Six months after coming to power, the Taliban announced the resumption of digging the Khoshtiba Canal on the Amu River, also known as the “Nile of Central Asia.” The initial plans for the canal date back to the 1950s during the presidency of former Afghan leader Mohammad Daoud Khan. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, along with civil wars and political unrest, hindered the digging process. In 2018, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) conducted a new study on the Khoshtiba Canal costing $3.6 million, and the previous Afghan government led by Ashraf Ghani managed to dig the first seven kilometers of the canal before being ousted by the Taliban in 2021.
The Khoshtiba Canal is one of the largest strategic projects implemented by the Taliban government in Afghanistan, aimed at transforming vast areas of desert land into agricultural land, enhancing food security and reducing dependence on imports. Nonetheless, the project raises regional concerns for Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which rely on the Amu River as a primary water resource.
This article aims to introduce the Khoshtiba Canal and discuss the reasons for the project’s stagnation, addressing why the Taliban initiated its digging despite objections from Central Asian nations.
The Khoshtiba Canal Project
Undoubtedly, the canal represents the largest developmental project funded by the Afghan state in its history. It aims to showcase the Taliban’s ability to manage major infrastructure projects that could reduce poverty, increase agricultural land, and enhance food security, delivering a message both domestically and internationally. The canal measures 287 kilometers in length, with a depth of 8.5 meters and an average width of 100 meters. The initial width of the canal is 152 meters, gradually decreasing to 64 meters at its end, averaging around 100 meters in width. The Taliban’s action plan for the canal includes three main phases: the first begins in Balkh Province (108 kilometers long), the second in Jowzjan and Faryab Provinces (117 kilometers long), and the final phase involves irrigation canals and water networks in the three provinces. The Taliban appears determined to complete the Khoshtiba Canal in Afghanistan for economic and strategic reasons aimed at enhancing stability and achieving self-sufficiency.
Project officials claim that it will provide over 1.2 million acres of agricultural land and create around 200,000 new jobs, employing about 5,000 workers, along with 4,000 excavators and trucks. The first phase was completed ahead of schedule, with the canal now entering the second phase. The Afghan government has set a six-year timeline for project completion, although government sources indicate it could be finished sooner.
For the current Afghan authorities, the Khoshtiba Canal represents a bold new vision for a country that has waited five decades to complete the project. Although the Taliban did not originate the plan, they have embraced it enthusiastically, making the canal part of their political effort to rally public support, evidenced by a 27-minute promotional video produced in early 2024 after phase one of the project.
The Soviet Occupation and the Project
The Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s led to the collapse of Afghan governance, contributing to the deterioration of land and water resources. Currently, only half of the arable land is cultivated due to water shortages, and 11% of agricultural land lacks access to water— a stark contrast to Afghanistan’s situation in the 1970s, when the country enjoyed not only food self-sufficiency but also ranked among the largest exporters of dried fruits and nuts worldwide.
According to studies conducted on the canal’s importance, it will secure food for the Afghan population, projected to reach 100 million by the end of the century, and contribute around $400 million annually to Afghanistan’s GDP. Strategically, the Taliban may view the project as a means to reduce dependence on neighboring countries for water and food supplies, thus enhancing national sovereignty. Completing the Khoshtiba Canal is a priority for the Taliban, as it combines economic, social, and political benefits during a critical time for the regime.
The Khoshtiba Canal project is located in a strategically significant area across three northern provinces in Afghanistan: Balkh, where the project starts, and Jowzjan and Faryab; the Amu River forms Afghanistan’s border with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The populations of these provinces total around 3.33 million people, and the canal currently under construction in Afghanistan will significantly impact water availability for irrigation and drinking in one of the most drought-stricken and desertified regions of the country.
Interestingly, the Khoshtiba Canal project had been underway for several years before the Taliban’s rise to power, with preliminary work and feasibility studies supported by the USAID during the previous Afghan government. However, the project gained considerable momentum under the Taliban’s guidance, as satellite images reveal that in just one year—from March 2022 to May 19, 2023—the Taliban managed to dig and build approximately 100 kilometers of the canal.
