By Mohamed Hossam Hafez
Translated by Mohamed SAKHRI
The last weeks of 2024 have brought monumental changes to the Syrian situation, triggered by events in Gaza and Lebanon. On December 8, 2024, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fled to Russia, while his large military and security forces vanished unexpectedly, abandoning their bases and weapons. These developments and accompanying agreements allowed allied factions under the “Military Operations Management Room,” with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as its most organized core, to enter Damascus without a fight that day.
These factions began their offensive on November 27, 2024, in operations dubbed “Deterring Aggression,” with the declared aim of delivering a preemptive strike against the Syrian regime and its allies, including the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian militias supporting the government. The military operations were the culmination of intense preparations lasting at least two years, resulting in medium to high-intensity battles in two primary axes: the western Aleppo countryside and eastern Idlib, which quickly escalated and led to the regime’s collapse in Damascus within less than twelve days.
Syria appeared to have exhausted all its resources from enduring a long suffering under a regime described as a bloody dictatorship that lasted over half a century. The surrounding Arab and regional environment also suffered under the Assad regime, particularly as he used provocation and extortion as central tools in his dealings with neighbors and other regional powers. The recent turn brought forth a surprisingly swift liberation operation, driven not only by internal factors but also by deep international and regional interactions.
Context Surrounding the Start of Operations
The timing for launching the “Deterring Aggression” operations was strategically chosen, coinciding with a mature internal, regional, and international context that enhanced its chances for success. Significant internal changes were driven by the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and repeated Israeli strikes on party or Iranian militia bases in various regions of Syria.
Concerning Russia, it had to divert most of its military and logistical resources to the war in Ukraine, which drained its capabilities significantly, reflected in its retreat from influence over the battlefield since 2015. Large portions of Russian forces and military experts were withdrawn, with the number of Russian military sites decreasing from 132 to 105 between 2022 and 2023, focusing on coastal areas near its bases in Hmeimim and Tartus. Russia also reduced its presence in southern areas like Daraa and Quneitra (though it did redeploy some during the Israeli war on Lebanon). The ambiguity of statements from its political leadership, such as Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov regarding rapid developments in Syria—“What the expectations will be? I cannot guess. We are not in a guessing game”—implied that Russia was no longer inclined to defend the Assad regime, although Russian aircraft carried out limited bombing operations at the beginning of the offensive, especially in Aleppo and its outskirts.
Iran, naturally, maintained a larger military presence compared to other foreign powers, with Iranian militias dispersed throughout areas controlled by Syrian forces, numbering at least 65,000 fighters, including 11,000 Syrians and around 18,000 from Arab and Asian nationalities. These militias operated from 55 bases and 515 military points in Syria. The commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hossein Salami, acknowledged in 2020 that the total number exceeded 100,000 in about 70 militias. The decision by Iran to withdraw its militias from their positions amid the “Deterring Aggression” operations contributed significantly to the exposure and decline of Syrian regime forces.
The operations began just hours after the implementation of a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah. The latter had suffered heavy losses over nearly two months of fighting, which included almost the entirety of its senior leadership, notably its secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah and his successor, Hashem Safi al-Din. A significant amount of the party’s military capabilities were also destroyed, compelling it to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), which entails its withdrawal north of the Litani River, a position it had previously absolutely refused.
The situation for Hezbollah worsened after Nasrallah’s death, coupled with ongoing Israeli strikes specifically targeting ground crossings between Syria and Lebanon, disrupting the party’s supply route and penetrating the intelligence shield around them. Morale waned among its personnel in Syria, creating a conducive battlefield context that provided the “Deterring Aggression” operation with an ideal opportunity to achieve rapid and decisive objectives.
Military Operations and Rapid Liberation
The signing of a ceasefire agreement in Idlib in March 2020 between Syrian revolutionary factions and regime forces had calmed extensive military operations, but HTS began restructuring its forces over the following years into a “conventional armed force,” enhancing military training and establishing special units for night raids, in preparation for any potential escalation. Their control over the regional economy and crossing points with Turkey afforded them significant financial leverage and maneuverability.
