The city of Córdoba, the capital of Al-Andalus in ancient times, has captivated many hearts and minds. This passion still evokes a sense of nostalgia for the Arab utopia associated with this magnificent place, which represents the idealized model for dreamers. However, beneath this beauty lies a history of tragedies, conflicts, and contradictions. The most eloquent description of Al-Andalus, particularly Córdoba, can be captured in the phrase: “Córdoba, the beginning and the end of time, the starting point and the destination, the heart of the world and the gathering of opposites, the arena and the battleground, the seat of caliphs, princes, and scholars, as well as the tavern of libertines and vagabonds, the ladder to ascend to the pinnacle and the slope leading to hell, fire and bliss, Córdoba.”
Transitioning from Córdoba to Lebanon—land of cedars, mountains, fashion, beauty, and a mosaic of various sects, ethnicities, doctrines, and religions—one finds a place that is not much different in description from Córdoba for those who have read about it but have never visited. Similarly, Lebanon is often heard about or visited for tourism and enjoyment of its beauty, yet many remain unaware of its realities, contradictions, and conflicts.
The allure of images and the beauty of written words can often lead us to believe things disconnected from reality. This is evident in the observations of many Arabs regarding Lebanon and its violent events. Thus, I found it fitting to write this article as an introduction for those interested in understanding Lebanon and its conditions. I would like to refer to a statement that I believe is entirely accurate: “The path to understanding Arab politics begins in Lebanon.” This holds true for many reasons, the foremost being that all the diversity and contradictions found in the Arab world are encapsulated in Lebanon. It truly represents the Arabs from the Atlantic to the Gulf with their ideas, ideologies, beliefs, sects, religions, ethnicities, successes, failures, and even their disappointments and setbacks. Such a confluence of experiences can only be found in Lebanon, a small country in size yet large in influence, which has become a preferred arena for various factions to manage their conflicts on its soil. This uniqueness grants Lebanon special significance as a gateway to understanding the complex landscape of conflicts and power dynamics in the region.
The Key to Understanding Modern Lebanon: Ancient and Medieval History
In Lebanon, one cannot separate history from the present. This country is still governed and constrained by its past and has yet to fully emerge into the horizons of the modern world. The history of what is now called Lebanon (a small part of a larger region extending to the coast of Palestine) began with the Phoenicians, whose civilization was distinguished by their ability to sail across the Mediterranean, reaching all its shores while transporting goods from India, Persia, the Levant, Egypt, and the Horn of Africa. Their industry, alongside trade, included various products such as purple-dyed textiles, pottery, glass, ivory, wine, and the export of cedar wood. They established several trading colonies along the Mediterranean coast, with Carthage in present-day Tunisia being the most famous. The Phoenicians did not have a centralized state throughout history due to the difficult terrain of the Levant, which allowed each city to protect itself and maintain independence from others. Competition and conflict were fierce among these cities, each governed by a political feudal family supported by a council resembling a senate, made up of large landowners, while the rest of the population were subjects under these feudal lords. A true state, as understood in contemporary terms, never emerged in Lebanon or other areas of the Levant; rather, a confederation resembling a union of major city princes formed when there was an external threat to their interests. Once this threat dissipated, they would revert to their usual conflicts.
With the rise of empires in the region and the advancement of military technologies that enabled armies to invade difficult terrains like the Levant, many empires successively dominated what is now referred to as “Lebanon.” These empires include the Assyrians, the ancient Egyptians, the Achaemenid Persians, the Macedonians, the Romans, the Sasanian Persians, the Byzantine Romans, the Arabs, the Mamluks, and the Ottomans. Throughout these periods, there were instances of partial or complete independence led by aspiring local princes, but none of these periods were able to endure for long. The empires’ control over Lebanon was also complicated by its rugged terrain, which posed significant challenges to all invaders. Additionally, while the influence of feudal lords waned, they remained central to the equation, often engaging in duplicity. For instance, they would correspond with the Egyptian king Ahmose II, who ruled from 570 to 526 BC, pledging loyalty and alliance against the Persians, while simultaneously forging agreements with Cambyses II. This historical trend reveals a pattern of maneuvering between contradictions and, at times, manipulating the major conflicting powers in the region.
