The Russian War in Ukraine: Between Realism and Morality in International Relations

By Guy VinetRevue Défense Nationale  2024/8 no. 873)

Translated by Mohamed SAKHRI

The Russian war in Ukraine and its global implications plunge actors and observers into depths of caution and inquiries. Aside from the purely military dimension of the conflict, it is its ethical and metaphysical aspects that raise questions. Aggressed without any legitimate reason, Ukraine seeks to bring the international community to witness its plight in order to obtain moral, legal, and material support, while conversely, the aggressor relies on a benevolent neutrality from numerous states by shifting its argumentation to the realm of influence against the West. For Ukraine, the stakes are nearly existential, while for Russia, it is about achieving its geopolitical aims as a great power.

This war is not merely a military confrontation. The two belligerents are no longer the only parties concerned; they have become, over the course of the conflicts, the advanced and fighting vanguards of two camps that structure the international community. Ukraine, a possible future member of NATO and the European Union, represents the West; Russia, contesting its influence and advocating for a multipolar world, positions itself as the defender of the “global South.” One of the notable paradoxes is that Russia acts as a colonial power toward Ukraine while claiming to defend the interests of formerly colonized nations.

Within the context of the Russian war in Ukraine, this article explores the dialectic of realism, or the principle of reality, and the moral perspective often tinged with idealism. Realism tends to assert “the existence of a reality independent of human thought,” while morality constitutes the set “of obligations or prohibitions that we impose on ourselves.” The two notions traditionally oppose each other in that the first considers facts and goals to achieve, whereas the second incorporates the human dimension from a sometimes abstract angle. In seeking to resolve the conflict, is the combined recourse to realism and morality unattainable, when one party seems to act outside established morality and the other is relegated to the role of a forced victim? Various interpretations allow for a better understanding of the issue at hand.

A First Perspective
This military confrontation is a clash of civilizations as analyzed by American political scientist Samuel Huntington in his eponymous work. The author shows that the West, buoyed by its victorious outcome from the Cold War, seeks to reinforce its global hegemony while “non-Western societies want to liberate themselves from the economic, military, and cultural domination of the West.” He points to the political-religious divide that separates Orthodox East from Uniate West in Ukraine and considers it improbable that Russia and Ukraine can coexist in harmony. Finally, Huntington explains how a civilization-based war, initially very localized, quickly spreads to other actors due to ideological sympathies or security fears. This is currently happening with the Russo-Ukrainian confrontation, and there is nothing less rational and moral than a war of this type.

Meanwhile, former advisor to American President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in The Grand Chessboard, underscores the importance of Ukraine, which he suggests should be “Finlandized,” for Russia: “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire.” Finally, American economist Robert Kaplan notes that “it is the fate of land forces that they have no other solution for survival than to conquer their neighbors.” Thus, the Russian invasion of Ukraine appears as the irrational result of geopolitical impulses that abstract from any moral consideration.

A Historical Approach
In ancient times, international relations (an obviously anachronistic term) were partly organized on the basis of a certain realism, as demonstrated by the Athenian historian Thucydides in the case of the Peloponnesian War (432-404 BC). The Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues were established based on an empirical balance of cities and spatial distribution, with the first controlling marine space and the second controlling land space. The war erupted when one of the Leagues attempted to disrupt this balance to its favor, leaving both Sparta and Athens bloodied. Thucydides narrates this war without resorting to mythology or morality, while clearly showing that, even then, war is an instrument of politics and a continuation of it by other means, as the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz would articulate later.

In a more modern era, Cardinal Richelieu brought prestige to realism in the conduct of the foreign affairs of the Kingdom of France, which he managed under King Louis XIII from 1624 to 1642. His desire to assert royal authority and neutralize other European powers (England, the Habsburgs of Austria and Spain, and Sweden) led him to make seemingly counterintuitive decisions: quelling the Protestant faction at home while allying with Protestant powers abroad. With the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) concluded by the Peace of Westphalia, the Cardinal succeeded in imposing his views without France experiencing war on its territory.

