The Turkish Mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia: Motivations, Obstacles, and Scenarios

Turkey’s efforts represent the latest attempt at a diplomatic resolution to the escalating crisis between Ethiopia and Somalia, which has been ongoing since the beginning of this year. Prior to this, there were reports of a Kenyan-Djiboutian mediation, which was denied by Mogadishu.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan successfully facilitated two rounds of indirect talks between his Somali counterpart, Ahmed Malim Faqi, and Ethiopian counterpart, Demeke Mekonnen, in Ankara in July and August. Although no decisive results were reached, a third round is scheduled for September. The most significant achievement of this mediation thus far has been the indirect meeting of the two parties and their declaration of commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes.

This paper seeks to answer key questions related to Ethiopia’s request for Ankara to mediate between it and Somalia, Turkey’s goals in this mediation, and the driving and hindering factors for Turkish efforts. It concludes with an examination of possible scenarios and their implications.

Why Did Ethiopia Request Turkish Mediation?

During his visit to the Turkish capital, Ankara, in May, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed initiated a request for mediation from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Addis Ababa’s approach can be attributed to several key reasons:

High Turkish Acceptability in Somalia: Unlike many other regional and international powers, Turkey is highly accepted as a mediator in Somalia. For instance, Kenya has a maritime border dispute with Somalia, which was ruled in Somalia’s favor by the International Court of Justice in 2021, a ruling Nairobi did not accept. This acceptance was evident in Mogadishu’s approval of Turkish mediation after it had previously rejected any such efforts until Ethiopia canceled its memorandum of understanding with Somaliland.

Ethiopia’s Awareness of Turkey’s Strategic Interests: Ethiopia understands the importance Ankara places on its relationship with Addis Ababa on various levels. Therefore, by inviting Turkey to mediate, Addis Ababa may hope to neutralize Turkey in case the conflict with Somalia escalates in the future.

Influence on Somalia: Ethiopia may believe that if it succeeds in convincing Ankara of its so-called “legitimate demands,” Turkey, with its close and multi-dimensional relations with Somalia, might be better positioned than others to persuade Somalia or pressure it to soften its stance regarding negotiations and Ethiopia’s demands.

Stability for Turkish Interests: The stability of the relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia is crucial for protecting Turkey’s interests in both countries and the region at large. Ankara is more invested in reconciliation between the two countries than other regional powers because a deterioration in their relations could lead to military conflict, which would be unfavorable for Turkey. This is especially relevant after Turkey signed a defense agreement with Somalia, which commits it to supporting Mogadishu in protecting its territorial waters, potentially putting Turkey in direct conflict with Ethiopia.

Improving Ethiopia’s International Standing: The memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland sparked this crisis and increased international pressure on Ethiopia. By seeking mediation, Ethiopia aims to alleviate some of the responsibility for the escalating tension and signal its willingness to use peaceful means to prevent a full-blown conflict in the Red Sea region.

Countering Egyptian Influence: Ethiopia may also seek to block any Turkish-Egyptian coordination concerning Somalia, as the two nations’ interests in the mediation appear to be at odds. While Turkey is invested in mediating between its two allies, the continuation of Ethiopian-Somali tension serves Egypt’s interests.

Internal Challenges: Ethiopia is aiming to reduce external tensions to focus on addressing its internal problems. Despite the end of the war in Tigray, the country still suffers from its devastating aftermath and is grappling with growing security unrest, particularly in the Amhara and Oromia regions.

Preventing Egyptian Intervention in Somalia: Ethiopia’s approach to Turkey may also be driven by its rivalry with Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. In this context, Ethiopia might see Turkey, as a Muslim Middle Eastern power, as a counterweight to Egyptian influence.

Weakening the Somalia-Eritrea-Egypt Alliance: A successful mediation could weaken the emerging alliance between Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt, which poses political and security challenges for Ethiopia.

Turkey’s Objectives in Mediation Efforts

Turkey’s agreement to mediate serves several key objectives, including:

Strengthening Turkish Influence in Africa: The Turkish initiative is part of a broader vision for Turkey’s role in Africa, where Ankara plays an active role in regional crises to boost its influence on the continent. Turkey’s balanced role and mediation between Somalia and Ethiopia are vital for ensuring regional stability. This initiative also aligns with Turkey’s broader security and cooperation initiatives across Africa, aiming to reinforce its diplomatic presence and reputation as a reliable partner.

Balancing Regional and International Influence: The Horn of Africa has become an open arena for competition between various regional and international actors, including the Gulf states, China, the United States, and recently Russia. Turkey’s potential success in mediation would impact the balance of power, especially concerning regional competitors like the UAE, potentially leading to new alliances in which Turkey plays a significant role.

Supporting Regional Stability: The Horn of Africa and the southern Red Sea are plagued by conflicts and security issues. Turkish mediation could curb some of these tensions, both in the narrow context of Ethiopia and Somalia and more broadly across the region. This would positively impact regional cooperation, benefiting Turkey’s significant investments in the area.