Meanwhile, the Assad regime faced a rapid economic decline as a result of international sanctions, particularly from the United States through the Caesar Act, alongside the spreading organized corruption transforming the Syrian governance structure into a mafia-like regime led by Bashar and Maher al-Assad. The latter transformed a significant portion of the Fourth Division and the Republican Guard into extensive drug production lines, leading to Syria being labeled the “largest drug state in the world” for its reliance on captagon trade to finance corrupt elites and military leaders.
Tensions escalated towards the end of 2023 when HTS intensified its skirmish attacks against government forces. By October 2024, military preparations peaked amid large mobilizations on both sides in the Aleppo countryside. On November 26, 2024, regime forces bombed the city of Ariha, resulting in 16 deaths and injuries, reigniting the conflict.
On November 27, 2024, the formation of a joint operations room titled “Deterring Aggression” was announced in response to the government bombardment that killed 30 civilians. In the early hours of the attack, the combined forces seized control of 20 towns and villages in western Aleppo, including the major towns of Orum al-Kubra, Orum al-Sughra, and Kubtan al-Jabal. They also gained control of the government’s “46th Regimen” military base. Casualties were significant, with 37 government soldiers and 60 from the operations room lost, while a Russian unit fell into an ambush, resulting in the death of a Russian soldier.
The government and Russian forces retaliated with airstrikes on opposition positions, targeting areas such as Atarb and Darat Azza, leading to numerous civilian casualties. By November 28, the operational room forces, primarily HTS, continued their advance in Idlib and Aleppo, including control of the M5 highway and attacking Aleppo Airport. The next day, the opposition launched a major assault within the city of Aleppo, capturing districts such as al-Hamdaniyah, New Aleppo, and Salah al-Din. By the end of the day, they had controlled half of the city, including Aleppo Citadel. The advance persisted as government forces withdrew southward, abandoning significant military equipment including tanks and aircraft.
Once HTS secured complete control over Aleppo post-government withdrawal, it continued expanding into other areas, capturing dozens of villages and cities in Idlib, including Saraqib and Maarrat al-Numan, while the government retreated into small pockets. In Hama, the opposition rapidly advanced, taking key towns such as Kafr Zita and Qala’at al-Mudhiq. In Homs, where the regime had mobilized its forces that fled or retreated from the north, the operation room forces largely avoided large battles, instead moving into towns like Taldou and Rastan with minimal resistance.
Following its capture of Aleppo, the “Deterring Aggression” forces advanced toward northern Hama, amid a significant retreat of Syrian regime forces, ultimately taking Hama after fierce battles that incurred numerous casualties among the attacking forces at the fortified Zain al-Abidin Mountain. Despite the previous valiant efforts and martyrdom attacks by the attacking forces failing to change the battle course, the military adjusted tactics, circumventing the mountain to penetrate through other neighborhoods in Hama.
On the first day, they seized strategically vital towns and villages, including Kafr Zita, al-Latamna, and Morek on the M5 highway, approaching Hama city within 20 kilometers. The battle concluded on December 5, 2024, with the opposition fully controlling Hama and liberating hundreds of prisoners from Hama Central Prison, while preparations began for the next battle in Homs.
The Battle of Hama was regarded as a pivotal turning point in the war, described as the “real decisive battle” for Syria’s future. It can be said that the battles in Hama were among the fiercest between the “Deterring Aggression” operations room and regime forces, with no effective presence from the Russian air force in supporting regime forces, unlike its prior intensive involvement against opposition forces.
The opposition’s control over Hama was a crushing blow to the regime, given its significant symbolic and historical importance for both sides and its strategic location leading toward the coastal cities, which the regime viewed as its core strongholds. Through this control, the fighters of the “Deterring Aggression” operations room extended their influence over the towns of Mahardah and Salmiyah after reaching agreements with local residents and dignitaries.
