Yemeni society is considered conservative and religious; however, it has not enjoyed stability due to a history marked by a cycle of conflicts and political struggles. These conflicts have led to political factions employing religious groups in their battles against adversaries, given the significant influence and presence of religious rhetoric in society. This utilization persisted even after the Revolution of September 26, 1962, which announced the establishment of a republican system, and continued after the Yemeni unification on May 22, 1990, which opened the doors for political pluralism, electoral competition, freedom of expression, and media. This highlights the importance of studying this phenomenon in its various dimensions within the political landscape.
With the emergence of religious groups at the beginning of the 20th century in the Arab and Islamic worlds, these groups became part of the social and political movements, including in Yemen, where their presence and influence extended. The political utilization of religious groups in the modern Yemeni state was imposed by historical contexts, real conditions, and the nature of the alliances that governed the political transformations from 1962 to the present. While political factions benefited from these religious groups in their struggles, the groups themselves gained from this relationship, whether through participatory, alliance-based, or cooperative formulas or through reciprocal exchanges, which facilitated the expansion and prominence of this phenomenon.
This paper reviews instances of the political utilization of religious groups in Yemen from 1962 to 2022, attempting to map out the characteristics of such utilization, its objectives, and its consequences, whether at the level of the conflicting parties or on a broader scale. It also discusses the extent of external utilization by regional and international systems of these religious groups for their agendas and policies in Yemen, and how they managed to engage and utilize them.
The paper will utilize descriptive and analytical methodologies to address this phenomenon, tracing available information, documenting the historical trajectory of events and facts, and linking them to positions, statements, and roles to outline the features and dimensions of the phenomenon, and subsequently analyze and deconstruct its components to provide an explanation for it. The geographical scope remains within Yemen, while the topic focuses on the political utilization of religious groups in conflicts.
Conceptual Framework
“Political Utilization”: Concepts and Implications
“Utilize” means to make something work or function; “function” refers to the work a person performs. It is said that “function” is assigned tasks that a person is always or almost always required to undertake. “Utilization” implies obligation, and in language, it also implies usage, occupation, employment, or exploitation. Consequently, a “utilized” person is someone engaged in certain tasks, occupied with responsibilities, and working according to a plan or approach, aimed at achieving specific objectives and demands.
The use or exploitation of events for political purposes is termed political utilization, wherein political authority or forces—regardless of their position—can use or exploit issues, parties, and events outside the political framework for political ends, transforming those issues and parties into tools to achieve the agendas and objectives of the ruling authority or the employing political forces.
The concept of “political utilization” closely aligns with commonly used terms in political science, such as political exploitation, political manipulation, or politicization. Politicization is the process of attaching politics to non-political subjects or transforming various topics into political ones. This process extends beyond formal state boundaries as individuals leverage their strong connections with external entities to attain political influence.
Both “politics” and “religion” are concerned with public affairs and address issues related to individuals and society within a framework of ruling powers, functioning within the same space. Their intersection and entanglement, and potentially their conflict, are inevitable. Therefore, throughout history, politicians have taken an interest in religion, while religious figures have engaged in politics. At times, politicians form alliances with religious leaders, while at other times, competition and enmity prevail.
Given that religion is deeply rooted in the individual’s nature and awareness, representing a strong motivator, human opinions and ideas acquire sanctity and influence over behavior when infused with a “religious hue.” Hence, the use of religion and religious individuals in political fields has been dominant historically. Even political struggles aimed at gaining or maintaining power have often involved religious frameworks for public mobilization against the opposing side.
Moreover, “political utilization” of religious groups does not conform to a single nature or form; rather, its nature varies and includes direct and indirect utilization, overt and covert forms, positive and negative aspects, as well as unidirectional and multi-directional forms. Particularly, religious groups differ in their sects, interests, and roles, with some having political agendas, others social orientations, some intellectual and cultural goals, and others militant orientations. Thus, “political utilization” can sometimes be a legitimate endeavor, even if the political entity’s intentions aim at a different end.
This broad meaning and the various forms of “political utilization” necessitate cautious engagement with the term and the examples presented for discussion or study, while allowing space for reflection, dialogue, and possibilities. Consequently, the term cannot always be associated with negative connotations; however, the exploitation of religious individuals or the religious domain for political gain remains a phenomenon deserving analysis and scrutiny within the context of its impacts.
Religious Groups
In this paper, religious groups refer to human collectives based on a religious affiliation, or aimed at a religious purpose or mission. Religion plays a significant role in defining their identity as distinct from others, serving as the primary consideration in their formation and cohesion. Thus, religious groups transcend genealogies, races, ethnicities, national identities, and states, functioning like any human cluster based on ideas, values, perceptions, and ideologies, independent of these associations.
In Islamic society, religious groups may include doctrinal sects or jurisprudential schools. For instance, the Khawarij, Mu’tazila, Shi’a, and Sufis are doctrinal sects, while the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali are jurisprudential groups. With the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate in the mid-20th century, various reformist movements emerged, forming groups with diverse interests—educational, da’wa (calling to Islam), social, jihadist, and political—aiming to reinvigorate Islam in the lives of Muslims, whether at the community or state level. These groups have varied in names, interests, and functions.
Among the prominent contemporary religious groups are the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb al-Tahrir, Tablighi Jamaat, al-Qaeda, and various Salafist groups. These groups have proliferated across the geography of the Muslim world, throughout the last century and up to the present day, including in Yemen.
Due to their spread and influence, these groups are now present in public affairs and are seen as components shaping the political landscape. Hence, it is impossible to exclude these religious groups from the analysis of events and political transformations in many Arab and Islamic countries.
The West and the Political Utilization of Religious Groups
Religious groups are a significant part of human society, including in Western countries, although most have adopted secularism as a basis for governance and political systems; this is because they represent an influential segment of society in shaping public opinion, prompting numerous leaderships and political parties to improve relations with them, maintain contact, and integrate them into public opinion-gathering tools. Liberal Western regimes have employed the church to face the impending communist tide from the East, utilizing religious rhetoric to oppose communist ideas and entities. Various parties in both Europe and America have allied with churches and religious sects to garner votes during elections. In the United States, Protestant Zionism adopted religious rhetoric to justify its support for Israel as a Jewish state established on Palestinian soil, touted as a national homeland for Jews. The British monarch serves as the head of the Church of England, despite having no direct ecclesiastical duties. When George W. Bush (the younger) announced his campaign against the Islamic region in 2001, he referred to it as a “Crusade,” attempting to rally the religious currents within the United States.
The issue of religious minorities in the region has long served as a tool for Western colonial powers to manage conflicts with the Ottoman state and the subsequent shaping of the region after its fall. France, Britain, and Germany incorporated minority issues into their political negotiations regarding this region from an early stage.
Britain has utilized religious groups in its various wars and has even fostered some of these groups. For instance, during the revolutions in India against British occupation, the British Indian government supported Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani, who was of Persian descent and claimed prophetic status, thereby founding an independent religious group, convincing his followers of the prohibition on fighting the British occupiers and the necessity to obey and advise the British government. Through generous support, Britain helped Ghulam Ahmad gather followers who came to be known as the Qadianis or Ahmadis, representing a phenomenon of collaboration with the occupying government.
With the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan and its expansion southward toward warm waters, the United States supported Afghan religious groups declaring jihad against the Russian occupation, regardless of their Islamic factions, aiming to thwart Soviet expansionist plans and embroil it in a long-term war of attrition. For this purpose, the United States, alongside its allies in the Arab region, funneled funds and personnel into the Afghan jihad of that time.
