When discussing the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” between India and Pakistan, it is essential not to overlook the historical context when analyzing the specifics of the bilateral relations between the two countries, as many problems stem from historical events that transpired between them. As such, it is necessary to review the main points that have influenced the current situation.
Following the independence of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, multiple wars and armed conflicts erupted in the Indian-Pakistani border region. Despite the Shimla Agreement of 1972, which reaffirms the parties’ commitment to normalizing relations and promoting peace and security in South Asia, India and Pakistan have, over the years since the mid-1980s, engaged their armies in aerial skirmishes or near-daily artillery exchanges in the northern part of the border with China over the disputed ownership of the Siachen Glacier at the foothills of the Karakoram Mountains. Until 1983, the presence of both Pakistan and India in the disputed region of Kashmir was limited to minimal military units.
Impact of Nuclear Factors:
In 1999, a Lahore Declaration was made between India and Pakistan in which both pledged to “take immediate measures to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and to discuss concepts and principles aimed at developing a confidence-building process to prevent conflict through the use of nuclear or conventional weapons.”
Between June 19 and 20, 2004, consultations were held in New Delhi between India and Pakistan regarding confidence-building measures in the nuclear realm. The agreements reached during these consultations included a halt to nuclear testing and efforts to reduce the risks of armed conflict. At that time, India proposed its nuclear doctrine, which emphasized that it “will not be the first to use nuclear weapons,” but Pakistan rejected this doctrine’s adoption, as the main obstacle to dialogue on nuclear weapons, beyond unresolved regional issues, lies in Pakistan’s concerns over Indian military buildup and its collaboration with the United States and Israel, particularly given India’s multibillion-dollar purchases of Israeli weapons and military equipment.
For India, possessing nuclear weapons, in addition to intimidating Pakistan, serves other objectives: geopolitical (containing China) and enhancing the country’s prestige. The latter is also significant for Pakistan: nuclear weapons are a source of pride for Islamabad, greatly improving its image in the Islamic world (as the Pakistani nuclear bomb is referred to as the Islamic bomb), with its military nuclear program initiated in 1972. Unlike India, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have been under military control from the outset, and experts today consider South Asia a region at risk of armed conflict involving nuclear weapons.
In the context of strengthening forces related to religious extremism, ethnic strife, and terrorism, the prospect of acquiring weapons of mass destruction poses a significant threat, especially concerning Pakistan as a state with unstable domestic policies due to complex internal issues and its proximity to Afghanistan and confrontation with India. However, instability and extremism could accompany evolving situations and bolster the positions of Islamic terrorists hiding in Pakistan and along its border with Afghanistan (followers of al-Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Chechen separatists, Xinjiang). That said, a catastrophic scenario involving the use of nuclear weapons remains unlikely, despite the Pakistani authorities’ inability to maintain complete control over their territories.
Analyzing the complex relationship between the two countries, we can deduce that it currently exemplifies a security dilemma. Here, we attempt to analyze the conflict from the perspective of the “Prisoner’s Dilemma,” which is a game involving two players.
- The Kashmir Issue and the Prisoner’s Dilemma:
The relations between India and Pakistan, which have been at odds since the establishment of the two states in 1947, can be analyzed using the classic “Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Both nations strive to enhance their military strength and nuclear capabilities, yet neither can guarantee complete victory over the other.
The territorial conflict over Kashmir does not represent the fundamental contradiction between India and Pakistan, but it is often presented as the main negative factor in bilateral relations in the common consciousness (and in many studies). Furthermore, alongside India and Pakistan, it is essential to consider the interests of other actors, such as Russia, China, the United States, international organizations, and NGOs, as their roles are also significant in decision-making processes.
Based on game theory, we can argue that India and Pakistan have similar strategies to those of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War: building nuclear capabilities or reducing nuclear warheads.
When analyzing the dominant strategy as an opportunity for a player to achieve a greater victory, we see that if Pakistan believes India will choose “military buildup,” it will maximize its spending to also opt for “military buildup.” However, even if Pakistan realizes that India is choosing to reduce “military buildup,” it will still work to enhance its nuclear capabilities. The same applies to India, which will develop its nuclear capabilities regardless of Pakistan’s choice. Therefore, both countries opt for “buildup,” which provides each a form of “insurance” against any actions taken by the opponent (the dominant strategy). However, this outcome is far from optimal. If a mutual agreement could be reached to reduce the number of nuclear warheads and limit themselves to conventional weapons as part of their security, both could greatly benefit by redirecting expenditure to other areas and prioritizing stability and peace. The main problem with this “dilemma” is that if such a settlement is reached, each party would have an incentive to deceive the other and violate the agreement. For instance, if Pakistan perceives that India is not reducing the number of nuclear warheads as part of the agreement, it would have an interest in increasing its warheads and violating the agreement. This would allow Pakistan to regain dominance, and similarly, India would have a comparable interest. Only when both countries find themselves in a state of balance would neither be interested in changing its strategy.