Enhancing Turkey’s International Standing: The region has attracted global attention following attacks by the Houthi group on Israeli interests in Bab al-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden, which have directly impacted international trade and shipping routes. The escalating tension between Somalia and Ethiopia threatens to exacerbate these disruptions. Thus, Turkey’s success in preventing further instability would boost its international standing, garnering support and recognition from global powers, including the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union.

Obstacles to Turkish Mediation

Despite its efforts, Turkey faces a complex situation with many challenges, including:

A Long History of Conflict: The current crisis between Ethiopia and Somalia is only the latest chapter in a centuries-old series of conflicts, characterized by disputes over borders, territories, and religion. This has created deep mistrust and sensitivity, complicating any mediator’s task of finding common ground.

Significant Distance Between the Two Parties: Ethiopia and Somalia have vastly different expectations from the mediation. Somalia demands respect for its sovereignty, starting with Ethiopia’s retraction of the Somaliland memorandum. Ethiopia, on the other hand, seeks to secure its “legitimate interests” through access to the sea, without backtracking on the memorandum.

Popular Sentiments: The maritime access issue has become a highly emotional and popular topic in both countries, making it difficult for leaders to make concessions without facing domestic backlash.

International Interference: The Horn of Africa is a hotspot for competing international interests, with some powers potentially seeking to derail mediation efforts for their own benefit.

Weak African Institutions: African institutions like the African Union and IGAD have struggled to effectively mediate conflicts in the region, which could limit their ability to support Turkish mediation efforts.

Factors Supporting Turkish Mediation

Turkey’s Relations with Ethiopia and Somalia:
Ankara enjoys close ties with both Addis Ababa and Mogadishu. Turkey is the second-largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ethiopia after China. According to the Turkish ambassador in Addis Ababa, there are about 200 Turkish companies operating in Ethiopia across various sectors, including construction, pharmaceuticals, and food industries. Additionally, Ethiopia is one of the largest buyers of Turkish drones and ammunition in Africa.

In contrast, Somalia is the backbone of Turkey’s influence in the region. It hosts the largest Turkish military base abroad, and Turkey has been active in the strategically located country since 2011. In February, both nations signed a defense and economic agreement under which Turkey helps Somalia defend its territorial waters in exchange for economic benefits.

Willingness of Both Parties to Embrace Diplomacy:
Despite the ongoing tensions between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa since the beginning of the year, the fact that both parties have agreed to use diplomacy as a tool to resolve their conflict supports Ankara’s mediation efforts. The occasional back-and-forth might be tied to negotiation tactics rather than outright rejection of diplomacy.

The Need for Both Countries to Cooperate with Turkey:
Both Ethiopia and Somalia are going through critical times, where international support is crucial. Ethiopia is dealing with the consequences of the catastrophic Tigray war and ongoing security tensions, which have placed a burden on its economy. Meanwhile, Turkey holds key cards in the form of military support and economic investments.

Similarly, Somalia is facing security challenges due to the recent rise in al-Shabaab activities and the impending end of the African Union Mission in Somalia. With the Somali army taking over security responsibilities, Mogadishu needs Turkey’s security support, which includes logistical and military assistance and the training of thousands of Somali soldiers. Turkey also plays a role in protecting Somalia’s territorial waters under the defense agreement signed in February.

Mutual Benefits from Reaching an Agreement:
The benefits of an understanding between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa outweigh the insistence on continued tension. Ethiopia seeks to diversify its access to seaports and reduce its dependence on Djibouti, while also keeping Egypt’s role in Somalia at bay. External peace would allow Ethiopia to focus on internal issues. On the other hand, Somalia would benefit from Addis Ababa’s support in its fight against terrorism and gain access to the large Ethiopian market, as well as profits from Ethiopian trade passing through Somali ports.

International Support:
Given the geostrategic importance of the southern Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, and the impact of disruptions in these areas on global trade, Turkey’s ability to advance its mediation efforts and bring both parties closer together could attract international support and recognition. This might serve as added pressure backing Ankara’s efforts.

Ability to Propose Creative Solutions:
Considering the complex situation between Ethiopia and Somalia, creative ideas and proposals are needed to ensure both sides’ interests are met, which would pave the way to overcome enmity and distrust. Ankara’s proposals might include Turkish and international guarantees for a cooperative framework that satisfies both Mogadishu and Addis Ababa.

Scenarios for Turkish Mediation

Turkey’s approach to the crisis relies on its capacity to act as a neutral and balanced mediator, given its desire to maintain close relations with both Addis Ababa and Mogadishu. The Turkish mediation is based on a step-by-step policy, as seen in the outcomes of the first and second rounds of talks.

The first round led to the signing of a joint statement in which both parties committed to a peaceful resolution of their disputes. The second round focused on bridging gaps and addressing concerns in a way that benefits the entire region, working towards specific solutions that could serve as a framework for a mutually acceptable resolution.