The United States also exploited Shia religious groups in its war against Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime in Iraq in 2003, despite its claims of liberating the Iraqi people and establishing a democratic system in Baghdad; nevertheless, it relied on armed sectarian Shia groups that employed violence as a political tool to impose their sectarian agendas. This led to the emergence of these groups as the ruling power in Iraq with U.S. backing.
The United States sought to exploit the “Fetullah Gülen” group in Turkey to orchestrate a military coup against the “Justice and Development Party” government in 2016, based on its considerable presence and influence in the public sphere and its potential to succeed the ruling party. The Turkish newspaper “Hürriyet” quoted then-Interior Minister “Süleyman Soylu” accusing Washington of being behind the failed coup in 2016, which Ankara accuses “Fetullah Gülen,” residing in the United States, and his “Hizmet” group of orchestrating.
Arab Regimes and the Political Utilization of Religious Groups
Many Arab regimes have invoked religion to lend legitimacy to their rule, despite committing significant religious infractions. These regimes have endeavored to incorporate religious slogans into their literature, official documents, and public displays, highlighting their leaders engaging in certain religious ceremonies, invoking religious texts in official speeches and declarations, and fostering a friendly relationship with appointed religious figures in state roles. These and other policies aim to facilitate the acceptance of the predominantly religious Arab societies of the ruling authority as a legitimate power that should not be violated or opposed.
With the rise of religious groups, Arab regimes have sought to utilize them, internally and externally. For example, Anwar Sadat’s regime in Egypt encouraged Islamic groups against leftist parties in an attempt to reduce the impact of these organized ideological opposition parties. Likewise, Gulf states sought to attract elements from the “Muslim Brotherhood” to counter the leftist tide in educational and media spheres during the mid-20th century. Saudi Arabia adopted a global support stance for the Salafi trend as a counter to the Shia push, initially supported by the Iranian regime to export its revolution in the region. The Syrian regime facilitated the movement of elements from “al-Qaeda” to and from Iraq during the period from 2003 to 2010, keeping the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq in a state of continuous threat, diverting its attention away from occupying Syria or striking it.
Various types of Arab regimes have kept the religious card active in domestic politics, seeking to strip legitimacy from opposition forces and Islamist parties, particularly after the Arab Spring revolutions in 2011. Some religious groups, belonging to Sufi orders, Salafi factions, or independent personalities, have accepted involvement in the political process on behalf of the ruling authority.
The utilization of religious groups will likely continue in the Arab region due to the profound presence of religion in the consciousness of Muslim Arab societies and the ongoing conflicts based on religious dimensions among sects and between other religions and civilizations. This necessitates a thorough and careful examination of the phenomenon to spare the region from serious disasters that would further distort religion and religious figures in the minds of the people.
Utilization of Religious Groups in the Yemeni Context
Yemeni society is regarded as religious, which has reflected on the socio-political landscape since the early 20th century. This has turned Yemen into a magnet for various Islamic groups and platforms, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis, jihadists, Tablighi groups, Hizb al-Tahrir, and others. The presence of these groups has significantly influenced political dynamics, whether negatively or positively, impacting both discourse and behavior. Given this presence, the political usage of these religious groups has become a prevalent strategy among the ruling political elite and active regional and international forces in the Yemeni arena, especially in political conflicts and military struggles, regardless of whether these religious groups consciously engaged in these conflicts or were oblivious to their involvement.
Here, we can observe this utilization through a review of the most notable manifestations and goals of the political utilization of religious groups and the conflicts in which they were politically employed in Yemen, and their effects on the political scene.
The Muslim Brotherhood
The “Muslim Brotherhood” was founded in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna in the 1930s. The organization successfully extended its presence and influence into several Arab and Islamic countries within two decades, representing a historical idea of authenticity and aspiration to restore the state of Islam and its civilizational role, following the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate and the fragmentation of the Islamic world into disjointed states occupied by foreign powers.
The Brotherhood had early connections with Yemen as “al-Banna” envisioned Yemen as a base for the group’s call and movement. The group contributed to supporting the opposition calling for reform and change, known as the “Liberation Party,” led by the revolutionary writer and poet Muhammad Mahmoud al-Zubairi. Consequently, the group played a role in forming the constitutional movement that aimed to overthrow Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din in 1948, declaring a constitutional monarchy. Although that experiment failed at its inception and dealt a significant blow to the group, it continued to spread its call and foster its relations, allowing it to impose its presence and influence on forthcoming events.
Following the success of the September 26, 1962 revolution, which was supported by the Egyptian regime led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, which was in conflict with the Brotherhood, Yemen experienced political relief following the overthrow of the imam’s rule marked by closure, tyranny, and terror against the people. This resulted in the establishment of a modern republican system that enshrined the principle of elevating the people’s status over that of the absolute ruler. This development allowed various parties, movements, and groups that had begun to emerge among the populace to operate freely, even if they did not officially form or declare themselves.
Nasserite discourse aimed to create loyalists among Yemeni army officers and elites and sought to make Yemen subordinate to the Egyptian regime’s leadership policy, leading Saudi Arabia to enter into a conflict with Egypt over the Yemeni arena, as the Saudi regime chose to support royalist forces and aid the Zaydi imamate followers to confront the nascent threat of Nasserism.
This conflict created divisions within Yemeni society, with some siding with Egypt and others siding with Saudi Arabia, while a neutral faction believed Yemen should be independent and not subservient to any external power. The Brotherhood was part of this third stream, unwilling to completely abandon republicanism in favor of monarchy and not succumbing to Egyptian leadership, having harbored enmity toward the latter within their homeland. This neutrality spared the Brotherhood numerous risks at both the organizational and societal levels, allowing them to maintain their strength and reputation and gain greater popularity.
After the establishment of the republican system, the Brotherhood focused on participation in national issues and the public sphere, engaging in public roles within the modern state and contributing to constructing public awareness and popular movements. With the onset of the power struggle among other parties and political forces—the Nasserites, Ba’athists, and leftists—the group sensed an imminent threat, realizing that these parties, which held a comprehensive vision and exclusive methodology, were generally adverse, if not negative, toward religion. Should they seize power entirely, they would extinguish the Brotherhood’s aims of establishing a model Islamic rule in Yemen.
The conflict between the parties began to take a military shape when Major Ibrahim al-Hamdi, with Nasserite inclinations, led a military coup on June 13, 1974, overthrowing President Abdul Rahman al-Iryani (the first civilian president of the Yemen Arab Republic). Following his assassination, leftist forces sought to seize power, particularly as they had already succeeded in the southern sector of Yemen, thus igniting a new internal conflict in the North.
The left’s drive for power and control threatened Yemeni society’s identity and religion, prompting the Brotherhood to mobilize to face this urgent threat alongside other national forces. The arrival of Major Ali Abdullah Saleh to the presidency on July 17, 1978—a military figure with a conservative tribal background—backed by Saudi Arabia, presented an opportunity for the Brotherhood to counter the escalating leftist threat to their aims.
Saleh, having reached power without popular or party backing, needed the Brotherhood’s support to halt the advancing leftist tide threatening his authority, especially since both the Islamic and leftist currents were inherently opposed to each other. Meanwhile, the Ba’ath and Nasserist movements viewed the left as a political competitor, and potentially an ally. Consequently, Saleh’s alliance with the Islamic movement proved to be a stabilizing factor for his regime against leftist ideologies, resulting in the emergence of a coalition between Saleh, the President of the Yemen Arab Republic, and the Brotherhood, a significant religious popular force.