Reasons for Diversity and Contradiction in Lebanon
Conflict has been a common thread throughout Lebanon’s history, taking on various forms that reflect the nature of the times. Initially, this conflict manifested as division and competition over trade interests among the Phoenician cities. Later, it evolved into struggles between feudal families competing for loyalty to the rival empires in the region. With the emergence of the Abrahamic religions, particularly Christianity and subsequently Islam—both of which differ from the ancient non-proselytizing pagan religions—the nature of the conflict transformed into a religious one.
One of the earliest religious conflicts arose from the Chalcedonian Council in 451 AD, which caused a schism within the Church over the nature of Christ. The debate centered on the belief in a single nature (“Miaphysite” or “Jacobite”) versus the belief in two natures (the Melkites). As the Miaphysite Syrians constituted the majority, alongside a minority adhering to the two-nature belief linked to the teachings of St. Maron the Hermit, who was born in Aleppo in the latter half of the fourth century, they decided to emigrate to the rugged mountainous areas of Lebanon. There, they preached Christianity among the local populations, establishing what would later be known as the Maronite community, which was predominantly composed of migrants from Syria alongside some residents from the Lebanese mountains.
Following the rise of Islam and its expansion into the Levant, tribal conflicts during the Umayyad period began to escalate, notably exemplified by the first and second “Tharthar Wars” between the Qays and Taghlib tribes. These conflicts created a new dynamic in the struggle based on tribal affiliations, with Lebanon serving as a battleground for these tribes. As sectarian divisions within Islam emerged, some Shiites migrated to Lebanon, and a portion of the local population converted to Shiism, alongside the Druze, Alawites, and others from various sects. Given its geographical position, Lebanon remained outside the central control of major ruling empires due to the difficulties of its terrain and the possibility of living securely in certain areas. This made it a safe haven for various sects and ethnicities that did not align with the political authority. In contrast, the coastal and flat areas were often inhabited by those loyal to the imperial powers.
When the Crusaders invaded the Levant, some Maronite Christians in Lebanon sided with them. However, after their defeat and expulsion from the region by Sultan Baybars, retaliatory actions were taken against these collaborating Maronites, coinciding with major religious conversions by others seeking to protect themselves. This cycle repeated itself among all sects throughout Lebanon’s Abrahamic religious history, with allegiances shifting according to power dynamics. Indeed, some feudal leaders altered their faiths based on their interests, with prominent examples including the Ma’n, Shihab, and Jumblatt families. Consequently, Lebanon became a microcosm housing various contradictions, where each group fortified itself within its cities and villages, living in safety and isolation from opposing factions. This created the highly diverse and complex mosaic we recognize today as Lebanon.
The Ottoman Era and Its Impact on Lebanese Divisions
It is historically unjust and a dismissal of research methodologies to attribute all of Lebanon’s woes solely to the Ottoman period, as if Lebanon experienced peace and harmony before that time. Numerous events in the commonly agreed-upon historical narrative highlight the highly negative role of the Ottoman state—not just in Lebanon’s history, but throughout the entire region. One of the most significant of these negative impacts was the use of sectarian policies to serve the goals of the Ottoman sultanate. Lebanon enjoyed a degree of autonomy under the rule of various empires, provided that everyone recognized the sultan’s authority and paid taxes to the ruler. This allowed various sects seeking refuge and protection to migrate there. Since the Ottomans’ entry into the Levant in 1516, their policies continued in this vein until they faced separatist movements in Mount Lebanon that they could not control.
These independence attempts began with the Ma’n family, an Arab Druze dynasty, whose most notable leader was Fakhr al-Din al-Ma’nI I. He initially claimed allegiance to Sultan Qansuh al-Ghuri of the Mamluks but secretly negotiated with Ottoman Sultan Selim I to abandon the battlefield at Marj Dabiq in 1516 in exchange for securing his leadership over Mount Lebanon. His grandson, Fakhr al-Din al-Ma’nI II, allied with Grand Duke Ferdinand I de’ Medici of Tuscany, as well as France and the Netherlands, and sought to become independent from the Ottomans. He frequently changed his faith according to political expedience, identifying as Druze, Sunni, and Maronite, depending on what would further his ambitions. However, this attempt ultimately failed, and he was executed by the Ottomans in 1653.