After liberating Hama on December 5, 2024, opposition forces advanced toward Homs, positioning themselves about 40 kilometers away. Regime forces withdrew from the towns of Rastan and Talbiseh, while the opposition executed drone strikes against the 26th Air Defense Division near the town of Tiry Maala, seizing an engineering battalion facility near Rastan and acquiring military vehicles and ammunition. Following this, Russian aircraft conducted air strikes targeting the vicinity of Rastan, while the Syrian army launched artillery barrages on Talbiseh. The regime attempted to reinforce its positions by sending a massive military convoy to Homs and erecting earthen barriers on the highway between Hama and Homs. On December 6, the opposition took control of Rastan, Talbiseh, al-Dar al-Kabira, and al-Ghanto, while regime forces withdrew from several towns north of Homs, including Tiry Maala, Za’franha, and Dayr Ful. Despite the regime retaining control of the international road, its forces experienced opposition strikes that caused significant human losses.
The following day, the opposition seized the town of al-Qaryatayn after the regime withdrew from Palmyra and Tiyas Airport, cutting the regime’s supplies via the al-Bukamal crossing. Meanwhile, the operations room forces launched a general assault on Homs, capturing the engineering battalion in al-Mushirfa, advancing toward the Deir Baalba neighborhood, seizing control of the 26th Air Defense Division, along with surrounding villages of Talbiseh, leading to the fall of the vital Moulouk barrier south of Talbiseh. By the evening of December 7, the opposition had taken over the northern and western neighborhoods of Homs, including the military hospital and the military academy, releasing 3,500 detainees from the central prison. As Hezbollah and regime forces retreated from the city, the attacking forces entered the governorate building and security branches. By the morning of December 8, the opposition had fully secured Homs, except for some Alawite neighborhoods, while senior officers fled to the coast via Shayrat Airport.
Meanwhile, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) maintained control over Deir ez-Zor and the al-Bukamal crossing, following the withdrawal of regime forces and the militias deployed there into Iraqi territory.
The Fall of the Regime in Damascus
The events leading to the liberation of Damascus on December 8 accelerated dramatically, as opposition forces entered Homs, specifically the day before, the Syrian Operations Room announced the beginning of the encirclement of the capital, Damascus, after achieving notable advances in controlling surrounding villages. An official statement from the “Deterring Aggression” operations room on Telegram announced the implementation of the final phase of encircling the capital after gaining control over the town of al-Sanamin, located just 20 kilometers from the southern entrance of the capital.
As opposition forces approached Damascus, one staff member at the presidential palace noted that they were preparing to broadcast a speech by the head of the Syrian regime, described as a potential historical turning point; Assad reportedly informed close aides that he would announce the end of more than 13 years of war and destruction in the forthcoming speech. Rumors circulated regarding the regime’s intention to launch a transitional phase based on UN Resolution 2254, enabling the opposition to participate in governance. Indeed, intense meetings were held among Assad’s aides to craft the speech and define its main messages, including the acceptance of power-sharing, a step indicated as an unprecedented concession. The broadcast hall was prepared with cameras and lighting, and filming teams were ready to relay the speech to the world; however, the speech never occurred, and it was rumored that Assad had prepared a secret decree instructing a military council to manage the transitional phase, depositing it with his military office director for implementation alongside the speech. Reports indicated that the military office director or a senior officer trusted by Assad had contacted elements of “HTS” to ensure personal safety, resulting in the decree’s non-execution.
After midnight on December 8, Assad’s inner circle realized that he had deceived them to conceal his plan to escape the capital without attracting attention, as he indeed left after dark heading to Hmeimim base, from where a Russian plane transported him to Moscow. Assad was not alone in planning his escape; his brother Maher Assad, commander of the Fourth Division, followed him, along with a group of senior officers who fled through the desert to Iraq, reflecting the collapse within the regime’s inner circle. As news of Assad’s flight leaked, the palace became a scene of chaos and confusion, panic spread among officials and guards, and mass escapes began, with many discarding their weapons and military uniforms in attempts to conceal and flee. Gates were left open, allowing attacking forces to storm the palace in the early hours of dawn without resistance. In a scene reflecting the extent of the collapse, feelings of betrayal and abandonment emerged among the officers who found themselves without leadership or clear orders, prompting some to steal computers and sensitive files while others burned them to conceal evidence that could incriminate them.
