The Jordanian/Egyptian Position on Trump’s Plan: A Look to the Future

The official announcement by both Jordan and Egypt rejecting Trump’s plan to control the Gaza Strip and displace its residents serves as a prelude for crafting a strategic vision that both countries can adopt, especially during the upcoming Arab summit in Cairo. I believe that thwarting Trump’s project requires a comprehensive vision from both nations, which should shift from the current perspective toward a forward-looking strategic outlook. It seems to me that this vision must be based on the following foundational elements:

First: Trump’s Personality: Trump—based on his narrow, purely commercial perspective—will retreat from his plan in one way or another if he feels that its gains are outweighed by its losses. Bargaining is the cornerstone of his thinking; he is not an ideologue entrenched behind absolute value visions and does not see a problem in withdrawing. He also does not respect the “concept of historical relationships nor does he care for traditional alliances.” A glance at his positions with allies reveals that he waged a trade war against both enemies and allies alike. This means that the primary requirement is to create a regional environment—through the Arab summit—that makes him feel the possibility of loss if he insists on his position. I believe this can lead to a change in Trump’s stance, as he is convinced that Arabs are “garrulous.” If he feels this is untrue through a firm, uncompromising stance, it could result in a modification of his positions over his remaining years in office.

I studied Trump’s personality based on several references and some of his books. I previously wrote in an article before he took office that “he would propose the idea of displacing Gaza to both Jordan and Egypt,” and no one believed my prediction… and here we are living the moment.

Second: Instability: Any consideration of the future consequences of accepting Trump’s plan—in any form or level—implies a transition from displacing Gaza to displacing the West Bank, and potentially later, the displacement of Palestinian residents from the Galilee. This signifies a state of instability that may last between 30 to 40 years.

It is essential to revisit history since every Arab concession to Israel leads to larger, deeper, and more prolonged crises. The political instability indicators in the Arab region since 1967 confirm this. I assert that the rate of instability in the region has increased after each concession to Israel compared to the period prior to these concessions. One can refer to the Kauffman model to measure political stability from 1994 to 2024 (thirty years), revealing that 97.2% of Arabs live in increasingly unstable areas. Almost all Arab countries fall within the negative region of instability, with rankings between 110 and 193 among countries globally regarding political instability (in 2024).

Thus, agreeing to Trump’s plan will deepen local and regional instability, as the phenomenon of instability is one of the most liable to spill over. This necessitates a clear and firm rejection of Trump’s plan since its consequences will be greater than all that has preceded it; it is a significant evil.

Third: Confrontation: I am almost certain that confronting the displacement project is feasible to a great extent, conditional on several steps:

a. The quicker the reconstruction process occurs, the stronger the factors for stabilizing the Gazan people in their land will be. Therefore, wealthy Arab countries (the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iraq, Algeria, and Libya) should contribute within their capacity to the reconstruction efforts, similar to their contributions during the Afghan war against the Soviet Union. The Arab nominal GDP is 5.20 trillion or 13.14 trillion (purchasing power parity). If reconstruction estimates reach 50 billion dollars, Arabs should spend between 1% (nominal) to 0.4% (purchasing power parity) for just one year. If we consider the likelihood of obtaining aid from other Islamic countries, the required contribution would be between 0.8% to 0.1% of the total Arab GDP, whether nominal or in purchasing power.

Thus, the summit’s first decision should be to establish an immediate reconstruction fund, with an Arab committee undertaking extensive diplomatic efforts to cover the financial requirements from all Arab parties and others, alongside opening channels for public fundraising in each country. This would help alleviate the burden on government budgets.

b. Avoid making “problematic” decisions, especially regarding who will manage the Gaza Strip for at least the coming year. This would open the door to endless complications and hinder reconstruction efforts. Therefore, it is necessary to allow the current Gaza administration to continue until economic and living stability is achieved before rearranging the political situation.

Proposing the formation of a new Gaza administration means delaying assistance and affecting the amounts of these aids, which is why Arab countries, especially Jordan and Egypt, must set aside sensitivities toward some Palestinian factions in Gaza until reconstruction is accomplished. Otherwise, political turmoil in Gaza will reinforce Trump’s justifications for his plan.

c. It is clear that all countries of the world (193 United Nations member states), except for the USA and Israel, have not shown any supportive position regarding Trump’s plan. Moreover, the European stance, including that of the UK, has expressed objections to the plan, and most international organizations and various sectors of international public opinion oppose and scorn the plan. Additionally, 145 American legislators issued a clear statement rejecting it, while influential American figures from intellectuals, writers, artists, and media personalities have “mocked” the plan, creating an environment favorable for Arab action.

d. There is a need to avoid discussing the topic of disarming the resistance, as disarmament strengthens the Israeli right-wing position and adds temptation to Trump’s temptation. Resistance arms should remain outside of any “trade-off,” even from a temporary negotiable perspective.

e. I believe that the resistance in Gaza should announce the “unification of all armed factions” under a single command to resemble a traditional army operating under unified leadership, without implying merging political factions into one organizational entity. The goal is to present resistance elements as a regular army like that in all countries of the world, and to consider it a protection and internal security apparatus for the forthcoming phase until the announcement of a Palestinian state as part of the two-state solution framework (which aims to absorb the momentum of Trump’s plan until ensuring stability in Gazan society and undermining the allure of emigration).

f. The upcoming summit’s work must be limited strictly to the Palestinian issue only, as some parties may push to open other files to create disputes that could be used to justify withdrawing from financial or political commitments.

g. Regarding the issue of patients from all categories, data available from the World Health Organization and other institutions indicate that there are approximately 6,900 hospitals (public and private) in the Arab world. If all Gaza injuries were distributed among Arab hospitals, each would receive between 15 to 20 casualties, which presents no burden on any country, regardless of its health or economic status.

Will the summit meet at the very least of these demands? We’ll wait for the coming weeks. I hope the meeting is not postponed, and I hope that leaders will attend personally rather than sending representatives… perhaps.