No specific Turkish proposals have been leaked yet, but Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan mentioned that “tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia will end when Ethiopia gains access to the sea through Somalia, as long as it respects Somalia’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty.” This proposal satisfies both sides, though questions remain about how to implement it on the ground.

Based on this, several potential outcomes for Turkish mediation between Somalia and Ethiopia can be envisioned, each with its own consequences:

1. Successful Mediation and a Comprehensive Agreement

In this scenario, Ankara would bridge the gap between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa, reaching a comprehensive understanding and signing an agreement that meets both parties’ interests. This could involve granting Ethiopia special status in Somali ports, creating a free trade zone, or offering other creative solutions.

While it’s difficult to predict the full implications of such an agreement due to the unknown details, potential outcomes might include:

Geopolitical Impacts:

• Elevating Turkey’s status in Africa and globally, especially in the Horn of Africa.
• Supporting regional stability and reducing tensions that have plagued the area in recent months.
• Weakening Egypt’s presence, as Addis Ababa would likely push to limit Cairo’s role, particularly in the security and military fields.
• Weakening the emerging alliance between Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt, which has accelerated due to the Somali-Ethiopian crisis.

Economic Impacts:

• Somalia would benefit from Ethiopian trade passing through its ports and gain access to Ethiopia’s vast market, positively impacting both countries’ economies.
• Both nations would likely attract more foreign investment and financial support, which they are in dire need of.

Security Impacts:

• A reconciliation between the two nations would boost efforts to combat al-Shabaab, which threatens both countries.

1. Failure of Mediation

This scenario arises if both parties refuse to back down from their positions, and Turkey fails to present satisfactory solutions. The consequences would be the opposite of the first scenario and could include:

Geopolitical Impacts:

• Heightened tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, possibly leading to limited armed conflict.
• A potential agreement between Addis Ababa and Somaliland, in which Ethiopia recognizes the region as an independent state. This could ignite armed conflicts within Somaliland and between Mogadishu and Hargeisa.
• Increased regional tension and stronger alignments between the Somali-Eritrean-Egyptian axis.
• Greater involvement of external powers, such as Egypt in Somalia and the UAE in Ethiopia.
• A weakening of Turkey’s influence in the Horn of Africa.

Economic Impacts:

• Increased economic burdens on both Somalia and Ethiopia, especially if a military conflict erupts.
• Greater social unrest due to mounting economic pressures.

Security Impacts:

• Al-Shabaab, the militant group, would benefit the most from this scenario, using the security vacuum to expand its recruitment and operations, as both Somalia and Ethiopia struggle with weakened security forces.
• Armed rebel groups in Ethiopia could gain more support, exacerbating proxy wars.
• Criminal networks engaged in illegal cross-border activities, such as human trafficking and arms smuggling, could thrive.
• In the event of armed conflict, regional security could deteriorate, affecting the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

1. Freezing the Conflict

In this scenario, Ankara could achieve partial success, convincing both parties to maintain a manageable level of tension without escalating to full-scale war. Alternatively, both parties might recognize the unsustainable costs of military conflict. The key consequences of this scenario would include:

• Continued low-intensity tension between the two nations.
• Ongoing regional tension and the realignment of alliances.
• Increased involvement of foreign powers in both Somalia and Ethiopia.
• Key issues between the two countries remaining unresolved, potentially sparking future crises.

Given the current conditions, it is difficult to predict which path this crisis will follow. However, many signs suggest that freezing the conflict and avoiding escalation will likely remain the most probable outcome, considering the internal crises both nations face and the reluctance of international stakeholders to see war break out. A war in this region, with its strategic significance and fragile security situation, could have far-reaching consequences beyond the borders of Ethiopia and Somalia.

References

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Paravicini,  Giulia, Gumrukcu,  Tuvan, Turkey mediating Somalia-Ethiopia talks on port deal, Reuters, 1 July 2024, (Accessed: 19 August 2024) https://n9.cl/5zeen   

Turkey today, Türkiye’s mediation efforts gain traction amid Ethiopia-Somalia tensions, 14 August 2024, (Accessed: 19 August 2024), https://n9.cl/imzme

Özpınar, Zeynep Gizem, Türkiye’nin Doğu Afrika Diplomasisi: Somali-Etiyopya Gerginliğinde Arabuluculuk Rolü ve Stratejik Hedefler, Türk Dış Politikası Araştırma Merkezi (TUDPAM), 20 August 2024, (Accessed 19 August 20, 2024), https://n9.cl/xly0o

U.S. Department of State, 2023 Investment Climate Statements: Ethiopia, (Accessed: 16 August 2024), https://n9.cl/37dnv

Mohamed Ali, Abdolgader, Will the Turkey-Somalia defence deal fuel Red Sea tensions? The New Arab, 5 March 2024, (Accessed: 16 August 2024), https://n9.cl/1swc5