The Syrian crisis is one of the most complex in the world due to the variety of actors involved—local, regional, and international—and the divergent interests that intersect. Twelve years after its onset in 2011, there are no signs of de-escalation, and the conflict remains intense. The situation in Syria becomes increasingly complicated every day, with the humanitarian crisis worsening, plunging the Syrian population into the weight of destruction, exodus, and violence.
The persistence of the Syrian conflict can be explained by several factors. It is a mix of civil war, regional and international conflicts, proxy wars, and sectarian tensions. The conflict, sparked by popular protests influenced by the 2011 “Arab Spring,” was exacerbated by the violent repression of the Assad regime, leading to a fierce civil war fueled by external powers according to their interests.
This study aims to understand the origins of the Syrian conflict by examining the roles of local and external actors, the mechanisms for managing the conflict, and the role of international institutions. It begins by tracing the historical roots of this crisis and presents recommendations to contribute to a resolution.
Research Question:
The Syrian crisis is exceptionally complex due to the diversity of actors and their objectives. The parties’ attachment to their own interests and the lack of concessions hinder any resolution. This context raises a central question: what are the main mechanisms used by regional and international actors to manage the conflict in Syria, and how effective are they? This leads to several sub-questions:
- What are the origins of the Syrian crisis?
- What are the causes of the conflict in Syria?
- Who are the actors involved directly and indirectly?
- What are the key stages of the conflict?
- What conflict management mechanisms are used by local, regional, and international actors?
- What is the role of international institutions, and what is the position of international law regarding the conflict?
Study Objective:
This study aims to answer these questions by exploring the historical origins of the crisis, the actors involved, the mechanisms for managing the conflict, and the role of international institutions. It also proposes recommendations and conclusions that, hopefully, could guide decision-makers toward a resolution or de-escalation of the crisis.
Importance of the Study:
The study of the Syrian crisis is crucial for the security and stability of the Arab region. It combines two aspects:
- Scientific: This study provides an in-depth analysis of the crisis, examining strategies and mechanisms for managing international crises, thus contributing to the enrichment of the field of international relations.
- Practical: By analyzing the causes and dynamics of the conflict, this study may offer insights to decision-makers to guide their policies in hopes of reaching a resolution.
Hypothesis of the Study:
The hypothesis of the study is that the Syrian crisis results from the interaction of internal and external factors. This complexity, combined with the lack of national sentiment and the dependence of certain local actors on external forces, could lead to the division of the country and perpetuate the status quo.
Methodology of the Study:
The study adopts an inductive approach, complemented by:
- Historical approach: To understand the origins of the conflict.
- Legal approach: To study the legal framework and its violations.
- Systemic approach: To analyze escalation factors, the decisions of actors, and their consequences.
- Decision-making approach: To understand the decisions of leaders from the various sides of the conflict.
Limitations of the Study:
- Field of knowledge: The study falls within the realm of international relations and the management of international conflicts.
- Period: From 2011, when protests began, to August 2022, the date of the Sochi Summit.
- Geographical scope: Mainly focused on Syria, with a view on the affected neighboring regions and countries.
The Causes and Motivations of the Syrian Crisis:
The Historical Roots of the Syrian Crisis
Contemporary Syria is marked by the diversity of its ethnic and religious groups, a factor that influences not only culture but also the potential for tensions and violence. Syria has also experienced colonial periods and changes in governance that have shaped the state before the current crisis. To better understand these historical roots, we will examine the historical context of Syria, addressing key milestones such as the French mandate, the rise of Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad, as well as the religious and ethnic divisions within Syria.
Historical Context of Syria
For millennia, Syria has been home to various populations and cultures. One of the earliest groups to dominate the region, from 3500 BC, were the Samaritans of Mesopotamia. Over the centuries, Syria has been influenced by the Babylonians, Egyptians, Hittites, Greeks with Alexander the Great, Romans, Byzantines, and then Muslims during the caliphate.
In 1516, the Ottoman Empire annexed Syria, allowing Damascus to become an essential stop for pilgrims en route to Mecca. Although various communities lived in relative peace, this harmony was shaken in the 19th century with the expansion of Western powers.
In the early 20th century, the Ottoman Empire found itself under British and French influence. During World War I, the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement divided the Empire into spheres of influence. Syria was placed under French mandate until 1946, the date of its independence.
In 1963, Hafez al-Assad took power through a military coup. From then on, Syria was subjected to a state of emergency that suspended the constitution and civil rights. Hafez ruled the country until his death in 2000, when his son Bashar al-Assad succeeded him in an uncontested election.
The Period of the French Mandate
The 1919 Treaty of Versailles formalized the Sykes-Picot Agreement and assigned the French mandate for Syria. The creation of artificial borders, mixing different ethnic and religious communities, laid the groundwork for tensions in the region. This partitioning process has left a lasting imprint on local populations, influencing the current conflicts in Syria.
The Rise of Hafez al-Assad
Hafez al-Assad, from the Alawite minority, came to power in 1970. His authoritarian regime relied on clientelist networks to maintain control over the country. In 1982, he ordered a brutal crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in the city of Hama, a memorable event for many. Upon his death, his son Bashar succeeded him but lacked his father’s influence to maintain a strong authority. With the advent of the Arab Spring, dissent began to grow in Syria.
Religious and Ethnic Divisions
Syria, a diverse country, had around 22 million inhabitants before the conflict, predominantly Sunni Arabs, but also including Kurds, Armenians, and Turkmen. Sunni Muslims made up 75% of the population, while Shiites, Druze, and other religious minorities accounted for the rest. These cultural differences, reinforced by the historical influence of various invasions and conflicts, contribute to current tensions.
This historical and ethnic diversity, combined with rivalries between Sunni powers (like Saudi Arabia and Turkey) and Shiite ones (led by Iran), partly explains the complexities of the Syrian crisis.
