The Evolution of Chinese-African Relations: Is It Shifting from Economics to Political Influence?

In April 2025, reports emerged indicating that Chinese diplomats had requested senior officials in Malawi and The Gambia to pressure their lawmakers to withdraw from the “Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China” (IPAC), an international multi-party alliance comprised of parliamentarians from democratic countries well-known for its criticisms of China. This incident is part of a series of Chinese diplomatic pressures in Africa, showcasing a more direct influence that reinforces the observations of movements by Beijing and the ruling Communist Party of China in Africa over the past few years.

Economic Partnership as a Gateway to Political Influence

The potential political influence of Chinese economic activities in Africa has frequently been debated; after extensive efforts and massive initiatives over the past two decades, China has risen to become the leading economic player on the continent, emerging as Africa’s largest trading partner, a major lender, and an important source of foreign direct investment. The positive aspects of these activities are reflected in significant infrastructure developments, notably roads, railways, and ports across various African nations. By 2023, trade volume between China and Africa reached 282.1billion,a1.5282.1billion,a1.5173 billion, mainly consisting of manufactured goods, electronics, and machinery.

Although imports from Africa to China dropped by 6.7% to 109billionin2023,withrawmaterials—suchasminerals,oil,andagriculturalproducts—accountingforthelargestshareoftheseimports,ChinaremainsthelargestbilateralcreditortoAfrica.Between2000and2023,Chineselendersprovidedapproximately109billionin2023,withrawmaterials—suchasminerals,oil,andagriculturalproducts—accountingforthelargestshareoftheseimports,ChinaremainsthelargestbilateralcreditortoAfrica.Between2000and2023,Chineselendersprovidedapproximately182.28 billion in loans to 49 African governments and seven regional borrowers. It is estimated that Chinese foreign direct investment projects in Africa have created around 325,000 jobs, with investment concentrated in sectors like construction, mining, industry, trade, and services, alongside a growing Chinese interest in renewable energy and mineral processing such as lithium within Africa.

The fact that Chinese economic and investment ties in Africa provide a solid platform for political engagement or influence is further illustrated by the positive African stances toward China on global issues. This is particularly evident as the loans and investments offered by China to African nations are often regarded as more attractive compared to the conditions sometimes associated with Western loans and investments. African countries are key components of China’s global strategy, especially as the last decade has shown that the “Belt and Road Initiative,” which many African nations joined to achieve their infrastructure development goals, is not merely an economic project for China, but aligns with Beijing’s global vision. Initiatives and benefits presented by this initiative encourage nations on the continent to support Chinese positions on global platforms concerning issues like Xinjiang, Taiwan, and the South China Sea.

Moreover, the challenges faced by some African countries, particularly Zambia, Angola, and Ethiopia, in repaying their loans create indirect opportunities for China to secure political concessions or diplomatic compliance from these nations. This was evident in the lengthy negotiations with China surrounding Zambia’s debt restructuring in 2023, positioning Zambia in a precarious situation and raising warnings at the African level about the potential role of Chinese economic dominance in geopolitical influence in Africa.

This indicates that China’s status as an important economic partner and a significant factor in the developmental successes of Africa in recent years grants it leverage and influence in African decision-making. This is manifested in the fact that crucial infrastructure projects funded by China, such as standard railways in Nigeria, Kenya, and others, airport terminals in Nigeria, and electricity networks in Ethiopia—among other strategically important projects for Africa’s growth—enhance the positive views of African governments and local populations toward Chinese governance standards and political ideology. Particularly, China funds and manages special economic zones in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Zambia, requiring political dialogues with all relevant government entities, state capability training, and shared governance models that potentially mirror China’s developmental trajectory. Furthermore, these deals necessitate close political cooperation, affording Beijing soft power that allows it to prioritize its interests over the needs and planning priorities of the local African populations.

The Increasing Political Influence of China in Africa

Recent developments suggest a shift in China’s influence in Africa from economic to political dimensions, seemingly contradicting China’s long-standing principle of non-interference in the domestic politics and sovereignty of other nations. One strategy China employs to achieve this influence is its ideological engagements with African political parties, which have grown markedly since 2022, surpassing the traditional political ties between China and Africa during anti-colonial solidarity in the Cold War era. This is supported by the emergence of China-funded ideological training centers in Africa, particularly concerning the interactions of the ruling party in China with the “Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa” (FLMSA), which includes Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.

For instance, China sponsored the revitalization of the “Herbert Chitepo School of Ideology” in Zimbabwe, connected to the ruling “Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front” (ZANU-PF). The school, which was reopened in 2016 after being dissolved following Zimbabwe’s independence in 1970, completed its renovation in 2023. Academics from the ruling Communist Party of China regularly visit, with the party donating 1,300 books about China’s history, financial reforms, developmental issues, and cultural affairs.

Another example is the “Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School” in Tanzania—the first school designed similarly to the “Central Party School of the Communist Party of China” aimed at training senior cadres and leaders in China. This school, inaugurated in 2022 with substantial funding from the Communist Party of China, trains cadres from major political parties in Southern Africa. Its curriculum, influenced by the “Central Party School,” focuses on governance, party building, and development models, offering the Communist Party of China a platform to disseminate its ideology and experiences in political governance, social control, and development plans.