Henry Kissinger acknowledges: “Richelieu’s France introduced the modern conception of international relations, based on the nation-state and determined by the pursuit of national interest as an objective.” He quotes a phrase from the Cardinal that summarizes this thought: “Man is immortal; his salvation will come; the state is mortal; its salvation is now or never.” This judgment underscores the emergence of modern realism in politics concurrently with the rise of states. In the second half of the 19th century, the decline of French influence in Europe in favor of Germany was marked by the disappearance of Richelieu’s “raison d’État” in favor of the Realpolitik of German Imperial Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Both provide a rational framework for state actions but risk excess. The two world wars demonstrated how they could occur devoid of any moral consideration but based on excessive national ambitions.

Classical realism in international relations emerged after World War II. The state naturally became the central actor as the repository of national sovereignty, recognizing no other authority. In a dispute between states, war is not an end in itself but a tool at the disposal of politics.

More recently, Henry Kissinger, as Secretary of State for American Presidents Richard Nixon (1969-1974) and Gerald Ford (1971-1977), conducted international policy maneuvers with the primary concern for American interests. He supported dubious regimes in South America and Southeast Asia to counteract communist advances. At various times, his political actions proved brutal, relying on unabashed realism, not without collateral damage. Kissinger considers that “the recourse to force or the use of force itself are necessary and legitimate instruments in foreign policy.” More diplomatically but no less realistically, he also worked toward rapprochement between Washington and Beijing to isolate Moscow. His realism could be perceived as cynicism and be described as prescriptive, as political scientist Raymond Aron lamented, given the long-standing relations between the two personalities who “sought to theorize a realistic foreign policy.”

In contrast to this classical realism, American political scientist Kenneth Waltz proposed a neorealism based on an ontological rupture that articulates the paradoxical weakness of force in balance relationships and distinguishes between power and its potential outcomes. This neoliberalism had limited success with American Presidents George W. Bush (2001-2009) and Barack Obama (2009-2017). Nevertheless, the hypotheses and principles set forth by classical realism continue to profoundly influence the discipline of international relations both in action and study.

A Philosophical Approach
For Pierre Hassner, another major theorist of international relations, as with Raymond Aron, their study cannot do without solid philosophical references.

While realism, in a more or less elaborate form, if not without formulation, imposes itself on all due to the force of an unavoidable reality during confrontations, it is challenging to pinpoint when the moral sentiment emerges in human and international relations. There is little doubt that the Greek philosopher Socrates gave it its first expressions when he spoke of the virtue of the good while asserting that no one would intentionally wish for evil but could contribute to it by believing they are doing good (the Socratic paradox). He provides insight into the intrinsic contradiction between morality and realism by accepting the injustice of his own condemnation out of respect for the city laws and by preferring the common good to his own personal interest.

The realism of ancient Greece lays the foundation for what will gradually develop through multiple versions starting in the 16th century with three thinkers: Florentine Niccolò Machiavelli argues that the art of governing is not inherently moral as state affairs take precedence over virtue. The Englishman Thomas Hobbes posits that force makes law but must be tempered by social contract, where morality is not excluded. The Prussian Emmanuel Kant, with his theory of the categorical imperative, asserts the primacy of universal morality, whose logic dismisses brutal realism and aspires to “perpetual peace.” Closer to our time, philosopher Emmanuel Levinas returns to Kant’s approach and the moral obligation of man toward man. Morality must combat evil and inhumanity without renouncing justice or creating evil.

Philosophy thus sketches a narrow path between the principle of reality and moral duty by outlining a synthesis on the notion of responsibility, of which Max Weber’s distinction between the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of conviction is an expression. However, “the devil is in the details,” according to Nietzsche, and some principles cannot command reality, especially since the moral approach is, by its nature, normative and idealistic. At this point, Raymond Aron contributes part of the solution when he illustratedly admits that “foreign policy is an exercise of rogues and gangsters” and that “politics is not exhausted in the actions of good Samaritans.” The teleological opposition between realism and morality must first reconcile with reality.