The ruling left in the South posed a threat to Sana’a, as the southern regime focused on ideologies and socialist theories, particularly Marxism, which could only be countered by religious ideological orientation. Thus, the Brotherhood was tasked with this mission, gaining increased influence as conflicts with the South escalated. According to leftist leader Abdul Bari Taher, this was a “political calculation,” as the southern left regime had a political tool in the North, which was not to be countered solely by military force but required a political-organizational and ideological counterpart, a role fitting for the Brotherhood alone.
The Brotherhood approached President Saleh with an initiative based on the shared threat represented by the left’s armed struggle against both Saleh and the Brotherhood. They proposed “cooperation” to face this threat, presenting a detailed plan outlining the significant common ground between the President and the group, both intellectually and politically. Saleh provided the necessary support for armed engagements and facilitated their public activities, including logistical backing. As a result, the Brotherhood, through substantial sacrifices, managed to eliminate the leftist National Front’s threat, driving them back into narrower regions after nearly seizing Sana’a.
By siding with Saleh and participating in the struggle against the “National Front,” the Brotherhood enhanced its presence in the state and society, broadening the scope of its influence and movement to eliminate leftist thought and movements. Each party achieved its political agenda: Saleh neutralized threats to his authority in the North while reaping multiple socio-political gains, thereby becoming an indispensable ally of the regime, granting it substantial presence in the “People’s Congress,” the political umbrella for governance in the Yemen Arab Republic established as an alternative to all other parties. They influenced the formulation of the “national charter,” seen as a unifying identity for national forces in the North.
Saleh’s alliance with the Brotherhood created a period of stability for the regime in the North, lasting until 1990. However, with Saleh unilaterally declaring unity in partnership with the Yemeni Socialist Party, tensions began to surface within the coalition. The announcement of the unification of the two sectors on May 22, 1990, and the consequent facilitation of party activity and political plurality set the stage for multiple parties to emerge, including the Yemeni Congregation for Reform—a political arm of the Brotherhood in Yemen, which had its cadres leaving the “People’s Congress” umbrella, similarly to other parties in the North.
With the formal announcement of the Reform Party and the emergence of a democratic system embracing party diversity and political plurality, the Brotherhood became more liberated in forming their political alignment and expressing their political stances; however, connections and ties with Saleh remained proportionate to the situational contexts at the time. The party managed to succeed in the parliamentary elections of 1993, allowing it to partner with the other two ruling parties. Escalating tensions between Saleh and his deputy, Ali Salem al-Beidh, over several issues began to threaten the integrity of the Yemeni unity, especially with regional and international forces fueling divisions and pushing the Socialist Party to adopt a stance against unity.
In 1994, armed conflict erupted between the Yemeni Socialist Party, led by Ali Salem al-Beidh, which had retreated to Aden declaring its secession, and Saleh’s regime, which remained committed to unity. To preserve Yemeni unity and save the South from the Marxist leftist grip, the Reform Party sided with Saleh, who sought to recruit the party to bolster their political, social, and discursive strength against the Yemeni Socialist Party and its secessionist project. Here, the Brotherhood reshaped a general religious discourse to combat the Socialist threat, framing it as a danger to identity and religion in Yemen.
Saleh mobilized “a wide coalition of political and social forces,” with the Yemeni Congregation for Reform at its core due to its organizational, political, media, and popular capabilities, alongside tribal forces and some jihadist Islamic organizations. As war threatened due to the Socialist Party’s inclination toward secession, the Reform Party played a pivotal role in popular mobilization for unity, bolstering Saleh and other political leaders to maintain the unity even if it required military confrontation with the Socialist Party leadership, maintaining the group’s hardline stance against any weaknesses or hesitations among those leaders concerning unity and contributing significantly to combat efforts, preserving internal cohesion, and ensuring popular support for the war efforts. Furthermore, Reform scholars worked hard to highlight the religious and moral legitimacy of the war, alongside its legal justification.
At the conclusion of the secession war, the Reform Party became a partner in authority alongside the Congress; however, Saleh viewed the growing strength, influence, and spread of the Reform Party as a threat to his absolute authority. Accordingly, he worked to marginalize the party during the 1997 elections. Gradually, efforts began to diminish its influence and presence, attacking its symbols and denying its historical roles. Saleh’s perception of the Brotherhood was that they were simply a “political tool,” a mere “card.” This prompted the Reform Party to declare the dissolution of its alliance with the Congress.
The roles of the Brotherhood in Yemen, prior to and following unification, are described by some of their members as necessities of political action that demand intersections, alliances, and temporary partnerships, and mutual assistance. The general secretary of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, Muhammad al-Yadoumi, contends that the alliance between the Brotherhood and Saleh in a previous phase was based on principles. Others within the party view it as “utilization” and “exploitation,” arguing that it resulted in them (Reformists) not possessing the political acumen to play significant roles, thus entangling them in a fate of perpetual use and a trap leading them to play unaware roles, and hence from the 1970s until the early 1990s, they were merely “tools used by the regime, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, often deceived and oblivious to the designs of the ruling regime, personified by its leader, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who adeptly orchestrated their rhythm and movements to achieve his objectives and cement his control.”
What can be affirmed, however, is that the “Muslim Brotherhood” achieved numerous benefits from their intersections with the authority, both personally and for Yemen generally. The Brotherhood would not have been able to eliminate the threat of Communist expansion, which had transformed into an ascendant power backed by various international forces, equipped with weapons and notorious for their brutality, without this alliance with the authority. Furthermore, they embedded themselves within the state apparatus, especially in the education sector, allowing them to disseminate their call and Islamic concepts at a time when state roles were monopolized by remnants of the royal imamate and the leaders of the Nasserist and Ba’athist movements that, owing to their military might and external backing, managed to impose their presence in various state institutions, including the military and security services, foreign affairs, and others.
Salafi Groups
With the incursion of foreign (Western colonial) occupation into the Arab region, voices calling for “modernity” from a Western perspective emerged, advocating for a break with the past and heritage; in contrast, countercalls advocating a return to roots and the Salafi approach to reclaiming glory and reviving Islamic identity arose. This trend later became known as “Salafism,” which developed across various schools throughout the Arab world, including in Egypt, the Levant, Morocco, and the Arabian Peninsula, escalating like other movements during the 20th century.
With the establishment of the third Saudi state by King Abdulaziz Al Saud, the system adopted the call of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a political ideology, which is essentially a Salafi call. Religious and educational institutions in Saudi Arabia were shaped according to the tenets of this call. The Saudi regime took on the responsibility of promoting Salafi calls in the region, particularly with the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran as an ideological “Twelver” system, adopting the principle of “exporting revolution” to the region.
Salafism in most Arab and Islamic countries shaped itself by late 20th century as a calling and educational movement, transitioning from being revolutionary and reformist to being politically engaged and involved in resistance against colonialism and social reform.
The Salafi presence in Yemen was minimal, peripheral to the political and military arenas, manifesting in scientific and da’wa platforms established by several scholarly figures. The Salafis did not form organizational frameworks until after the unification and the transformation of most intellectual trends into political parties and organizations; this transformation prompted a faction of Salafis to keep pace with this shift, aiming to establish organized entities for their members and efforts, albeit not explicitly declaring the formation of groups; rather, they announced the establishment of charitable associations, which was the legal framework available at the time.