Local Actors and Their Role in the Crisis
The Syrian crisis has led to the polarization and arming of local groups divided by ethnic and sectarian affiliations. These factions, bolstered by military support from neighboring countries, have transformed Syria into a battleground involving multiple local, regional, and international actors. In this section, we will analyze the local forces and their role in exacerbating the crisis.
Local Forces Affecting the Syrian Crisis:
Free Syrian Army (FSA):
The Free Syrian Army was formed in Turkey on July 29, 2011, under the leadership of Riad al-Asaad. Several military officers defected from the armed forces to join the FSA in response to the rising violence of the regime against the Syrian population. The FSA aims to establish an independent Syrian state with a moderate Arab identity, based on justice and respect for human rights and minorities, without specific political or ideological affiliations. It advocates for responsible cooperation with the international community and adheres to the principles of humanitarian law.
However, the FSA has struggled to promote its ideas compared to Islamic factions, due to a lack of communication tools with the populace and a shortage of charismatic figures to mobilize the people and present a clear political vision. Composed of several brigades spread across about 11% of Syrian territory, the FSA later reorganized into military councils in the governorates of Damascus, Homs, Hama, Idlib, and Deir ez-Zor and is funded by countries like Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
Al-Nusra Front for the People of the Levant:
The Al-Nusra Front, an armed jihadist group led by Abu Mohammed al-Julani, emerged in Syria in late 2011. Initially, it gathered a large popular base but quickly lost support due to its affiliation with al-Qaeda.
The Front conducted operations against the Syrian regime, including the bombing of the military headquarters in Damascus in October 2012. In 2013, Al-Julani pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, distancing himself from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Subsequently, the Al-Nusra Front lost ground to ISIL supporters, particularly in areas like Raqqa and Aleppo, where ISIL imposed its control and forced residents to pledge allegiance.
Islamic State (IS):
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant was officially founded in 2013 when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced a merger with the Al-Nusra Front. This merger was rejected by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, leading to a split where many members of the Al-Nusra Front joined IS. The IS then engaged in numerous battles in Syria, controlling approximately 95,000 square kilometers of Syrian territory. In response to its military activities and its classification as a terrorist organization, an international coalition was formed to combat IS in Syria.
Army of Islam:
The Army of Islam was founded in September 2011 in the Eastern Ghouta of Damascus by Zahran Alloush. Initially composed of a small armed group, it quickly expanded to include thousands of fighters spread throughout the Eastern Ghouta and Qalamoun. It then structured itself into a large opposing military organization, the Islamic Front, where Alloush served as the general military commander. The Army of Islam consisted of a command council and 64 battalions distributed across various regions of Syria. However, on July 15, 2017, it announced its dissolution, distributing its fighters among other opposition factions.
Kurdish Opposition Parties:
Kurdish parties began organizing into two main coalitions. The first, the General Council of the Kurdish Alliance, includes the Progressive Democratic Party of Kurdistan and the Democratic Union Party, allied with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) led by Abdullah Öcalan. This coalition has increased its influence in northeastern Syria. The second coalition, the Kurdish Political Council, consists of nine parties.
The Syrian regime attempted to attract the Kurdish opposition to its side, neutralize it, and divert it from the protest movement. This strategy is partly explained by the importance of the highly active Kurdish political arena, as well as some Kurdish parties’ connections with the autonomous Kurdistan region of Iraq, offering the regime a strategic depth and a means of pressure against Turkey to achieve its objectives.
Assad’s Forces:
At the beginning of the Syrian uprising, the government had one of the most powerful armies in the Middle East, with over 300,000 soldiers. Although a wave of defections occurred early in the armed insurrection, Assad’s forces maintained significant firepower and a substantial workforce. They still control Damascus, as well as all provincial capitals and major military bases.
If Assad’s regime were to fall, it would represent a strategic setback for Iran, which would lose a crucial ally in the region. Iranian leaders also fear that Assad’s fall could stimulate an internal overthrow movement against the Islamic Republic. The disappearance of the Syrian regime would also be a severe blow to Hezbollah, another ally of Iran, and would weaken Iran’s influence in the region.
As for Russia, it remains a steadfast ally of Assad, although its motivations are more complex. Syria is not only a major client for Russian arms but also hosts Russia’s only naval base in warm waters. Although modest strategically, this base serves Russia’s power ambitions.
Opposed in principle to Western military interventions, Russia has also protected Assad by blocking UN Security Council resolutions condemning the regime for massacres of civilians and the use of chemical weapons. Additionally, Moscow has provided military equipment to the Syrian army, such as helicopters, air defense systems, and fuel, while sending advisers to train Syrian officers in the use of these weapons.
Foreign Forces and Their Relationship to the Syrian Crisis:
After the onset of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the country plunged into a crisis that, although initially internal, gradually developed into a conflict with regional and international dimensions, akin to the Arab Spring uprisings that affected several countries in the region. Syria, due to its strategic position in regional balances, has become a battleground for regional and international agendas, dominated by geopolitical calculations. This situation has made finding a solution to this conflict, which is now nearing its eleventh year, extremely complex and difficult to envisage.
Many external powers and stakeholders have gradually participated in the conflict, motivated by the various internal actors—both the Syrian regime and the opposition—seeking external alliances to tilt the outcome in their favor.
The war transformed into a proxy conflict, considerably prolonging its duration. Consequently, the intervention of foreign forces has taken various forms, whether through direct or indirect support for diverse objectives: for some, aiming to end the conflict; for others, working to prolong it. While some powers support the existing regime, others actively seek to overthrow it.