Efforts to gain independence from the Ottoman Empire were made repeatedly, culminating during the rule of Bashir II al-Shihabi, a member of the Qurashi al-Makhzoumi Shihab family, which adhered to Sunni Islam, although some of its leaders converted to Christianity based on political interests. Bashir al-Shihabi II forged an alliance with Muhammad Ali Pasha, declaring independence from the Ottoman sultanate. This attempt, however, collapsed when the Egyptian army withdrew from the Levant in 1840 under Western pressure.
As a result of these events, the Ottomans found that the most effective means of controlling Mount Lebanon lay in exploiting its contradictions and the historical rivalries among the feudal princes. By favoring one faction over another, they sought to balance the various interests. This policy led to a conflict that spiraled out of control, culminating in the 1860 massacres between the Druze feudal lords and the Maronite peasants, eventually drawing other Muslims into the fray. This conflict resulted in widespread displacement and a reconfiguration of the sectarian landscape in Mount Lebanon, which politically manifested in its administrative separation from the province of Syria, which encompassed all of Greater Syria. A Christian governor was appointed to govern the region, with this appointment requiring the approval of the six European powers (Britain, France, Russia, Austria, Italy, and Prussia—now Germany), as each of these nations had clients and supporters within Lebanon, maneuvering according to their interests. This new administrative region became known as the “Mutasarrifate of Mount Lebanon,” representing historical Lebanon, covering an area of 3,500 square kilometers. The mutasarrifate remained in place from 1861 until 1918. This policy had a profound impact on modern Lebanon, leading to significant changes in its sectarian composition and fostering a general atmosphere of animosity that persists to this day. Many regions converted to Islam as a means for Christian inhabitants to safeguard their lives, with most of them embracing Shiism. Adopting a sect contrary to that of the ruling power became a means of sustaining opposition, albeit within the framework of the ruling religion.
The French and the Emergence of Greater Lebanon
The governance of Mount Lebanon continued until the French Mandate was established under the Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain and France, which aimed to divide the remnants of the collapsed Ottoman Empire. During this period, for the first time in history, a Lebanese state with defined borders emerged, known as “Greater Lebanon.” It was officially proclaimed on September 1, 1920, by General Henri Gouraud, the High Commissioner for the French Mandate in Lebanon and Syria, with an area of 10,452 square kilometers. The establishment of this state created significant issues for the Muslims, who found themselves, for the first time, within a state isolated from the larger Syrian capital of Damascus. They rejected this forced division, did not recognize anything called Lebanon, and desired unity with Syria, which they considered their homeland. Land had been cut off from Syria to benefit this new Lebanese entity, while the Maronite Christian elite opposed any unity with Syria. This discord between the two sides resulted in the continuation of the French Mandate, which faced several revolts demanding independence.
The National Pact and the Establishment of Sectarian Governance
The disagreement between the Maronite and Muslim elites concerning Greater Lebanon, its identity, future, and destiny persisted until the historic agreement known as the National Pact was reached in 1943. This unwritten accord was established between Maronite leader Bishara al-Khuri, Sunni leader Riad al-Solh, and Shiite leader Sabri Hamada. The terms stipulated that Muslims would accept the state of Greater Lebanon and cease demands for unity with Syria in exchange for the Maronites relinquishing their calls for France to remain in Lebanon and supporting Muslim demands for its withdrawal and the declaration of independence. It was agreed that the President of the Republic would be a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shiite, with the Vice President from the Greek Orthodox community. Additionally, the parliamentary representation would allocate six seats to Christians for every five seats for Muslims. The agreement recognized 17 official sects, each entitled to representation in the government and Parliament. This distribution was based on a census conducted by the French authorities in 1932, which revealed that 51.2% of the population of Greater Lebanon was Christian, while 48.8% was Muslim. However, many studies have questioned the accuracy of this census, arguing that the French authorities were biased in favor of Christians at the expense of Muslims. Based on this framework, Lebanon’s independence and the establishment of the republic were declared, with Bishara al-Khuri as its first president on September 21, 1943.
