After the sudden downfall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, the country entered a sensitive phase in its contemporary history following the protests that began in 2011. For the first time in nearly five years, the power dynamics reshaped, with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham stepping in to fill the gap left by the collapsed regime, while the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) struggled to survive as the military wing of the Kurdish self-administration under the weight of Turkish threats and its ally, the Syrian National Army. Throughout this period, ISIS has maintained a “dual” stance, marked by escalated threats in its rhetoric while keeping practical engagements at a lower level. The question remains: How does ISIS perceive the developments in the governance system in Syria? What are the potential scenarios for its interaction with these changes?
Transformations of ISIS:
The U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003 to end Saddam Hussein’s rule marked the beginning of a prolonged war against jihadist organizations, notably represented by “Al-Qaeda in Iraq,” led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was killed in June 2006. At that time, the organization controlled wide areas in Iraq, allowing it to declare what it called the “Islamic State of Iraq” in April 2006. Following the deterioration of security conditions in Syria, the organization decided to expand its reach into Syrian territory, proclaiming the so-called “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) in April 2013 under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, thus becoming known by the acronym “ISIS.”
However, Abu Muhammad al-Julani (Ahmad al-Sharah), the leader of the Nusra Front and representative of al-Baghdadi in the Syrian part of the declared “state,” decided to sever ties with al-Baghdadi’s organization and pledge allegiance to Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in April 2013. The organization then proceeded with its efforts to assert its influence and impose its decisions on those who opposed it, declaring “armed jihad” against al-Julani’s followers in various Syrian cities. Al-Baghdadi’s organization announced the so-called “Islamic Caliphate” according to its interpretation of political legitimacy in June 2014, attempting to delegitimize any organization not under al-Baghdadi’s authority.
However, vigorous international efforts culminated in the formation of the “International Coalition to Fight ISIS” in September 2014, which quickly concluded the project of the “Caliphate,” with Iraq announcing the expulsion of ISIS from its territory in December 2017, and U.S. forces and their SDF allies declaring its expulsion from the town of Baghouz, its last stronghold in Syria, in March 2019. Thus, ISIS lost its geographical control, entering a new phase of conflict through scattered and active cells characterized by hit-and-run operations, known in jihadist discourse as “thorns and vexation.” These operations aimed to demonstrate presence and obtain resources, primarily in the desert areas under the control of the former Syrian regime, and limited locations within SDF’s influence. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham successfully distanced ISIS from its positions and secured itself against its infiltrations, though it returned to mention its name in April 2024 when it accused ISIS of assassinating Abu Mariya al-Qahhtani, one of its prominent leaders, within its control areas in Idlib province.
Consequently, during this period, ISIS remained exposed to attacks from Assad’s regime, supported by Russian airstrikes on one side and campaigns by the SDF and its allies in the international coalition on the other; the outcome was a significant depletion of its capabilities, losing four of its leaders in just four years, the first being Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October 2019 and the last, Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi, in April 2023.
However, the significant geopolitical shift that occurred after October 7, 2023, and its subsequent regional ramifications, affected the Iranian leadership’s ability to maintain the balance of power in the region and altered the dynamics of the Syrian scene after Hezbollah entered into a comprehensive and direct war with Israel. This situation was exploited by the Syrian opposition, primarily represented by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham under its leader Ahmad al-Sharah, to advance towards Damascus, which it seized after just about twelve days, forcing Bashar al-Assad to flee to Moscow on December 8, 2024.
These developments prompted ISIS to contemplate the implications of rapid and profound changes on its future, as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, accused by ISIS leaders of killing its fourth leader, has become a pivotal force in Syria and a focal point of regional and international interest regarding political transition and counter-terrorism efforts. Therefore, the most crucial development for ISIS in the upcoming phase relates to the determination of the “hybrid” coalition, comprised of local factions and regional and international powers, to eradicate it.
Determinants of the Two Scenarios:
ISIS finds itself facing a sudden change in the map of influence in Syria and a consensus, both internally and externally, to create the conditions for the reconstruction of the country. This implies placing the fight against ISIS at the forefront of priorities; thus, it must decide between two opposing scenarios. The first is the “Mobilization and Confrontation” scenario, which bets on the organization maintaining a foothold in Syria and nurturing hopes of transitioning from the phase of “thorns and vexation” to “empowerment” to reclaim its claimed “Caliphate.” The second is the “Retreat and Departure” scenario, which relies on ISIS recognizing the magnitude of the changes and the potential for Syria to come under a centralized authority supported regionally and internationally, thereby avoiding any disproportionate confrontation that could eliminate its existence.
“Mobilization and Confrontation” Scenario: This scenario is based on a set of indicators and data that can be illustrated as follows:
A. Difficulty of Political Transition: Syria faces complexities that may hinder its path to successful political transition and institution-building, primarily due to previous organizational ties of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham with Al-Qaeda and its ideology, as well as the difficulty of imposing a single sectarian model on the sectarian reality of Syrian society. Additionally, the possibility of your local authorities tightening power through decisions that might provoke civil opposition and encourage other factions to cling to their weapons could lead to a mistrust that complicates the transitional phase in Syria, potentially allowing ISIS to find a favorable environment to regroup its strength, gathering its members in neighboring countries along the Syrian front, and preparing to confront potential battles by attracting angry youth.
B. Increase in ISIS Operations: ISIS significantly increased its operations in Syria during 2024, reaching 491 operations, according to the Syrian Observatory, which noted on December 30 that ISIS exploits political and military unrest to achieve its goals and reorganize its ranks. The Soufan Center estimated on December 18 that ISIS’s attacks in Syria had tripled compared to 2023. These estimates corroborate the U.S. leadership’s interpretation from July 17 that ISIS conducted 153 attacks in Iraq and Syria in just the first half of 2024, aiming to double the number of attacks it declared in 2023 and viewing the increase in assaults as a sign of its attempts to “reshape itself after several years of reduced capabilities.” Given the upward trajectory of this activity amidst suspicious security conditions, ISIS might be capable of increasing its operations and countering Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, simultaneously exploiting its recent governing experience and wearing it down through surprise assaults to stir feelings of insecurity, thereby fragmenting its efforts and stirring factions and the Syrian populace against it.
