The Future of Leadership: What Lies Ahead for the Senior Military Leadership in the Chinese Army?
Over the past twenty years, only a handful of studies have examined the leadership of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). These studies typically covered only specific sectors of leadership, and most were completed before the structural reform of the PLA that began at the end of 2015. In this context, the Institute for National Strategic Studies published a report in September 2022 by Joel Wuthnow, a senior fellow at the U.S. National Defense University, titled “The Gray Dragon: Assessing Senior Military Leadership in China.” The report provides a comprehensive assessment of the senior leadership of the PLA in 2021, analyzing more than 300 biographies of senior Chinese military officers from 2015 to 2021 to evaluate the structure, demographic composition, career patterns of PLA leadership, as well as their political qualifications and promotion determinants. Ultimately, the report assesses China’s military effectiveness and the future of leadership within the army.
Army Structure
The report focuses on the structure of senior leadership within the PLA and analyzes the major changes that have occurred under the structural reforms implemented by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2015, as follows:
Presence of Elite Officers in Senior Leadership:
According to the report, the senior leadership of the PLA consists of the top 100 to 200 officers in the army, who sit at the peak of an officer corps made up of hundreds of thousands. The number of senior leaders in 2021 was approximately 155 officers. They are similar in importance to the three- and four-star officers in the United States, according to the report.
Clear Division of Specialties in Senior Leadership:
The report notes that before reaching senior leadership, these officers systematically progress through lower ranks. Upon commissioning, they are categorized into five specialties: military affairs, political affairs, logistics, equipment, and technical specialists.
Periodic Structural Reforms in the Army:
According to the report, the senior leadership was not immune to the structural reforms undertaken by President Xi within the army. In 2015, the number of senior leaders was 182 officers, but by 2021, the number had decreased to 155. This 13% decrease aligns with the overall reduction in army personnel during the same period from 2.3 million to 2 million individuals. The reductions in leadership also included the Central Military Commission itself; when Xi became chairman of the commission in 2012, it included 10 officers, but after the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, this number dropped to six officers. According to the report, the cornerstone of the PLA reforms under Xi was the development of a joint command structure in which theater commanders have peacetime authority over land, naval, and air forces. This model was better aligned with the army’s focus on preparing for high-intensity joint operations compared to the pre-reform system, where military region commanders lacked peacetime operational control over non-military units. The Chinese military has also expanded joint training in recent years, allowing officers to hone their planning and command skills in a “realistic combat” environment.
Dominance of Air and Naval Forces in Positions:
The report highlights that the share of ground force officers in senior positions has decreased by more than 20% under recent structural reforms, after having dominated most key positions in general departments and military regions. This shift favors the development of the Chinese military’s future operations in the maritime and aerial domains. The biggest winner from these reforms, according to the report, was the “Rocket Force,” which saw its share double (from 4% to 8%). Additionally, naval and air force officers became military theater commanders for the first time in 2017.
Increase in Leadership at Military Service Headquarters:
According to the report, the share of officers appointed to service headquarters doubled from 16% to 32%. This reflects the creation of new military headquarters, such as the Strategic Support Force (SSF) and the Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF). Under the new system, officers appointed to army, navy, and air force headquarters are primarily responsible for building forces in terms of training and equipping them. The report suggests that having a larger share of senior officers in service headquarters may have implications for competition among upper echelons in the future.
Leadership Characteristics
According to the report, the group of senior military leaders in 2021 has formative and professional experiences different from their predecessors, but they are demographically similar, as follows:
Possession of Similar Professional Experiences: The report indicates that the current leadership was the first to join the PLA during the “Reform and Opening-Up” era (1979 to the present). Their careers were shaped by the changing military strategy of China before and after the end of the Cold War. Most began their careers preparing for a large-scale conflict against the Soviet Union, which was China’s main adversary in the late Cold War. These officers were also in service during the 1980s, when the Chinese military engaged in significant military cooperation with the United States. However, they also witnessed the deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations after the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989.
Similar Ages Among Senior Leaders: Only 18 out of 155 senior officers in 2021 joined the military during the era of President Mao (1949–1976); they are now in their mid-sixties to early seventies and will soon retire. Most senior officers joined in the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the youngest joining in the mid-1980s. According to the report, Chinese military officers rotate every two to three years and are exposed, to some extent, to different responsibilities, but less so than in the U.S. system, where four-star officers typically change positions every 18 months or so.
Similar Gender and Ethnic Composition: The report states that male Han Chinese dominate the senior leadership of the PLA. There were no women among the senior military officers in 2015 or 2021. The military also follows preferential policies against ethnic minorities, though it has sometimes appointed Uyghur and Tibetan officers to senior levels in the Xinjiang and Tibet military regions, according to the report.
Limited International Experience: According to the report, senior Chinese military leaders often move across the country but have limited international experience, aside from what they may have gained through military diplomacy on short tours earlier in their careers. The report also suggests that there may be limited awareness of other functional skills; for example, operational commanders tend not to have backgrounds in logistics or acquisition.
Promotion Determinants
All PLA officers must be in good standing with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but candidates for promotion to the highest ranks are subject to further scrutiny due to the sensitivity of their positions. Below are the key qualifications and determinants for promotion in the Chinese military:
Loyalty to the Chinese President: Senior leaders need to possess political acumen; they must have not only social capital but also successfully navigate elite internal struggles. Some have already been purged in anti-corruption campaigns that Xi used to remove political opponents after taking power. The report emphasizes that those who survived the purges were those who avoided association with Xi’s rivals and were also careful to show loyalty to him by supporting his agenda for military reform.
Competence and Diverse Experiences: There is a misconception that senior PLA officers are disproportionately selected from the Nanjing Military Region, where Xi Jinping served from 1985 to 2007. It is also known as the “cradle of generals” due to its importance in preparing for the anticipated Taiwan conflict. However, only about a third of the senior leaders in 2015 had served in the Nanjing Military Region in the past decade. Instead of favoring officers with a specific geographical background, Xi focuses on high performers and ensuring that leadership includes a diverse range of experiences.
In conclusion, the report suggests that the stringent duties within the PLA and the extreme centralization of decision-making may reduce China’s effectiveness in future conflicts, especially those requiring a high level of cooperation and adaptability, such as the war Russia waged against Ukraine in 2022. This is particularly true if Chinese military leaders lack the ability to think in new ways beyond their service and specialty.
Therefore, there are signs of change in the senior leadership, most notably by providing emerging leaders with greater experiences and giving the new generations the opportunity to participate in senior leadership. This could create a future generation that is quick to grasp modern operations and technology. The report also suggests that producing a completely different type of senior PLA officer would require changes in service traditions and organizational culture, which has proven to be difficult even for the United States after more than three decades of the Defense Reorganization Act passed on October 4, 1986.