The Modern Lebanese
From the preceding discussion, it becomes clear that there is no singular race or dominant nationality in Lebanon. Historically, Lebanon was a center for Phoenician trade that spread along the Mediterranean coast. While the origins of the Phoenicians are debated, there is a general consensus among historians that they came to Lebanon from the Arabian Gulf coast. Numerous studies, supported by historical documents and references from prominent historians across various eras, discuss this matter. Regardless of the Phoenicians’ origin, it is certain that they spread to several locations and settled there, alongside the major migrations that Lebanon has witnessed throughout its history, as well as waves of settlement resulting from the succession of different empires that ruled the region. Lebanon served as a safe haven for many political, religious, and nationalist groups opposing imperial rule in the area. Thus, there is no nation in Lebanon characterized by ancient and uniform ethnic traits; rather, it is a blend of peoples. This mixture primarily consists of populations from the region and is not foreign to it. Moreover, all religions and sects in Lebanon cannot claim a single ethnic origin uniting them, as the process of religious conversion has been dynamic, influenced by coercion, allure, and political interests. This has led to the emergence of many diverse families in terms of religion. The Phoenician civilization has long since disappeared, yet its cultural influences remain evident in the lives of modern Lebanese, manifesting in various aspects, including dialect, heritage, social customs, and even some religious rituals. Much like Egyptians, Iraqis, Syriacs, Berbers, and other peoples with ancient civilizations in the region, Arabic has ultimately become the language of all inhabitants, while the religions that have arrived from abroad have replaced ancient beliefs.
Currently, the number of officially recognized Lebanese sects with representation in Parliament stands at 18. These sects include: Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholics, Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholics, Chaldeans, Latins, Evangelicals, Copts Orthodox, Copts Catholics, Assyrians, Sunnis, Shiites, Alawites, Ismailis, Druze, and Jews. According to the 2017 census, Lebanon has a population of approximately 6.082 million, while the number of Lebanese in the diaspora ranges between 12 and 18 million.
The Struggle for Lebanon
Since its inception, Lebanon has been marked by a fierce struggle over its identity. This conflict intensified following the end of World War II, the division of the world into Eastern and Western blocs, the establishment of the State of Israel, and the subsequent fragmentation of the region. The influx of Palestinian refugees into Lebanese territory further complicated matters, as segments of the Lebanese population expressed dissatisfaction with the newly formed state, feeling it did not reflect their ambitions and aspirations. Many Muslims felt marginalized within a governance system that favored the Maronites, granting them significant influence and power concentrated in the hands of the Maronite President. Amidst military coups of a “revolutionary” nature that swept through the region, Lebanon found itself divided. Some believed it was essential to align with the Arab national security framework in the ongoing conflict with Israel, while others argued for Lebanon’s neutrality, claiming its identity as a Mediterranean nation. Opinions varied; some viewed Lebanon as European, while others saw it as rooted in ancient Phoenician heritage. This identity struggle became a dominant theme among all factions, with each group seeking to leverage ideological slogans to achieve political gains and alter the balance of power, ultimately aiming to reshape the National Pact of 1943.
Lebanon and the Road to Civil War
The American nuclear physicist Robert Oppenheimer, who coordinated the American nuclear project, reportedly remarked after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, “We have done this work on behalf of the devil.” Lebanon, too, witnessed a similar sentiment, where the groundwork for civil war was laid from the very first day of the republic’s announcement after independence. Many Maronite elites viewed the republic as an opportunity to utilize the powers granted by the National Pact to dominate Lebanon’s economic, political, and security resources, attracting the predominantly Christian Lebanese diaspora, and subsequently altering the pact when the balance of power shifted in their favor. Conversely, some Muslim elites saw the pact merely as a temporary arrangement that allowed the French to maintain their foothold in Lebanon. With the departure of the French, they anticipated the ability to shift the power dynamics in their favor. Others within the Muslim community believed themselves capable of leadership and were frustrated by the sectarian system that limited their roles to ministerial positions at best. Additionally, some hoped to leverage ideology’s appeal to achieve what they could not within their sect due to their lack of ties to influential political families. Thus, a convergence of interests emerged, enabling these factions to undertake the arduous task on behalf of the devil, with Lebanon being the ultimate prize. Political clashes ensued, most notably the armed events of 1958.
