By Jean-Michel Jacques (Revue Défense Nationale 2024/8 n° 873)
Translated by Mohamed Sakhri
Four years ago, Admiral Pierre Vandier, then Chief of Naval Staff, informed the new officer cadets at the Naval School that by joining these ranks, they had chosen to commit to “a Navy that would likely encounter fire at sea.” Today, it is evident that we are facing such a reality. At the beginning of 2024, during its deployment in the Red Sea, the frigate Alsace fired its weapon systems to protect free navigation threatened by Houthi drones between Suez and the Gulf of Aden.
This episode illustrates the turning point we are currently experiencing, which is no less significant than the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Indeed, the war in Ukraine, rising tensions in the Red Sea, and the increasing challenges to international maritime law stemming from the Montego Bay Convention (1982) are troubling symptoms of this situation. Consequently, our Navy must adapt to an altered international environment and geostrategic context to continue protecting the interests of the Nation, which we now recognize are more threatened than during the period of “peace dividends.” In any case, our Navy cannot successfully achieve this essential adaptation without the equally adaptive support from our shipbuilding industry.
As the Euronaval exhibition approaches, it seems useful to revisit the determinants of this necessary transformation that the Military Programming Law 2024-2030 has taken into account, as well as the remaining steps needed to implement the indispensable changes that will allow our Navy to maintain its rank and operational superiority.
Building a Combat Navy Adapted to Future Storms A World Ever More Dangerous Let’s face the world as it is. Within less than a decade, the geostrategic context has changed dramatically. For some states, demonstrations of force are becoming common practice once again. This usage, once reserved for revisionist powers, has spread alongside the collapse of multilateral regulations: too many governments now believe that violence can be the shortest, most effective, and least costly path to achieving their goals. This is evident from the Levant to Africa, through Eastern Europe and the South China Sea.
This alarming observation led to the early adoption in 2023 of a new Military Programming Law (LPM) 2024-2030, with 413 billion euros in programmed needs, which is one-third more than the previous LPM projected for a similar duration, to address these significant challenges for our national defense. After a LPM 2019-2025 focused on “repairing” and restoring a military model worn down by thirty years of underinvestment in defense, the new LPM aims to deeply modernize our defense tools while maintaining coherence and making them more responsive. The ambition is clear: to guarantee France its autonomy in analysis, decision-making, and action, while maintaining its status as a balancing power and leading nation.
A Historic Programming Law Supporting the Coherence of Our Navy by 2030 In the face of increasing maritime conflict and considering that France holds the world’s second-largest maritime domain due to its Overseas Territories, it was essential to strengthen the efforts made since 2017. Therefore, by 2030, the French Navy will fully benefit from the historic investment planned. It will see 65% of its vessels renewed, including the delivery of 3 Force Supply Vessels (BRF), 3 Defense and Intervention Frigates (FDI), and 7 Ocean-going Patrol Vessels (PH), the arrival of 5 Overseas Patrol Vessels (POM), and the launch of the third-generation Nuclear Ballistic Submarine program (SNLE-3G) alongside the new aircraft carrier (PA-NG). Furthermore, by 2030, the 6 Suffren-class Attack Submarines (SNA) will have replaced the Rubis-class SNAs. The Navy will also “drone-ify” its mine warfare, develop underwater operational capabilities down to 6,000 meters, modernize its maritime surveillance assets, and strengthen its overseas presence—especially coveted by certain competitors—while increasing its capabilities through efforts in munitions stockpiling, Operational Maintenance (MCO), and combat readiness.
A More Cohesive Navy by 2030; A New Format Afterwards? The format of our Navy will not change radically by 2030, mainly due to the necessary management of public finances; the decisions taken by the last LPM will modernize current capabilities while maintaining a coherent fleet in relation to existing threats and the ambitions held by France. The decision has been made to trim budgets to a level of “strict sufficiency.” The resources freed up will not change the dimensions of the fleet in the short term, but they will alter its configuration and usage through the enhanced capabilities brought by the new vessels, particularly evident overseas.
Today, we are modernizing and renewing; starting in 2030, we will need to reassess the size of a fleet tasked with controlling the world’s second maritime space and operating with the support of strategic partners across all seas of the globe. This reflection will need to consider how European countries manage to coordinate their military fleet’s maritime operations and how technological revolutions—data integration, drone utilization, and differentiation of operational assets—are incorporated to better manage the economic balance between low-cost saturation weapons and high-tech decision-making weapons.