Due to the overwhelming intellectual and jurisprudential influence of the Salafi orientation from the Arabian Peninsula over Yemeni scholars and preachers, they adopted similar views and fatwas concerning democratic practices; the Salafi stance toward democracy crystallized into a rigid ideology, reinforced by the ruling Saudi regime’s desire to close the door on nationalist and leftist “revolutionary” parties that surged in the region during the mid-20th century.
In the post-unification period, a protracted dispute arose between the Brotherhood, structured as a political party, and the Salafi trend, which vehemently opposed the very idea of partisanship and democracy on strictly religious grounds, directing their criticisms at it as a threat to Yemeni identity. Among those most vocally against democracy was the Salafi Sheikh, Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wad‘i, who, while initially a zealous Zaydi, turned to Saudi Arabia for livelihood due to living conditions, received his education there, and engaged in Salafi da’wa; he was later expelled from Saudi Arabia due to his association with the “Juhayman” movement at the end of the 1970s. Although he initially collaborated with the Brotherhood upon his return to Yemen, he later distanced himself, working independently to establish his famous scientific center in Dammaj, in northern Saada.
Shortly after the announcement of Yemeni unification, “al-Wad‘i” released a tape stating that Saudi Arabia had provided him financial support via intermediaries to announce jihad against the Socialists, which he rejected, realizing Saudi Arabia’s conspiracy against Yemen and its desire to incite internal conflict, while warning against the Saudi regime, labeling it as “agent,” which he often reiterated at that time; despite issuing a fatwa against unity with the Socialist Party, viewing it as unity with “communist infidels.”
The Salafi stance towards democracy has served Saleh and his party and the political parties competing with the “Yemeni Congregation for Reform,” albeit not intentionally by the Salafis, as they advocated for abstaining from candidacy and voting, diminishing Islamic presence within the political scene when the arrows of “al-Wad‘i” and his students began to aim at “Reform,” deeming it as having deviated from its rightful course and thus engaged in practices some view as heretical!
This Salafi rejection of democracy, which eschews political party formation and engagement in electoral competition, casts an unequivocal shadow on legitimate political pluralism; it heavily served the ruling Arab regimes, including monarchical systems striving for an absolute monocratic governance. Consequently, the Salafi movement was permitted to operate and express its opinions freely, often leveraging their stances against the presence of Islamic parties opting to participate in the political process based on a discourse of resistance and change.
This long-standing stance of rejecting democracy is echoed in the writings of Hassan al-Banna, often taking on dogmatic or principled forms among certain scholars of the community due to the dominance of secular parties over the political landscape at the time. However, it was not solely a viewpoint of the Salafis in Najd and the Arabian Peninsula, as some might believe; rather, it was a theological and doctrinal position held by several figures and authorities across numerous countries affected by modern systems and incoming ideologies.
After 1990, the Salafi trend in Yemen witnessed deep divisions, resulting from disputes between some scholars and preachers in Saudi Arabia with the regime over the issue of foreign (American and British) military presence in the country to be used against Iraq. The Saudi regime sought to amplify voices of scholars and da’wa figures that reinforce the government’s authority while questioning the opinions and motives of opposing scholars and preachers, accusing them of rebellion against the “guardians of authority.” Leading this front were two men associated with the Salafi orientation: Rabee al-Madkhali and Muhammad Aman al-Jami, and this trend is characterized by extreme obedience to rulers to the extent of diminishing the status of scholars and the role of the community, known as “al-Madkhaliya” and “al-Jamiya.”
This discourse was adopted by Saudi Arabia and exported to the Muslim world to enhance its image, which had been tarnished due to the presence of foreign troops in the land of the two holy places. This trend found its expression in the Dammaj Center, led by Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wad‘i.
The “al-Madkhili” and “al-Jami” currents developed under the sponsorship and support of various regional regimes, becoming progressively more of a security breach directed against Islamic movements seeking reform and change, opposing corruption and tyranny, and removing sharia from politics; consequently, they specialized in attacking dissenting Salafi trends and the Reform Party. Furthermore, this trend played a significant role in dissuading people from participating in elections, engaging in active campaigns during election seasons across multiple governorates, thereby inevitably harming the Reform Party’s public support, as it drained its popular base in the name of religion and under the guise of fatwas forbidding participation and voting.
While the “Madkhili” and “Jami” currents deem democracy as outright disbelief, they have characterized President Saleh as the “guardian” whose obedience is obligatory—an approach fundamentally contrary to constitutional and legal descriptions of the presidency within a legal framework that accommodates rights and responsibilities. This Salafi group’s extremism and political exploitation reached the level of siding with Saleh’s regime against the people’s revolution that erupted on February 11, 2011, issuing fatwas condemning it, labeling it a fitna (sedition), and even permitting armed confrontation against it.
There exists a contradiction in this Salafi current, advocating for retreat from politics while engaging entirely in political matters in favor of the regime and the ruler from a gaze of extreme loyalty and a legal description which bears no relation to reality. Recently, some figures within this current transitioned from academic circles into combat formations, enlisting themselves as armed forces to engage against various Yemeni powers on behalf of regional states, associating with political entities, particularly the “Southern Transitional Council,” backed by Aydroos al-Zubaidi (a former leftist leader) and the “Political Bureau of National Resistance,” led by Major Tarek Muhammad Saleh (a Congress figure previously allied with the Houthis). The commonality between these entities is their foreign funding and resistance to legitimate authority (earlier succumbing to the Presidential Leadership Council).
The fate of this current post the military intervention of the “Arab Coalition,” led by Saudi Arabia in Yemen, has become intertwined in combat and politics, even achieving power through alliances and subservience to certain regional entities that qualified them for ministerial positions (as is the case with Hani Ben Brik) or appointments in the Presidential Leadership Council (as with Abu Zaraa Abdul Rahman al-Mahrami). This group did not confine itself to this transformation and total political engagement; instead, it enlisted its members and followers for combat in the ongoing conflict, executing targeted assassinations against officials, preachers, sheikhs, and social figures, especially those from the Reform Party, and perhaps against the legitimate government and President “Hadi” himself, going as far as endorsing normalization processes with the Israeli usurper entity.
Beyond the “Madkhili” and “Jami” currents, the Salafi trend has undergone several transformations regarding political engagement and participation; voices advocating for candidacy and voting have gradually emerged under notions of “necessity” or “interest.” Yet, such statements and revisions have not significantly impacted a notable transformation. The most significant shift occurred with the eruption of the February 11, 2011 revolution, where popular movements against the tyranny of ruling regimes swept through the Arab region, prompting activist Salafists in Yemen to reconsider their perception of reality, leading some to engage in popular revolution activities.
Following the successful demands of the February 11 revolution in ousting the regime and the announcement of several factions forming new parties in the field, Salafis pursued the establishment of a political party. However, their inability to reconcile their differences led them to form several parties, the most prominent being the “Yemeni Union for Guidance” and the “Party for Peace and Development.” This shift in the Salafi posture suggested that the Islamic trend was poised to emerge as the most influential presence in the political landscape, which prompted international forces opposed to what was termed “political Islam” to work to obstruct the path of transformation and change in Yemen, utilizing rebellious components in society and the state harboring latent animosity toward Islamists of all affiliations.