The complexity of the conflict has increased with the involvement of numerous actors: several European capitals, such as France and the United Kingdom, as well as the European Union, Turkey, and Gulf States, all favoring change and opposing the Assad regime, backed by the United States. In contrast, powers like Iran and its allies in Iraq and Lebanon (notably Hezbollah) support the continuation of the Assad regime, aided by Russia, China, Brazil, India, and, to a lesser extent, South Africa, grouped in the BRICS bloc.
In this section, we focus on the main influential external actors in the Syrian context. On one hand, regional powers such as Iran, Turkey, and Israel have become major players, while at the international level, Russia and the United States play central roles. These powers have primarily adopted a proxy war approach, providing support, weapons, and logistical assistance to various internal factions. They have intervened directly in certain situations. Here, we will examine these interventions and their manifestations, taking into account the national interests of the different powers involved.
Iran, for example, has been a historical ally of the Syrian regime since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. This country’s expansionist ambition sometimes drives it beyond its capabilities, which can generate internal political crises in several instances.
The situation in Syria decisively influences Turkey’s regional position as well as the form and extent of its foreign policy in the Arab world, particularly linked to the deterioration of its relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia due to its support for the Muslim Brotherhood at the beginning of the Syrian crisis.
Moreover, the security dimension of Syria holds special importance for Turkey, which seeks to prevent any attempts to create a “Western Kurdistan” in the northern and eastern regions of Syria, rich in oil and affected by a security void. This vacuum has allowed Kurdish movements and parties to gain a foothold in these areas by establishing Kurdish security structures and political institutions.
As for Israel, its priority is to ensure the security of its borders with Syria. This concern is driven by the fear of instability should the Syrian regime collapse, which could jeopardize the disengagement agreement signed in 1974 between the late President Hafez al-Assad and Israel, under the auspices of Henry Kissinger.
Israel also fears the growing influence of Iran and its allies, notably Hezbollah, who prefer the prolongation of the conflict to maintain a threat-free zone on the Syrian side for Israel for many years to come.
Regarding the global powers, Russia seeks to preserve its strategic influence in the region due to Syria’s privileged geopolitical location. The United States, for its part, continues its containment policy against Russia established since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The confrontation with extremist organizations in Syria is also a U.S. priority. However, for these major powers, the situation in Syria goes far beyond this country; it involves broader and more complex considerations related to potential consequences on the redistribution of power balances in the region.
In the following analysis, each actor and their position on the Syrian conflict will be examined in detail, from the onset of the crisis to the current state of the war, including the temporal solutions considered. This analysis will trace major developments and transformations in each position over the years, beginning with regional powers and then moving to global powers.
Regional Powers:
Iran: The Syrian-Iranian relationship dates back to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, these ties have not always been close, particularly in the context of Iran’s quest for regional hegemony, where Syria represents an important strategic ally. Since the Ba’athist Alawite regime of Assad, Iran has intensified its military, logistical, and security support to bolster the Syrian regime against the revolution. This relationship has become mutually beneficial, with each side being indispensable to the other: the Syrian regime would not have survived without Iranian support, and Iran cannot successfully pursue its regional project without the cooperation of Syria, which serves as an extension of its influence.
Despite official Iranian denials of any interference in Syrian affairs, keen observers clearly see Iran’s involvement through the Quds Force and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in Syrian events. With the economic and military weakening of the Syrian regime amid continued popular protests, its dependence on Iranian support has become crucial for its survival, leading Iran to perceive the Syrian crisis as a matter of its own national security.
This is evidenced by General Hamedani’s statement that Bashar al-Assad “is fighting for Iran” in Syria and that the war in Syria is as critical for Iran as the one with Iraq. Hamedani also disclosed that 130,000 Basij forces were ready to fight in Syria, in addition to troops already present since the conflict began.
The Syrian crisis has also become a crucial card for Iran in negotiations with the West regarding its nuclear program. Faced with the threat of an Israeli attack on its nuclear facilities, Iran asserted its readiness for a deterrent response, including closing the Strait of Hormuz, which is essential for oil transportation from the Gulf.
Iran’s current strategy relies on integrating regional issues, leveraging interconnected interests to preserve its advantages in Syria and minimize strategic losses. Economically, Iran aims to recoup investments made despite enormous losses resulting from the war. Among these projects is the extension of its gas pipelines through Syria, Lebanon, and the Mediterranean to several Western European countries.
Politically, Iran upholds three principles: first, that any national reconciliation in Syria must come from within; second, the rejection of any Western intervention, notably from the U.S. or NATO, in the political reform process; finally, Iran maintains strategic alignment with Russia and China to counter any threats against Syria.
Iran also seeks to block any initiative that could lead to the departure of the Assad regime and actively works to prevent any agreement between the Syrian opposition and the regime that could jeopardize Assad’s hold on power.
Ultimately, the survival of the Syrian regime is crucial for Iran, as its collapse would signify the end of the Iranian axis of influence in the region. Militarily, Iran has exerted considerable means, benefiting from the lack of coordination among supporters of the Syrian opposition and the inaction of the United States regarding military intervention. Thus, Iran has been able to quietly carry out its military operations in Syria to defend the Assad regime, an essential historical ally for its strategic interests.
Turkey is one of the most concerned countries regarding the Syrian issue within its regional domain, not only because of its long shared border with Syria or the similarities and entanglements of ethnic and sectarian groups, but also due to shared challenges like the Kurdish question. Most importantly, the Syrian crisis has become a decisive test of Turkey’s regional policy and the future of its position in the Middle East.
Since the onset of the Syrian revolution, Turkey has attempted to capitalize on the instability of the Syrian regime by supporting the formation of a national unity government that includes the Muslim Brotherhood, Ankara’s allies, which would have strengthened its influence in Syria. However, as this attempt failed, Turkey displayed its hostility to the Syrian regime, first supporting its political opposition and then providing military support as the conflict escalated.
