The Future of Iranian Society: Issues and Challenges

While the future cannot be predicted with precision, humans have always strived for a relative vision of it, investing their efforts and capabilities in this pursuit. As Daniel Franklin points out, history is filled with predictions that have proven incorrect; yet, speculation still holds value. Today, global communications have transformed in at least four significant ways:

First: Their speed is much faster compared to the past.

Second: Globalization operates on a far broader scale than one might think, impacting nearly all individuals and felt even in the most distant places.

Third: The scope of global communications is vast and encompasses various dimensions: economic, technological, political, legal, social, and cultural, each with its unique aspects.

Fourth: They create a new level of complexity in the relationships between politics and labor.

Certainly, Iran today is vastly different from its past. Major global changes, coupled with influential internal trends and phenomena, have rendered Iran’s future more opaque than ever, complicating predictions.

The global megatrends of globalization, the information and communications technology revolution, and the biotechnological and nanotechnology revolutions have altered not just Iranian society but all contemporary societies. However, in addition to these global megatrends, Iranian society is also affected by specific national trends and phenomena. These include student movements, cultural and social transformations, social movements, economic crises and sanctions, urban expansion, the unique governance model, generational divides, and the extensive presence of educated women in society, which are among the national phenomena that have changed Iranian society compared to the past.

Of course, the impact of unpredictable phenomena like the COVID-19 pandemic, military tensions in the region, and others should not be overlooked. This writing seeks to achieve a relative understanding by studying the influential trends and phenomena affecting Iranian society.

Humans are currently experiencing a unique period characterized by significant danger; lifestyle and governance methods, as well as personal behaviors, may radically change. It seems we have arrived at the end of a historical era and are living at the beginning of a new age. The future appears to be more ambiguous and complicated than ever, and we seemingly have no choice but to adapt to it. However, through analysis and a relative understanding of it, as well as preparing appropriate mechanisms, we can equip ourselves to confront, manage, and leverage the opportunities it presents. As Matthias Horx, a futures studies researcher, notes, there are certain historical periods that change the future’s trajectory, and we are currently at such a critical juncture. Although studying the future and attempting to predict it is inherently challenging, by examining some existing evidence and clues that have already initiated changes in society, we can somewhat recognize and predict this process.

Current Situations in Iran

Iran, with a historical and civilizational span of ten thousand years and a homeland of numerous ancient civilizations, such as the Elamite civilization in the fourth millennium BC, is the eighteenth largest country in the world by area. It holds a specific strategic position in the Middle East and Eurasian region and has always served as a bridge facilitating communication between East and West, being a significant part of the ancient Silk Road. This vast and historical land inherits a comprehensive culture and civilization, ranking tenth globally in ethnic diversity and housing fifty languages and dialects, as well as eight official nationalities. According to the constitution, the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on two pillars: the republic and Islam, and thus, the Iranian government operates on a religious framework based on the system of velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist). Economically, Iran has a mixed economy, with a large state sector managed approximately 60% in a centralized and directive manner.

In terms of GDP based on purchasing power parity, Iran’s economy ranks twenty-second among the largest in the world, but according to the GDP list from the World Bank, it is ranked fiftieth among global economies. In terms of capabilities and natural resources, Iran holds a unique and distinguished position.

Iran ranks first among holders of hydrocarbon resources in terms of total oil and gas reserves. It possesses 160.12 billion barrels of oil and 32.5 trillion cubic meters of gas, placing it fourth and second, respectively, in terms of oil and gas reserves. According to the latest FAO statistics, Iran ranks seventh globally in the production of twenty-two important agricultural products and is among the top twenty countries in the production of an additional twenty-nine significant agricultural products.

Thanks to possessing 7% of the world’s rich mineral resources, Iran is considered one of the top fifteen mineral-rich countries in the world. In terms of natural landmarks and cultural heritage, Iran ranks fifth and twelfth, respectively. In the field of handicrafts, according to Maryam Jalali, the deputy head of handicrafts and traditional arts, based on data from the World Craft Council, as of now, fifty-nine cities worldwide for handicrafts have been registered, with Iran holding eleven of those cities and three villages, representing 24% of the global statistics and 32% of regional statistics. Additionally, according to her, 600 items of handicrafts have been registered with UNESCO to date, with 450 of those works belonging to Iran, constituting a notable 75% of the global works in the handicrafts sector. For this reason, Iran holds the first position globally in the handicrafts industry.