Thus, we find that Salafis were not distanced from politics, whether in their rejection or distance from it, or in their acceptance and engagement therein; their exploitation for political agendas by authorities and regional entities aimed at achieving political goals, including attempts to crush the phenomenon of “political Islam” and cement hostilities towards it, hampered the electoral progress of the Reform Party at various junctures, resulting in deteriorating presence after the February 11 revolution, thereby painting regional intervention in a veneer of legitimacy.
Al-Qaeda
“Al-Qaeda” was formed following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 25, 1979, enticing Muslim youth to engage in “jihad” in defense of Afghanistan. The United States exploited this conflict at the time to drain the Soviet Union through exhaustion in an Afghan quagmire, aiding “Afghan jihad” and urging allied Arab regimes to offer support for this endeavor; thus, the “Arab Mujahideen” phenomenon emerged from individuals traveling from Arab countries to fight in Afghanistan, with young Yemenis significantly participating in this trend.
On August 11, 1988, “Al-Qaeda” was announced under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, consolidating many remaining Arab fighters in Afghanistan during that period, to evolve into a collective defending oppressed and besieged Islamic peoples. Thus, this entity later became part of influential non-state actors on the international stage.
In the early 1990s, after the liberation of Kabul in 1992, most Arab fighters returned to their homelands, only to be astonished at the presence of foreign troops arrived during the Second Gulf Crisis in 1990, which remained in the region. In 1996, “Al-Qaeda” declared the establishment of a global jihad front to expel foreign forces from Islamic lands.
Those Yemeni youth who participated in the Afghan jihad during the 1980s did not manifest as a significant faction upon their return to Yemen, remaining unorganized and merely symbolically present. However, the political assassinations that appeared in Yemen following the schism between the People’s Congress and the “Yemeni Socialist Party,” specifically in 1993, began to recall the phenomenon of returning “Afghan Arabs” in Yemeni media.
During the period (1993-1994), Yemeni Socialist Party newspapers accused the Sana’a regime of using jihadist youth, or what they referred to as “Arab Afghans,” against party figures and cadres through assassination and threatening actions. The party alleged that Saleh was patronizing extremist and violent groups, promoting this narrative regionally and internationally. The party also accused Saleh of using “Arab Afghans” in the 1994 war, as part of the government armed forces that invaded southern provinces during confrontations with Socialist Party forces. This participation was confirmed by Khaled Abdul Nabi, commander of “Ansar Al-Sharia,” asserting, “The events of Summer 1994 happened while we were in Abyan, and we participated in that war against the Socialist Party’s forces.” This engagement was reportedly ordered by Osama bin Laden, according to “Al-Qaeda’s” former spokesperson, Ahmed Mansour.
The involvement of returning jihadist youth in the 1994 war was motivated by several factors that allowed Saleh to benefit from their involvement, including:
- The desire for revenge still held by southerners who had suffered violence, assassination, dismemberment, and torture at the hands of the Socialist Party prior to the unification.
- The Socialist Party’s adoption of evident atheistic communist ideologies, enforcing these on the ground through educational laws, media, and various instruments of power, leading to a direct clash with Yemeni society’s identity in the south.
- The Socialist Party’s adoption of secularism in the constitution post-unity, albeit easing its extreme leftist rhetoric; this led to a direct conflict with Islamic movements advocating for the implementation of Sharia in a predominantly religious society.
- The Socialist Party maintained its security and military grip even after unification, as its security and military forces continued to control southern provinces, posing a threat to southern individuals who had fled its oppressive regime before unification.
- The renewed announcement of the party’s secession and a return to pre-May 22, 1990 conditions threatened to subject southerners once again to the severe leftist totalitarian regime marked by security clampdown and oppression.
The jihadist youth, engaged in combat against the Socialist Party during the 1994 war, suffered substantial casualties across southern provinces. They were given freedom of movement in the combat zones and fought alongside government military forces and popular committees.
However, these youth did not achieve tangible results from their combat efforts, whether personally or for the community and the state, prompting them to search for a new “struggle” project.
“Al-Qaeda” and its affiliates emerged in Yemen under multiple banners, operating under the name “Islamic Army of Aden–Abyan” during the periods from 1997 to 1998, then “Al-Qaeda—Yemen Branch,” from 2000 to 2009. In mid-2007, “Yemen’s Battalions” were announced as a splinter group, followed by the declaration of the “Global Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula” between 2009 and 2011, following the merger of Al-Qaeda branches in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
With the launch of the February 11 uprising in 2011, the organization surfaced under the name “Supporters of Legitimacy,” seeking to exploit the situation to strengthen its foothold in southern provinces (Abyan, Shabwa, Hadramawt), facilitated by Saleh and his military, security, and tribal leaders; Saleh utilized Al-Qaeda to his internal and global agendas, investing in security and military matters, as well as in economic and political contexts.
According to Hani Mujahid, a former activist in “Al-Qaeda,” who spoke to Al-Jazeera, Saleh supported and directed “Al-Qaeda’s” Yemen branch and played a “dual game,” with his nephew, Colonel Ammar Muhammad Abdullah Saleh, being the security officer orchestrating the deployment of informants within Al-Qaeda to serve the Yemeni government, assuring the delivery of explosive materials to Al-Qaeda.
In fact, the organization succeeded in establishing control over Abyan province and nearby areas, declaring the establishment of its own Emirate, calling its followers and supporters to this endeavor. They began building their capabilities and structuring themselves as a de facto authority. Saleh provided them with support, funding, and advice through intermediaries.
A United Nations panel of experts affirmed Saleh’s collusion and close connections with “Al-Qaeda” and its leaders within Yemen; it reported that Saleh’s minister of defense, Muhammad Nasser Ahmed, held several meetings with Al-Qaeda leaders to halt military operations against the group in Abyan, and that military orders were issued in May 2011—by Yahya Saleh, Saleh’s nephew and head of the counterterrorism unit—to withdraw military forces from Abyan towards the capital Sana’a, facilitating “Al-Qaeda’s” assault and takeover of the province until mid-2012. The assessment by the UN panel indicated that Saleh financed sabotage and violent acts through financial and political support employing his agents in “Al-Qaeda” to execute targeted assassinations, and disrupt public and military facilities to undermine the authority of President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi.
Saleh utilized “Al-Qaeda” across several frameworks: against political adversaries, through assassinations and threats; maintaining control to prevent the establishment of foreign military presence, especially as Western nations were seeking to solidify their standing in the region during the late 1990s. Moreover, Saleh positioned his regime as a partner in the “War on Terror” following the events of September 11, 2001, claiming to be the guardian of Saudi borders against any threats posed by extremists. In 2011, he attempted to leverage “Al-Qaeda” to create chaos that would inhibit the transformative trajectory of the ongoing revolution in Yemen.
Recently, “Al-Qaeda” has been cooperating with the Houthi group in northern provinces, as well as with the “Southern Transitional Council” in southern provinces. While being the weaker link, some interpret this synergy in light of how both the Houthis and the STC leverage “Al-Qaeda” for their political agendas.
An investigative report from the British BBC revealed the United Arab Emirates’ involvement in financing politically motivated assassinations in Yemen, indicating that most targeted individuals were members of the Reform Party. The report disclosed that the Emirates utilized American mercenary forces for this purpose, and went further by recruiting former “Al-Qaeda” members to serve in a newly established security apparatus to combat the Houthi group and other armed factions. The BBC obtained a document stating that eleven former “Al-Qaeda” members are currently working under the Elite Forces of the Emirati-backed “Southern Transitional Council.” Among those named was Nasser al-Shaiba, a former operations officer in “Al-Qaeda,” previously imprisoned for his involvement in the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 off the coast of Aden. Various sources have confirmed that “al-Shaiba” has turned into a leader within the “Southern Transitional Council” militias.
