The Military Domain: The Gateway for International Powers to Enhance Their Influence in the African Sahel
This article explains that the protection of interests and the enhancement of geostrategic positioning are the main reasons behind the international competition to enter the Sahel region through military means. There are signs suggesting that the map of competition and expansion is extending towards the countries bordering the Gulf of Guinea, which suffers from widespread piracy.
Introduction
The fall of cities in northern Mali to armed groups in 2012 marked a turning point in the growing competition for the Sahel and West Africa via the military gateway. The rapid collapse of the Malian army in the face of the advance of Azawadian fighters and the “Ansar Dine” movement led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, and the proximity of the capital, Bamako, to danger—with the fighters only hundreds of kilometers away—prompted the then interim president, Dioncounda Traoré, to call for France’s immediate intervention in January 2013 to save his country.
France’s response to this call was swift; within a few days, French air and ground forces were deployed in Mali. These forces succeeded in recapturing the cities previously controlled by the armed groups but failed to eliminate them entirely. As a result, the activities of these groups expanded towards neighboring countries such as Burkina Faso and Niger.
This expansion provided a pretext for the increased presence of French troops in the region under the banner of pursuing armed groups. This was carried out through Operation Barkhane, launched in 2014, which included Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad.
In 2020, France, in collaboration with several European and African allies, announced Operation Takuba to fight alongside the armies of Mali and Niger against armed groups that had become a growing threat to the Sahel and West Africa.
Under the same pretext of combating armed groups, the United States, Germany, and Italy deployed military forces in Niger, and Washington stationed a special force in Chad, which faces a threefold armed threat: from Al-Qaeda affiliated groups along its border with Niger, from Boko Haram active on its border with Nigeria, and from Chadian rebel groups along its border with Libya.
Naturally, economic interests and strategic dimensions are the primary drivers for foreign countries to enhance their influence in the region under the guise of protection and training. Failure to achieve these goals has been publicly cited as the primary reason for a series of coups in some Sahel countries in recent years, leading to the expulsion of French forces from Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, and their replacement by Russia, which has supplied weapons to these countries and deployed military forces in some of them.
In light of this new development, France and the United States are maneuvering to redeploy their forces in other countries in the region, while Turkey has increased its competition by selling arms.
France in the African Sahel: From Influence to Adaptation
France’s colonial rule over many African countries in North, West, East, and South Africa allowed it to maintain extensive influence in these countries even after their independence. This enabled France to benefit for decades from various resources of the African continent under different agreements, ostensibly partnerships and cooperation, but essentially to preserve Paris’s economic, commercial, and strategic interests.
Former French President Jacques Chirac was quoted as saying, “Without Africa, France would slip to the level of a third-world country,” and his socialist predecessor François Mitterrand said, “Without Africa, France would have no history in the 21st century.”
These statements reflect France’s deep dependence on Africa, particularly economically. Through its various companies spread across the Sahel and West Africa, France dominates many resources. For instance, some African countries continue to supply France with about 25% of its nuclear reactor needs, and approximately 80% of Africa’s mineral resources are exported under French supervision to other continents.
To justify its dominant presence in Africa in the post-independence era, France focused on promoting the idea that it was the true protector of these countries and their ruling systems. As a result, France deployed military forces in several of these countries to counter any potential threats.
France has conducted dozens of military operations over nearly six decades, some alone and others in collaboration with African, Western, or international forces.
French military interventions in Africa began early in the post-independence period, such as in Gabon in 1964, Chad from 1968 to 1972, and continued with interventions in Central Africa in 1979, Comoros in 1989, and Rwanda in 1990.
In the early stages, French military interventions in Africa focused on protecting ruling regimes to safeguard French interests, thwarting several coups and rebellions. Later, the justification for French military intervention included combating armed groups, as seen in Mali in 2012 with Operation Serval, which was succeeded by Operation Barkhane and expanded to include neighboring countries threatened by armed activities.
However, the failure of French forces to curb the threat from armed groups in the Sahel over more than a decade resulted in adverse effects. Populations began to protest, calling for the withdrawal of French troops.