The repercussions of the 1967 defeat were felt in Lebanon, as Gamal Abdel Nasser lost his stature in the Arab world and his ability to influence the conflicting factions within Lebanon. Historically, the appointment of the president had passed through Cairo before any other capital, with Cairo serving as a political, cultural, and civilizational partner to Beirut. Additionally, all political rivals united to dismantle “Shihabism,” referring to the security and military institutions established by General Fouad Chehab, Lebanon’s third president from 1958 to 1964. Leaders of the political elite feared these institutions could foster a robust state that would undermine their current or hoped-for leadership. Moreover, the 1969 “Cairo Agreement” permitted armed Palestinian organizations to operate within Lebanon and use its territory against Israel. Following Nasser’s death in 1970, the guarantor of minimal peace among these factions disappeared. The 1974 ceasefire between Egypt and Israel and Sadat’s 1977 visit to Jerusalem marked the beginning of Egypt’s independent peace process with Israel, culminating in the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement of 1979. The fall of the Shah’s regime, the rise of the Islamist movement led by Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, and the absence of Arab leadership exacerbated the conflict, leading to a long civil war that lasted 15 years and resulted in the deaths of between 150,000 to 200,000 Lebanese and Palestinians. Over a million people were displaced, alongside numerous injuries, enforced disappearances, and widespread destruction across Lebanon. I provide several links for those interested in a deeper study of various perspectives on this war, ranging from the far right to the far left.
The Taif Agreement
In Lebanon, Muslims were predominantly characterized by an ideological rather than a religious outlook. The Sunnis and Druze took the lead in political activism, supported by charismatic leaders or belonging to prominent political families. In contrast, the Shiites were politically marginalized and economically disadvantaged, lacking regional or international support while all major sects in Lebanon enjoyed such backing. Additionally, Shiites faced not only poverty and marginalization but also harassment from armed Palestinian groups, which exerted control over their villages and areas adjacent to the occupied Palestinian territories, enduring retaliatory Israeli attacks. During this period, Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi aimed to establish influence in Lebanon, capitalizing on the marginalization of Shiites and the presence of the charismatic Shiite leader Musa al-Sadr, who had Lebanese roots. He supported al-Sadr’s journey to Lebanon in 1958, highlighting that Iranian presence in Lebanon predates the Islamic revolution. The Shiites benefitted militarily from Palestinian organizations in southern Lebanon, where many received training in armed combat, leading to the establishment of the Amal Movement, or the “Lebanese Resistance Brigades,” in 1974. Notably, among those trained by the Palestinian Fatah movement was Imad Mughniyeh, who later became a military leader in Hezbollah.
After the Iranian revolution and the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr in Libya in 1979, coupled with the onset of the Afghan War and the proliferation of religious ideologies in the region, the lack of a charismatic leader to succeed al-Sadr led to a faction within the movement adopting more religious orientations, aligning closely with Iran. This led to the establishment of Hezbollah in 1982, initially focusing on resisting the Israeli occupation and avoiding involvement in the Lebanese civil war. In this context, and due to the Lebanese state’s inability to maintain a real army after the civil war and the weakening of all armed political factions, along with the expulsion of Palestinian factions from Lebanon to Tunisia, Hezbollah emerged as “the symbol of Lebanese resistance” against the Israeli occupiers. Therefore, when the Taif Agreement was signed in 1989, the decision was made to disarm all armed militias, with Hezbollah exempted from this mandate since it was the only armed group directing its weapons outward, avoiding internal conflicts.