“Al-Shaiba,” mentioned in the BBC’s investigative report broadcast on January 23, 2024, who goes by the nickname “Abu Juhayman,” hails from the Baakazim tribe in Abyan province. He currently engages in oil smuggling between Aden and Hodeidah and frequents the UAE. “Al-Shaiba” participated in an ambush against government forces in Abyan in 2019, following an Emirati airstrike on advancing National Army convoys at the entrance of Aden, resulting in the death of 12 soldiers in that ambush.
Saleh was not the only one to exploit “Al-Qaeda”; the Houthis positioned themselves post-Sana’a’s fall as allies of the West in the fight against “Al-Qaeda” and “terrorism,” portraying their adversaries as “Al-Qaeda” and “ISIS” to solicit Western cooperation with them. On the other hand, the Houthis benefit from “Al-Qaeda” as it opposes the legitimate government, capable of operating within its territory against its military and security forces, by seizing areas pertaining to the government (as seen in Hadramawt) or assassinating government military leadership.
Thus, while the Houthis manage armed conflicts against “Al-Qaeda” in their territories, they simultaneously push the group’s presence and movements toward areas held by the legitimate government. On February 20, 2023, the Houthis announced a prisoner exchange with “Al-Qaeda,” following the accusations from the chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad al-Alimi, who charged the Houthis with collaborating with terrorist organizations, asserting that the Yemeni government possesses evidence of the group’s release of many convicts involved in “terrorism.”
However, this does not prevent the “Arab Coalition” from convincing a faction of “Al-Qaeda” to fight alongside them against the Houthis early in their military endeavor in Yemen. The BBC obtained evidence that “Arab Coalition” forces, led by Saudi Arabia in Yemen, fought together in one of the major battles alongside troops loyal to “Al-Qaeda” against the Houthis. A team documenting for the BBC visited frontlines near Taiz, where Emirati and Sudanese forces alongside “Al-Qaeda” loyalists engaged the Houthis, positioned in separate contact points. However, the filmmakers noted that each party harbors suspicions about the future of their collaboration.
Thus, “Al-Qaeda” found itself exploited by various parties, becoming the weakest link in relationships with other powers, as all its intersections with other factions directed its efforts toward their ends, with the latter being more capable of harnessing and exploiting the outcomes and effects of such interactions.
The Houthi Group (Ansar Allah)
In 1994, Hussein al-Houthi emerged as a notable Zaydi figure who supported the Socialist Party’s stance against the regime. This led him to confront Saleh’s authority, after which he fled, accompanied by his father, Badr al-Din al-Houthi, out of Yemen. He returned after 1997, having visited and stayed in Iran, and engaged in the “Believing Youth” movement, a revivalist Zaydi organization founded in the early 1990s aimed at revitalizing the Zaydi sect and protecting its followers from the transformations experienced within Zaydi society (Shi’ism) toward Sunni Islam.
Hussein al-Houthi was a candidate for the “Haq” Party in the province of Saada during the April 27, 1993 elections and won a seat in parliament. Later, after dominating the “Believing Youth” movement, he joined the People’s Congress; President Saleh provided him with financial support before both parties entered into an armed conflict spanning 2003 to 2010.
In a 2004 meeting with a group of scholars and preachers in Sana’a, President Saleh stated that he supported the group upon recommendations from individuals in his circle, “believing them to be moderate and unbigoted” youth who aimed to support the state and disengage from external affiliations. It appears that Saleh sought to co-opt them politically to benefit his power and dominion. When Hussein al-Houthi began advocating ideas counter to Saleh’s interests, tensions between the two escalated, culminating in a military confrontation in 2004 that resulted in Hussein al-Houthi’s demise.
Subsequently, Saleh engaged in multiple wars against the Houthi group, albeit under engagement rules serving each party’s agendas; Saleh sought to create a “boogeyman” for opposing parties to remain in power while Saudi Arabia was pressured for financial resources by presenting the Houthis as a threat. Meanwhile, the group’s leaders aimed to generate visible grievances among Zaydi society, establishing a battleground for training in combat and smuggling while building capacities and military resources. Consequently, wars would halt and reactivate at Saleh’s call, who refused various mediations to resolve the conflict. An American document dated December 9, 2009, asserted that the Houthis were acquiring weapons from the Yemeni military.
Internally, the Houthi movement functioned as an objective counterpart to the Reform Party in Zaydi regions, and Saleh’s support aimed to draw religious legitimacy away from the Reform Party toward a Zaydi wing loyal to him. Moreover, the planned hereditary succession project by Saleh met resistance from Republican currents within the party, including the deputy commander of the armed forces (Major General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar), leading to an effort to create conflict between the Houthi group and the first armored brigade loyal to Ali Mohsen, thus exhausting his resources and loyal human assets.
After the success of the February 11, 2011 revolution that overthrew Saleh’s regime, he sought to ally with the Houthi group, which had initially participated in the revolution calling for his ousting. Saleh facilitated their empowerment in Saada and surrounding areas by relinquishing several military and government centers as well as transferring many locations to them, which transformed them into a formidable force in the province, encouraging them to extend their influence into neighboring provinces (Hajjah, Al-Jawf, and Amran).
Saleh aimed to exploit the Houthi faction to eliminate his political adversaries who had supported the February 11 revolution, whether military leaders (such as Major General Ali Mohsen and his supporters) or tribal figures (like the sons of Sheikh Abdullah ibn Hussein al-Ahmar and other pro-revolution sheikhs), as well as the Reform Party. This partnership—which was regionally and internationally supported—facilitated the Houthi takeover of Amran Province, followed by the swift capture of Sana’a on September 21, 2014, within just 12 hours. Saleh sought revenge against those forces, finding in the Houthi group an ideal entity that could act violently and extrajudicially, aligning with his interests and urging them to confront his opponents on his behalf.
However, Saleh was not the only one weaponizing the Houthi movement; regional nations also endeavored to exploit them. Iran was the most investive regional player, managing to equip them with military and logistical expertise that organized them into a cohesive armed group possessing military, media, and economic capacities over nearly a decade and a half. Iran directed the Zaydi orientation through the Houthi group into conflict with neighboring states, particularly Saudi Arabia, rendering the Houthis a threat to neighboring countries by employing their capabilities and behavior to serve Iranian interests. The evidence of the relationship between the Houthi group and Iran is overwhelmingly transparent, especially given the Houthis’ involvement in what is known as the “Axis of Resistance” or the “Resistance Front,” comprising Shiite groups in the region led by the Iranian regime.
Furthermore, neighboring states hostile to the February 11 revolution, which have fought what they label as “political Islam,” worked to utilize the Houthis for their political agendas; retired Saudi General Anwar Eshki confirmed in a special interview with Russia Today on August 14, 2016, that the Houthis had betrayed and let down a Gulf state that financed them to counter the Reform Party, only to end up occupying Sana’a. He stated that the Houthis also betrayed the United States when they promised counter-terrorism efforts but instead occupied Sana’a.