Inspired by the Libyan revolution — despite its initial opposition due to economic interests with the Qadhafi regime — Turkey quickly took the side of the Syrian revolution, hoping to gain in economic, political, and geopolitical terms against a change it deemed inevitable in Syria.
Turkey bet on a swift resolution to the Syrian crisis, akin to the changes observed in other Arab countries during the Arab Spring. However, the Syrian situation proved to be far more complex and dynamic than initially envisioned by Turkey. With its gamble on the rise of political Islam, Turkey became an incubator for Islamist movements in the region, banking on their rise to power as seen in several neighboring countries following their revolutions.
This approach bolstered its influence not only in Syria but throughout the region. It also supported the diverse Syrian opposition, notably allowing the opening of the first official bureau of the Syrian National Council in Istanbul on December 27, 2011.
For Ankara, the Syrian revolution represented a unique opportunity to rebalance regional forces by toppling the pro-Iranian regime in Syria and replacing it with a strategic ally more aligned with its regional political orientations.
However, this stance exposed Turkey to increasing tensions with several neighboring countries, notably Syria, Iraq, and Iran, and also resulted in negative repercussions for its own security. Facing these challenges, Ankara had to readjust its positions and moderate its rhetoric to ease tensions with certain regional actors affected by the Syrian crisis and its many developments.
Factors prompting a change in policy emerged as the situation in Syria evolved unexpectedly. Turkey’s initial hopes of establishing a Sunni regime close to its orientations in Syria, as a strategic partner to marginalize Iranian influence in the region, were thwarted by the unforeseen turn of the Syrian crisis. Growing concerns forced Turkey to adjust its policy in Syria based on the new developments, both within Syria and at its own borders.
On a national level, Turkey faced ethnic and sectarian tensions linked to the worsening Syrian crisis. Due to the government’s policy toward Damascus, seen as sectarian, Turkish Alawites intensified their protests against the government. Since the events at Taksim Square at the end of May, the majority of victims during protests were Alawite citizens. This increased support for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which expanded its influence and intensified its actions against Turkish forces.
Additionally, political divisions emerged, particularly among senior figures in Erdogan’s party opposing his regional foreign policy, leading to a deterioration of relations with several neighboring countries, especially after Turkey transitioned from mediator to stakeholder in the Syrian conflict, provoking Arab nationalist sensitivities toward Turkish presence in Syria.
At the regional level, interconnected changes altered the balance. U.S. policy toward Iran changed, limiting Turkey’s role, which had previously been an ally of Washington in the context of the siege on Tehran. Simultaneously, Russia increased its presence in the region, while relations between Turkey and Gulf countries soured after the events of June 30 in Egypt, where Turkey took a position perceived as hostile toward the Egyptian institutions.
In light of these unforeseen developments, Turkey moderated its position on the Syrian regime and adopted a more conservative policy, limiting its support for the Syrian opposition. It also sought to mend relations with Egypt, Gulf countries, and even Iran, in an attempt to ease conflicts through proxy means in Syria. This change was illustrated by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu during a meeting with his Iranian counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif.
Davutoğlu stated that both countries would strive to avoid the sectarian dimension of the Syrian conflict. In this context, Turkey today aims to redefine its foreign policy by seeking to reduce the tensions and disagreements that have accumulated over the past three years, in contrast to its previous strategy aimed at strengthening cooperation and mutual trust.
Regarding Israel, its intervention in Syria is neither new nor unique. The Syrian war is a major concern for Israel, with stakes potentially as grave as those of the October 1973 war. The collapse of the Syrian regime could transform the regional geostrategy, directly benefiting Israel by weakening both Syrian society and the regime as well as the Syrian army.
Initially, Israel remained silent regarding the Syrian crisis, leveraging the situation to improve its media image and justify its own actions against the Palestinians. However, the entry of Hezbollah into Syria marked a turning point, leading Israel to strike military sites near Damascus in January 2013, targeting suspected chemical weapons and the transfer of arms to Hezbollah. These Israeli strikes continued to protect its security interests.
In its strategy, Israel adopted a dual approach: diplomatic, cooperating with Russia through a “deconfliction mechanism” and relying on the United States with which it shares common interests. Additionally, Israel supported certain armed factions to secure its borders against Iranian militias, although it denied this support until its formal acknowledgment in June 2017. This support, which included twelve factions, ended in July 2018 following an agreement with Moscow.
Israel’s objectives in the Syrian war are to limit Iranian influence in Syria, halt the transfer of arms to Hezbollah, undermine the Russian presence in Syria, and prevent the consolidation of a permanent military presence. This would represent increased support for Iran, thereby enhancing Iran’s position and consolidating forces allied with the Syrian regime. Israel also seeks to prevent Syria from becoming a force that could threaten its security.
Furthermore, the continuation of the sectarian war in Syria, pitting Iran and its proxies against Sunni extremist groups, may prove advantageous for Israel. Paradoxically, Israel aims to maintain the Assad regime, but in a manner that does not render it threatening— a delicate balance considering Assad’s relations with Iran. The fall of the Syrian regime could open a chaotic space where the focus of belligerents would shift to fighting against Israel.
Israel’s direct actions in the Syrian war are typically limited to targeting Syrian-Iranian sites, especially those connected to chemical weapons that Iran is trying to produce in coordination with the Syrian regime, such as in the Hama region, which hosts chemical weapon production facilities and others belonging to Hezbollah.
Israel thus conducts selective strikes aimed at prolonging the conflict for defensive and preventive purposes, while avoiding favoring one camp over another and ensuring it does not come into conflict with Russian forces. The Israeli objectives do not necessarily require large-scale military force to modify the regional environment, but rather quick, targeted strikes that effectively achieve these objectives, using force as a tactical tool. Israeli intervention in Syria can, therefore, be categorized into four areas: military intervention, intelligence intervention, media intervention, and political intervention.