Several regional armies capitalized on this growing public discontent and carried out military coups, ousting civilian leaders allied with France. The coup leaders promoted sovereignty, leading to the expulsion of French forces from Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.
This new factor marked the actual beginning of France’s diminished influence in its traditional areas of presence across various levels: security, economic, and diplomatic.
In response, France is now seeking mechanisms to adapt and maintain its presence in the region, fortifying its military bases in other Sahel and West African countries to avoid expulsion.
French media have reported that President Emmanuel Macron is considering reducing the number of French troops in Senegal and Gabon from 350 each to 100, and similarly in Côte d’Ivoire, where about 600 soldiers are stationed. In Chad, Paris aims to retain 300 out of approximately 1,000 troops.
The United States: A Difficult Withdrawal and the Search for New Destinations
The series of military coups in the Sahel and West Africa since 2020 have embarrassed the U.S. administration and disrupted its calculations. The U.S. found itself faced with two difficult choices: either maintain its military presence and protect its strategic interests by aligning with the new military rulers, or oppose the coups in line with its strategy on the continent, which places a strong emphasis on democracy and human rights.
Without a third option, it seems that the U.S. did not succeed in addressing the new developments in the region through force, as evidenced by its expulsion from Niger and the threat of being expelled from Chad.
The announcement by the military council in Niamey in March 2024, which canceled the military cooperation agreement with Washington that had been in place since 2012, marked the beginning of the end of U.S.-Nigerian relations.
The military council, which assumed power after a coup ousted civilian President Mohamed Bazoum at the end of July 2023, listed several reasons for canceling the military cooperation agreement with Washington and demanding the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Among these reasons were the council’s view that the agreement was “illegal” and “violated all constitutional and democratic rules.”
In response to this official stance, supported by popular backing—evidenced by numerous demonstrations calling for the departure of U.S. forces similar to those that occurred with French troops, albeit to a lesser extent—Washington agreed to withdraw its forces, setting mid-September 2024 as the deadline for the departure of its last troops.
The American withdrawal began with the evacuation from Air Base 101 in the capital, Niamey. Both the U.S. and Nigerien defense ministries stated that the process was “uneventful,” with a total of “766 military personnel” withdrawing, along with “six aircraft including two Raptor helicopters, four drones, and 1,593 tons of equipment” since May 2024.
The next step involves the gradual withdrawal from Air Base 201 in Agadez, which is considered “strategic for the United States” and “houses important aerial equipment.”
In a similar but less intense move to its departure from Niger, the United States received a request from Chad to withdraw its forces. This request came in a message from the Chadian Air Force Chief of Staff in early April 2024, citing the absence of an agreement permitting their continued presence.
According to media reports, a Pentagon spokesperson noted that around “60 U.S. service members” had been transferred from Chad to Germany, where they would continue their work, with the full withdrawal expected to be completed later.
The decline of U.S. forces in these two countries, following the earlier retreat of French troops from Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, comes amid increasing Russian presence in these nations. Although Chad has not expelled French troops and Russia has not yet deployed military forces there, the rapprochement between N’Djamena and Moscow is accelerating. Following President Mahamat Idriss Déby’s visit to Moscow in early January 2024, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Chad in June of the same year, marking the first such visit in decades.
However, the United States has not resigned itself to this growing Russian incursion into its sphere of influence. It has begun searching for new destinations for its military forces. French media sources close to the issue reported that “Abidjan has given the green light for the establishment of a U.S. base in Odienné in the northwest, where jihadist groups in the Sahel threaten the Gulf of Guinea states,” indicating a potential repositioning of U.S. forces in the region.
Additionally, senior U.S. military officials held intensive discussions with several African defense ministers during the recent “African Defense Leaders” conference held in Botswana. This annual event, organized by the United States since its inception in 2017, was hosted in Africa for the first time, signaling ongoing U.S. efforts to establish a new foothold on the continent.
Wagner and the African Legion: Russia’s Entry into Africa
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia’s presence in Africa diminished, but it has recently returned with renewed vigor through various avenues.
The recent military coups in the Sahel and the growing public and official discontent with French presence have highlighted the security and military gateway as a key entry point for Russia in a region traditionally considered a French sphere of influence.
