Since the announcement of the “Trans-Caspian International Transport Route” idea in 2012, the Middle Corridor has become one of the most ambitious projects in the world of logistics. The project aims to create a trade bridge between China and Europe via a fast and secure land-sea route, bypassing traditional corridors dominated by Russia. With growing global interest in this project following the Russian-Ukrainian war, questions are increasing about its ability to overcome economic and geopolitical challenges that may limit its effectiveness.

Project Description

The Middle Corridor, also known as the “Trans-Caspian International Transport Route” (TITR), is a land-sea transport route connecting China to Europe. Shipments begin in China, travel by rail to Kazakhstan, reach the port of Aktau in Kazakhstan, cross the Caspian Sea to the port of Baku in Azerbaijan, then proceed by rail to Georgia, and finally to southern or central Europe—either via Georgian Black Sea ports or through Turkey via the “Baku-Tbilisi-Kars” railway, depending on the shipment’s destination.

The Middle Corridor, spanning 7,000 kilometers, is geographically the shortest route between western China and Europe compared to the 10,000-kilometer Northern Corridor and the 20,000-kilometer traditional maritime route. Turkey and Georgia first seriously proposed the project in 2012, and the idea gained the attention of decision-makers in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

Moreover, the opening of the Kazakhstan Trans-Caspian Railway, linking Baku (Azerbaijan), Tbilisi (Georgia), and Kars (eastern Turkey), marked the first practical step toward implementing the project and, more broadly, trade connectivity between Asia and Europe via Turkic states. Additionally, the first dedicated Middle Corridor freight train from China to Turkey was completed in 2020.

The project was officially adopted during the Ankara Declaration, endorsed at the 11th meeting of transport ministers of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in February 2022. The aforementioned countries also formally agreed on the project during the international conference “Logistics and Its Advantages in Developing Transport Links Between Tajikistan and Regional Countries,” held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, on November 2, 2023. Finally, discussions were held on unifying legal and technical standards for regulating cargo transport via the corridor, as well as enhancing transport connectivity among participating countries.

Thus, it can be concluded that the project has seen significant progress in recent years, though it remains in the regulatory and technical formulation stage. This article provides a comprehensive analytical overview of the opportunities and constraints affecting the project’s potential success.

Turkey’s Motivations for Supporting the Project

Strengthening Turkey’s Role as a Natural Gas Hub: Ankara aims to leverage the project to become a link between energy production centers in Central Asia and European consumer markets. During a 2024 meeting of Turkic state leaders in Shusha, Azerbaijan, Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz stated: “The transfer of Turkmen natural gas to Turkey and Europe will contribute to our national welfare and Europe’s energy security.” This highlights the project’s strategic value for both Turkish and European energy security.

Deepening Ties with the Turkic World: The project aligns with the “Turkic World Vision 2040,” which seeks to transform the Organization of Turkic States (including Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan) into a model resembling the EU, allowing free movement of goods, capital, services, technology, and people among member states. Yılmaz’s statement supports this: “The transport project extending from Turkey to Central Asia will enhance cooperation among Turkic states and showcase the global role of the Turkic world.” This means the Middle Corridor strengthens Turkey’s economic and cultural ties with Central Asia through direct geographical connectivity.

Elevating Turkey’s Role in Global Trade: During the same meeting, Omer Kocaman, Deputy Secretary-General of the Organization of Turkic States, emphasized the Middle Corridor’s importance as a “global trade artery.” He also stressed leveraging the Turkic world’s strategic location—especially Turkey’s position at the “crossroads of continents”—to maximize economic value. Kocaman’s remarks highlight Ankara’s ambitions to exploit geopolitical instability in competing routes to strengthen its position in global trade: “Amid recent global challenges, the Middle Corridor has become an extremely vital artery. Beyond facilitating trade, its strategic importance will enhance economic resilience and cooperation amid evolving geopolitical dynamics.” Thus, Turkey presents the Middle Corridor as the most stable and secure trade route today.

Reducing Russian Influence in Central Asia: Beyond economic benefits, the project has political dimensions for Ankara, as it reduces Turkic republics’ dependence on Russia for global trade. Turkey aims to divert at least 30% of Northern Corridor traffic to the Middle Corridor. If successful, the corridor will offer developmental opportunities for participating countries, provided security, stability, and effective governance are ensured.

Factors for the Project’s Success

Impact of the Russian-Ukrainian War: Global supply chain disruptions caused by the war have increased interest in alternative East-West trade routes avoiding Russian territory. Western sanctions on Moscow have made replacing the Russian Northern Corridor an economic necessity. The Middle Corridor has greatly benefited from shipping companies shifting away from Russian-dominated routes, with cargo volume surging from 530,000 tons in 2021 to 3.2 million tons by the end of 2022 (the year the war began).