International Powers
The relations between Syria and Russia are rooted in a long history of stability. The Soviet Union was one of the first countries to recognize Syria after its independence and to establish diplomatic relations. Russian foreign policy, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, has been characterized by pragmatism and realism, driven by Russian national interests. Russia’s stance on the war in Syria reflects this trend. Russian interests in Syria include political, economic, military, and strategic considerations. The fall of the Syrian regime would entail significant losses for Russia on all these fronts.
Although the Syrian crisis began as an extension of the “Arab Spring,” it quickly transformed into a struggle for regional and international influence. The Russian intervention in Syria must be understood as a response to Western policy or as part of a broader strategy of exchanging concessions on higher-priority issues.
American restrictions imposed on Moscow and efforts to limit its security, including neighboring countries of Russia joining NATO (which were once part of the Soviet Union), fuel Russian distrust regarding American support for political Islamist movements. Russia is also wary of an escalation of this dynamic in its own Islamic regions, given its experiences in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Turkish expansion in the region and the success of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) amplify these concerns. Consequently, Russia has decided to support Iranian-led Shiite Islam against Sunni Islam, represented by Turkey at the beginning of the crisis, as the fall of the latter would jeopardize regional stability.
Moscow understands that supporting the Syrian military institution is essential for maintaining its influence in the region. The collapse of the Syrian regime would weaken Iran, which has become a central actor in the Russian strategy to counter the American project and growing Turkish influence.
In summary, Syria is a pivotal country for Russian aspirations in the region. Despite the modesty of its naval base in Tartus, it holds strategic importance for Russia in its quest for a greater geopolitical role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The current Russian administration seeks to meet the demands of Russia’s political and economic growth by playing a central role in regional and international arenas.
The effectiveness of this role relies on restoring areas of influence lost after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and rebalancing relations with the United States within an egalitarian framework in a pluralistic polar system. This justifies the Russian intervention in Syria, whether through direct military actions or ongoing support for the Syrian regime, including using the veto in favor of Syria, as well as economic and military support.
Russia’s direct intervention in Syria came only after the opposition made substantial advancements, leading the regime to completely lose the province of Idlib following the loss of Raqqa city. Before this intervention, Russia had always provided support and assistance to the Syrian regime from the outset of the crisis in all international forums and events, rejecting any foreign interference in Syrian internal affairs and any calls for the ousting of the Syrian president. Since then, Russia has not hesitated to provide economic, political, and military support to the Syrian regime, even up to its partial and tactical withdrawal in 2016.
Moreover, Russia has played an active role in international political contributions and initiatives, organizing a series of conferences to resolve the Syrian crisis through national agreements. This began with the Geneva 1 conference in 2012 and continued up to the Geneva 6 conference in 2017, followed by the Sochi conference in 2018, which was a Russian attempt to eliminate the UN component of Geneva to unilaterally address the Syrian issue. This conference was boycotted by the Syrian opposition, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom.
The Russian withdrawal in 2016 significantly impacted the balance of power among regional and international actors in the Syrian situation, revealing several elements related to the dynamics of the situation in Syria, primarily:
- Avoiding a scenario of a global military confrontation with Turkey, which is well-prepared and supported by the West. Russia also sought to bring Gulf actors and the Syrian opposition to the negotiating table to accept Bashar al-Assad as a part, even temporarily, of Syria’s future.
- Recognizing the inability to eliminate or weaken the opposition through air operations, which necessitated the need to conduct ground operations.
- Pressuring the Syrian regime to accept compromise solutions and soften its position while maintaining the possibility of a transition during which Bashar al-Assad would play a role with limited powers.
- Efforts to lift economic sanctions against Russia in exchange for a partial concession by Bashar or an exchange of areas of Russian influence in Syria.
- Limiting the deterioration of relations with Iran, which refused to abandon Assad and opposed a partition scenario that could disrupt the land connection between Iran and southern Lebanon.
It is crucial to highlight the devastating effects of the Russian military intervention since its onset in 2015, including a high number of casualties among Syrian civilians. According to a report published by the Syrian Network for Human Rights, 6,943 civilians, including 2,044 children, have been killed, with 1,243 incidents of attacks on vital civilian centers perpetrated by Russian forces. This report indicates that since their intervention until July 30, 2022, Russian forces committed at least 1,243 incidents of attacks on civilian facilities, including 223 schools, 207 medical establishments, and 60 markets. Additionally, at least 237 attacks have been recorded using cluster munitions and at least 125 attacks employing incendiary weapons.
The competition for influence in the Middle East is among the most significant issues in international politics. This importance arises from the interests of the parties involved in this competition and Syria’s strategic position in the Middle East. The United States has sought to encircle the Russian Federation to prevent it from any expansionist moves while maintaining its dominance over the international system in the aftermath of the Cold War. In response, Russia has consistently worked to restore its role as a superpower on the international stage.
As mentioned earlier, Russia’s intervention in Syria is situated within broader considerations and deep-seated objectives. Likewise, the U.S. position regarding Syria is also driven by geopolitical objectives. The United States aims to strengthen its control over the region while preventing Russia from extending its influence there.
The Syrian crisis has seen three U.S. presidents succeed one another since its onset in 2011: Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden. Each has approached the Syrian scene differently, with President Obama initially limiting U.S. intervention to condemning the regime’s actions and calling for reforms while seeking to include Bashar al-Assad in a solution. In 2014, he called for increased support for the “moderate Syrian opposition” to confront terrorist organizations in Syria, such as the Islamic State. This demonstrates that the American position was not solidified regarding the situation in Syria and evolved through phases ranging from calls for a political solution to the imposition of economic sanctions.
