innovative amalgamation of values, behaviors, and institutions; as Francis Fukuyama himself advocated, “Before you can achieve democracy or economic development, you must have a state.” However, we must recognize that establishing an effective state within a short timeframe is a difficult and unrealistic option, as demonstrated by various models like Somalia, Libya, and Sudan. Therefore, preserving the state—however fragile—remains far preferable to its absence since development and progress upon an existing structure is a more rational and less costly option than seeking what does not exist and needs to be formed anew.
