There is a set of international initiatives and measures aimed at reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons from military arsenals worldwide, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia. These initiatives are designed to foster collaboration among states and international organizations to enhance global security and peace. As a result of these efforts, global nuclear arsenals have significantly decreased to nearly 13,000 warheads.
However, the remaining nuclear weapons in the hands of nine nuclear-armed states continue to pose a global threat and challenge efforts to prevent proliferation. The United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel collectively hold about 12,100 nuclear weapons, of which around 9,600 are in active military stockpiles ready for practical use.
In this context, the “Weapons Reduction Association” published a working paper titled “How to Address All Nuclear Weapons?” in 2024 to clarify the fundamental challenges facing nuclear arms control efforts, including geopolitical tensions, state competition, and the focus of arms control efforts primarily on the United States and Russia. The paper also addresses issues such as nuclear programs in specific countries and opportunities for engaging additional nuclear-armed states in future initiatives.
The paper emphasizes the importance of continuing nuclear arms control negotiations for several reasons, the first being the enhancement of strategic stability—meaning creating a situation where nuclear-armed states see no incentives to use nuclear weapons even in the face of a severe crisis. The second is managing nuclear competition, especially among states with politically strained relations. The third reason is to reduce nuclear risks and enhance transparency and predictability. Finally, it aims to support the NPT framework.
Key Challenges
A number of key challenges confront global initiatives aimed at reducing nuclear proliferation, the most notable of which include:
Tension in U.S.-Russia Relations: Russia rejected a U.S. offer in 2013 to negotiate an additional one-third reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons to below the levels set by the New START treaty. In 2014, the U.S. accused Russia of violating the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty by testing the ground-launched cruise missile M7299 at ranges prohibited by that treaty.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Washington halted strategic stability talks with Moscow, and in 2023, Russia suspended its implementation of the New START Treaty, which covers the most destructive American and Russian nuclear systems (deployed strategic warheads, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and both deployed and non-deployed heavy bomber aircraft equipped for nuclear weapons).
Narrow Focus of Initiatives on the U.S. and Russia: The majority of nuclear arms control measures so far have focused on the U.S. and Russia, with many nuclear-armed states outside this framework. Consequently, there are no clear regulatory norms that extend beyond these two countries. In connection with this, some initiatives have been launched to engage more countries in the essential aspects of nuclear disarmament efforts. For example, the U.S. State Department and the Nuclear Threat Initiative launched the “International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification,” where 25 countries are collaborating in working groups to develop the technical foundations for future nuclear disarmament verification. The scope of work ranges from innovative technological methods to tangible regulations on inspection drills, disclosures, training standards for international inspectors, and future disarmament scenarios. However, these efforts remain inadequate and poorly organized; they need to become more standardized and structured, including comparable data.
Lack of Transparency Among Some States: Certain countries have different cultures and policies regarding transparency and may be concerned that increased transparency could make them vulnerable to threats or attacks by global powers and organizations. Thus, opacity, from their perspective, reinforces nuclear deterrence. For example, a country like China prefers no transparency regarding its nuclear forces to avoid being vulnerable to a strike from the U.S. Conversely, transparency reflects the willingness of nuclear-armed states to move towards their commitments under Article VI of the NPT.
Preliminary Steps
The Weapons Reduction Association’s paper identifies several topics that need to be addressed before tackling nuclear weapons and coordinating among states, including:
Defining Nuclear Warheads: A nuclear warhead is technically a military device capable of producing a nuclear explosion, primarily consisting of fissile nuclear material, conventional explosives, and electronics. Therefore, addressing all nuclear warheads should encompass strategic, non-strategic, operational, deployed, undeployed, standby, stored, and dismantled warheads. The paper emphasizes the need to clarify the location of the “nuclear warhead” of the nuclear-armed state. It is worth noting that existing (or pending) nuclear weapons agreements between the U.S. and Russia are limited to deployed strategic warheads or warheads attributed to strategic delivery systems.
Strategic Delivery Systems: This includes heavy bombers and long-range missiles used in silos, mobile launch platforms, or submarines to deliver nuclear warheads to specific intercontinental targets. Initially, bilateral nuclear arms control treaties between the U.S. and Russia focused on limiting strategic delivery systems and bombers and later added restrictions on attributed strategic warheads (i.e., warheads allocated to specific military units stored at specific locations) and deployed strategic warheads (distributed to military units in the field or located near conflict zones).
