“European defense autonomy” is no longer framed as a project to break away from NATO, but rather as a pathway toward building stronger European capabilities within the logic of Atlantic integration. Europe has come to recognize that geopolitical shifts—particularly the persistence of the Russian threat and the policies associated with the return of Donald Trump—require a recalibrated strategic approach. In this context, the debate has moved beyond broad rhetoric toward concrete tools and funding mechanisms tied to armament and defense production, alongside a strengthened role for the European Commission aimed at reinforcing strategic autonomy.
Core Pillars
As security transformations accelerate across the continent, the concept of European defense autonomy has gradually shifted from political debate to more defined institutional and military pathways.
1. A Shift Toward Self-Reliance Under External Shock
European defense autonomy is no longer presented as a long-term theoretical option but as a practical response to two overlapping strategic shocks.
The first stems from Russia’s war against Ukraine, which has reintroduced deterrence logic and nuclear pressure to the heart of European security. The second relates to growing uncertainty surrounding the continuity of the American security guarantee following Donald Trump’s return to office, accompanied by open U.S. debates about burden-sharing and reducing direct engagement in Europe’s defense.
This dual shock explains Europe’s transition from discourse to action in addressing the so-called “deterrence gap” through enhanced European roles and capabilities. This dynamic was particularly visible during the February 2026 meeting in Kraków of the E5 group—Germany, France, Poland, the United Kingdom, and Italy—where the “LEAP” initiative was launched to develop low-cost platforms and autonomous drones inspired by lessons from the war in Ukraine. Polish Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz declared at the time that “Europe has woken up.”
2. Expanding European Defense Pathways
European defense autonomy is no longer being constructed through a single institutional track. Instead, it combines European Union frameworks with flexible forms of intergovernmental cooperation, allowing member states to bypass slow consensus-building when crises demand speed.
This approach is evident in discussions about Ukraine’s security, where the “coalition of the willing” model has emerged as a flexible mechanism to manage potential military crises outside traditional bureaucratic constraints. At the same time, the European Union has developed the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC), a 5,000-strong force intended to blend political flexibility with structured institutional capability.
Similarly, the concept of “defense clusters” seeks to connect smaller cooperative initiatives with broader EU tools such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative, transforming fragmentation into a more coherent system of defense cooperation.
3. Developing European Defense Financing Mechanisms
European defense autonomy is increasingly tied to tangible financial instruments rather than rhetoric alone. A central role has been played by European Commissioner for Defence Andrius Kubilius, who has advocated converting defense plans into operational programs backed by clear funding mechanisms.
In this context, the SAFE initiative has emerged as a key instrument. It provides European loans to help member states finance defense procurement and projects in a faster, more coordinated manner. With a projected volume of €150 billion, initial requests quickly reached approximately €38 billion from eight member states. Importantly, SAFE requires that at least 65% of contract components originate within Europe, ensuring that defense autonomy strengthens the continent’s industrial base rather than merely facilitating purchases abroad.
Nevertheless, a large portion of European defense spending remains nationally managed, limiting the speed at which a cohesive European defense capability can emerge.
4. Franco-German Momentum in Defense Capabilities
At the February 2026 Munich Security Conference, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz reaffirmed his objective of making the German armed forces “the strongest conventional army in Europe,” reflecting a broader German strategic shift.
In parallel, French President Emmanuel Macron advanced a vision of aligning France’s national doctrine with European cooperation frameworks, including joint exercises and shared security interests. Merz also referred to discussions with Macron on European deterrence, signaling a Franco-German convergence on opening the debate without moving toward full sovereignty integration.
5. Proposal for a Permanent European Army
In January 2026, Andrius Kubilius introduced a more institutional proposal advocating the creation of a permanent 100,000-strong European army and the establishment of a European Security Council to manage deployment decisions. This reflects a growing trend within EU institutions toward building instruments parallel or complementary to NATO structures.
This political momentum is supported by a financial surge: EU member states’ military spending rose by 17% in 2024, reaching $693 billion.
Future Determinants
As European defense ambitions expand, the future of autonomy will depend on the EU’s ability to overcome several structural tests.
1. The NATO–United States Dilemma
The most likely trajectory for European defense autonomy in the near term is strengthening the European pillar within NATO rather than establishing a unified European army immediately.
This aligns with influential European positions. EU High Representative Kaja Kallas has emphasized that the objective is not a single European army but making Europe’s 27 national armies more interoperable, increasing spending, and enhancing operational capability. Conversely, Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares has framed the idea of a European army as a long-term strategic necessity for deterrence purposes.
Notably, 23 EU member states are already NATO members, complicating any move toward separation. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has stated that Europe cannot currently defend itself without U.S. support. Thus, the future of European defense autonomy will likely be measured not by distance from NATO but by Europe’s ability to build complementary strength without duplicating leadership or command structures.
2. Organizing Cooperation Across Multiple Frameworks
The likely future model combines two parallel tracks:
- An institutional path led by EU bodies to ensure funding, coordination, and medium-term prioritization.
- A flexible track allowing ready and capable states to act swiftly in times of crisis without waiting for broad consensus.
This dual structure does not signal competition between tracks but rather an effort to address the structural slowness of collective defense decision-making. The EU provides regulatory and financial frameworks, while flexible coalitions handle operational responsiveness.
3. The Financing and Sustainability Test
A key challenge is how to rapidly increase military spending without destabilizing national budgets. France and Italy—and, in the broader European context, the United Kingdom—appear more inclined toward expanding joint financing instruments. Germany, by contrast, remains cautious regarding large-scale common European borrowing.
SAFE’s loan-based model offers a compromise: up to €150 billion in EU-backed loans aimed at facilitating joint procurement, signaling a bloc willing to experiment with collective funding mechanisms rather than waiting for slower alternatives.
4. Strengthening Defense Industrial Capacity
The success of European defense autonomy ultimately hinges on production capacity and delivery speed. Although European rearmament has accelerated, procurement remains fragmented and uncoordinated.
For example, the joint industrial program between Leonardo and Rheinmetall to modernize Italy’s armored forces—announced in early 2025—includes 132 tanks, 248 additional armored vehicles, and approximately 1,000 infantry fighting vehicles at a cost of around $16 billion, with about 60% of production located in Italy. While this demonstrates industrial sovereignty progress, it also reveals the long timelines required for building a cohesive defense industrial base.
Similarly, France faces challenges in restarting production of the Leclerc tank in its previous configuration, while next-generation alternatives are not expected to enter service before 2045.
5. Divergent Threat Perceptions Among Member States
The most significant challenge lies not merely in increasing spending but in aligning priorities among states that perceive threats differently. Northern and Eastern European countries, facing heightened security concerns, advocate deeper and faster cooperation. Southern European states appear less urgent in unifying defense priorities.
Major powers such as France, Germany, and Italy prioritize protecting their national defense industries, sometimes favoring bilateral agreements that serve domestic industrial interests. Smaller states—particularly those closer to Russia—prioritize immediate readiness and rapid coordination, even if it comes at the expense of long-term industrial calculations.
Managing this divergence will determine the trajectory of European defense autonomy.
Conclusion
Current European defense policies represent a foundational step toward greater autonomy, but they have not yet reached full strategic independence. Success depends on three interlinked conditions: aligning priorities among member states, accelerating industrial production and delivery within Europe, and converting shared financial tools into concrete operational capabilities.
If the gap between political rhetoric and coordinated implementation persists, Europe may expand its defense spending significantly without achieving true, integrated strategic autonomy.