This is only possible if each country is entirely confident that the other party acts strictly according to the agreements. The relative power of the states remains stable. Simultaneously, they save funds that will be used for non-military purposes. If one party violates the agreement, its competitor will respond immediately and appropriately, and if both nations are committed to peace, they will not view such behavior as beneficial and will never violate the agreement reached. If each believes that the other will act as expected, and that it will face some form of “punishment” for noncompliance, both will choose to reduce military expenditures regularly, leaving neither with a reason to alter their assumptions about the situation.
Unfortunately for Pakistan, the prevailing strategy is “reinforcement,” while a less favored strategy may be a unilateral arms reduction, as it threatens the country’s security. The situation with India is similarly cautious, given external factors.
In 2014, the dispute with India forced Pakistan to spend about 50 million rupees daily, which could have been used to almost double healthcare costs. It is also crucial to highlight another factor: the absence of a mechanism for both parties to reach a settlement and collaborate. Furthermore, the chaotic nature of the international system creates incentives for participation in an arms race and prevents them from halting it.
- The Evolution of Regional Cooperation in South Asia:
Economic cooperation and integration could positively affect India-Pakistan relations. Joint economic projects could have a similar effect. Thus, the two countries signed cooperation agreements in 2012 on several commercial issues. It is unfortunate that Pakistan’s position significantly limits the positive impact of the economic system, while India demands that a constructive approach lead to a change in strategy—essentially rejecting stereotypes and moving each country away from the notion of the enemy—while nationalist rhetoric should be excluded from discussions surrounding the regional belonging of Kashmir. Informal communications between the conflicting parties are considered one of the essential mechanisms to de-escalate the conflict, as they allow for building bridges at the grassroots level, increasing trust, and enhancing mutual understanding. They can help overcome false and unreasonable fears, as well as remove the enemy image from collective consciousness. It is important to work towards improving relations between the peoples and protecting them from governmental provocations. This is where the soft power of music, cinema, art, literature, and media plays a role in eliminating stereotypes and prejudices. However, it would be naive to expect that an increase in grassroots communication would avoid regional issues. It is more likely that this would only prepare them for dialogue, as religious confrontations have made India and Pakistan captives of mutual distrust. Thus, not only does the structure of relations resemble the “Prisoner’s Dilemma,” but local interests also hinder them from taking steps towards joint action. This reluctance is expressed in the unwillingness to reevaluate perspectives that have remained unchanged for decades, influenced by conflicting ideas and beliefs, as well as the organization of terrorist attacks, leading to regression even in attempts to reach agreements on several issues. The obstacle to resolving the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” in the case of the states involved is the fear stemming from a lack of trust, despite both sides (India and Pakistan) recognizing that cooperation could be the best solution. Nonetheless, historical facts relating to the U.S. and Soviet policies during the Cold War suggest that building nuclear capabilities is an irrational approach. Acknowledging this, both countries have started to agree on reducing their nuclear arsenals.
Although the path to peace may be fraught with risks and extremely difficult, the time has come when the arms race is no longer effective. To resolve the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” in the case of India and Pakistan, a regional level inclusive of institutions that promote cooperation, individual communications, and expanding mutually beneficial economic cooperation is of paramount importance.
Ultimately, the primary issue in international relations remains the problem of cooperation. The Prisoner’s Dilemma emphasizes that settlement and cooperation are benefits that both parties can reap; however, it also implies the involvement of two actors, excluding the roles of external (global powers and international and regional organizations) and internal (populations and NGOs) actors, which renders the situation somewhat idealistic. Therefore, both nations need to undertake a series of measures to minimize the likelihood of nuclear conflict in the Indian subcontinent and gain the world’s trust. Among the most critical is stabilizing the region, ensuring that Pakistan does not incorporate first use of nuclear weapons into its military doctrine, as China and India have done.
I would like to point out that despite the contradictory relationship between India and Pakistan, they are relatively in a positive state today. It is noteworthy that the political elites have ceased to use harsh language in their speeches concerning each other. An important fact is that in their interactions, there are many points of contact in military, economic, anti-extremism, and anti-terrorism areas. This provides a reason for more active integration but has not resulted in complete peace, as the Kashmir issue continues to slow down all positive initiatives and compels both sides to enhance their defensive capabilities and develop their nuclear programs, suggesting a flare-up of conflict in the future.