In this context, the original and new START treaties allowed both Russia and the U.S. to take steps to convert heavy bombers to be used solely as carriers for conventional weapons. The paper argues that any future treaties aimed at limiting non-strategic nuclear weapons must address dual-capable delivery systems, which can be equipped with either nuclear or conventional warheads. This includes conventional strategic delivery vehicles as well as new types of strategic delivery systems such as Russia’s Burevestnik cruise missile, which is capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
Non-Nuclear States
Nuclear arms negotiations typically focus on the U.S. and Russia due to the size of each country’s nuclear arsenal compared to that of other nuclear-armed states. However, the size of nuclear arsenals is starting to shift due to the behavior of countries like China, which has maintained a relatively small nuclear force for years but has significantly expanded it, including the construction of about 350 new ballistic missile silos and approximately 500 nuclear warheads. This number is expected to rise to 1,000 by 2030, especially as China develops a modern strategic triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
Meanwhile, the United States seeks to engage China in discussions on nuclear arms control. For example, American and Chinese security experts met in November 2023; however, Beijing has shown little interest in sustaining bilateral dialogue with Washington or in coordinating tri-partite discussions including Russia.
In a related context, Russian officials emphasize the need to address nuclear weapons through a multilateral framework that includes five states (the U.S., Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France), which are the officially recognized nuclear-armed states under the NPT. These five nations issued a joint statement in 2022 on “Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races,” asserting that “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” and that all are committed to their obligations under the NPT to pursue nuclear disarmament, reiterating that their nuclear weapons are not aimed at any state. None of these principles have been disrupted by the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine; however, the five states have not utilized these principles to take significant steps toward reducing nuclear weapons levels.
To effect tangible change in nuclear arsenals and build trust, the paper suggests that negotiations between the U.S. and Russia should be accompanied by parallel but less formal discussions among the five states or full negotiations among these states aimed at establishing a multilateral treaty to limit the nuclear forces of all five, with appropriate monitoring and verification measures. Alternatively, it proposes involving India and Pakistan in talks among seven parties (given that neither of these states has signed the NPT). However, the challenge lies in that negotiating a multilateral treaty would become more complex if the negotiations expand to include seven or nine nuclear-armed states, including North Korea and Israel.
Proposals for Control
In order to address the current situation and continue formal negotiations regarding nuclear arms control, the Weapons Reduction Association’s paper offers several key proposals, including:
Reinstating the New START Treaty Between the U.S. and Russia in Full Force, including the resumption of data exchanges, notifications, and inspections at sites, while both countries re-establish their dialogue on nuclear arms and related issues such as missile defense and long-range conventional weapons.
Initiating a U.S.-China Dialogue on strategic issues to avoid a nuclear arms race, while the U.S. and Russia explore potential agreements covering their intermediate-range missiles.
Enhancing Reporting and Transparency Procedures conducted by nuclear-armed states, as well as intensifying their dialogue on nuclear issues, including models of nuclear balance, strategic stability frameworks, establishing a unified reporting model or database of key information concerning nuclear arsenals, potential negotiation models for nuclear reductions, and measures to mitigate risks.
Engaging in Dialogue Between India and Pakistan, either bilaterally or with the five permanent members of the Security Council.
The U.S. can share its nuclear review process and the methodologies used, along with certain outcomes, thereby encouraging other countries to conduct their reviews.
In conclusion, the paper asserts that the optimal approach to addressing nuclear weapons and warheads is to pursue an agreement between the U.S., Russia, and other nuclear-armed states. However, the current geopolitical conditions make it challenging to envision a resumption of discussions aimed at mitigating nuclear risks, let alone formal negotiations between the U.S. and Russia or with other countries. Finally, arms control can contribute to international stability and security by avoiding greater nuclear risks, reducing military spending, and preventing further nuclear proliferation, alongside halting the current emerging nuclear arms race.
Source: Pifer, S., Neuneck, G., Mizin, V., & Rusten, L. (2024). How to address all nuclear weapons? Deep Cuts.