In light of these various perspectives, what is the situation with the two belligerent parties?

Russia
The Russian aggression against Ukraine cannot, a priori, find any moral support. Nevertheless, caution is warranted because morality can have a malleable content, and Western criteria do not possess universal value.

For Westerners, this aggression is immoral due to its motivations and brutality; it is a war of colonization and a “war of convenience,” according to Swiss military theorist Antoine Henri Jomini. Even from a realist standpoint, this initiative appears very disconnected, if not irrational, and potentially counterproductive. The outbreak of this war starkly illuminates what a great power is capable of when it feels threatened, even in a chimerical manner; the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 already fit this perverse logic. In both cases—the American war in Iraq and the Russian war in Ukraine—it is clear that morality and international law have been forgotten and that a brutal, even distorted, realism has prevailed. For Westerners, it is thus easy to condemn Russia by combining moral and international legal viewpoints. Nonetheless, it is worth recognizing that arguments can explain its stance: the famous “humiliation” suffered at the hands of the West in the 1990s, NATO’s geographic encroachment, and the spread of the decadent values of the West. All these points have been largely invalidated, but they nevertheless constitute the backbone of Russian resentment toward the West, with the potential “loss” of Ukraine being the last straw. This resentment is based on what theologian Jean-Michel Garrigues calls the “Russian lie,” which consists of “adhesion to a surreal world that disqualifies the real world of common sense” and a complaint “against the real world for continuing to exist and thereby preventing the true world, the Russian world, from coming to fruition.” On such a fantasized basis, what remains of a possible realistic or moral approach?

In seeking a resolution to the conflict that will eventually present itself, Ukrainian and Western realisms cannot ignore these elements and must incorporate them into discussions. The relevance of this viewpoint is notably defended by Professor Stephen Malt, who argues that “morality is the enemy of peace.” No matter what one thinks of Russia’s motivations, they cannot be dismissed by pure reasoning of immorality or unthinkable Western perspectives. Russia’s behavior for nearly twenty years aligns with what Pierre Hassner analyzed in his work The Revenge of Passions, the title of which summarizes the content. One should not forget that the unleashing of Russian violence in Ukraine followed the example of the United States in Iraq (supra), which was never sanctioned.

Russia lacks restraint in brandishing the nuclear weapon threat and heavily striking civilian targets: it combines realism and immorality to achieve its objectives.

Ukraine
Ukraine is subjected to Russian aggression, whose precursors date back to the spring of 2014, reaching full-scale dimensions in February 2022. Partially occupied and in a position of weakness, Ukraine has endeavored to gather support of all kinds based on this unjust and illegitimate aggression. It has sought the backing of the international community through the United Nations by condemning Russia. The path through the Security Council being closed, the General Assembly adopted several resolutions denouncing the Russian aggression in various forms.

In the West, the Ukrainian cause is heard and supported. This is not the case elsewhere, where this war seems distant; this difference in perspective sheds light on and relativizes the notion of morality. Some states have not condemned the Russian aggression in Ukraine based on their realism and/or rejection of Western moralism. Furthermore, Russian diplomacy has effectively mobilized to defend Moscow’s viewpoint, which presents itself as the spearhead of the “global South” and leads an anti-Western crusade.

Quite logically, the Ukrainian President adopted uncompromising positions toward Russia from the start of the war. In June 2024, he refused the participation of a Russian delegation at the international peace conference on Ukraine. Despite these maximalist positions, meetings have occurred between the two belligerents under the auspices of external actors (Red Cross, United Nations, Turkey, etc.) on issues of prisoner exchanges, secure humanitarian corridors, and grain trade via the Black Sea. The Ukrainian President ultimately accepted a Russian presence at the next international conference on peace in Ukraine. A minimum of realism is necessary when faced with a vision that is overly moral: having a just cause without force is of little value.