In the streets of the capital, security checkpoints vanished, and personnel from the security branches began shifting their loyalties. Members of the “National Defense” stripped off their uniforms and raised the revolutionary flag above their facilities in an attempt to adapt to the new reality. As central authority disintegrated, the city experienced major turmoil, marked by an atmosphere of anticipation and fear over what the coming days would bring. While opposition factions tightened their grip on vital headquarters, recordings surfaced showing elements from the regular army renouncing their uniforms while shouts of “Allahu Akbar” resonated from the city’s minarets. Regular forces abandoned their headquarters, and operations at Damascus International Airport ceased entirely. Attacking factions seized control of Sednaya Prison and released thousands of detainees, including political and criminal prisoners. By morning, the attacking forces had fully taken control of the capital and announced the regime’s fall through a statement broadcast on state television by a group of fighters.
The fall of the presidential palace was not merely a symbolic event but represented the collapse of an entire regime. News of Assad’s escape quickly ignited waves of surrender among regime forces, with Syrian cities sequentially declaring their exit from regime control while military units attempted to reorganize their ranks in vain. Damascus became a leaderless city as the opposition continued to secure government premises, marking the end of the Assad era amid scenes of dramatic flight and betrayal. As dawn broke, the capital entered a new phase, divided between celebrations of victory amidst popular crowds and the fears of regime supporters who felt betrayed by their leader who fled in the dark, alongside concerns about potential security breakdowns and the country’s future.
Scenes of the Final Collapse
The Assad regime did not anticipate any of the details that unfolded after November 27, 2024, even as it recognized the opposition’s movements in Idlib and their military preparations. The regime also knew that the high casualties suffered by Hezbollah and Iran in both Lebanon and Syria would fundamentally impact the regime’s military stance across Syria.
The assassination of Nasrallah marked a turning point in the party’s four-decade history and also represented a critical moment in the conflict with the regime and its allies. This event, along with the massive losses endured by Hezbollah and Iran, led to the latter being in its weakest state in Syria, prompting attempts to find different military approaches in both Lebanon and Syria.
This was evident through the visit of the Supreme Leader’s chief advisor and member of Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council, Ali Larijani, to Damascus, where he met with Assad on November 15, 2024, before heading to Beirut. The next day, Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasir visited Damascus, reaffirming Iran’s commitment to provide all forms of support “according to the recommendations of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution.”
About ten days later, the “Deterring Aggression” operation began, with Iran withdrawing all its militias from Aleppo and other Syrian cities as the troops from the joint operations room approached, leaving the regime’s forces that were already attempting to flee behind them.
Larijani’s visit to Damascus was the last instance of communication and coordination between Iran and the Assad regime before its collapse, clearly failing to establish the approach Iran hoped to adopt to overcome the repercussions of Hezbollah’s collapse and the weakening of Iranian power in Syria. It was evident that Tehran felt the risks to its regional project as the crossings between Syria and Lebanon faced Israeli attacks threatening its connections with Hezbollah, underscoring the fragility of the Syrian situation. Nevertheless, Iran was in dire need of preserving its relationships with the Assad regime, ensuring its survival, and affirming that Syria would remain a strategic pivot within the axis of resistance despite all pressures.
These visits showed that the Iranian axis was racing against time to contain any confusion that might arise from faltering Syrian policies. However, such efforts were insufficient to halt the series of events that ultimately led to the breakdown of traditional balances and the fall of the regime due to developments and changes that Tehran could not completely contain, despite its vigorous attempts to retain its presence and influence in the Syrian scene.
Around the same time, Assad sent his foreign minister, Bassam Sabbagh, to Tehran on November 19, 2024, at the head of an official delegation for the declared purpose of “enhancing bilateral relations and discussing developments in the regional scene.” In reality, the delegation’s task was to reassure the Iranians and seek to garner their support again to improve the military position, even if briefly, allowing the regime head to negotiate with Turkey via Russia.
After the start of the “Deterring Aggression” operations, the regime took time to absorb its forces’ defeat and the loss of major cities. In a late measure, Assad sent his minister Sabbagh to Baghdad on December 5, 2024, to hold trilateral discussions with his Iraqi and Iranian counterparts. The meeting concluded with a call for peaceful solutions to the challenges facing Syria and recognizing that “threats to Syria’s security constitute a general danger to the stability of the entire region.” The Baghdad meeting appeared to avoid any mention of military involvement to support the regime in Syria, especially from Iraq.