The Russian rapprochement with Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso has been bolstered by the fact that some military leaders involved in the coups previously received training in Russia and maintained good relations with Russian circles.
Although Russia does not officially have any military bases in Africa yet, it has expanded its military interests in the continent since 2017 by signing cooperation agreements in this field, including arms exports and military training.
The Wagner Group has become one of the mechanisms through which Moscow seeks influence. On the surface, the group appears to be a security entity that any African or non-African country can contract with, but it is essentially a tool for gauging internal conditions and establishing a stable presence that might later allow Russia to seek a military base to serve its goals.
Wagner Group and Its African Presence
The Wagner Group emerged in 2014, coinciding with the Russian attack on eastern Ukraine, and began its foreign operations in Syria in 2015. Its African operations began in 2017 under the direction of its late leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Russian businessman known as “Putin’s Chef.”
While accounts vary regarding the exact number of African countries where Wagner operates, it is confirmed to be present in at least four countries: Libya, particularly in the cities of Sirte in the east and Jufra in the southeast, as well as the Central African Republic since 2018, and Sudan since 2017. There are also Wagner forces in Mali, numbering in the hundreds, deployed following the completion of French troops’ withdrawal from the country.
Some sources also indicate Wagner’s presence in other African countries including Botswana, Burundi, Comoros, Guinea, Congo, and Zimbabwe.
The announcement of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death in a plane crash on August 23, 2023, raised numerous questions about the future of Wagner, leading to several scenarios, ranging from “dissolving the group, nationalizing it by Russia, or appointing a new leader.”
The African Legion: Russia’s New Expansion Effort
In early 2024, the “African Legion” was revealed as a new Russian military formation on the continent, focusing on five countries: Libya, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and the Central African Republic. This legion is overseen by General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, the Russian Deputy Defense Minister.
What distinguishes the “African Legion” is its official Russian nature, which Russia uses to signal a departure from the militias that its Western opponents link to Wagner and associate with extensive human rights abuses in various countries where it operates.
Although Russia previously claimed that Wagner was a private company open to contracts with any party, through this legion, it seeks to formalize its military presence in Africa in a manner similar to French and U.S. forces, by establishing agreements with the countries where these forces will be deployed.
It is possible that the scope of the “African Legion” will expand to include additional countries on the continent, especially given Russia’s increasing interest in some Sahelian and West African countries more broadly.
Turkey and Drone Diplomacy
Turkey’s interest in African Sahel countries, which have experienced military coups, has grown significantly. This is evident from the numerous reciprocal visits and the signing of cooperation agreements, some of which pertain to arms exports.
Among the most recent visits was one by a high-level Turkish delegation to Niamey, which included the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Energy, as well as the heads of the intelligence agency and the defense industries institution, and the Assistant Minister of Trade. During this visit, Turkey and Niger signed a “Declaration of Intent on Cooperation in Oil and Natural Gas,” which aims to “support and encourage Turkish companies in developing oil and natural gas fields in Niger.”
Before this, in late June 2024, the Commander of the Malian Ground Forces, Harouna Samake, visited Turkey at the official invitation of his counterpart, General Selcuk Bayraktaroglu. Additionally, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar hosted Malian Defense Minister Colonel Sadio Camara in Ankara, where they discussed strengthening cooperation in the defense industries.
As an indication of the strengthening Turkish-Malian relations, Bamako received Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones in December 2022. In April 2024, Burkina Faso’s transitional president, Captain Ibrahim Traore, who had previously honored Selcuk Bayraktar, CEO of Baykar Defense, with the country’s highest decoration, gifted several Bayraktar drones to his country’s Ministry of Defense, purchased from Turkey.
Several officials from Traore’s administration have visited Turkey and signed cooperation agreements in various fields. Niger has taken similar steps, with reports indicating that it received Turkish drones in May 2022, like several other countries in the region.
Like other competing nations in Africa, Turkey is working to consolidate its security and military relationships with African countries to enhance its influence. It has signed agreements with over twenty-five countries on the continent in the defense and security sectors, including Senegal, Mali, and Nigeria. Turkey has also conducted security exercises in more than ten countries, including Gambia.