For Ukraine’s allies, it is unclear which prevails, realism or morality, but it is evident that their lack of conviction encourages Russia: realism and morality cancel each other out, undermining their credibility and perpetuating a war that ultimately benefits the aggressor.

Ukraine remains condemned to endure this war and to evolve along a path constrained by Western realism and moralism.

In Conclusion
The brutal aggression against Ukraine by Russia has reignited the debate on the legal, political, and moral assessment of international relations practices and the recourse to war. In this context, the opposition between realism and morality is common. Too conventional, it may seem artificial, yet it constitutes a necessary dialectic. The debate exists both within warring states and among those not party to the conflict who have taken a stand for one or the other protagonist. While realism in the conflict would require defining a feasible short- or medium-term objective, the moral dimension could support and channel its execution. In this instance, realism and morality appear irreconcilable when they should share the burden of conflict resolution. If realism should logically prevail, a certain moral framework should guide it by setting boundaries.

Ultimately, morality or justice would wish for the aggressor to be defeated, pushed back within its borders, and internationally sanctioned, but as demonstrated by the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials following World War II, it is the victor who defines the law and… morality.

  • [1]Comte-Sponvile André, Dictionnaire philosophique, PUF, 2001, p. 655 et 847.
  • [2]Huntington Samuel P., Le choc des civilisations, Chapitre VIII : « L’Occident et le reste du monde : problèmes intercivilisationnels », Odile Jacob, 1997.
  • [3]Voir Brzeziński Zbigniew, Le Grand Échiquier, Bayard Editions, 1997, p. 122 et suiv.
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  • [5]Kissinger Henry, Diplomatie, Fayard, 1994, p. 1.
  • [6]Kissinger H., World Order, Penguin Books, 2014, p. 22-23.
  • [7]Araud Gérard, Henry Kissinger – Le diplomate du siècle, Tallandier, 2023, p. 255.
  • [8]Roche Jean-Jacques, « Théorie des relations internationales », in Ramel Frédéric, Jeangène Vilmer Jean-Baptiste et Durieux Benoît (dir.), Dictionnaire de la paix et de la guerre, PUF, 2017, p. 1410.
  • [9]Gallon Jérémie, Henry Kissinger – L’Européen, Gallimard, 2021, p. 17-23.
  • [10]Waltz Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, Boston, Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 188-190.
  • [11]Hassner Pierre, La revanche des passions, Fayard, 2015, p. 80 et suiv.
  • [12]Schaeffer Christophe et Escot Richard, Dictionnaire des penseurs, Honoré Champion Éditeur, 2018, p. 294.
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  • [14]Jomini Antoine Henri, Précis de l’art de la guerre, Perrin, 2001 (1836), p. 55 et suiv.
  • [15]Garrigues Jean-Michel, « Pour défendre la liberté, renonçons à nos ressentiments », Commentaire, n° 186, été 2024, p. 372-373.
  • [16]Malt Stephen P., « Morality is the Enemy of Peace », Foreign Policy, 13 juin 2024 (https://foreignpolicy.com/).
  • [17]Assemblée générale des Nations unies, Resolutions 2623 du 27 février 2022 (https://undocs.org/), ES/11-1 du 2 mars 2022 (https://undocs.org/), ES/11-2 du 24 mars 2022 (https://undocs.org/), ES/11/L.4 du 7 avril 2022 (https://undocs.org/), du 14 novembre 2022 et ES-11/L.7 du 23 février 2023 (https://undocs.org/).
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SAKHRI Mohamed
SAKHRI Mohamed

I hold a Bachelor's degree in Political Science and International Relations in addition to a Master's degree in International Security Studies. Alongside this, I have a passion for web development. During my studies, I acquired a strong understanding of fundamental political concepts and theories in international relations, security studies, and strategic studies.

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