The meeting in Doha, held on December 7, did not deviate from this context, calling for a political solution to the Syrian crisis that would lead to a cessation of military operations and protection of civilians from the repercussions of this crisis. Foreign ministers from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq participated in this meeting, along with the foreign ministers of Iran, Turkey, and a representative from Russia from the Astana process.
It was evident that opposition forces’ advancement on the ground in Syria was faster than all delayed political attempts, as hours after the Doha meeting, Assad’s regime indeed fell, redirecting the regional and international effort towards a different trajectory.
Governance Challenges and State Management
From the first day after seizing control of Damascus, the new administration faced immense challenges related to governance, security, sovereignty, national unity, and addressing demands from the international community and local societies, along with the heavy legacy of the previous regime, particularly the severe economic situation and rising poverty levels affecting the majority of Syrians.
The most significant challenges the new administration in Syria faces can be summarized as follows:
- Economic Challenge: This is the primary challenge confronting the new government in Damascus, as Syrians endure a severe economic crisis due to sanctions and the corruption of the previous regime. A report from the World Bank indicated that the poverty rate among Syrians reached 69% in 2022, a figure that the report says has increased in subsequent periods due to rising economic contraction and reductions in subsidies on essential goods.
- Security Challenge: Security challenges arose instantly upon entering Damascus and establishing control. One prominent issue was confronting remnants of the previous regime, which began relatively early when some key aides of Assad notorious for their brutality against the Syrian people attacked the new security forces.
- Political and Constitutional Challenge: The transitional phase currently in Syria is crucial for determining its future. Although the new administration expressed goodwill, it lacked a clear transitional plan.
- Reconstruction Challenge and Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons: Syria has the largest refugee population globally, with over 6.5 million registered refugees distributed across 130 countries, primarily hosted by neighboring countries, including Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan.
- Sovereignty Challenge: A significant portion of Syrian territory still remains beyond the control of the central government in Damascus, which complicated matters following Israeli breaches after the regime’s fall.
- Transitional Justice and Humanitarian Situation: The fall of the Assad regime revealed a catastrophic tally of crimes and violations against the Syrian people. Beyond the over 13 million refugees and displaced persons, the regime’s jails and security branches highlighted systematic repression and violence, rendering the situation dire.
In the aftermath of regime collapse, both initial public sentiment and the eagerness to provide formative ideas suggested positive reception toward the new administration. However, the future of Syria is contingent on the new administration’s ability to address internal challenges and constructing a comprehensive democratic system that ensures political inclusion for all factions. The question remains: Can the new Damascus achieve stability and launch a new phase of development and national reconciliation, or will it remain hostage to internal complexities, including the nature of its new governance and regional and international interventions?
References
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(2) Details and figures. Map of Iranian militias in Syria, Sky News Arabia, February 22, 2024, (accessed January 1, 2025), https://shorturl.at/cCxKp
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(5) Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and its allies. Who are the jihadist groups participating in Operation Deterring Aggression?, Akhbar al-‘Aan, December 5, 2024, (accessed January 1, 2025), https://shorturl.at/4QZuu
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7 Ibid.
[8] Backstage of the last days of the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s rule, Amman, December 23, 2024 (accessed January 3, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/ybdt5stf(9) Larijani and Nasizadeh in Damascus. Objectives of the visits “Under Fire,” Al Jazeera Net, November 17, 2024, (accessed January 3, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/bdhnpnee
10 Ibid.
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(15) Most notably smuggled money. 5 major economic files on the table of the new administration in Syria, Al-Jazeera Net, December 29, 2024, (accessed January 10, 2025), https://shorturl.at/8kIQj
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(21) Matthew Levitt, How did Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham be included on the US terrorist lists? Why should it stay there for now?, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 17, 2024, (accessed January 14, 2025), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/kyf-audrijt-hyyt-thryr-alsham-ly-qwaym-alarhab-alamrykyt-wlmadha-yjb-tbqy-hnak-fy
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