This interest reflects Turkey’s focus on the Sahel and West Africa, aiming to compete for presence in the face of diminishing Western military involvement. Nevertheless, Ankara maintains a comprehensive interest in various African countries, with a strong military dimension. It has two military bases, one in Somalia with about two thousand soldiers and another in Libya with dozens of military personnel along with some drones and armored vehicles.
The role of the Turkish military base in Libya is expected to increase, given Libya’s border with Niger, which has been of interest to Ankara since the era of former civilian President Mahamadou Issoufou and his successor Mahamadou Bazoum, and continues to be under the transitional President General Abdrahmane Tiani.
In this context, Nigerien Prime Minister Ali Amin Zain visited Turkey in February 2024 at the invitation of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Nigerien media reported during the visit that Ankara was seeking to establish a military base in Agadez, northern Niger, near Libya, Chad, and Algeria.
In addition to its strategic location, Agadez holds another significant aspect for Turkey, as it is home to a U.S. military base, Base 201, which cost 110 million dollars to build. However, the U.S. is preparing to vacate it as part of its planned complete military withdrawal from Niger, expected to be finalized by mid-September 2024.
China and Arms Export
China maintains a single military base on the African continent, established in Djibouti in 2017, amid an international race to enhance influence in this small, sparsely populated country with a unique strategic location controlling international navigation through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden.
Due to its strategic position, Djibouti now hosts six military bases belonging to China, France, the United States, Japan, Spain, and Italy, to safeguard these countries’ strategic interests in the region and expand their influence.
China competes in the Horn of Africa through military presence, with its base in Djibouti, and also competes in the Sahel region by selling arms and training soldiers. Reports indicate that Beijing, the world’s second-largest arms producer and fourth-largest arms exporter, has significantly increased its arms exports to sub-Saharan African countries.
Chinese weapons flow to several countries in the Sahel and West Africa, such as Chad and Nigeria. Additionally, a Chinese company has opened a sales office in Senegal to supply small arms, artillery, and armored vehicles.
China appears to have exploited the gap left by Russia’s focus on the war in Ukraine, contributing to a substantial decline in Russian arms exports to Africa by nearly 44%. This allowed China to strengthen its presence and become a major supplier to twenty-one African countries.
According to a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report on the largest arms exporters for 2022, China ranked fourth with 5.2%, behind the United States and Russia at 31% and France at 11%.
These figures reflect that China had not previously focused much on arms exports to Africa as a means to enhance its presence. However, it has recognized that this avenue is crucial for expanding influence and achieving various other objectives. The interest of China and other competing nations in the region has been heightened by some Sahelian countries seeking new allies beyond the Western powers, which the new military rulers view as part of the problem in deteriorating security and economic conditions rather than part of the solution.
Conclusion
In recent years, the military dimension has become a major arena of competition among major powers for influence in the Sahel and West Africa, serving as an important gateway to enhance influence and exploit the region’s resources.
The military dimension is central to dominating the exploitation rights of resources such as gold, cotton, zinc, and phosphate in Burkina Faso; uranium, gold, and the anticipated production of gas and oil in Niger; and gold, cotton, fertilizers, and iron in Mali.
This extends beyond these countries to others, including Côte d’Ivoire, which has oil, gas, diamonds, iron, copper, and bauxite, and Chad, which exports crude oil to France, the United States, and China as major trade partners.
France, due to its colonial past, has long been the dominant foreign partner, or at least a primary one, for these countries, maintaining a significant level of dominance despite some decline in its traditional spheres of influence.
To protect its strategic interests in the Sahel and West Africa, France has deployed thousands of troops and established several military bases to shield allied leaders from military coups. As security challenges have grown and armed groups’ activities have increased, countering these threats has become part of the French military’s roles, with Paris even deploying special forces to combat armed groups.
Over time, as the security threat expanded across the region, several other countries entered through the military avenue, establishing bases and deploying troops. Many of these countries’ companies have benefited from mining concessions and large trade and economic deals.
Protecting interests and enhancing geostrategic positioning explains the international competition to enter the Sahel through military means. There are signs of expanding competition and presence toward the Gulf of Guinea, which suffers from piracy and is a vital source of oil and gas for some of these powers.
References
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