Why Did the Previous Government Fail to Implement the Khoshtiba Project While the Taliban Succeeded?
A former security source states that “a group of former warlords were obstructing construction on the canal, encouraged by Central Asian countries, and were handing out bribes and causing security issues. When the Taliban began the project, the same group raised questions on social media, doubting the Taliban’s ability to complete the project, but the Taliban managed to move forward and proved to Afghans that they could.”
An American Study
According to a feasibility study conducted by USAID in 2019, the Khoshtiba Canal could irrigate 1.2 million acres of land annually, necessitating the extraction of up to 13.02 billion cubic meters of water from the Amu River. However, it is estimated that only 49% of the total available land in the surrounding area is suitable for agriculture; thus, the actual annual water extraction rate is expected to be around 6.37 billion cubic meters. “When analyzing these numbers and excluding areas unsuitable for agriculture—such as salinized land and those dominated by sand dunes—it seems that the Khoshtiba Canal may need between 8% and 17% of Amu River water, which is less than the previous estimate. There is clearly an urgent demand for more research on how the canal will affect the flow of Amu River water in Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.”
It is notable that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Central Asian countries signed the Almaty Agreement in 1992, which continued to follow the framework set by Protocol 566 for sharing water among them. Afghanistan was excluded from the negotiations, while the 1946 agreement with the former Soviet Union lost its effectiveness due to the lack of specific provisions for allocating water between Afghanistan and Central Asian countries.
The Amu River is known as the widest river in Central Asia and the second longest in Afghanistan, flowing through six countries: Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. It spans a distance of 2,540 kilometers, originating from Afghanistan and Tajikistan and ending in the Aral Sea, serving as a vital shared resource among these nations.
The Amu River (Gihon)
The Amu River springs from the Afghan Pamir Mountains and flows approximately 1,126 kilometers along Afghanistan’s northern border with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Afghanistan has not significantly benefited from Amu River water since the 1970s, but the former Soviet Central Asian republics have exploited its water resources for intensive cotton agriculture, consuming 92% of the water drawn from the Amu. In 1987, the Soviet Union divided the river’s waters—61.5 cubic kilometers—among the republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, while Afghanistan, still under Soviet occupation, was completely sidelined from the plan. Once completed, the canal will annually draw over 10 billion cubic meters of water from the Amu River. Additionally, the Taliban government plans to construct three reservoirs to store water and generate hydroelectric power.
Discussions held in Tashkent in 1977 between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union did not yield fruitful results. Afghanistan’s request for 9 cubic kilometers of water was met with a Soviet offer of only 6 cubic kilometers, and no final agreement was reached. The absence of treaties or formal agreements complicates the situation, especially as Afghanistan progresses in its efforts to extract water, potentially affecting downstream countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which heavily depend on the Amu River for their water supply.
As the Taliban government began to benefit from the river, Central Asian countries, especially Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, objected, claiming that the Afghan project would cause drought in downstream states and demanded a water-sharing agreement. “Forming a comprehensive agreement regarding the Amu River between Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries is essential for ensuring long-term water security and preventing future conflicts over water resources. The old water-sharing arrangements from the Soviet era no longer reflect the region’s reality, and Afghanistan has the right to utilize its water as needed.”
The Khoshtiba Canal project has not escaped the attention of Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors. In 2023, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for careful study before building the canal, warning that it could “radically alter the water system” in the region. Turkmenistan supported this view and asked Afghanistan to adopt a “scientific approach” in managing water resources, ensuring that the canal’s construction is executed by qualified personnel to mitigate environmental risks.
Although the Khoshtiba project contributes to reducing poverty and improving food security in Afghanistan, it raises serious concerns among neighboring Central Asian countries like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The canal will divert water from the Amu River away from these nations, which have relied on it for decades to cultivate cotton, fruits, vegetables, and fodder for livestock. The downstream countries have over-exploited Afghan water resources, establishing agricultural projects and hydroelectric reservoirs without coordinating with Afghanistan. Now, when Afghans wanted to claim their rights to the Amu River’s water, they are opposing the Khoshtiba project, despite Afghanistan providing approximately 30% of the river’s water and not benefiting from its rightful share.
