Introduction
Naval drones fall under the category of weapons operating within the (A2/AD-Anti Access/Area Denial) strategy. This strategy is typically employed by forces lacking extensive military capabilities across various branches, reflecting the pragmatism of the Ukrainian Navy’s leadership. Instead of relying on surface ships in naval battles against the technologically advanced Russian Navy, with its frigates, destroyers, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, multi-role fighters, and attached bombers, the Ukrainian Navy focused on naval drones and cruise missiles, which have direct economic, political, and military impacts.
Military and Geopolitical Perspectives on the Black Sea Battles
At the onset of the war with Russia, the Ukrainian Navy possessed a small maritime force, consisting of one frigate, patrol boats of various sizes and speeds, and an amphibious landing ship. Notably, the frigate in the Ukrainian Navy’s possession was of the (Krivak3) class, lightly armed for self-defense against aerial threats, with no anti-ship armament. The frigate was intentionally sunk to prevent it from being captured by the Russian Navy. Additionally, Ukraine had an old missile boat of the (Matka) class, stripped of its missile-launching capability and relegated to combat patrols, stored in the port of Odessa.
Given these constraints, Ukraine’s only option was to acquire naval drones while developing a comprehensive plan that included acquiring modern Turkish-made (Ada) corvettes capable of surface-to-surface combat and self-defense. These corvettes were contracted in 2021, but none have been delivered yet. These factors allowed the Russian Navy to pressure Ukrainian shipping vessels on one hand, while targeting grain silos in Odessa, destroying 280,000 tons of grain on the other. Ukraine responded by using transport ships to carry out drone boat attacks on the port of Sevastopol, the main base of naval forces in Crimea.
The Russian Navy’s Objectives and Actions
The Russian Navy had two main objectives: first, to achieve naval dominance and blockade all Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea, and second, to carry out an amphibious landing to capture the Ukrainian port of Odessa and encircle ground forces in the Mykolaiv area from the rear. The Russian Black Sea Fleet comprised a battleship, a frigate, two corvettes, six landing ships, and two submarines. The battleship (Moscova) was designed and heavily armed to engage aircraft carriers and their accompanying ships single-handedly, capable of executing offensive missions with its large arsenal of fast, long-range guided missiles, while also providing fire support to ground forces through naval gunfire, as it did during the 2008 Russo-Georgian war.
In the initial naval battles in Ukraine, the Russian Navy successfully blockaded “Snake Island,” leading to the surrender of the Ukrainian garrison. The Russian Navy also played a secondary role by providing aerial defense coverage for other naval units and restricting the freedom of Ukrainian and European Allied air operations over the Black Sea. The Black Sea Fleet included a modern (Grigorovich) class frigate, and in cooperation with the (Buyan) and (Karakurt) class corvettes and (Kilo) class submarines, it was able to conduct preparatory and targeted strikes from the beginning of the war to the present using (Kalibr) missiles.
NATO’s Indirect Involvement
NATO participated indirectly in the naval battles to support the Ukrainian Navy through reconnaissance and maritime patrol aircraft, tracking Russian naval units, studying their movements, and then assisting Ukraine in targeting those units using their coordinates if desired. The aircraft permanently monitoring the Black Sea include the U.S. Navy’s (P-8) maritime patrol aircraft and the (EP-3) electronic reconnaissance aircraft, both flying from the Sigonella base in Italy, along with two drones (RQ-4) and (MQ-9). Additionally, the British (RC-135), Turkish (ATR-72), and Italian (G-550) aircraft contribute to the surveillance.
NATO did not limit its support to providing intelligence; it also supplied the Ukrainian Navy with naval drones in April 2022, according to statements made by the White House National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications, John Kirby. Subsequently, manufacturing capabilities were transferred to the Ukrainian side, leading to the development of a locally-produced version designed for attacks on rear lines and bridges. The first generation of these drones was characterized by a simple design, high-precision targeting capabilities, autonomous navigation, and a 200 kg explosive payload.
These drones first appeared on September 21, 2022, when an unmanned vessel went adrift after communication between it and its operator was deliberately cut off. Typically, communication is maintained via the “Starlink” satellite system, owned by American billionaire Elon Musk, as reported by Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukrainian military intelligence, to The Warzone. This incident created significant media pressure on Musk to continue providing internet services to the Ukrainian military, which relies heavily on them for managing military operations. The Ukrainian military doctrine has shifted significantly from Soviet to Western principles, leading the Ukrainian army to use military applications that enhance awareness and alertness against Russian threats on the defensive level and improve targeting and ambush quality on the offensive level. Examples of such applications include Delta and Kill-Chain, which align with NATO’s operational standards, facilitating their integration with NATO’s command and control networks for military operations and information exchange.