According to the latest official census conducted in the year 1395 (2016), Iran’s population was close to 80 million, and based on that, the current population of Iran is estimated to exceed 86 million according to data from the same center. While World Bank data indicates that Iran’s population surpasses 90 million, the website Worldometers estimates the figure to be over 91 million. Despite these vast capabilities, discussing the reality of Iran today is both easy and difficult; easy because quantitative and qualitative indicators can provide a relatively understandable picture, but difficult because, first, not all conditions can be expressed within the confines of indicators, and second, one cannot ascertain the status of these indicators themselves. Therefore, to understand the future state of Iranian society, a correct understanding of the forces affecting Iranian society is essential. Generally, to comprehend the characteristics of Iranian society, the issue must be studied at two general levels, as both levels have deep impacts on society and will lead to fundamental transformations. These two levels are: the global level and the national level, each consisting of several key factors.

The global trends likely to transform Iran include three basic phenomena: globalization, the revolution in information and communication technology, and the revolution in biotechnology and nanotechnology. The first undeniable megatrend that has changed both the world and Iran is globalization. Although there are significant differences among thinkers and the general populace regarding this phenomenon, what is clear is that globalization has palpably changed our world. Globalization has imposed itself on our world in three dimensions:

A) The socio-cultural dimension: In recent decades, the driving forces of globalization have rapidly affected various aspects of social and cultural life in societies. The trend towards unifying cultural manifestations, from clothing and music to food, language, and customs, on one hand, and forming global values and standards such as minority and women’s rights, freedom of expression, and other universal measures, on the other hand, has not only affected the beliefs of popular culture but also their lifestyles. It can be said that a new discourse and lifestyle have been created in both individual and collective dimensions.

The emergence of feminist movements, nuclear families, a decline in formal marriage, a loss or decline of religious reference, excessive individualism, and the destabilization of traditional formal institutions are results of this aspect of globalization.

B) The economic-commercial dimension: Following the collapse of the socialist system and the weakening of central visions in economic fields, the role of markets and liberalism has become prominent, with a market-based economic system dominating a significant part of the world. On one hand, the increasing dependence of national economies on the global economy and their mutual relations has driven global trade growth to unprecedented levels, with international trade growing approximately threefold faster than national economies. The impact of the economy has intensified to the point that it directly influences the political equations of countries, sometimes compelling political systems to alter their governance structures. The production of massive, homogeneous products for the global market, the growth of transnational and global companies that do not recognize borders, the control of market rules over the economic and political relations of states, and the diversity and increase in the availability of varied products are key driving forces of economic globalization.

These forces have led to increased consumerism and a desire for variety at the individual level, elevating the focus on economic indicators within the social dimension. An increase in working hours, a desire for variety and consumerism, and the emergence of economic indicators in assessments rather than social and cultural indicators are all outcomes of economic globalization.

C) The political-legal dimension: Even before the 19th century, one could argue that governments had complete authority over their territories and executed their measures without fear; however, this is no longer the case. The growth of legal movements and organizations, along with the acceptance of global values and standards in legal and political spheres, has diminished the effective power of states and changed individuals’ perspectives towards society and government. There is a growing inclination to harmonize with the global order, acceptance of democratic governance, citizen rights, increased roles for individuals in society, and sometimes fulfilling traditional state responsibilities through non-governmental organizations. The rise of political awareness and vision at the global level is a major driving force of globalization in the political and legal realm. These forces have resulted in people becoming more demanding and conscious of their rights and duties, a growth in democracy, the rise of grassroots movements on various issues, the expansion of environmental organizations, and the quest for freedom and diversity, alongside other outcomes stemming from globalization in the political and legal dimensions.

The second major phenomenon in the world is the revolution in information and communication technology. This revolution has transformed our traditional world, bringing it much closer together and reducing spatial distances. The increase in the speed of information transfer and excessive access to information—where, in the past, the issue was accessibility, today it has become the overwhelming volume and accumulation of data—are indicative of this change. The growth of communication exchanges, speed of transport, and mobility are results of the information and communication technology revolution. Economically, this revolution has led to significant reductions in production and distribution costs, and a radical change in the production and distribution process. Comprehensive access to products and the ability to purchase or access certain products with a few clicks are among its economic outcomes. In the cultural and social dimension, it has resulted in cultural and social convergence between communities and allowed for the organization of virtual gatherings from anywhere at any time, facilitating wide-ranging exchanges of opinions and interactions without constraints with other communities and nations.

This revolution has provided an environment for society to express itself freely, away from prevailing values and norms, where anyone can present their wishes to the public at minimal cost and time, reaching the broadest audience possible. Politically, it has rendered barriers transparent and increased accountability, revealing previously confidential government matters to the public.