Consolidating the Shipbuilding Industry to Ensure Our Combat Navy’s Capabilities The BITD as the Primary Strategic Depth of the Navy In the context of contemporary warfare, a state’s strategic depth primarily comes from its Defense Industrial and Technological Base (BITD). The era of “peace dividends” may have led us to believe that optimizing logistical flows could suffice and that “just-in-time” production could replace “traditional stockpiles.” The war in Ukraine has shattered this illusion: the lessons learned apply to the Navy as much as to land or air forces, which are at the core of the observed efforts in Ukraine. This is the essence of the shift towards a “war economy” promoted by the President and the Minister of the Armed Forces since the summer of 2022. Indeed, the hardening of relations between powers should no longer lead us to dismiss the possibility of an “industrialized” military engagement against a symmetric state adversary.
This challenge has been perfectly recognized in the latest LPM: we must collectively succeed in adapting our economic framework to make it more resilient and efficient in the event of a major crisis. Reviving a war economy mindset means relearning how to quickly produce more at lower costs without delay. It involves understanding the advantages of stockpiling, pre-identifying critical dependencies, securing strategic supply sources well in advance, establishing dormant production capacities that can be activated at short notice, and ensuring a mobilizable workforce when production needs ramp up to sustain military efforts over time.
Preparing for a Major Crisis Means Reinforcing the Shipbuilding Industry What are the key conditions for successfully consolidating our naval military tool? Without being exhaustive, the answer must include achieving at least the following four objectives.
First, we must adhere to the financial trajectory outlined by the LPM 2024-2030, while keeping in mind that the battle for resources must also be won with financial actors since the era of public arsenals is long gone. The shipbuilding industry must be able to raise funds, borrow, and secure guarantees, relying on a military-friendly financial industry that plays its full role in enhancing our strategic autonomy.
Second, we must win the talent war. Enhancing the attractiveness of technical fields, improving the alignment between training offerings and business needs, instilling pride in working within the naval BITD, and operationalizing the industrial reserve are all necessary actions to ensure the recruitment levels required by increased naval investments.
It is also crucial to support exports, as the domestic market is currently too limited to guarantee the economic viability of our main prime contractors and their supply chains. In this context, seeking collaborations among French and European industrial players should be explored without reservations, including opportunities for industrial consolidation, as the fragmentation of supply on the continent is currently a hindrance to the strategic autonomy that Europe requires.
Finally, we must better ensure the integration of innovation in armament programs by simplifying acquisition processes, cultivating a risk culture less tied to bureaucracy, and enhancing the networking of innovation capture within our regions through economic development networks, local elected officials, etc.
The Breton Example: An Industrial Foundation Sustaining the Regional Economy and Supporting Our Defense Policy With nearly 17,000 jobs in Brittany, the naval component of the BITD encompasses over 200 companies located in the region. Among them are major groups such as Naval Group—the heir to French arsenals—along with a range of small and medium-sized dual-use enterprises. We can take pride in the strong ties between Brittany and the defense sector. The significant contribution of this region to our military capabilities, not only in naval shipbuilding but also in areas like space and telecommunications, should encourage us to ensure the sustainability of this defense industrial ecosystem that is aligned with current challenges, high-performing, and innovative.
To achieve this goal, it is essential to continue the efforts made to support the adaptation of the industrial tool to the logic of a war economy, support export projects, and favor a regional training policy aligned with the needs of businesses (such as welders, metalworkers, and electromechanics). While national initiatives are important, the implementation and mobilization of local actors (economic development networks, local officials, etc.) remain a sine qua non condition for the success of the France package against national defense challenges. In this spirit, I organize the “Innovation and Industry Meetings” in Quéven every two years—an important civil and military event centered around dual-use SMEs in Southern Brittany, with the third edition scheduled for the fall of 2024. The role of local decision-makers and elected officials is essential to fully realize the multiplier effects of defense investment: territorial marketing and spatial planning are levers for the industrial rearmament we need.
Conclusion The maritime dimension of conflict necessitates that France enhance its naval forces. The Military Programming Law 2024-2030 is addressing this, but it will only yield its full potential if we successfully mobilize our shipbuilding industry to support the Navy’s revitalization. It is up to each of us to contribute to this effort! And initially, at the territorial level, as the strategic depth of the naval tool primarily relies on the deep and active grounding of our sailors and shipbuilding industries within the territories they serve.
