On October 21, 2024, the French newspaper “Le Monde” interpreted the retreat of the Malian army and its ally Wagner from the “revenge” operation aimed at reclaiming the Tinzawatine area in the far north of the country from Azawad rebels, after ten days of preparation, as a result of Algerian warnings to Moscow regarding the dangerous consequences of the operation, which was to take place near its borders.
Meanwhile, the French magazine “Jeune Afrique” discussed in several of its reports the growing mistrust and accumulated disagreements in the relationship between the Malian authorities and Wagner, which may culminate in the imminent departure of Russian personnel from Mali. This situation follows the cancellation of the operation without any battles being initiated to restore their honor, particularly after their heavy losses to the rebels of the “Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad” and “Jama’a Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin” in late July. This situation necessitates a reassessment of their combat strategy.
To what extent can the “break” scenario with Wagner be considered likely? How might this scenario affect Mali’s relationship with Russia? Whether due to feelings of frustration in Bamako towards Moscow, which favors Algerian interests, or due to a potential Russian decision to concentrate Wagner elements on the Ukrainian front, answering these questions requires a review of the relationship between Mali, Wagner, and Russia, alongside an exploration of the available alternatives for Mali and its capacity to meet its sovereign and security demands.
Mali and Wagner: Contempt as the Price of Necessity
On October 20, 2024, “Jeune Afrique” reported on the discontent within Wagner regarding the performance of Malian soldiers and the competence of their officers in managing battles, to the point of describing them as “amateurs” on social media. This disdain presents a challenge for the transitional authorities in Mali, which have continuously emphasized a spirit of nationalism and its symbols in their liberatory discourse.
This is not the first time that Mali’s authorities have faced challenges to their national sovereignty from the Russian group. In November 2023, less than a week after seizing control of the city of Kidal in northern Mali, Wagner released a video showing their flag raised over the city fort to assert their role in expelling the rebels, in response to Malian leader Assimi Goita, who celebrated the heroism of the Malian army in his speech while ignoring Wagner’s decisive contribution to this victory, which had eluded France and Western forces since March 2012.
The circumstances surrounding Wagner’s seizure of the largest gold mine in Intahaka, Gao state, in February 2024—following threats made to the “Imghad and Allies Self-Defense Group,” led by a general of Tuareg ethnicity loyal to Bamako, which was warned to vacate the mine within 24 hours—provide further insight into the challenges facing the transitional authorities due to Wagner’s “aggressive” thrust to increase its financial revenues, regardless of the sentiments of local leaders in Azawad, who would not tolerate the humiliation of their general and the exploitation of their resources by foreigners.
These positions from Wagner are likely to escalate towards a direct confrontation with the Malian authorities due to the conflicting perceptions each side has of the other. Wagner views Malians through the lens of their need for the security that its fighters provide, and in this light, they consider them indebted to Wagner for their very existence. Conversely, Mali regards Wagner from a contractual perspective, seeing it as a “mercenary” entity providing security services in exchange for financial benefits, while also remaining bound by partnership understandings with Russia governed by mutual interests.
Mali and Russia: An Alliance, Not Dependence
Russia has invested diplomatically and militarily in Mali to create influence in the Sahel that compensates for the receding Western influence since the military coup in 2020. Russia presented itself to the new regime as a strong alternative capable of meeting its liberatory demands by enhancing the independence of national decision-making, which has been perceived by the Malian public as having been usurped by France. Thus, during a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow in late February 2024, Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop emphasized Mali’s efforts to strengthen military cooperation with other partners, such as China and Turkey.
This inclination of Mali towards diversifying international partnerships has been officially expressed regarding Russia. From the heart of its capital, amidst the victory of reclaiming Kidal—which would not have been possible without Russian support—this reflects Moscow’s flexibility in seemingly accepting the position of “non-dominant primary ally,” granting it some advantage in economic dealings. On the other hand, it illustrates the transitional authorities in Mali’s belief that replacing France with Russia would undermine its legitimacy based on “establishing independence,” in addition to their conviction of the limitations of Russian power, which is being scrutinized by Western circles and has been embroiled in a long attritional war in Ukraine.
Thus, exclusive reliance on Russia carries geopolitical risks, exacerbated by its growing needs for human and financial resources, which impacts its overseas expansion and explains its decision to withdraw elements from the “Bears Brigade” from Burkina Faso in late August 2024 to support its operations in Kursk. Additionally, it has received soldiers and equipment from North Korea to bolster its forces, which has significantly increased its military expenses in Mali. This led to the amendment of the “Mining Law” in August 2023 to secure necessary funding through the exploitation of gold mines, which reportedly provides a monthly income of ten million dollars for the Russian presence, according to the “Blood Gold” report published in December 2023.