C. Openness to “Cooperation”: Despite ISIS’s rigid ideological convictions, it has shown flexibility on several occasions by allowing “cooperation” with enemies of its enemies, regardless of their doctrinal and sectarian affiliations. This cooperation has occurred between its leadership in Syria and elements from Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Thus, continued regional and international division in Syria could keep ISIS as a card to be played by those adversely affected by recent developments in reshaping balances on the Syrian territory. This not only pertains to Iran; the SDF might also consider if its areas are subjected to Turkish military intervention to lift its oversight over the prisons and camps housing 9,000 detained ISIS members and 40,000 of their relatives, in exchange for ISIS performing “functional roles” against Turkey, which has declared the killing of its last leader and arrested hundreds of its members in recent years. This would provide ISIS with leeway for maneuvering and opportunities for mobilization and confrontation.
“Retreat and Departure” Scenario: This scenario is based on contrasting readings to the previous data that lead ISIS to rely on concealment and finding an alternative refuge to ensure its survival. It is supported by the following:
A. Support for Political Transition: The new Syria has attracted regional and international attention, which encourages factions to surrender their weapons and transition into political parties competing for power through electoral programs. It is not in the interest of the West or Turkey, as well as Arab nations and even Israel, to see the foundations of peace in Syria collapse and the country veer into chaos. The West desires a new Middle East where Israel holds the dominant hand, a goal that has reached a significant milestone with the departure of Assad’s regime. Therefore, they will aim for de-escalation to avoid complicating matters in favor of Iran and Russia. Subsequently, U.S. forces, which have increased their numbers from 900 to 2,000, as declared in December amidst signs of their intention to establish a military presence in Kobani, began targeting ISIS sites following the regime’s fall. This culminated on December 20 with the killing of its leader in Syria, followed by French operations on December 31. Turkey will likely not hesitate to negotiate with the U.S. regarding disarming the SDF and positioning Ankara as a trusted interlocutor for the current authority in Damascus and as a decisive partner in ensuring the country’s security against terrorism. Meanwhile, Arab countries will support the transitional phase in Syria to counter foreign projects and engage with its new leadership to reintegrate Syria back into the Arab fold.
B. Relative Reports on ISIS: Regardless of the credibility of reports indicating an increase in ISIS operations during 2024, these cannot be relied upon to judge its future, as the recorded rise coincided with the most violent phase in the region’s contemporary history due to the Israeli war on Gaza and its regional ramifications, providing the organization an opportunity to amplify its combat efforts to achieve its ambition of controlling part of Syrian territory for the first time since its expulsion from Baghouz in 2019. Moreover, security reports are surrounded by circumstances that compel dealing with them “relatively”; thus, they failed to accurately assess the magnitude of the shift in power balances following the Israeli strikes against the Syrian regime’s army and did not anticipate Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s control over the country, alongside speculation from some about potentially using figures to serve certain political decisions as a justification for the continued U.S. presence. Additionally, the new authority in Damascus possesses experience in dealing with ISIS and has regional and Western support, aiding it in tracking and monitoring the organization’s movements, as evidenced by thwarting an attempt to blow up the Shrine of Sayyida Zainab south of Damascus on January 11, 2025.
C. Avoiding Losing Battles: Over the past years, ISIS has benefitted from the distribution of influence in Syria among conflicting powers, providing it opportunities for “cooperation” in exchange for support from one side or another, allowing it to aspire to regain control over land and promote in its propaganda that its alleged caliphate is “alive and expanding.” However, this has become more challenging with the presence of a centralized authority represented by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, striving to tighten its grip on Syria and with indications of increasing regional and international engagement in its favor, reminiscent of Iraq’s successful securing of its territory after achieving political agreements and amassing international support. Consequently, it is no longer in ISIS’s interest, amid a lack of real incentives, particularly with Washington’s efforts to repatriate detained ISIS members from Syrian camps to their home countries, to enter into battles that are already lost, which would merely serve one party against another. The “Retreat and Departure” scenario is more credible, having found validation in Afghanistan after the Taliban regained control of Kabul in 2021, in contrast to previous readings that suggested a strong return of ISIS Khorasan. Thus, unless one of the “black swan” scenarios occurs, such as widespread defections within Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, ISIS will not be able to mobilize its members due to the security encirclement of Syria’s borders, especially with Iraq, which has sent a security delegation to Damascus. The organization is also unlikely to initiate confrontations despite reports of it possessing remnants of the former regime’s arms and Iranian-backed groups, as it is aware of its limited capabilities in comparison to the West, which is more determined than ever to stifle disruptive voices against its strategy in the Middle East. Hence, ISIS operations may be limited to sporadic strikes that inevitably result, however painful, in forcing its fighters to leave Syria and the region. Despite the centrality of Sham in jihadist discourse, ISIS—whose operations inspired by “lone wolves” in Europe and the United States will only tighten Western policy—will likely opt to leave rather than rally. Thus, its fighters, estimated at around 2,500 in Syria and Iraq, will likely migrate to Africa, particularly the Sahel region, where the regimes are fragile, the likelihood of their collapse is greater, and Western interest in their fate is less, while its branches there are stronger, with more assured opportunities for rebuilding. This was hinted at in a UN report since January 2024, predicting ISIS’s transition to the Sahel due to the pressures it faces in Iraq and Syria.