After taking into account the strategic importance of Syria to the U.S., they sought to exercise caution to avoid repeating their mistakes following their experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. The American objectives in Syria can be summarized as follows:
- The overthrow of the Syrian regime and the establishment of a regime loyal to the United States, due to Assad’s alliance with enemies such as Hezbollah and Iran.
- Protecting Israel’s security, influenced by the Zionist lobby within the American government.
- Avoiding direct military involvement in Syria, reflecting lessons learned from previous conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- Prioritizing the fight against terrorism on Syrian territory rather than focusing solely on the Syrian regime.
The ultimate objective is to restrict the movements and influence of international and regional powers that support the Syrian regime, as well as forces represented by Iran within the country, Russia and China at the international level, undermining their influence in the region and limiting their operational capabilities. This aim seeks to pressure the Syrian regime, attempt to overthrow it, change its trends and alliances, encourage it to turn toward the West, and leverage these forces on other matters of common interest with the United States.
In pursuit of these objectives, the U.S. has utilized several tools, including:
- Political tools: Washington has never declared that the Russian regime has lost its legitimacy and that a political transition must occur in Syria to ensure the protection of public rights and the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, thereby ending ongoing persecution and violations. Furthermore, the U.S. has repeatedly tried to pass UN resolutions to pave the way for international intervention in Syria, but these resolutions have always faced vetoes from Russia and China.
- Military tools: The use of military force has been divided between the threat of its use—illustrated by the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons, which President Obama termed a “red line”—and the American threat of a limited strike to paralyze the regime’s capabilities to use these weapons, regarded as war crimes. Simultaneously, the U.S. has provided indirect support to the opposition in Syria, justifying an increase in armament by the regime’s regional adversaries, including anti-aircraft missiles.
- Economic tools: The U.S. has made the imposition of economic sanctions and tightening the noose on the Syrian regime a core policy in addressing the situation in Syria. They have imposed economic sanctions on public institutions, regime pillars, and their officials. They have also encouraged international and regional powers to apply sanctions against the Syrian regime, which the European Union adopted, and the Arab League followed suit by imposing economic sanctions on Syria after suspending its membership, not to mention Turkish sanctions.
This established the American position on the Syrian war, but this stage was followed by two other stages under Presidents Trump and Biden. We summarize the most important developments in the American position under their administrations as follows:
During President Trump’s era, military intervention in Syria took a new turn. The American military intervention in the Syrian conflict began on the ground in March 2017, after the Trump administration decided to become more involved in the Syrian crisis, contrary to the previous administration. This had an impact that extended beyond military dimensions, as it also led to significant political repercussions, including the formulation of “new political influence maps” and a more hostile stance towards Iranian intervention, which Trump labeled “the official sponsor of terrorism” in the region. He viewed the previous administration’s withdrawal from the region as detrimental to U.S. vital interests, benefiting Russia and Iran.
However, the American military intervention in the Syrian conflict did not clarify the American position on the conflict as a whole, particularly regarding the relations between the Syrian regime and the opposition, the future of the crisis, and the nature of the desired settlement. There is still a lack of an integrated strategic vision to manage the Syrian conflict, and the strategic options for this intervention, both political and military, remain unclear. Nevertheless, this underscores the reasons that might compel Washington to increase its military presence in Syria, as a necessary factor in light of developments related to the confrontation phase with ISIS and beyond, as well as new formulations of security, political coordination, and cooperation with other forces, particularly those led by Russia.
Trump’s policy in Syria may be best described by himself when he stated that he did not want to get involved in the Syrian issue, an interest the U.S. lost when the Obama administration abandoned its red line, leaving behind only “death and sand.” Trump also clarified that U.S. support for the Kurds had been decisive in their ground combat, and they had fought ISIS on behalf of Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime. Trump thus abandoned the Syrian opposition by canceling two support programs for the armed opposition, including joint operations rooms in the north and south, halting the Pentagon’s training and equipment program, as well as State Department programs in northern Syria, and suspending American financial support for stabilization efforts in Syria, particularly for Syrian refugees, until further notice.
As for President Biden’s administration, it recognized that the main failure of the Obama and Trump administrations in Syria was the failure to understand the strategic interest of the U.S. in the stability of Syria. The two administrations did not prioritize this issue but instead used it as a card related to other regional challenges, such as the confrontation with Iran and the fight against terrorism.
This failure has led to strategic advancements for Russia and Iran in Syria and the region as a whole. As the conflict in Syria enters its second decade following Biden’s administration inauguration, the balance of power has shifted, with Russia and Iran dominating the conflict on the ground in areas controlled by the Syrian regime, representing the majority of regions in southern Syria up to the Idlib province in the northwest, as well as the largest parts of the Aleppo province in the north and some areas in the Raqqa and Deir Ezzor governorates in the north and northeast of Syria. Except for the border area surrounding the American base of al-Tanf in the southeast, controlled by American and Syrian opposition forces, the regime also maintains an administrative and military presence in the Hasakah province. Opposition factions control Idlib province in the north of the country and parts of the Aleppo, Hama, Raqqa, and Hasakah provinces. The Syrian Democratic Forces control the area of American forces in the northeast of the country, which includes the Hasakah province and parts of Deir Ezzor, Raqqa, and Aleppo.
This reality limits the options available to the Biden administration, unlike the situation under the Obama administration, where the opposition once controlled two-thirds of the country, making the overthrow of Assad possible had the White House had the will. This is no longer the case after these developments in the Syrian arena. However, with the continued presence of American military forces and the Biden administration’s willingness to maintain them, the situation is not yet resolved. The American military presence in northeastern Syria and in the southeast around the al-Tanf base represents one of the most important cards at the Biden administration’s disposal in its relations with the Assad regime and its allies, who have severed all agreements signed with them regarding Syria over the past ten years. It is therefore likely that this administration will maintain and strengthen this presence in response to the severe criticisms leveled at Trump after he withdrew some of these forces.