Protests and expressions of dissent in virtual spaces and on the internet, considered relatively safe spaces for the individual, have posed challenges for ruling regimes. The two grand phenomena, globalization and the information and communication technology revolution, have realized the idea of the global village proposed by Marshall McLuhan. These phenomena have turned the world into a village where access and the speed of information transfer have become rapid and easy, resulting in swift and simple mobility and leading to extensive and profound changes in individual beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors, as well as in collective structures, norms, values, and criteria within societies.

The third major global phenomenon is the revolution in biotechnology and nanotechnology. While the consequences of this phenomenon have not yet been fully realized, thus far it has had profound effects on both individual and collective human life.

If the second global phenomenon has connected people and human societies, thereby narrowing the gap between individuals and communities, the third has revolutionized all things through the fourth industrial revolution, the Internet of Things, and artificial intelligence, linking everything together. This has infused intelligence into all aspects of life and led to the implanting of microchips into humans, granting feelings to robots, thus steering humanity’s age-old dreams toward realization. While significant milestones have been achieved in nanotechnology, many experts view this technology as a future-oriented one. The manufacturing of materials on a nanoscale has resulted in the emergence of new and diverse products across various technological fields.

Moreover, considering current living conditions, humanity seems compelled to utilize biotechnology. Recent advances in genetics and biotechnology have provided new possibilities for manipulating and altering any form of life, creating entities with entirely new traits. This technology has extremely beneficial applications in medicine, pharmacy, agriculture, and industries.

It can be concluded that these three major phenomena have not only transformed individual life but also significantly impacted collective life, affecting lifestyle, values, norms, and beliefs in society, especially among the younger generation, bringing different outlooks and behaviors that have led to noticeable generational gaps. This has resulted in numerous issues and challenges, not only for societies but also for governments.

The formation and growth of social and cultural movements, such as the feminist movement and LGBTQ+ rights, alongside the widespread adoption of concepts like democracy, human rights, and freedom, have substantially reshaped society and elicited significant expectations and demands from a large segment of the populace, particularly from women and youth. Alongside these larger trends, regional transformations must not be disregarded.

Conflicts in Gaza and the brutal Israeli attacks on Gaza and Lebanon, with escalated tensions resulting in exchanges of fire between Iran and Israel, have complicated matters. Furthermore, the fall of the Ba’ath regime in Syria, once a principal ally of Iran in the region, has narrowed Iran’s sphere of influence. These events have also prompted segments of the Iranian population to express dissent regarding the exorbitant costs allocated to the resistance axis and to voice grievances regarding the failure of this strategy. There’s no doubt that recent events in the region, alongside undermining Iran’s political and social standing, have exacerbated the gap between the government and society.

In addition to these global and regional trends, Iranian society faces its own unique challenges and issues that must be taken into account. Thus, attempts will be made to study Iran’s future situation from multiple economic, social, cultural, demographic, and political indicators.

Iran’s Economic Future

If we consider today’s world as one predominantly driven by economics, we would not be mistaken, as the overall situation today is directly or indirectly influenced by economic phenomena, or that the economy was a central foundation in shaping it. Thus, any change or transformation in this dimension of human society can leave profound effects on the broader community. But how does Iran’s economic horizon appear?

From the perspective of ownership, Iran’s economy operates within three main sections: the public sector, the government sector, and the private sector. The public sector yields the least return, the government sector also has minimal yields, and due to the dominance of both sectors in the economy along with the weakness and stagnation of unions and trades, the return from the private sector has also been affected and has become insignificant, driving society toward economic decline. As economic expert Farshad Momeni stated, “We witness daily the process of economic decay and the sale of the future in the country; 75% of the Iranian population relies on support to survive.”

Thus, the unproductive sector of Iran’s economy has seen substantial growth in recent years, and the inability of all governments across the spectrum to curb this sector can serve as an indicator of dysfunction within the governmental economic system. While some contend that the country’s economic crisis stems from external enmity, recognition must be given that a significant portion of the problems is linked to the nonproductive nature of the economy and ineffective economic diplomacy, which has weakened both the internal economy and external interactions. Despite constituting about one percent of the world’s population, Iran produces less than one percent of the world’s economic value.