For the Taliban, the canal symbolizes a political message to all segments of the Afghan populace, indicating their commitment to improving the lives of all citizens. Geopolitically, it serves as proof that Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, can successfully manage large-scale infrastructure projects and fulfill its national interests.
These motivations spur considerable public relations efforts surrounding the project, as demonstrated by statements from Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, who emphasized the Islamic Emirate’s focus on agricultural development and water management, using the Khoshtiba Canal as a prime example of this commitment.
Despite Afghanistan’s non-participation in international treaties regarding water-sharing, Afghan Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar reiterated Afghanistan’s right to utilize its water resources in accordance with international standards of law. This announcement underscores Afghanistan’s quest for legal recognition and its determination to ensure the legitimacy of the project.
Some Afghan experts and officials believe that Afghanistan should not be held accountable for the existing water scarcity issues in the region, as it is one of the countries sharing the Amu River but does not benefit from it. The Taliban, as a regime seeking international recognition and opportunities for trade and investment in infrastructure, must maintain diplomatic relationships with its neighbors, such as Uzbekistan, a major supplier of electricity, and Turkmenistan, a gas supplier to Afghanistan. Heightened animosity among neighboring countries could accelerate the deterioration of relations in Central Asia, hampering trade and increasing the risk of isolation.
The initiation of canal construction in Afghanistan presents a significant challenge—a test Central Asian states are unprepared to face. The absence of institutional and legal frameworks for managing water resources in Afghanistan underscores the complexity of this issue.
What Do Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan Want?
Central Asian countries generally express concern and opposition toward the Khoshtiba Canal project in Afghanistan, particularly Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, as downstream states of the Amu River. They believe that the canal may decrease water flow to them, negatively impacting agriculture, especially cotton farming on which these nations rely.
Afghanistan contributes about 30% of the river’s water but has historically benefited less than the downstream countries, prompting it to advance the project to meet its domestic needs. Former Water Minister Arif Noorzai stated, “The Khoshtiba Canal is not the primary cause of a comprehensive crisis between Afghanistan and Central Asian states; however, it has sparked existing tensions and fears regarding water resource management in the region, particularly between Afghanistan and downstream countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.”
Disputes over the Amu River (Gihon) date back to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 when Central Asian countries began competing for water resources without a strong coordination framework with Afghanistan, despite its significant contributions to the river. Afghanistan had been disconnected from this dynamic for decades due to wars and internal chaos, which has left its share largely unutilized. The average flow of the Amu River is about 75 billion cubic meters, while Afghanistan benefits from just 7% of its estimated annual entitlement of 22.5%.
Agriculture is the primary consumer of water resources in both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, accounting for about 90% of total water usage in both countries. Agriculture contributes 17% to Uzbekistan’s GDP and 10% to Turkmenistan’s GDP, with a significant share of water allocated for cotton production.
Some experts believe that these concerns may be exaggerated. A recent study conducted by a German economic team indicates that even if the Khoshtiba Canal diverts 25% of Amu River water, it would lead to only a 0.7% decline in Uzbekistan’s GDP by 2030, as agricultural water usage will not be significant at that stage, given that the branch canals designed to transport water to the fields have not yet been established, and the agricultural fields are not ready for cultivation.
Uzbekistan has publicly opposed the project and called for negotiations on water division and management, indicating that the canal’s size might divert nearly a fifth of the river’s water. Turkmenistan has expressed similar concerns, but it appears that both countries have implicitly accepted the canal’s construction and have been unable to halt its progress, especially following the completion of the first phase in 2023 at a cost of $91 million. The neighboring countries may feel they are benefiting from the water without contributing to replenishing the river. Uzbekistan and Kabul formed a joint committee to discuss issues concerning the Khoshtiba Canal in Afghanistan, and two meetings have taken place in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, with a third meeting set to occur soon in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan assert that the Khoshtiba Canal aims to divert around 20% of the Amu River’s water, threatening agriculture in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, particularly cotton farming reliant on irrigation. This threat has led Uzbekistan to express “deep concern” and request Afghanistan to halt construction or enter negotiations, showing the potential for water conflicts, though it has not escalated into a full-blown crisis.