Local, Regional, and International Forces in the Syrian Crisis and How to Manage Them
The management of international conflicts typically involves the intervention of a third party aiming to prevent, control, or resolve disputes and establish peace between conflicting parties. Regardless of their objectives, those responsible for managing these conflicts utilize various means to achieve their goals. Notably, these means include:
- Diplomatic means (negotiation, bargaining, mediation)
- Economic sanctions
- Threats and actual use of force
In this section, we will discuss the role of local, regional, and international forces in the management of the Syrian crisis.
The First Requirement: The Approach of Local Forces in Managing the Syrian Crisis
In our previous presentation of the role of local forces in the emergence of the crisis in Syria, we observe that all these forces exist in a state of continuous conflict to fulfill their own interests, disregarding the supreme interest of the Syrian state. This illustrates the incapacity of local forces to manage the conflict.
A conference was held in Geneva in 2014, conducted in two rounds where negotiations took place between the Syrian government and members of the opposition. However, these negotiations ended without significant agreement from either side. The Syrian regime clearly demonstrated during the conference that no solution could be found as long as Assad remained in power, thus refusing to make political concessions. It is evident that the local forces at that time were not willing to de-escalate or manage the conflict in a manner that served the public interest of Syria.
Here, we must highlight certain local forces:
- Assad’s Army: The Syrian army has lost many positions and thousands of its soldiers have been killed or defected. Within Syria, there are armies and militias belonging to more than eight countries. However, Assad’s army has benefited from Russian and Iranian support to reclaim strategically lost areas, such as Aleppo, Homs, and Deir Ezzor, prompting several parties, who had conditioned Assad’s departure before any negotiation, to change their positions.
- Kurdish Fighters: Over the past two years, the Kurds have gained significantly, and their voice and influence are increasing as they have taken control of oil-rich areas in the northeast. They also form the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which liberate Raqqa with the support of the international coalition and have established an “autonomous administration” in the areas under their control. However, the Turkish military operation “Olive Branch” in Afrin against the Kurdish fighters resulted in the loss of several areas and countless deaths.
- Armed Opposition: The Syrian armed opposition initially emerged as a potential alternative to the Assad regime, controlling a significant part of Syria. However, it later lost much ground. The opposition suffers from ideological fragmentation, a multitude of supporters, and a diversity of objectives. This has led some to label it the “opposition,” and it has also been severely impacted after terrorist organizations, such as ISIS and Al-Nusra, intervened and seized territory under its control.
From our exposition, it is clear that the local forces that ignited the conflict have failed to manage it, as each side uses its military capabilities to serve its interests without considering negotiation. Even when present at the negotiation table, each party displayed unwarranted militancy towards its own interests and ideas, leading to their failure to manage their internal crisis. This has necessitated the intervention of external forces to address the crisis in Syria.
The Second Requirement: The Role of Regional Powers in Conflict Management
Regional powers have played a profoundly influential role in the Syrian crisis from its inception to the present day. Nominally, their role has clearly increased within the international community. What we will address here is the role of these powers in conflict management, as well as their tools and mechanisms.
First: Turkey’s Role
Turkey and Syria share a long history of relations marked by both political tensions and cooperation due to a multitude of interwoven issues related to their geographical proximity. With the onset of events in Syria, Turkey gradually began to engage, reaching the current situation.
- Turkey’s Position and Military Intervention Mechanism:
Turkey’s foreign policy has undergone radical transformations since the rise of the Justice and Development Party in 2002. These changes have redefined Turkey’s role in the Middle East and revitalized what can be termed regional ascendance.
This dynamic aligns with the vision of strategic depth and the “zero conflict policy” articulated by Ahmet Davutoglu. Thus, the goal of Turkey’s foreign policy was to prevent attempts at marginalization and to expand its sphere of influence eastward, westward, northward, and southward, transitioning from a marginal state to one with decisive geopolitical weight.
Ankara has adopted a foreign policy towards Syria that relies on activating “smart power” to protect its national security. Ankara continues to fear the resurgence of Kurdish influence in northern Syria and their potential desire for secession, similar to what is occurring in Iraqi Kurdistan, taking advantage of the weakness of the central authority. Consequently, the main objective of Turkey’s presence is to encircle this Kurdish influence in Syria and position itself as an international actor in the country’s reconstruction and the security of Turkish borders.
First: Pressuring for Political Reforms in Syria
This phase extended from the beginning of the protests in March 2011 until the withdrawal of the Turkish ambassador from Damascus in March 2012. Turkey’s position gradually deteriorated following developments in the Syrian domestic scene. Initially, Turkey expressed confidence in the Assad regime and supported the implementation of promised reforms, later working to expedite these reforms, subsequently criticizing security actions, and calling for attention to peaceful change. Ultimately, Ankara threatened to reconsider its support for Assad after he vacillated and deceived Turkey.
Second: Supporting the Opposition to Overthrow Assad
This period lasted nearly three years. After the breakdown of diplomatic relations, Turkey lost its capacity to exert pressure on the regime due to the opposition’s ascendancy on the ground. Thus, it considered the Assad regime to lack legitimacy. Turkish support for the Syrian opposition manifested across various levels: media, political, humanitarian aid, and even military. Turkey participated in most opposition conferences and aided its international recognition.
Third: Accepting a Political Solution
Turkey abandoned the idea of toppling Assad by accepting a transition plan according to the U.S.-Russian agreement in Vienna, implicitly acknowledging Assad’s maintenance of power until the next elections whilst asserting that it did not desire his continued rule beyond that timeframe.
Factors prompting Turkey to endorse this plan included the stagnation of the conflict on the ground, the outcomes of the June elections, and a reassessment of its foreign policy in light of direct military intervention by Russia.