Iran’s economy has sustained considerable damage due to its reliance on oil, international sanctions, negative economic growth, rising inflation, and other factors. Naturally, numbers and statistics are the best indicators of any situation. Thus, we will study several major economic variables, including economic growth, money supply growth, the growth of the dollar value, inflation, and several other key indicators over the past decade to provide a relatively comprehensive picture of the Iranian economy on the macro level. Comparing these indicators and reviewing the influencing factors can show us how long current trends might persist, in both the medium and long term.

The oil boom in the 1980s (the first decade of the new millennium) led to an increase in Iran’s economic growth rate, reaching 10.2% in 2003 and nearly 12% in 2007. However, with the imposition of international sanctions, economic growth began to descend, reporting a negative growth rate of 9.4% in 2011. Following the nuclear agreement in 2015, economic growth improved again, peaking in 2016—a 13-year high. But once more, with the United States’ withdrawal from the nuclear agreement in 2018, economic growth fell back to a negative rate of 6.6%. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the difficult economic conditions in Iran, leading to negative economic growth rates in 2019 and 2020.

In general terms, economic growth over the last decade has seen a sharp decline, to the extent that economic growth for the past decade was nearly zero, indicating substantial reductions in production and declines in employment and industry. In other words, the real size of Iran’s economy in 2021 was estimated at around 756 trillion tomans, whereas this number was about 686 trillion tomans in 2011; thus meaning that over 11 years, the real size of the Iranian economy increased by just 70 trillion tomans.

Current statistics indicate a decline in industrial sector growth since 2023, implying a risk of recession in this sector in 2024. The results show that the pattern of recession in the industrial sector is more aligned with reduced demand. It appears that unless the current situation changes in the coming months, demand recession in this sector will become more widespread.

Unfortunately, Iran’s economy has not seen any success in controlling liquidity over the past decade, with the liquidity volume soaring from 354 trillion tomans to 3,476 trillion tomans—an unprecedented rise since 1979, marking nearly a 1000% increase in liquidity within a single decade. Consequently, statistics show that liquidity growth in the past decade has consistently been above 20%, peaking at 40% in 2020. In other words, the liquidity volume in the Iranian economy has increased almost tenfold over the past decade while economic growth during that same period has not kept pace. At the beginning of 2010, the monetary base was at 68 trillion tomans, and by the end of February 2020, it reached 436 trillion tomans, indicating 6.4 times growth, or a 540% increase over ten years.

The latest statistics from the Central Bank indicate that liquidity growth, which had declined to 24.1% last March, increased again to 28.4% in August throughout this year. As illustrated in the accompanying graph, the liquidity volume in 2016 was around 12,534 trillion rials, climbing to 78,775 trillion rials by 2023.

The data regarding liquidity in Iran suggest that an increase in liquidity may support short-term economic growth, but in the long term, without proper oversight, it can lead to more serious problems.

The data from the Central Bank and the free market dollar exchange rate show that exchange rates in the free market witnessed a 40% increase in the early years after the revolution. Between 1982 and 1989, the free exchange rate increased by a factor of 4.8, rising from 27 tomans to 96 tomans. In 1994, it increased by 46% to 263 tomans, and in 1995 it rose by 53% to 403 tomans. By 2015, it reached 3,673 tomans; in 2016, it was documented at 3,772 tomans. As shown in the chart, from 2017 onward and due to political developments, the dollar surged unprecedentedly, doubling its value in a remarkably short period. By the end of 2017, the free market dollar price was about 4,899 tomans; by the end of 2018, it hit 12,894 tomans, and by the end of 2020, it reached 23,963 tomans. Thus, the free dollar price soared 7.8 times from 2011 to 2020. At the end of 2021, the dollar rose to 27,735 tomans, with a staggering price of 49,000 tomans at the end of 2022.

By the end of 2023, the dollar reached a striking figure of 61,000 tomans, and as prices continued to rise, it reached 85,000 tomans by the end of January 2024. Current trends indicate a daily increase in dollar prices, with most predictions suggesting it will surpass 100,000 tomans by year-end, soon to reflect its impacts on prices, inflation, and the overall economy.

Iran’s inflation statistics have been recorded since 1935. In these statistics, the annual inflation rate in Iran for that year was logged at 21.2%. In 1945, 1946, and 1950, inflation was negative. However, in recent years, Iran has consistently faced high inflation, with rates not dropping below 40% from 2018 to 2022.

The inflation graph in Iran over the past decade employs data from the Central Bank. It reflects the tumultuous growth of accelerating inflation during this period, particularly after 2018. The average inflation rate for the four years ending in 2022 stands at 44%, which is indicative of historical stagnation in average inflation rates over a four-year window since the early 2020s. Regarding the unemployment rate, statistics show that throughout the last decade, the world’s average unemployment rate was around 5.5%, while unemployment in Iran was approximately double the global average, averaging 11.2%.

