The phenomenon of divisions and conflicts between branches of “Boko Haram” in the African Sahel region

Since mid-February 2025, competing terrorist factions branching off from the Boko Haram organization have engaged in a new wave of armed conflict, just two weeks after the failure of an attempted reconciliation between the group (Ahl al-Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad), loyal to Al-Qaeda, and the group (West African Province), loyal to ISIS. The fighting erupted in the local area of Abadam in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, overlooking Lake Chad.

According to local sources, the camps of the West African Province were subjected to armed attacks that resulted in significant losses among the ranks of the organization loyal to ISIS, especially after the attacks included the use of Lake Chad waters to enhance the offensive capabilities of the group (Ahl al-Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad – Al-Qaeda).

First: A history of divisions:

The phenomenon of internal divisions and internal conflicts is not new to the Boko Haram organization since its early years. This is as follows:

1. Divisions during the organizational formation stage: Just three years after the start of Boko Haram’s intensive activities, the year 2012 witnessed the first signs of a significant organizational split, when a number of the organization’s fighters broke away and established a new organization called “Ansar al-Muslimin in the Land of Sudan,” known locally as Ansaru. This split had a regional and ideological nature.

On one hand, this split was carried out by a number of Boko Haram members from the North Central region specifically, and on the other hand, those responsible for the split attributed its occurrence to the refusal of Abu Bakr Shekau, the leader of the organization, to expand operations into the urban centers of northern Nigeria, where the Muslim population is concentrated, which they considered contrary to the priorities of jihad. It is noteworthy that the organization immediately pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda and established operational ties with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb after announcing its secession.

2. The major wave of divisions (2015): The most impactful wave of division was what the organization witnessed after pledging allegiance to ISIS in 2015, as a leadership struggle erupted in the following year between Abu Musab al-Barnawi and Abu Bakr Shekau, which ended with Shekau breaking away with a new splinter organization called “Ahl al-Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad,” while the faction led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi continued to operate under the name “West African Province.”

The consequences of these divisions were not limited to weakening the organization’s effectiveness in confronting counterterrorism operations led by the Nigerian armed forces, but rather led to the branches of the organization engaging in intermittent armed confrontations that initially had the character of carrying out precise assassination operations targeting leadership elements before turning into a field competition aimed at expanding the geographical area of control of each branch at the expense of the rival branch. The most prominent confrontations between the branches of Boko Haram were what happened in 2021 at the peak of the advance of the West African Province led by al-Barnawi, which managed to besiege the faction led by Abu Bakr Shekau, who was forced to blow himself up after being besieged in one of the most intense confrontations between terrorist factions in Africa.

Second: A recurring and persistent phenomenon:

The recent confrontations between the branches of Boko Haram since February 2025 reflect the increasing impact of ethnic divisions within terrorist organizations in the African Sahel. The latest clash can be read as one of the direct repercussions of the dominance of ethnic and regional considerations over organizational and ideological considerations within Boko Haram.

1. Cracks within the branches: The manifestations of this logic can be traced beyond the split of Boko Haram into two conflicting branches; as these manifestations extended within the same branch after the West African Province – the largest organizational branch of Boko Haram – announced in 2021 the adoption of a new internal division that divided the “province” into four independent “provinces” in the Alagarno Forest, Sambisa Forest, Lake Chad, and the Tombo Ma Baba region. This new division led to giving most of these branches a narrow local and ethnic character to reduce the space for ideological differences and organizational and field disputes.
2. Escalation of confrontations: The recent clashes come as an extension of the manifestations of the increase in indicators of violence between the branches of Boko Haram since October 2023 witnessed an expansion in the circle of confrontation with the transition of (Ahl al-Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad – Al-Qaeda) to the offensive position, taking control of 40% of the islands that were under the control of (West African Province – ISIS) in addition to expanding the scope of control over the shores of Lake Chad. This attack came after an ethnically driven split led by Michael Osman, known as “Kayla,” a former leader in (West African Province – ISIS) belonging to the Buduma group, which is a minority in the northern regions of Nigeria but constitutes the main group of the inhabitants of the Lake Chad islands. Kayla broke away at the beginning of 2023 with a large number of group elements to join (Ahl al-Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad – Al-Qaeda), which constituted a variable that reshaped the field balance between the two branches in a new way.
3. Revealing precedents: Another precedent in the broader scope of the African Sahel region confirms this pattern, as witnessed in 2017 with the formation of an alliance called (Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin) in the African Sahel as a highly flexible coordination framework, where the organizations that formed it retained a large degree of independence and consistency with almost pure ethnic rules, as the organization (Ansar al-Din) represented the Tuareg component, while the movement (Tawhid and Jihad) represented the Arab tribes, and (Macina Liberation Front) represented the Fulani group. Perhaps this organizational division between different ethnic components allowed the organization to expand its activities in the following years.

Third: The future of the phenomenon:

Despite the increasing indicator of internal conflicts within the branches of Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria, it cannot be concluded from this phenomenon that terrorism is in decline in Nigeria, which ranked sixth globally on the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) in 2025, which can be attributed to several reasons, the most important of which are:

Here is a table listing the 10 countries most affected by terrorism, including 6 African countries, based on the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) for the year 2025:

1. The continued high rate of operations by the various conflicting branches of the organization, targeting civilians and security forces equally, in parallel with the internal conflict between the branches of the organization. This fact draws attention to a number of dangerous phenomena accompanying the split of the terrorist organization on an ethnic basis, which contributed to deepening the roots of the different branches of the organization in local communities, and relying more on kinship relations and social ties in financing the organization and supplying it with fighters, which gives these branches greater ability to cohesion and continuity.
2. The resilience of the branches of Boko Haram to successive military operations, especially in the Lake Chad basin, cannot be separated from the complex conditions that Nigeria has been witnessing since the arrival of Bola Tinubu to power, including a complex economic crisis, ongoing popular protests, and multiple security challenges, as Boko Haram’s activities in northeastern Nigeria are accompanied by other challenges, the most prominent of which is the expansion of organized crime groups in the northwestern part of the country, the escalation of clashes between farmers and herders in the central belt, in addition to the continuation of secessionist demands in the southeastern part. This complex situation reduces the chances of the Nigerian armed forces achieving a decisive breakthrough in confronting Boko Haram with its various branches, which may pave the way for the complete elimination of the organization.
3. The unfavorable regional environment constitutes one of the main contributing factors to the resilience of the Boko Haram organization, in light of the highly complex conditions faced by the countries of the Lake Chad basin, which have cast their shadows on the capabilities of these countries to develop comprehensive confrontation operations against the terrorist organization. Niger is not far from these turbulent conditions, as it is still going through a troubled political transition since the August 2023 coup, followed by a radical shift in the nature of foreign alliances from relying on France and the United States to relying on Russia, which has resulted in a relative decline in the ability to confront multiple security challenges in the eastern part of the country at the Liptako-Gourma border triangle or in its southern part overlooking Lake Chad.

The latest round of clashes between the branches of Boko Haram indicates the continuation of the sharp division within the organization, especially after the repeated attempts at reconciliation between those branches have failed. However, this situation has a high potential for continuation in light of the inability of any of the conflicting branches to impose full control over all units of the organization, and in light of the inability of the Nigerian government to exploit this raging division since 2021 to achieve a qualitative breakthrough due to multiple challenges at the national and regional levels.