On the international level, the Houthis presented themselves as warriors acting on behalf of the United States and Britain in the “War on Terror,” mobilizing their fighters against elements of Al-Qaeda in Yemen to expand their control over other provinces under the cover of U.S. airstrikes. A former American security official hinted at cooperation between both parties, asserting in statements published by Foreign Policy Magazine in 2014 that “America is less concerned about who collaborates with it than about continuity in that geographical territory in Yemen,” adding that the “Houthis achieved in their war against Al-Qaeda in al-Bayda what the governmental authorities failed to accomplish over the previous decade.” Additionally, Houthi political council member Mohammed al-Emaad hinted at this cooperation, stating in a January 2015 interview with Al-Jazeera, “American interests converge with those of the Houthis in their war against Al-Qaeda.”
In conclusion, the Houthi movement managed to employ itself for the agendas of others to achieve its objectives, starting from its foundation on collusion with Iran, spearheaded by Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, who successfully transitioned the “Believing Youth” organization from its local Zaydi perspective into the service of broader regional and international Iranian agendas, drawing inspiration from the ideas, opinions, and slogans of Khomeini’s Iranian revolution, which has rendered the group an active arm for Iran in the region. The group has not limited its objectives to domestic ends; it has also gone further by threatening the security of neighboring countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, in pursuing Iranian interests. The evidence of the group’s threats against the security of neighboring states is abundant. The Houthis have likewise become part of the “Axis of Resistance,” led by Iran, infiltrating all sectarian groups allied to it.
In this case, groups of imams and scholars have also witnessed a sustained political involvement; they remain engaged in political processes relevant to their agendas, forming scholarly councils and associations to influence policies while often positioning themselves within various political factions navigating changes.
Sufism
Sufi orders emerged after the third Hijri century within Islamic history, evolving from individual behaviors into methods and communities with figures, leaders, and names. Sufism spread widely across the Islamic world due to numerous social, political, economic, cultural, and intellectual factors; Yemen has been among the regions where Sufi movements have gained traction early on.
Typically, Sufi scholars distance themselves from political authority, believing it clashes with spiritual purity, moral integrity, and renunciation of worldly gain; nonetheless, a form of collusion often arises between these authorities and influential figures from behind the scenes.
In Yemen since 1962, Sufi movements have not participated in political conflicts or party disputes, nor have they formed any political or party entity post-1990, maintaining their status as a religious social movement focused on their da’wa role. The establishment of Yemeni unification in 1990, alongside the Socialist Party’s diminishing dominance in the southern provinces since 1994, facilitated an expansion of Sufi groups, as they had been previously persecuted by the Socialist regime.
Sufism flourished in northern Yemen, including Tehama, Taiz, Al-Bayda, and Ibb; the southern provinces, particularly Hadramawt and Aden, became strongholds for the movement. Their activities are evident in scientific congregations and religious shrines, many of which were established on the graves of notable Sufi figures, inviting devotees and seeking blessings. While focusing on personal matters, prayers, and religious celebrations, Sufism has not been insulated from the attempts of political parties vying for influence and support.
President Saleh sought to attract these groups, particularly those in the south and Tehama, to form a religious discourse challenging that of the Brotherhood and Salafists in Yemen; for this reason, he opened official channels for them in media outlets and public platforms, establishing universities aligned with their methodologies and embedding their figures in governmental ministries and institutions, like the Ministry of Awqaf, Justice, and the judiciary; he aimed to garner support for his regime among this constituency during elections and referendums, facilitating their endorsement within the community.
In 2011, the general position of Sufis in Yemen was one of refraining from interference in protests against Saleh’s regime; however, some individuals supported Saleh against these protests, such as Sheikh Hussein al-Haddar and Sheikh Muhammad Marai, who defended his position and denounced what they termed “sedition” against the ruler.
After the Arab Coalition’s intervention in Yemen on March 26, 2015, following the Houthi insurgency against the state on September 21, 2014, the Sufi movement in Yemen underwent pressures from both local and regional forces. Some Sufi figures sided with factions in the conflict.
In areas like Hodeidah, Taiz, Ibb, and Al-Bayda, some prominent Sufi figures aligned with the Houthi and Saleh groups, with names such as:
- Sahl bin Aqil Ba’alawi: He rose to prominence for promoting and defending the Houthi group in Taiz, so much so that he became known as “the Mufti of Taiz” and was lauded by Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi upon his passing as “a great scholar” and a “voice against American hegemony over Yemen.”
- Adnan al-Junaid: He founded the “Sufism Forum” in Taiz and supported the entry of Houthi militias into the city but was killed by the Houthis on March 19, 2020. Al-Junaid labeled supporters of the legitimate government as “mercenaries of aggression,” accusing them of ethnic cleansing and sectarian warfare, framing the Houthi war against their opponents as a “Husaini jihad.”
- Abdul Latif Abdul Rahim: Known for his loyalty to Saleh, he served as Deputy Minister of Awqaf from Sana’a, which is currently controlled by the Houthis.
Despite the Houthis’ advance toward Aden and the city’s residents forming popular resistance, Sufi figures maintained silence and neutrality without denouncing or condemning the Houthis’ intent to seize the city. Abu Bakr bin Ali Al-Mashoor, founder of the Average Shar’iah University for Islamic and Human Sciences in Hadramawt and head of the Al-Aidrus Center, remained neutral even until his death on July 27, 2022, while the Houthi government in Sana’a held a memorial highlighting his achievements.
In Tarim, the Sufi stronghold in Hadramawt, its figures, including Sheikh Umar bin Hafidh, maintained silence and neutrality, which included a neutral stance regarding the Houthi movement’s activities, while Sheikh Ali Al-Jafri (who is largely supported by the UAE) maintained a neutral position against the Houthi attack on the Dammaj center, considering it a “political battle” and refraining from supporting either side amidst the Houthis’ advances toward southern regions!
The refusal of this large faction of Sufis to take sides reveals a vague conviction that hints at non-recognition of the legitimacy of the government that the Houthis overthrew.
While some perceive the affiliations of certain Sufi figures with the Houthi movement to stem from mutual Hashemite descent, others attribute their alignment to longstanding hostility between the Sufi direction and other Sunni factions.
Maintaining the public’s disengagement from the dangers posed by oppressive regimes, insurrectionist factions, or foreign occupiers, framing struggle, resistance, and jihad as “sedition,” while imbuing negative spirituality within the conscience of societies to yield responses to present realities and their surrounding circumstances, serves quite well these elements in conflict situations; as it dissuades people from endorsing efforts to combat oppressive regimes and insurrectionist factions, or foreign invaders. This aspect of Sufi involvement is what authorities exploit to realize their ambitions and plans.
Yemeni Scholars Associations
In Yemen, a combination of societies and associations of scholars, comprising diverse scholars and clerics, arose to advocate legitimate positions concerning crises, events, and common issues. Three key entities emerged in this landscape: the Yemeni Scholars Association, the Yemen Scholars Authority, and the Yemen Scholars League.
The Yemeni Scholars Association operates as an official body representing Yemen’s scholars at large, though it predominantly comprises traditional figures. It has been instituted at various times to express voices in favor of the ruling system; for instance, in 2005, regarding the conflict in Saada, while Badr al-Din al-Houthi described the armed clash between his followers and government forces as “sectarian warfare” and “genocide,” the Iranian “Qom Seminary” issued a statement condemning what it labeled “the Yemeni authority’s practices against the Shi’a,” asserting it was “genocide of the Shi’a of the Ahl al-Bayt.” This prompted the Yemeni Scholars Association to issue a rebuttal statement denying any persecution against the Zaydi and Twelver Shi’a, contending that circumstances in Yemen were underpinned by stable legal and constitutional principles without discrimination between sect and sect. Notably, the association—predominantly comprising Zaydi references—characterized the armed insurrection in some areas of Saada as not representative of the Zaydi sect, labeling Hussein al-Houthi’s actions as a “sedition” that caused “loss of lives, bloodshed, compromising assets, and destabilizing security and tranquility,” stressing that President Saleh consistently affirmed the state’s commitment to-uphold the interests, rights, and safety of the entire nation without targeting any specific sect or group.