According to a report on this type of drone published on October 19, 2023, by American writer Sebastien Roblin on Inside Unmanned Systems, the first reported drone attacks occurred on October 29, 2023, at the port of Sevastopol, causing damage to the frigate Grigorovich and a minesweeper. The subsequent attacks in May and June 2023 were carried out by a locally made version called Magura-v5 against two Yuriy Ivanov-class intelligence reconnaissance ships, with minor damage to one. In July 2023, the Kerch Bridge was targeted by two maritime drones to disrupt logistical support from Russian territories to Crimea. August 2023 witnessed the most successful mission by the 358th Ukrainian Special Maritime Operations Brigade (specializing in controlling these drones), which attacked the Novorossiysk base within Russian borders, destroying an oil tanker. The brigade was honored by the Ukrainian president. Russian corvettes, including the Vasily Bykov, were attacked between September 13 and 16, 2023, though the attackers were destroyed with only minor damage to the Russian ships. On November 9, 2023, Ukrainian intelligence carried out an offensive operation using maritime drones, successfully hitting two Serna-class and Akula-class landing ships.
On the other side, the Russians also benefited from acquiring an undestroyed Ukrainian drone to produce their own version named “Sargan.” This version is characterized by speed, small size, and maneuverability but with a smaller explosive charge than the Ukrainian version. It successfully attacked the Ukrainian Zatoka Bridge in February 2023. The Russian perspective on the use of such drones has evolved, according to Mikhail Razvozhaev, the Russian governor of Sevastopol, who stated on his Telegram channel that this type will be used in the future to escort cargo ships to protect them from potential risks posed by hostile surface vessels, indicating that Russia’s future use will involve both offensive and defensive tactics.
According to a British intelligence report dated October 14, 2023, providing an update on the Ukrainian war, the Russian navy has doubled its defenses and response measures, repositioning ships and submarines capable of launching cruise missiles from the port of Sevastopol to Novorossiysk in the far east. Despite Ukrainian attacks on the Russian Black Sea fleet using maritime and aerial drones and cruise missiles, Russian ships continue to fulfill their offensive duties by launching cruise missiles while simultaneously defending against various threats and adapting to and countering Ukrainian tactics. However, the noticeable eastward retreat of Russian naval units is expected to negatively impact Russia’s political objectives in the naval battle over time, especially after the sinking of the Russian warship Moskva, which had been a formidable obstacle to any Ukrainian or even NATO air ambitions.
Changes in Russian and Ukrainian Tactics
The Ukrainian tactic of using drones resembles the strategy employed by al-Qaeda on October 12, 2000, near the coast of Yemen, as demonstrated by the attack on an Arleigh-Burke-class destroyer using a suicide boat. The approach involved getting as close as possible to one of the ship’s blind spots that its guns could not cover, while maintaining a fast, zigzag course in the final phase of the attack. On the other hand, following the second Ukrainian attack, the Russian response was swift and robust, with helicopter patrols of the Mi-8AMTSH and Mi-24M models, which attacked the drones with machine guns and warned ships to engage the target using 14.5-inch caliber machine guns.
The continued success of Russian adaptation required a change in Ukrainian tactics to disrupt Russian naval operations by supporting offensive efforts through attacks on ports located deep within Russian territory. These attacks were carried out using British and French cruise missiles, “Storm Shadow/SCALP,” launched from (Su-24M/MR) bombers operating within the Seventh Air Brigade. The brigade focused its strikes on the Sevastopol naval base twice in September 2023, in addition to hitting a submarine with a cargo ship and damaging the recently joined Karakurt-class corvette in November 2023.
It can be said that Ukrainian success using cruise missiles in the naval theater was significant compared to the land theater, due to the intensive efforts to neutralize Russian air defenses in the south. This was achieved through a complex tactic aimed at leveraging NATO reconnaissance systems to pinpoint the locations of these defenses, and by harassing and distracting them using drones, often Chinese-made Mogin models, and the flying radar decoy (ADM-160). Additionally, the Ukrainian forces neutralized the capability of Russian air defense radars with (HARM) missiles and executed the main attack using (Neptune) missiles, especially the version designed for ground attack.
As is typical of Russian adaptation, the response was always through airstrikes using (KH-22) and (K-300) missiles, which Ukrainian air defenses are unable to intercept, according to the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Air Force, Yuriy Ignat. The strikes focused on the maritime drone manufacturing facility in Odessa and the Starokostiantyniv Air Base, the headquarters of the Seventh Ukrainian Bomber Brigade.
According to the updated report from the European statistical site (The Oryx), which tracks naval losses on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides since the beginning of military operations, 11 Russian naval assets have been destroyed and 5 damaged, totaling 16 naval assets. On the Ukrainian side, 9 naval assets have been lost, 1 damaged, and 17 naval assets captured, totaling 27 naval assets.
In conclusion, there is no doubt that maritime drones were one of the Ukrainian tactical adaptation tools to deal with the overwhelming Russian naval superiority at the beginning of the battle and the complete control over the Black Sea. They have managed to achieve results, even if they seem minor, but with significant operational impact, especially after being integrated with other systems. This has necessitated a change in Russian naval planning, which will likely expand to include the production of such drones that could be used in another theater of operations against a potential enemy. Certainly, many navies will seek to acquire this specific type, raising the notion of the inevitable presence of drones in future naval battles.