The failure of the Maronite right-wing’s policies to dominate the Lebanese state and achieve its goal of repatriating Christian expatriates to increase their numbers, alongside the tensions witnessed in Lebanon from the tenure of the second president Camille Chamoun leading up to the civil war, and the escapades of Bashir Gemayel significantly impacted the Maronite Christian community. It weakened their position, resulting in their exit from the war without victory, suffering significant losses. Consequently, the powers of the presidency were curtailed in the Taif Agreement of 1989 compared to the National Pact of 1943. The governmental and parliamentary quotas were redistributed evenly between Muslims and Christians, traditional Sunni leadership diminished, Egypt was excluded from the equation, Saudi Arabia stepped in, and Iran and Syria increased their influence. In the absence of Sunni leadership, Rafik Hariri was promoted, a businessman working in Saudi Arabia, who held its nationality and enjoyed the trust of its officials. Through political and financial support, he managed to lead the Sunni community despite not belonging to an influential political or feudal family. The civil war ended with Syria assuming the role of the guarantor of the Taif Agreement, maintaining a military presence in Lebanon and managing the political process and its negotiations, a situation critics labeled the “Syrian hegemony.” Thus, a new landscape emerged in Lebanon, continuing the historical trend of shifting power dynamics and structural changes throughout the ages.
How Did Hezbollah Dominate the Lebanese Scene?
Several factors contributed to Hezbollah’s dominance in Lebanon. These include the monopolization of the Sunni leadership by Rafic Hariri, who lacked a strong ideological drive to mobilize the population, and his subsequent assassination on February 14, 2005. This was followed by the weak leadership of his successor, Saad Hariri. Additionally, there was the fragmentation of political Maronism into various parties, weakening the traditional Maronite leadership and reducing the influence of major feudal families. Figures like Samir Geagea and Michel Aoun founded parties that further diminished the traditional Maronite political base. The diminishing role of France, the historical protector of the Maronites, and its inability to provide significant support also played a role. Similarly, the U.S. failed to grasp the complexities of Lebanese politics, while Israel prioritized its security over Lebanon, and Britain, once the protector of the Druze, lost its influence. Meanwhile, Russia, the historical patron of the Orthodox Christians and Armenians, had withdrawn from its sectarian alliances during the Soviet era and became less influential in the 1990s due to internal chaos and corruption.
The corruption and political bribery that spread among Lebanon’s elites, combined with the exhaustion of all parties following the civil war and the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, also left a political vacuum. This was exacerbated by the chaos sown by Syria, which had laid many political mines before its exit. New actors, such as Qatar, entered the scene, with the latter playing a significant role in the Doha Agreement in 2008, which resolved the political crisis in Lebanon. Meanwhile, Sunni intellectuals and professionals emigrated in increasing numbers, as did many Christians.
Against this backdrop, Hezbollah managed to defeat the “South Lebanon Army,” a militia composed primarily of right-wing Maronite Christians and some Shia elements, which had received training, financial, and military support from Israel. The Israeli army eventually withdrew at night, finding its presence too costly. Ehud Barak, then Israeli prime minister, had bet that Hezbollah would occupy the south, leading to a confrontation with the Lebanese state or retaliatory actions against those who collaborated with Israel. This would have reignited civil war. However, Hezbollah surprised Israel by asking then-President Emile Lahoud, an ally of Hezbollah and Syria, to be the first to enter the liberated territories. The party handed over control to the Lebanese army and sent assurances to Maronite church leaders and Shia families that it had no intention of seeking revenge against anyone who had collaborated with Israel. Those involved in crimes such as espionage or murder would be tried by the Lebanese military intelligence according to the law. Hezbollah also resolved its rivalry with the Amal Movement, which had seen the party as a threat to its leadership within the Shia community.
Hezbollah’s rise was marked by a sense of purity in contrast to the rampant corruption among Lebanon’s political elites. The party’s leadership included spiritual figures like Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah and charismatic political figures like Abbas al-Moussawi, who was assassinated by Israel in 1992. He was succeeded by an even more charismatic leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Nasrallah’s credibility increased when his eldest son, Hadi, was killed in battle with Israel in 1997 at the age of 18, further enhancing the party’s image of sacrifice and dedication. Although Hezbollah had religious roots, it did not impose its religious views on the state or society, and it accepted the idea of a civil government (though this would change after 2006). These factors contributed to the party’s widespread popularity, not just in Lebanon but across the Arab world. Even the Egyptian comedian Mohamed Henedy tapped into Nasrallah’s popularity in his 1999 film “Hammam in Amsterdam” when he asked his Lebanese friend for a picture of Nasrallah, saying he admired him greatly. The party’s crowning achievement was liberating Lebanese territory from Israel without negotiations, a peace treaty, or recognition of Israel.
