The Syrian Scene: Between Sect, State, and Political Organization

Perhaps a historical review of the first major split in Islamic history takes us back to Umayyad Damascus and Abbasid Baghdad. In contemporary history, the same scene has resurfaced with the division of the Ba’ath Party into an “Abbasid” Ba’ath and an “Umayyad” Ba’ath. However, the animosity between them has never faded; in fact, it has been one of the darkest episodes of enmity in both ancient and modern Arab history. Yet, the management of this enmity varied between the model of Al-Hajjaj bin Yusuf (the authoritarianism of the Bedouin) and that of Muawiya bin Abi Sufyan (the authoritarianism of the merchant). While the Abbasid state lasted for over eight centuries (across its four eras—Arab, Turkish, Seljuk, and Mamluk), the Umayyad state lasted about 90 years. In modern times, the Ba’ath ruled Iraq for 35 years, while it has remained in power in Syria for about 60 years (1963–2024), with 53 of those years under the rule of the Assad family. Thus, Islam was the foundation for both the Umayyads and the Abbasids, but it did not unite them. Similarly, nationalism, in its Ba’athist conception, was the foundation for the party in Syria and Iraq, but it did not unite them. One could even argue that the Ba’ath, with its two wings, is nothing more than a reproduction of the Abbasid-Umayyad duality. How can we explain this?

Undoubtedly, the issue is complex and open to multiple interpretations. However, I lean toward a geostrategic explanation based on the idea that when two states in a specific geopolitical region have similar levels of power, they become more competitive and contentious over who will be the “center of the region.” If we look at regions around the world, we find, for example, that much of European history has been a competition among central European powers over who would lead Europe and bring it under their influence. In the Arab East, the competition between Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia is at the heart of interactions. In the Maghreb, the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco forms the basis of interaction in the Maghrebi sub-regional system. This pattern is also evident in East Asian history, where even during the communist era, competition was concentrated within the communist bloc between its two poles at the time: the Soviet Union and China.

It is noteworthy that the competition for regional centrality during the Abbasid era relied on Persian support (unlike the contemporary Ba’athist period), while the Umayyads were more sensitive to the Persian role, unlike the Syrian Ba’ath after the Iranian Revolution. Interestingly, the new regime in Syria currently leans on unambiguous support from Turkey, as if history is repeating itself, and we are back in the era of the Turkish governor “Aşnas.”

The oscillation between seeking support from Iran and Turkey is merely a scene in the competition over who will be the center of the “Arab East, including Egypt.” I am almost certain that the Indian thinker Kautilya recognized this issue—the struggle for regional centrality—as early as 375 BCE, long before modern and contemporary political geographers.

When examining the regional alliances of Syria and Iraq in the modern era, we find that the dominant (though not absolute) characteristic is that the Palestinian issue has been used to support the regional centrality of each. However, it recedes in their strategic priorities if either regime requires a change in its structure or political system. The degree of Iraq’s commitment to the Palestinian cause varies between those left in power by Bremer and those who rely on Iranian support. Currently, the discourse of the Arab-Zionist conflict has completely disappeared from the “jihadist literature” in the new Syria, even though Hamas supported the change in Syria at its outset and suffered greatly as a result. On the other hand, the transitional phase recently announced for building the political system is not officially defined but is merely an initial estimate (four years), as is the case with the timeline for drafting the constitution or the date of the national dialogue conference. (Hadi al-Bahra, head of the Syrian Coalition, estimated the required period as a year and a half to prepare for free elections and six months to draft a new constitution.) In fact, his deputy, Abdul Majeed Barakat, confirmed that the current government was formed without any consultation with the coalition. What does this signify? On the other hand, why is the issue of the Golan Heights absent from the declaration of principles under the pretext that the regime is in the establishment phase? The ruling front in Syria today has fought the Syrian army, the Iranian and Russian forces, Hezbollah, and even Kurdish organizations, and ultimately emerged victorious. Yet, it remains silent about the Golan, Al-Aqsa, Gaza, and even Israel’s continuous expansion to the point where Israeli forces now overlook Damascus. Why is there such excessive tolerance from the Americans to remove the president’s name from terrorism lists and expedite the lifting of sanctions, while the Islamic Jihad movement—which has not carried out any military action outside Palestine—faces increasing pressure and is placed at the top of the U.S. State Department’s terrorism lists? While Arab rulers yawn at the plight of Gaza, they rush to Damascus to save it? These are not questions of accusation or doubt but rather questions to understand an extremely ambiguous reality. Why, for example, is the European Union quick to announce upcoming support for Syria? Politics is not based on charity; every dollar or euro must bring political or economic benefit to the giver. Why this generosity toward one party and stinginess toward another? How do we understand providing support to a political system while cutting aid to UNRWA or some Arab countries, as Trump recently did?

On the other hand, it seems to me that Turkey, under Erdogan, is haunted by a new Ottomanism, and he is clearly pursuing this. He faces no criticism from Arab Muslim Brotherhood members, even though he is Israel’s primary trading partner, a NATO member, and has over a dozen security agreements with Israel. Does opening a radio station or allowing a Brotherhood-affiliated TV channel suffice to swallow his orientations? Or does the principle of necessity permit the forbidden, even if the forbidden is the annexation of Al-Aqsa Mosque to Israel? These are questions for understanding.

Returning to the issue of competition for regional centrality, the Middle East is contested by three powers: Israel, Iran, and Turkey. Each seeks to build a bloc that enhances its centrality vis-à-vis international powers to become the capital of the region, where any regional decision must pass through this capital. It seems that the new Abbasids and Umayyads in Damascus and Baghdad have accepted a subordinate role, while Egypt lives in a split personality between “historical civilizational centrality and contemporary civilizational backwardness,” with fires burning around it from the north, south, east, and west. There is no place for an Arab state in the competition for the region’s capital.

I say clearly: Don’t tell me, but let me see. The promises of ‘Uqbah (broken promises) have almost become a fixed rule in the Arab mind and conscience. For those who doubt this, a review of Arab summit decisions will suffice. From 1945 to 2025, 54 Arab summits have been held, and the implementation rate of their decisions is only 9%, according to a university doctoral thesis…