Mali’s Options: Diversifying Alternatives
The awareness of the Malian authorities regarding the limitations of Russian power and their doubts about Wagner’s future presence on their territory, along with their understanding of the rising financial demands of both, have motivated them to strengthen their reserves by exploring all available alternatives to the Russian presence, starting with its neighbors in the Sahel—Burkina Faso and Niger. In September 2023, the “Sahel States Alliance” was announced, wherein the three countries (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger) committed to mutual defense in the event of any internal rebellion or external aggression and pledged to combat terrorism in all its forms and organized crime within the alliance’s shared space. In the same month, an expert meeting was organized among the three countries to accelerate the process of economic and financial integration and to propose the launch of an “Economic and Monetary Union.” In December 2023, the foreign ministers of the three countries recommended forming a confederal union, followed by the announcement in March of the establishment of a joint force to combat jihadists and address security challenges within their nations.
Moreover, Mali, which expressed its grand ambitions in late September by declaring interest in joining the BRICS group, has engaged in expanding the scope of its security alliances, now particularly including China, Turkey, and Iran, as follows:
China: Mali has sought to strengthen its security relations with China, a great power sympathetic to it in the face of the West. It called upon the international community in January 2023 to support its anti-terrorism efforts with funding, equipment, intelligence, and logistics, while also respecting its right to security cooperation. It has offered China payment facilitation following its arms purchases, considering the embargo imposed by ECOWAS. On the sidelines of the “FOCAC 2024” summit in September, an agreement was reached with the Chinese defense company NORINCO to provide Mali with equipment, training, and technology in key military fields. This cooperation is expected to flourish following the early September declaration of a “strategic partnership” by the leaders of both nations, with Goita expressing hope to benefit from Chinese expertise in security and other areas and appreciating Beijing’s efforts in promoting regional and global peace and development.
Turkey: Malian diplomacy has directed attention towards Turkey, which has expressed support for Mali in its war against rebel organizations, persuading its authorities of the effectiveness of its military industry in combating terrorism, especially with UAVs like the “Bayraktar TB2.” In March 2023, Turkey supplied the Malian army with three drones, and Goita himself presided over the reception ceremony for around 20 drones earlier this year. Consultative meetings between Malian and Turkish parties in October 2024 culminated in the transitional president receiving a Turkish parliamentary delegation, discussing ways to enhance bilateral cooperation across several sectors, including security. Recently, there have been talks about engaging the private military company SADAT, close to the Turkish government, to address Mali’s security concerns, which appears to have led to the company being responsible for training many Malian soldiers tasked with protecting the transitional president.
Iran: Mali views Iran, which perceives the West as an “arrogant power,” as a potential ally to help fill the gap left by the withdrawal of Western forces from its territories. This opportunity allows Iran access to the Sahel, thus overcoming the failure of former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s visit to Bamako during the previous regime in 2016. Tehran has promoted its ability to assist Mali in combating rebels, establishing “arms exports,” particularly drones, as a key component of their partnership and emphasizing security matters in all their negotiations. This was reaffirmed in August 2022 during late Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian’s visit to Mali, and again during the meeting of the defense ministers of both countries in Tehran in late May 2023. Furthermore, following the reception of the Iranian ambassador in Bamako by the Malian defense minister in October 2023, the Malian army spoke of the two countries’ commitment to enhancing cooperation through defense and security.
Wagner’s Break and Moscow’s Flexibility
Mali views the “break” scenario with Wagner as a realistic option, especially since its rebellion against its home country (Russia) in June 2023 under the leadership of its former chief, Yevgeny Prigozhin, remains a fresh memory, notwithstanding formalities regarding its affiliation with the Russian state under the name “African Legion.”
Consequently, Mali diversified its partnerships, positioning security as the cornerstone of its strategies. However, despite the importance of these partnerships, they cannot cover all of Mali’s projected security needs, which could escalate due to any abrupt withdrawal of Wagner; this stems from concerns about the weakness of its products, financial difficulties, the consequences of its unequal competition with Western powers, and the increasing threats from terrorist and separatist organizations, which have shown closer ties and more brutal attacks, in addition to indications of foreign involvement, such as Ukraine complicating Mali’s security landscape.
Thus, it is in Mali’s best interest, in the event of a break with Wagner, to maintain a functional role for Russia that does not dominate its security framework; this is facilitated by Moscow’s flexibility in its relations with Bamako, which could evolve into enhancing intelligence, training, and arming efforts or assisting in the formation of militias instead of direct combat that may become costly in terms of personnel. The Russian position may also exhibit greater flexibility to ensure that Mali does not return to the Western fold—whether through Spain, with which it is negotiating to train its soldiers, according to a report by the Spanish newspaper “El País” on October 25, or through the United States, whose ambassador to the UN met with the Malian Foreign Minister on September 30, or even through the “Atlantic Initiative” proposed by Morocco in November 2023.