Expected Growth: Cargo volume via the Middle Corridor is projected to reach 10 million tons, especially after Turkey completes the “Marmaray” railway network under the Bosphorus, enhancing Central Asia-Europe connectivity. Major shipping companies like Austria’s Rail Cargo Group, Denmark’s Maersk, Finland’s Nurminen Logistics, and the Netherlands’ Rail Bridge Cargo have already shifted to the Middle Corridor. Western shipping traffic through Russia’s Northern Corridor dropped by 51% in 2023, making the Middle Corridor an attractive alternative. Once fully operational, transit time between China and Europe is expected to be just 12 days.

Genuine Political Will:

China: Has invested in logistics infrastructure supporting the Middle Corridor, including the Khorgos Gateway and the Khorgos-East Gate Special Economic Zone, forming a massive rail hub along the China-Kazakhstan border. For Beijing, a trade route not dominated by Russia (like the Northern Corridor) or directly influenced by the U.S. (like the maritime route) holds strategic value.

Turkey: Has made the Middle Corridor a focal point of its Central Asia foreign policy. From 2013 to 2015, it signed agreements with Azerbaijan, China, Georgia, and Kazakhstan to improve corridor connectivity with Europe. Turkey also built the Eurasia Tunnel and the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge in Istanbul (2016), with other projects like the Edirne-Kars high-speed railway nearing completion.

EU: To reduce reliance on Russian routes, the EU supports the project by investing in infrastructure. Brussels has allocated $10.8 billion to corridor countries for road and rail development, partly to secure access to Central Asian oil as an alternative to Russian gas.

Central Asian States: Seek greater agency and independence through the project, viewing it as a more “equitable” economic plan compared to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which has burdened them with debt. The project also helps reduce Russian regional influence.

Instability of the Southern Route: The “Southern Route,” relying on Egypt’s Suez Canal (which handles 15% of global trade), has faced disruptions due to Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping. Canal traffic dropped by 50% in 2024, potentially boosting interest in alternatives like the Middle Corridor.

Obstacles to the Middle Corridor Project

Geopolitical Environment: Despite economic alignment among participating countries, geopolitical complexities could hinder progress. Russia may use its regional influence to obstruct the project to protect its trade interests. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, giving Moscow veto power over their involvement. Additionally, the prolonged Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict in the South Caucasus and Russia’s military presence in Georgia’s Abkhazia region create security instability, deterring foreign investors.

Infrastructure Deficiencies: There are disparities in infrastructure capabilities among participating countries. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development estimates an immediate need for €3.5 billion in infrastructure upgrades. While Russian railways could transport 144 million tons of cargo pre-war, the Middle Corridor’s current capacity meets only 5% of China-Europe trade demand. Though Kazakhstan has built 2,500 km of railways ($35 billion) and Azerbaijan/Kazakhstan are upgrading Caspian Sea ports, further investments are needed to compete globally.

Border Procedures: Delays at Middle Corridor borders undermine its competitive advantage as the shortest China-Europe route. Actual transit time is around 40 days (vs. the projected 12), with current shipping times double those of the Northern Corridor. High tariffs (estimated at 5,000pershipmentvs.5,000pershipmentvs.2,800–$3,200 for the Northern Corridor) further weaken competitiveness. Unlike Russia/Belarus, corridor countries lack industrial hubs along the route.

Competitiveness of Maritime Routes: Maritime transport accounts for 91% of China-Europe trade (vs. 3.3% for land transport, per World Bank data), offering greater capacity, lower costs, and minimal environmental impact. Despite Red Sea instability, the Suez Canal remains the most attractive route for global shippers.

Environmental Challenges: Climate fluctuations, like Caspian Sea summer disruptions, hinder cargo movement. Azerbaijan plans to expand Baku Port, but without solutions for climatic obstacles, the corridor’s appeal remains limited. Declining Caspian Sea levels (−29 meters below sea level in 2023) necessitate more deep-water ports and vessels.

Conclusion

Turkey’s motivations for supporting the Middle Corridor include strengthening its role as a natural gas hub, deepening ties with the Turkic world, enhancing its global trade position, and reducing Russian influence in Central Asia.

However, despite its potential as a strategic alternative to traditional corridors, the project faces significant hurdles. Geopolitical tensions, incomplete infrastructure, logistical delays, high costs, and maritime competition threaten its success. Without overcoming these challenges, the Middle Corridor may struggle to achieve its near-term goals.

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  3. Hunter Stoll. The Middle Corridor: A Renaissance in Global Commerce. Rand Organization. 11/3/2024. Available at: https://shorturl.at/c2DXn
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