Since the departure of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024, military clashes have escalated in northern and northeastern Syria between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), of which the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) are the largest component, and Turkey alongside pro-Turkey Syrian military factions.
During the years of war in Syria, the Kurdish forces, particularly the YPG, enhanced their presence in northern Syria, backed by the United States. In 2015, the SDF was established to become the local partner of the international coalition against ISIS. However, Turkey did not recognize these Kurdish forces, viewing them as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it designates as a terrorist organization. Turkey executed three military operations against these Kurdish forces in northern Syria between 2016 and 2019.
The ongoing clashes between Kurdish fighters and factions loyal to Ankara in northern and northeastern Syria, which have resulted in these factions gaining control of the cities of Tal Rifaat and Manbij, have raised the possibility of Turkey launching a new military operation against the Kurds to push them away from its southern borders, especially with continued fighting around Ain al-Arab (Kobani) and Raqqa, along with ongoing attacks in Hasakah. However, such an operation may require Ankara to obtain approval from the international powers present in Syria, particularly the United States, the main supporter of the SDF.
Triggers of Confrontation:
In the context of the armed Kurdish presence in northern and northeastern Syria, multiple factors could lead to an escalation of Turkish-Kurdish military confrontations, including the following:
- Strategic Importance of Kurdish Areas: The regions controlled by the Kurds in northern and northeastern Syria are of strategic importance, being considered the “oil and gas reservoir” of the country. The SDF controls the largest oil fields in Syria, including the Suwayda and Rmelan fields in Hasakah province and the Al-Omar field in Deir ez-Zor province. The Assad regime had relied on Iranian oil in the past years amidst sanctions imposed on Damascus under the U.S. Caesar Act. With the fall of this regime, it is likely that Iranian oil supplies will cease, thus creating a need for the new Syrian administration led by Ahmad al-Shara to reach an agreement with the SDF to rehabilitate the Syrian oil sector to meet the country’s needs.
- Current Military Clashes in Northern Syria: For about a month, military confrontations have intensified between the factions of “Operation Freedom Dawn” loyal to the Turkish-backed National Syrian Army and the SDF in northern and northeastern Syria. During these clashes, these factions managed to gain control of the cities of Tal Rifaat and Manbij and plan to take over Raqqa and Hasakah, aiming to eliminate the presence of the SDF near Turkey’s southern border. Thus, Turkey’s continued military interventions in the future, following the departure of the Assad regime, could be part of Ankara’s strategy to reshape areas of influence in northern Syria in line with its interests.
Ankara’s Objectives:
Turkey has various motivations to continue military confrontations with the Syrian Kurds, influenced by both internal and external factors. The primary of these motivations include:
- Preventing the Establishment of a Kurdish State: Ankara fears that the establishment of a Kurdish entity in northern Syria could encourage Kurds within Turkey to demand more rights or even seek separation. Therefore, preventing the emergence of a Kurdish state or independent entity in Syria is a top priority for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government, which perceives a Kurdish entity on its southern borders as a direct threat to its territorial integrity. In this context, Erdoğan pledged on December 25 to “bury the Kurdish fighters alive in Syrian territory if they do not lay down their arms,” adding, “We will achieve our goal of making Turkey free of terrorism in the coming period using all the available tools of our state.” On December 28, Erdoğan reiterated that his country would start 2025 with new steps to enhance the security of its southern borders and eliminate “external terrorist threats.”
In line with this, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan emphasized in a televised interview on December 13 that his country “wants Syria free of terrorism,” stating that its strategic goal is to end the YPG, giving them two options: either to disband or to be eliminated. In a phone call with his American counterpart Antony Blinken on December 28, Fidan stressed that the presence of Kurdish fighters in Syria cannot be allowed.
- Enhancing Regional Influence: Turkey aims to have a leading role in reshaping Syria’s future after the Assad regime’s fall. Ankara believes that a strong Kurdish entity in Syria could diminish its regional influence and limit its ability to impact the political solution in Syria. Therefore, confrontation with the Kurds may be part of Turkey’s strategy to ensure its future role in Syria specifically and the Middle East more broadly.