Although according to data from the Iranian Statistical Center for 2022, this figure has slightly improved to over 8.1%, it remains higher than the global average. Furthermore, published statistics indicate that the economic participation rate has dipped from over 44% in 2019 to under 41% in 2023, reflecting a decrease in employment rates by about 2.5%. Part of the improvement in recent unemployment figures appears to stem from disillusionment with the labor market.

Iran’s status regarding financial corruption ranking is also not favorable. According to data from the Trading Economics statistical site, Iran’s ranking has consistently remained above 130 over the years, although since 2018, the downward trend in corruption rankings has worsened, plummeting to 150 by 2021. This reflects that despite some strides in combating financial corruption in certain years, there has generally been a decline in Iran’s corruption ranking globally during this period.

The country’s situation in terms of the misery index, based on data from Statista, was at 62.5 in 2021, making it the tenth worst country in the world according to this metric. Research also indicates that individual income levels have shown a downward trend since early 2016, with more than one-third of individual income in Iran wiped out over the past decade. This situation somewhat reflects the decline in the well-being of Iranian families.

Given these factors, economic statistics from 2010 to the present are not favorable, and it is nearly impossible to find any economic statistic showing a better situation at the end of this decade compared to its beginning. The absence of a stable economic environment, lack of appropriate investment prospects, significant capital outflow, economic sanctions, interruptions in cross-border financial relations, lack of monetary discipline, structural budget deficits, and various other factors have rendered this decade one of the weakest in Iranian economic history in terms of statistical records. These statistics suggest that the economic governance in Iran has not received an acceptable rating, and trends indicate that conditions in the future do not seem particularly promising.

Iran’s Socio-Cultural Future

In recent decades, broad cultural and social changes have occurred in Iran, transforming the face of this nation compared to its past. Renowned sociologist Alain Touraine observed after his visit to Iran that the first noticeable aspect of this country is that you are not on the margins of modernity; you are right at its core. These changes are evident not only in large cities but also in small towns, generating global expectations among Iranian citizens. The development of communication and media has created favorable conditions for the formation of movements. These transformations can be seen reflected in the youth population, urbanization rates, industrialization rates, access to media, domestic and international travel rates, and rates of interaction with the outside world. The aforementioned structure, theoretically, is amenable to the formation of new social movements. Hence, in the past few decades, we have witnessed the emergence of various social and political movements and protests in Iran.

To portray a picture of Iranian society from a social perspective, we must refer to social indicators. Research results conducted by Mohammad Panahi and colleagues reveal that social hope in Iran has witnessed a decline.

In the 2020 Social Progress Index report, Iran scored 67.49, ranking 93rd among over 160 countries. As evident from the graph, the state of sub-indices of social progress in Iran relative to Norway, the leading country in this index, shows that Iran suffers from the largest gap regarding the opportunity inclusiveness index. This indicates a deplorable situation concerning discrimination in opportunity distribution among Iran’s populace compared to the world’s best performer in social progress, signifying a 63.8% gap between the two nations.

The most significant agreement in the social progress situation of Iran with Norway exists in the areas of sub-indices related to water and health, shelter, nutrition, and primary healthcare. Among other important indicators, access to information is noteworthy, where the gap between Iran and Norway is around 37%. Iran also suffers from a considerable gap in individual rights compared to Norway, with its individual rights index score aligning at only 39.5% with Norway’s score.

Throughout twelve years of study, Iran has not been in a favorable position concerning the social progress index. In 2011, Iran ranked 166th, with only South Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, and Chad faring worse than Iran. The approximately 40% gap between Iran and the global average in human rights and freedom of expression, and about 25% gap between Iran and the global average in terms of freedom and choice rights, illustrates the unfavorable condition for Iranian citizens regarding access to opportunities for social growth and advancement.

Since 2019, the rate of increase in the social progress index has gradually diminished, ultimately becoming negative in 2023. Iran’s ranking has plummeted to 105 in 2023. Although the social progress index has improved slightly compared to 2011, this increase was lesser than that seen in the global average for the same index.

In this index, countries are categorized into six levels; level one represents the best conditions while level six designates the worst. Iran has ranked in the fourth level throughout the years in question. In 2023, Iran found itself aligned with countries like Guinea, Lebanon, Ghana, Turkmenistan, Namibia, Nepal, and Iraq. In general terms, social progress data in 2023 indicate that Iran’s situation has worsened compared to earlier conditions. While there are better circumstances in meeting basic needs and educational requirements, in terms of opportunities, which generally correlate with freedom, rights, inclusivity in society, and choice rights, Iran’s condition appears grave.