Fourth: Transitioning from Initiative to Defense
This phase began with the downing of a Russian fighter jet by Turkey, marking the loss of hope for a favorable outcome in the crisis due to punitive Russian measures against it. The Russian military subsequently established an effective no-fly zone over Syria to counter any Turkish military initiatives.
Fifth: Military Intervention
Turkey utilized military means manifested in various operations:
- Euphrates Shield: Launched in 2016, targeting Kurdish militias and terrorists, with the support of Syrian opposition forces.
- Olive Branch Operation: Begun in 2018, targeting the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which Turkey considers a terrorist organization.
Despite these interventions, Turkish military operations have been limited, primarily aimed at preventing ISIS from threatening security at the Turkish border.
Reasons for Turkish intervention include:
- The direct impact of the Syrian crisis on Turkish national security.
- Increasing security threats, particularly relating to ISIS and Kurdish groups.
- The superior military capabilities of the Turkish army compared to the opposition.
- Supporting an Islamic project in the Arab world through the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood.
- Fearing that Syrian Kurds might establish an autonomous entity threatening territorial integrity.
Second: Iran’s Role
Iran has played a crucial role on the ground, supporting the Syrian regime by sending Shiite militias, becoming the most influential country in Syria. This support has fortified the political, economic, and security dependence of the Syrian regime on Tehran.
- Developing Iranian Presence in Syria
In 2013, it became evident that the Syrian army could not win the war without external help. For several years, Tehran provided massive support to Damascus, despite its negative repercussions on Iran’s economy.
- Forms of Iranian Intervention in Syria
- Economic Support: Iran has granted several loans to Syria to support its economy, particularly for purchasing essential commodities.
- Credit Lines: The Syrian regime received substantial credit lines to ensure essential needs, in exchange for conditions favoring Iranian interests.
- Commercial Cooperation: Iran continued to actively trade with Syria despite imposed economic sanctions.
- Military Support: Direct Iranian military intervention has intensified since 2011, including sending troops and militias in support of the Syrian regime.
Israel’s Role:
Israel has also intensified its military engagement in Syria by targeting installations linked to Iran and Hezbollah, under the pretext of neutralizing security threats.
Third Requirement: The Role of International Forces and Institutions in Managing the Syrian Crisis
Since the onset of the crisis, various international forces and institutions have sought solutions, but these efforts have generally failed. Russian interventions were motivated by their geostrategic interests, supporting the Assad regime against the opposition backed by the West.
Russia linked its intervention to the sovereignty of states while simultaneously supporting the regime. Its methodical approach shifted the control landscape in Syria, allowing Assad to regain the majority of territory.
The activities of the international coalition led by the United States mainly focus on combatting ISIS while pursuing their own pressure policies against the Syrian regime.
The Syrian crisis has proven to be a battleground between regional and international powers, evolving into a complex situation where the struggle for power has resulted in military interventions and disagreements among external actors.
Conclusion:
The Syrian crisis represents one of the most complex crises, intertwining multiple interests and regional and international stakes. Attempts to resolve the crisis require a multilateral approach that respects the concerns of all involved actors, leveraging peaceful negotiations rather than military actions.
References
- (Chelsea Marie Baltes, Causes and Consequences of Syrian Civil War, University of South Carolina, 2016)
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1106&context=senior_theses
- (Zachary Laub, Syria’s Civil War: The Descent into Horror, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2021)
https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war
- (Mazigh M, Syria: Land of History, Civilizations, and War, CCDR Supplement, March 17, 2016, Volume 42)
- Hafeez Ullah Khan and Waseem Khan, Syria: History, The Civil War and Peace Prospects, Journal of Political Studies, Issue XXXII, Dec 2017)
- Kim Hua Tan & Alirupendi Perdun, The “Geopolitical” Factor in the Syrian Civil War: A Corpus-Based Thematic Analysis, SAGE open, volume 9, issue 2, April 2019)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2158244019856729
- George Freidman, “Russia’s Strategy”, Stratfor, 24/4/2012.
- Bulent Aliriza & Stephen Flanagan, “The End of Zero Problems? Turkey and Shifting Regional Dynamics”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 12/4/2012.
- Trump suspends US refugee programme and bans Syrians indefinitely, BBC, 28-1-2017.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38777437
[1] (Chelsea Marie Baltes, Causes and Consequences of Syrian Civil War, University of South Carolina, 2016, page 8)[2] Baltes, Causes and Consequences of Syrian Civil War, page 8, ibid.[3](Mazigh M, Syria: Land of History, Civilizations, and War, CCDR Supplement, March 17, 2016, Volume 42).[4] Mazigh M, Syria: Land of History, Civilizations, and War, Volume 42-Suppl 2, ibid.[5] (Hafeez Ullah Khan and Waseem Khan, Syria: History, The Civil War and Peace Prospects, Journal of Political Studies, Issue XXXII, Dec 2017).[6] Khan & Khan, Syria: History, The Civil War, and Peace Prospects),Op.cit.[7] (Zachary Laub, Syria’s Civil War: The Descent into Horror, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2021).[8] Baltes, Causes and Consequences of Syrian Civil War, page 9, Op.cit.[9] Laub, Syria’s Civil War: The Descent Into Horror, Op.cit.[10] Khan & Khan, Syria: History, The Civil War, and Peace Prospects, Op.cit.[11] Baltes, Causes and Consequences of Syrian Civil War, page 8, Op.cit.[12] Kim Hua Tan & Alirupendi Perdun, The “Geopolitical” Factor in the Syrian Civil War: A Corpus-Based Thematic Analysis, SAGE open, volume 9, issue 2, April 2019).[13] Mazigh M, Syria: Land of History, Civilizations, and War, Volume 42-Suppl 2, Op.cit.
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