In response to the protests that erupted in the South, which resulted in armed formations calling for secession, the Yemeni Scholars Association issued a statement emphasizing that the unity achieved in 1990 was a divine grace that “required everyone to safeguard it,” reaffirming the obligation to protect it, as much was realized and several “major developmental and economic projects were accomplished.” It stated that “any calls for narrow tribal, regional, sectarian, or racial loyalty are entirely prohibited by Islamic law,” positing that obedience to the authority that ensured safety and embraced tolerance is obligatory; it further stated that any rebellion against the system organized by the constitution and laws emanating from Islamic law amounted to an act of fitna and corruption and warned against the ensuing bloodshed, incitement to insecurity, and waste of public resources. The scholars urged the state to perform its share according to the law and religious obligations.
In 2011, Saleh convened a meeting with members of the Association along with a spectrum of other scholars, preachers, and clerics, at the Saleh Mosque in Sana’a, calling for adherence to “the Book of God,” which he raised before those present, and to detest seeds of sedition, condemning the opposition’s actions during the protests. Saleh attempted to rally scholars to his side by advocating goodwill proposals. The meeting concluded with a statement calling on political factions to achieve conciliation and understanding to avoid national strife and bloodshed, indicating Saleh’s insistence on retaining power to the extent that might lead to conflict, albeit indirectly implying as such without outright acknowledgment. The statement carried an underlying tone of threat and intimidation should opposing parties continue resisting against his ruling regime after thirty years of minimal substantive transformation in Yemen across political, economic, security, educational, and service landscapes.
The Yemen Scholars Authority is an independent body, led by Sheikh Abdul Majid Azizi Al-Zindani, a prominent figure within the “Muslim Brotherhood” and the Yemeni Congregation for Reform. In addition to representatives from “Reform,” the authority encompasses scholars from the Salafi trend. It has expressed various stances on several issues. Nevertheless, its most significant position can be contextualized regarding its political utilization by the ruling regime—its stance against the American administration’s hints at the possibility of invading Yemen due to the events of September 11, 2001. As these hints became more recurrent, the Yemen Scholars Authority issued a warning against the repercussions of a potential invasion, asserting that such an approach would elicit calls for jihad. More than 150 Yemeni scholars and preachers signed the statement, which reverberated in international media, with “The Guardian” and “The Times” echoing its content: “If any foreign nation insists on aggression and invasion or intervening in our affairs militarily or security-wise, then jihad and combating the aggressors becomes a duty upon our Muslim youth.”
This statement emerged despite the constraints, oppression, and marginalization imposed by Saleh’s regime post-2001 against the Islamic trend; it nonetheless represented a supportive position for the regime amidst growing Western pressure, particularly from the United States, urging the Yemeni government to allow the establishment of military bases.
After the Yemeni Congregation for Reform reached a rapprochement with other Yemeni opposition parties, forming the Joint Meeting Parties—the largest opposition coalition against Saleh’s regime—“the Virtue Authority” was declared in mid-2008 as a community da’wa entity intended to execute “hisbah” duties according to Islamic jurisprudence, protecting the identity, religion, and ethics of Yemeni society. While the circumstantial context prompted such communal engagement, some viewed the timing as a political exploitation, with Yemeni writer and researcher Zaid Jaber interpreting the emergence of the Virtue Authority at this juncture as a product of collaboration between the regime and the Salafi orientation to accomplish multiple goals, chiefly: “Mixing political dynamics concerning the Joint Meeting opposition parties, attempting to dismantle relations between Reform and other coalition parties, or shifting the conflict within “Reform” itself,” as well as “confronting (the Reform Party) in forthcoming elections by inciting fear among the populace regarding this authority and the potentials for the Reform Party attaining power,” and “challenging southern movements and the insurgency in Saada under the pretext of opposing separatist rhetoric and Shiite ideologies.”
The Yemen Scholars League presents itself as an independent entity, incorporating numerous Zaydi and Sufi references, enabling it to persist in its operations within Sana’a and regions under Houthi control in the North without threat or hindrance. The league has contributed to issuing statements denouncing the “Arab Coalition” as instigators of aggression against Yemen and its people, simultaneously granting legitimacy to the authority formed in Sana’a after September 21, 2014, resulting from the Houthi rebellion and the state’s collapse.
The League expressed its endorsement of statements from Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi during the ninth anniversary of what the group calls the “September 21 Revolution,” describing him as “the revolution’s leader” while characterizing the Houthi coup on September 21 as a “revolution,” urging Yemeni citizens to rally behind “this great leader and the political leadership,” advocating a grand turnout on the 12th of Rabi’ al-Awwal commensurate with the Yemenis’ faith and history, as well as in support of Allah, His Book, and His Messenger in response to the blessed leadership.
Thus, the Yemen Scholars League today functions as a proxy to the previously established Yemen Scholars Association under Saleh’s regime, providing religious legitimacy alongside the endeavors pursued by the Houthis in the face of opposition, framed within sectarian and religious legitimacy.
Hence, we observe that this dynamic of polarization and utilization has reached various scholarly entities, both official and independent, in a bid to exploit their religious discourse and operational stances for specific political agendas at certain times.
Conclusion
Based on the above, it can be concluded that the Yemeni landscape, which has witnessed multiple political conflicts both internally and due to external interventions, has propelled political actors to exploit religious groups to fulfill their specific agendas, recognizing them as the weakest link and least empowered party. It can also be asserted that these religious groups have engaged— to various extents—in these conflicts under different pretexts; thus, the following outcomes can be drawn:
- President Saleh exploited the “Muslim Brotherhood” to eliminate leftist forces during the 1980s and 1990s, a tactical move perceived by the Brotherhood as an opportunity to eradicate leftist threats to religion and societal identity; this collaboration yielded them particular benefits.
- The Saudi regime exploited the “Madkhili” and “Jami” currents within the Salafi orientation to attack democracy, political pluralism, and incitement against the “Yemeni Congregation for Reform,” seeking to crystallize an opposition narrative to the concept of “political Islam” presenting a governance vision outside the framework of monarchy.
- The Saudi establishment has utilized the “Madkhili” and “Jami” currents within the Salafi collective in the current conflict in Yemen since March 26, 2015, aiming to eliminate the influence of political Islam and weaken its political, military, and social presence.
- “Al-Qaeda” fell under Saleh’s exploitation for various purposes, against socialist adversaries, for regional blackmail, and in averting Western objectives concerning military presence in Yemen, as well as thwarting the achievements aimed at by the February 11 revolution. Thus, the organization acted as an instrument in multiple conflicts and encounters.
- The Houthi group was employed by President Saleh against his foes, by neighboring states against “political Islam,” and by the Iranian regime to bolster its influence and alliances across the region, resulting in continued conflict since its emergence in 2003.
- President Saleh leveraged Sufi currents to strengthen his influence against political adversaries, with the UAE later exploiting their neutral stance (negatively), redirecting populations away from supporting legitimate government authority while prompting rebellious groups to assert values, principles, and rights.
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