Regarding the success indicator from the Legatum Institute, measuring wealth and societal well-being, Iran’s social development status in 2019 stood at a score of 48.3 out of 100, placing it 119th among 167 studied countries, a deeply unfavorable position. In the 2020 World Happiness Report, Iran ranked 118th with a score of 4.672 on a scale from 0 to 10 among 157 nations; indicating relative fragility for the country.

According to the latest statistics from this institute, Iran ranked 101st globally among 122 studied countries and ranked 11th out of 11 countries in the Middle East and North Africa. While there has been a relative improvement compared to the past, it remains in an unfavorable situation compared to global and regional averages.

The national values and attitudes survey results show that the Iranian public’s evaluation of social unity and cohesion and their outlook on the future of social coherence are as follows: 40% perceive that the state of unity and solidarity will worsen in the future, and 44% believe the current situation will stagnate, while only 16% consider the future of society in this regard to be acceptable. Furthermore, research suggests that the social cohesion index among the surveyed students is the lowest among five indicators of social health. This condition is even worse for children, as results from a study by Moradi and colleagues in 2014 indicated that the social cohesion index for children in Tehran received a score of 16 out of 85, reflecting a dire social cohesion situation for this demographic group.

Iranian society faces multiple social challenges. Research by Rafiei and colleagues identified fifteen social issues that prioritize social challenges in Iran, such as addiction, unemployment, violence, social distrust, economic poverty, corruption, social discrimination, injustice in power enjoyment, declining values, rising crime rates, economic policies, traffic issues, education and training concerns, disrespect for citizens’ rights, and inequality in law enforcement. Among these challenges, addiction, unemployment, violence, distrust, poverty, and corruption emerged as the highest priorities compared to other issues.

Thus, the current ideals of Iranian youth, who constitute a majority of the population, have vastly diverged from those of the initial revolution generation that was highly ideological and often tied to specific intellectual and political groups.

Overall, it can be said that Iranian society has undergone profound transformation. The weakening and erosion of many prevalent values and standards have confronted us with a society entirely different from the past, sometimes in full conflict with the cultural and social fabric of traditional Iranian society. The fluidity of beliefs and values in society, the focus on ancient Iran, emphasizing past history to challenge and neglect the Islamic history of Iran, an inability to accept others, the rising acceptance of atheistic schools and ideas by part of society, the evasion of social responsibility, indifference towards national and local issues, the declining traditional status of the family, generational divides, and other factors have created a society grappling with identity, fragmented, frustrated, and pessimistic, leading to cultural and social disjunction.

The Future Population of Iran

Population is a critical factor in human development and has played a special role historically; attention to population growth has always been among the important topics in societies and has consistently preoccupied the minds of social, economic, and political circles. John Parker wrote in an article titled “Not Everything is Predestined” in The Economist: under current circumstances, the world’s population is experiencing its fastest increase in human history. It took 250,000 years for the number of living humans on Earth to reach one billion, and over a century to reach two billion in 1926, then only thirty-three years later did it reach three billion. The world population is expected to exceed nine billion by 2050, with continuous growth forecasted.

Regarding Iran, according to the General Director of the Population Office at the Iranian Statistical Center, the population growth rate in Iran, based on the last census conducted in 1395 (2016), was 1.24%. Since then, the trend has been downward, now around 0.77%. In terms of internal composition, approximately 24% of the populace are children and adolescents under 15 years, 25% are youth aged 15-29, 44% are adults, and the remainder are elderly over 65, indicating a predominantly adult demographic in the country. The current life expectancy in Iran has reached 74 years, and the literacy rate stands at 87.6%.

Despite the Iranian culture traditionally promoting multiple children, even until the early 1950s, the population growth rate was low. With improvements in health and medical conditions during the decade starting from 1956, the country saw an average annual growth rate of 3.2%, reaching 7.25 million by 1966. With the Islamic revolution and the ensuing cultural and social shifts, coupled with the cessation of family planning programs, population growth surged again, with the first official census after the revolution in 1986 reporting an average annual growth rate of 4.3%, totaling 49 million citizens. Population and housing statistics from 2011 indicate that the growth rate has fallen to 3.1%. Overall, between 1956 and 2016, Iran’s population has steadily added an average of one million annually, reflecting a roughly eightfold increase over the past century. Despite recent declines in fertility rates, population movement is trending towards aging, with the overall fertility rate nearing 2.1. It is anticipated that if this trend continues, Iranian population growth will slow to 1% by 2030.