Domestically, Hezbollah formed a close alliance with the Amal Movement. Both movements dominate the Shia political scene, unlike their rivals, whose constituencies are fragmented among various parties. Hezbollah also established a powerful internal economic system, supported by its wide network of relationships and the financial, military, and security capabilities provided by the Iranian state. Through these networks, Hezbollah controls a wide range of global economic projects that ensure financial resources that are difficult to track and immune to international sanctions. This enables the party to maintain a steady flow of financial resources.
The party also benefits from the Shia community’s religious structure, which mandates that every Shia Muslim follow a living religious authority and pay one-fifth of their income (known as “khums”) to the representatives of this authority. In Lebanon, most Shia adhere to the authority of Iran’s Supreme Leader, meaning that much of this religious tax ends up in the hands of Hezbollah leaders, allowing them to finance media operations, support the families of martyrs, and address social issues.
The Shia and Maronite communities are the two largest groups of Lebanese expatriates, but the Shia diaspora is more diverse and sends significant financial support back home, often contributing more than just the religious tithe. Expatriates maintain strong ties to their villages and families, contributing to Hezbollah’s strong social network, unlike other Lebanese emigrants, who often lose touch with Lebanon after settling abroad. As a result, Hezbollah has established an economic and financial network that is almost impossible to track, making it resilient against international sanctions, and its social base remains strong. The party also enjoys a solid alliance with Syria and Iran, both of which strengthen Hezbollah’s position internally.
Hezbollah’s resilience was demonstrated when it withstood the wave of pressure following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, threats against its ally Bashar al-Assad, sanctions on Iran, the assassination of Rafic Hariri, and the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon. The July 2006 war, which aimed to eliminate Hezbollah militarily, ended with the party claiming a symbolic victory, as Israel failed to destroy it. However, Israel achieved a political victory by positioning UN forces between itself and Hezbollah, limiting Hezbollah’s ability to launch surprise attacks or initiate future wars. After this, the party began losing popular support, especially following its actions on May 7, 2008, when it took control of Beirut within hours, a move that marked the beginning of its decline in popularity. This decline peaked with Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict, which turned violent in 2013.
Hezbollah managed to capitalize on the sectarian propaganda that spread across the region after the so-called “Arab Spring.” This propaganda strengthened Hezbollah’s internal cohesion, which had weakened due to the lack of a direct confrontation with Israel after 2006. The rise of radical Islamist movements also terrified other Lebanese sects, prompting fears of a repeat of past conflicts. With no serious Arab initiative in the region and with internal Lebanese factions in conflict, a coalition of minorities emerged, united by the belief that the Sunni majority posed an existential threat. This coalition included Hezbollah, the Free Patriotic Movement representing the largest Maronite Christian bloc, the Armenian Tashnag party, and the Marada Movement representing the Maronites in northern Lebanon, as well as Druze parties and leftist movements. Hezbollah’s regional allies, Syria and Iran, have played a crucial role in maintaining this coalition, while the opposition coalition, known as the “March 14 Alliance,” has gradually disintegrated.
Conclusion
Based on Lebanon’s historical context, political makeup, and current power dynamics, Lebanon cannot be considered a true state in the traditional sense. Instead, it functions more like a state on paper, with different sects dominating at different times: political Maronism from 1942 to 1975, political Sunnism from 1990 to 2005, and now political Shiism since 2008.
The Lebanese army remains weak, its composition reflecting the country’s sectarian makeup, making it incapable of resolving internal conflicts or operating in Hezbollah’s stronghold in southern Lebanon without Hezbollah’s consent. Additionally, the army’s leadership, traditionally held by a Maronite figure, often adopts a neutral stance to secure its path to the presidency, further limiting its ability to act.