- Gaining Domestic Support: The issue of confrontation with the Kurds is not just an external matter for Turkey; it has internal dimensions relating to Erdoğan’s government’s considerations. In light of increasing tensions with the PKK (classified as terrorist by Ankara) and political pressures domestically, the Turkish government might see confronting the Syrian Kurds as a means to rally public support and strengthen its internal position.
Position of the SDF:
Multiple Challenges: The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) face increasing challenges from various fronts, primarily from Turkey, which sees them as a direct threat to its national security, as well as from the new Syrian administration in the post-Assad era. Key challenges include: a. The Turkish Challenge: Turkey maintains a significant military presence in northern Syria, posing a continuous threat to SDF control, with Ankara potentially executing more military operations to strengthen its influence and weaken the Kurdish presence along its southern borders. Additionally, Turkey may attempt to exert pressure on the United States to limit its military and political support for the SDF. It is also expected that Turkey will try to impose political arrangements in the new Syria, including marginalizing and weakening the SDF. These Kurdish forces might face pressure to accept political settlements that require them to forfeit the gains they have achieved over the past years in northern and northeastern Syria. Ankara will likely impose policies that exclude these Kurds and prevent them from playing any significant role in Syria’s future. b. The New Syrian Administration: Following the fall of Assad’s regime, the transitional government in Syria enjoys strong support from Turkey, thus presenting new challenges for the SDF concerning the struggle for influence in northern Syria. Syrian factions supported by Ankara are working to regain control over areas currently held by the SDF through military means, as evidenced by the ongoing confrontations between these factions and the SDF.
Available Options: Given these challenges and the new balance of power currently in Syria, particularly with the increased Turkish influence, the SDF’s options for confronting the current pressures and threats seem limited, with the highest priority being to maintain support from Washington, which includes: a. Strengthening International Alliances: The United States is the most important international ally for the SDF, thus the SDF can work to enhance its relations with Washington and other Western countries by reaffirming its role as an effective force in combating terrorist organizations in Syria, especially ISIS. Continued American support for the SDF may provide a guarantee for its survival as an influential power in the Syrian landscape. b. Building Internal Alliances: The SDF can pursue building alliances with other local Syrian factions that oppose Turkish intervention or seek to achieve independence from external influences. c. Making Tactical Concessions: Under the significant pressures facing the SDF, it may have to make tactical concessions on both political and operational levels. These concessions could include agreeing to reduce its military role in exchange for political guarantees or offering some concessions to the new Syrian administration and to Ankara as part of a comprehensive political settlement. Thus, the SDF may attempt to open channels of dialogue with al-Shara, hoping to reach a political settlement that guarantees it autonomy or a degree of independence within Syria.
In this context, on December 30, al-Shara met with a delegation from the SDF; this was the first dialogue he had with Kurdish leaders since the overthrow of the Assad regime. Media reports revealed that this meeting was a preliminary encounter aimed at laying the groundwork for future negotiations between the two sides. Al-Shara had preceded this meeting with statements on December 29, indicating that the Kurdish forces should integrate under the banner of a unified Syrian army, stating, “Weapons should be in the hands of the state only, and those who are armed and qualified to enter the Ministry of Defense will be welcomed.” He added, “Under these terms and conditions, we will open a negotiating dialogue with the SDF.” Military leader of the HTS, Marhaf Abu Qasra, announced on December 17 that the authority of the transitional government would extend to the Kurdish-controlled areas in northeastern Syria.
Conversely, SDF leader Mazloum Abdi confirmed on December 27 his readiness to integrate into the new Syrian army after agreeing on a “suitable formula through negotiation,” emphasizing the necessity for Syria to remain a unified country, but the determination of its political system is “left to the will of the Syrian people and constitutional discussions.” As part of the flexibility the SDF seeks to show, the “Syrian Democratic Council,” the political wing of the self-administration and the SDF, announced on December 22 its readiness to engage in dialogue with Turkey.
In conclusion, the escalation of Turkish-Kurdish confrontation in Syria, following the fall of the Assad regime, remains a strong possibility; given the ongoing tensions between the two parties, despite efforts, particularly from Washington, to avoid this scenario, the complexities of the political and military landscape in Syria and the current military clashes between Turkey and its allied factions on one hand, and the SDF, which forms the backbone of the Kurdish units on the other hand, make this scenario the most likely to occur. This will have significant implications for the future of Syria in the post-Assad era.