Research conducted by Saeedi Arsi and colleagues regarding age structure changes from 1956 to 2006 shows that the period from 1956 to 1965 had a favorable youth demographic, peaking from 1975 to 1985, subsequently descending post-1985, with a remarkable acceleration of this decline from 1995 to 2005. Additionally, results from studies by Masoudi and Fathzadeh align with Tarakhshond and Hosseini’s findings, indicating that the span before 2000 represents youthfulness, while the time after 2035 denotes aging within the population.

Studies by Moshfeq and Hosseini show that the Iranian population has experienced stages of childhood, adolescence, and youth, having entered middle age since 2010, and will enter the aging phase by 2030. The data also suggest that the total fertility rate has dropped from 6.5 children per woman between 1985 and 1999 to 2.2 children by 2005, reflecting a decline in birth rates during the 2000s. In 2010, the fertility rate fell slightly to one child.

Research conducted by Abbasi Shavazi and colleagues indicates that from 2010 to 2015, the declining fertility trends in the country stalled, with fertility graphs leveling out. Between 2016 and 2021, fertility rates boosted to 2.7 children per woman in 2016, only to decrease again to 1.74 children in 2020. Thus, projections indicate that population growth in the country will not be substantial; estimates suggest that by 2050, depending on scenarios of continued decline of the total fertility rate to 1.6 children, the population may reach about 93.632 million, with worst-case scenarios dropping the rate to 1.3 children yielding approximately 90.220 million, and best-case scenarios, where the total fertility rate increases to 2.5 children, could yield around 102.189 million. Meanwhile, the population is aging similarly to trends observed globally.

Iran’s Political Future

Romer posits that politics—not economics—is the most significant unknown in the coming century. Therefore, predicting political conditions in countries is challenging, if not impossible. General trends suggest that in the years leading up to 2050, democracy will face a contradictory and complex narrative. Countries that have not experienced democracy will encounter it more significantly, while those that are democratic will witness its erosion. Current authoritarian democracies will progress, while free countries will regress. Yet the question remains: how will political conditions unfold in Iran? Historically, Iran has been an authoritarian state, with authority and dominance not established on rights or laws, resulting in practical independence between government and society and fostering animosity between them, with society frequently bearing the brunt of political events. This dynamic is reflected in the myriad of movements and revolutions witnessed over the past century, including the Constitutional Revolution and the Islamic Revolution.

Following the Islamic revolution of 1979, active political forces in the country gradually clarified their ranks, giving rise to small and large political parties. According to official statistics from the Ministry of Interior, there are 74 national parties, 31 regional parties, and 21 political fronts and alliances in Iran authorized to operate.

Understanding the current and future political landscape in Iran necessitates referencing studies conducted in this area. According to research results, the political governance index in Iran from 1998 to 2003 equaled 2.8 out of a total index of ten, placing it 84th worldwide among 116 countries. Additionally, Iran’s average score on the soft power index for 2015 was 28.00, significantly distant from the last-ranked nation in the 2015 ranking, Brazil, at 41.9.

Analyzing changes in the governance index in Iran illustrates a continuous decline in governance trends over the years, with scores dropping from -0.78 in 1996 to -1.14 in 2019. The persistent negative governance score in Iran, especially when the global governance average was a positive number throughout these years, reflects an unfavorable governance situation in the nation. Still, even under negative circumstances, governance appears to be deteriorating. If we categorize the member states of the governance project according to their performance in governance into five groups, Iran falls into the fifth group, signifying the weakest category. Moreover, Iran’s scores on all six sub-indices of governance are below the desired minimum for optimal governance. A prevalent lack of trust among individuals regarding citizen rights, political stability, and the government’s capacity to legislate are significant reasons for Iran’s poor scores on sub-indices of governance. In the last year the governance index report was published, 2020, Iran ranked 181st out of 202 countries, indicating its unsuitable status compared to others.

According to evaluations conducted by the Peace Fund’s Research Institute in 2017, Iran’s standing among failing states and its fragile index categorizes it between orange and red. Moreover, according to the press freedom report by Reporters Without Borders, in 2024, Iran ranked 176th out of 180 nations globally. Furthermore, a report by Transparency International in 2023 placed Iran 149th out of 180 nations regarding the prevalence of financial corruption.