The Uzbek envoy to Afghanistan, Ismatulla Irgashov, states, “It can be argued that Afghanistan and the Afghan people have the right to utilize the waters of the Amu River by principle, and there are no fears or challenges; rather, the core issue is how much water should be extracted from the Amu River. Here, the interests of all countries using its water resources must be taken into account, and the third issue is that the water level in the Amu River changes every year.”
During the Soviet era, there were bilateral agreements with Afghanistan for sharing Amu River waters, such as the 1946 agreement that allocated Afghanistan a share of about nine billion cubic meters annually. However, these agreements have not been significantly updated since 1991, remaining ambiguous due to Afghanistan’s inability to fully utilize its share.
The Position of Tajikistan
Conversely, Tajikistan, a water-supplying state like Afghanistan, has not shown strong opposition, perhaps because it is not directly affected by reduced flow. Both countries, as upstream states, have not recorded recent official agreements regarding the Amu River, as Tajikistan focuses on its projects, such as the Rogun Dam, and is not directly affected by the Khoshtiba Canal. Their relations tend toward economic cooperation rather than water disputes. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have not taken notable stances on the canal, but economic rapprochement with Afghanistan reflects a shift toward cooperation despite water tensions.
There is no recent regional agreement governing the sharing of Amu River waters. Afghanistan sees itself as exercising its sovereign right over its water resources, while downstream countries interpret this as a violation of the “no harm” principle toward others. The Khoshtiba Canal has not yet caused a full-blown crisis between Afghanistan and Central Asian countries but has ignited significant tensions due to concerns over water security. The outcome will depend on whether countries reach an understanding or if Afghanistan continues its unilateral policies, which may escalate tensions in the future. Central Asian nations have not yet taken tangible measures; the most noteworthy development has been the first tripartite meeting between Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan amid dwindling water resources. Water management was among the main topics discussed at this meeting.
The Khoshtiba Canal as a Tool of Influence
The construction of the Khoshtiba Canal will cast a shadow of influence over neighboring Central Asian countries, unleashing serious repercussions. Various assessments suggest that within 5-6 years, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan will face a noticeable decline in their average water absorption capacity along the river’s middle and lower tributaries, decreasing from 80% to 65%. As a lifeline for these nations, the waters of the Amu River hold immense significance, contributing enormously—up to 80%—to the total water resources available in northern Afghanistan.
On the other hand, regional water agreements between Central Asian countries and Afghanistan are neither standardized nor particularly comprehensive. Rather, they predominantly rely on bilateral or historical arrangements, especially concerning the management of transboundary rivers such as the Amu River. These agreements are often linked to the previous Soviet context, where water resource management was centrally organized before the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991. Subsequently, the issue of water sharing has become a source of tension between Central Asian nations and Afghanistan.
Water Diplomacy
After the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani took office in 2014, Afghanistan began using water as a strategic tool against its neighbors. This concept was translated into tangible projects such as the Kamal Khan Dam, plans for dams on the Kabul River, and the digging of the Khoshtiba Canal. The canal is now regarded as a strategic tool for the Taliban, both economically and geopolitically, serving not only as an agricultural project but as a means of influence to establish a new reality in its relations with regional neighbors and the international community.
Despite its limited economic resources, Afghanistan holds leverage through its water resources, giving it influence over its neighbors, especially amid regional water scarcity.
The Khoshtiba Canal forces Central Asian countries, particularly Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, to balance regional instability with domestic unrest. These nations evaluate the benefits of having the Taliban in northern Afghanistan against the costs their populations may incur if Amu River resources are increasingly depleted. Although the current Uzbek discourse and its absence in Turkmenistan might suggest that Uzbekistan values internal stability while Turkmenistan values regional harmony, the rapid progress of the project could also signify that Tashkent and Ashgabat have not had ample time to calibrate their diplomatic responses appropriately.
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