Evidence suggests Iran is one of the most closed economies in the world, as indicated by one measure placing Iran 169th in economic freedom among 175 countries. Concerning resource conversion into development, its ranking sits at 143rd out of 147 countries, indicating that the country’s resources are squandered and cannot be effectively utilized for development. Bank of World indicators similarly highlight a decline in governance quality in Iran over the last 25 years.

Research findings indicate that the vast majority of respondents provide negative evaluations of governance quality in Iran. Regarding its dimensions, anti-corruption, accountability to citizens, freedom of expression, and transparency receive the most negative feedback. Clearly, the governing style over the past two decades has lacked the necessary stability and consistency, with governance quality in decline, implying the government’s inability to deliver services and regulate the existing mechanisms in society. Predictions suggest that if current conditions persist, the decline of governance in Iran will continue. It is evident that this situation translates into rising public discontent, as a decrease in the governance quality index implies a deterioration in the quality of life.

Simin Kazemi, an Iranian sociologist, based on the latest survey of Iranian values and attitudes conducted in 2023, notes that only 8.2% of Iranians regard the current situation as acceptable, with the vast majority of society expressing dissatisfaction with the current state. Approximately 30% of them do not even hope for improvements in the current status. In her view, this discontent has surfaced during the first round of presidential elections in 2024, where the turnout was merely 60%, effectively serving as a warning bell for the government. Otherwise, escalating discontent may result in political and social crises even larger than before.

National surveys indicate that public opinion regarding the political situation suggests that more than half of the populace (55.5 percent) in 2023 believes conditions will worsen in the next five years, a stark contrast to predictions in 2015, which were significantly lower at 22.2%. Conversely, while 28.4 percent believe conditions will improve, 16% also view that things will remain unchanged.

Overall, it can be said that the accumulation of issues in Iran has reached a level that makes it challenging to envision clear prospects for politics and economics in the country over the next one or two decades. Iran has fallen into a deep pit (declining environmental livability, sanctions, governance issues, economic backwardness relative to regional competitors, relative exclusion from global trade relationships, and more), making exit from this state far from easy. One could argue that Iran has become a society filled with unresolved issues, facing at least two or three challenging decades ahead, rife with uncertainty, along with the potential for exceedingly unsatisfactory pathways.

Conclusion

While some forecasts regard the futures of the world as bright and optimistic—envisioning a wealthier, healthier, more interconnected, sustainable, productive, and innovative world with diminished gaps between the rich and the poor, men and women, and increased opportunities for billions—Daron Acemoglu posits different conditions for the Middle East. He believes that although the informal expansion of political and civil rights for individuals, women, and minorities appears possible, it would be naive to expect even more states in the region to gravitate towards openness in the coming decades. Indeed, Iran is part of this region and is somewhat subjected to its conditions.

Despite ranking among the top ten nations globally in terms of benefiting from divine blessings, misguided policies, mismanagement, and the dominance of ideological perspectives over the economy have hindered the country from leveraging these bounties, resulting in an unfavorable situation. The vast number of unemployed individuals with higher education degrees, the prevalence of poverty, unemployment, inflation, declining purchasing power, and the general living conditions have shifted many people’s life priorities. Among the outcomes of this state are decreased marriage and birth rates, shrinking family sizes, simultaneous working of men and women, and living on the margins.

This situation has created conditions wherein the government has faced waves of public discontent over the past decades, leading to outbreaks of mass protests. The protests of 2009, 2017, 2019, and 2022 exemplify this trend within less than two decades. Results from the fourth wave of the national values and attitudes survey conducted by the National Projects Office of the Institute of Culture, Art, and Communication in Iran reinforce this observation. In the survey, when respondents were asked, “What do you consider the most pressing issue in the country at present?” they sequentially identified inflation and high prices as the most critical issue, accounting for 81.9% of responses, followed by unemployment at 47.9%, addiction at 26.9%, economic and administrative corruption at 13.1%, housing issues at 12.1%, the hijab issue at 11.9%, youth marriage concerns at 10.7%, divorce issues at 7.1%, water shortages at 7.5%, and lastly, disregard for law enforcement at 7.4%. In this context, 4.2% also viewed constraints on freedom of expression and press, with 2.6% identifying air pollution, dust, and sandstorms as key issues in Iran. This comes at a time when evidence indicates that the executive body of the government, despite nearly five decades of experience in modernization and development programs, due to various reasons such as government size, inefficacy of employees who are not from elite backgrounds, failure to respect principles of efficiency, inappropriate and irresponsible regulations and laws, among others, is not only incapable of finding effective solutions to these problems but has also become a catalyst for crises.