Additionally, China has funded the construction and renovation of strategic political infrastructures in various African countries, including parliament buildings and foreign ministry offices. While this generous Chinese support fosters goodwill within Africa, it also provides Beijing access to legislative and executive elites, relying on reports of growing Chinese government interest in building relationships with political elites to create long-term networks of influence.

There is further evidence that the “International Communication Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” maintains relationships with over 100 political parties in 51 African countries, including ruling and opposition parties. Thousands of African political party officials are invited to China for training and to learn about the Chinese governance and development model, enhancing personal and professional ties between Chinese and African political elites. Additionally, African political elites participate in Chinese political events, such as the Chinese Communist Party and Global Political Parties Forum, and the Beijing International Democracy Forum, with the National Academy of Governance of the Communist Party of China forming partnerships with governance academies in various African countries (like Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Africa), providing year-round training programs for government officials and political party members.

It is noteworthy that the diminishing American influence during former President Joe Biden’s administration created a vacuum easily filled by China, contributing to its growing clout on the continent. The current leadership under Donald Trump distancing Washington from Africa allows Beijing to solidify its position as a reliable partner, especially given the recent imposition of American tariffs on African goods, which has fostered trade uncertainty and expectations of economic harm for African nations, reinforcing their inclination toward Chinese economic support and making them more amenable to alignment with Chinese political interests.

The evolution of China’s political engagements and influence in Africa can be observed in the use of pressure and “diplomatic coercion” against governments and politicians in Africa, resulting in a decline in diplomatic relations between African countries and Taiwan. Notably, the “Belt and Road Initiative” and the “One China” policy compel countries seeking diplomatic or economic relations with Beijing to sever official ties with Taiwan. Additionally, there have been reports of Beijing threatening African parliamentarians who wanted to attend a political summit in Taiwan, notably direct pressures in 2024 from Chinese diplomats threatening to cancel official visits and visas and impede bilateral cooperation with Malawi and The Gambia.

In the case of Malawi, reports indicated that the Speaker of the National Assembly contacted a Malawian legislator who wished to participate in the IPAC summit organized in Taipei on July 30, 2024, informing him that the Chinese government threatened to cancel both the upcoming visit of Malawi’s President to Beijing and his meeting with President Xi Jinping. The two Malawian lawmakers announced their withdrawal from the alliance less than two weeks after the Taiwan summit, a development mirroring another similar case where Kenyan MPs canceled their plans to attend the summit while maintaining their membership in the alliance.

African Agency in the Context of Increasing Chinese Political Influence

African nations have not merely been passive recipients of Chinese influence, despite criticisms directed at both the Chinese and African sides; over the past two decades, Chinese-African partnerships have shown that many countries on the continent collaborate with Beijing to achieve their developmental goals, diversify their international relationships, and reduce reliance on their traditional Western allies. This strategic choice grants them greater leverage and negotiating power when discussing specific project terms and financing that align with their needs. Thus, African agency significantly impacts the dynamics and outcomes of cooperation with China, indicating that this agency (or the limits of African effectiveness and influence) can temper Chinese political power in alignment with national strategic interests and objectives.

Moreover, several African leaders have demonstrated their adeptness at leveraging the competition between China and other global powers to secure better agreements and more favorable terms for aid, loans, and investments. This is particularly evident in African countries whose governments solicit bids and proposals from Chinese and Western companies during negotiations over infrastructure projects, taking advantage of the competitive landscape to drive down costs or obtain better offers. African nations actively participate in the “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation,” utilizing the platform to express their needs and negotiate collaboratively on agreements while advocating for debt relief and increasing specific infrastructure initiatives that align with regional and national African development goals.

While scholars within Africa have acknowledged China’s positive contributions to recent developments on the continent, the increasing influence of China has raised concerns regarding debt sustainability, transparency, and potential implications for governance and human rights. Opinions on this matter appear polarized; proponents of African partnerships with China, particularly those who overlook the rising political and diplomatic pressures, are often accused of bias towards the Russian-Chinese axis and labeled as undermining democracy. Conversely, those warning about the risks of debt traps, along with their detrimental effects on the economy, development, and political institutions, are depicted as biased towards Western interests under the guise of promoting democracy.

For China, enhancing its political engagement in Africa is paramount; as its economic presence and investments on the continent grow, Beijing must ensure political stability in its partner countries. This holds particular significance given Africa’s increasing strategic importance for China in securing essential minerals and energy resources, which are vital for China’s industrial growth and its competitiveness against international rivals, as well as its shift toward a green economy, which necessitates greater political influence for securing supply chains.

Furthermore, China has long sought to establish itself as a practical alternative to Western models of development and governance. This ambition is evident in various initiatives that require close political participation in Africa, such as the “Global Security Initiative” launched by President Xi Jinping during the annual Boao Forum on April 21, 2022. There is also the “Global Development Initiative” proposed by Beijing to promote global development partnerships and advance sustainable development goals, along with the “Global Civilization Initiative” unveiled by the Chinese president in 2023. All these initiatives reflect China’s intention to influence global standards and practices, aligning with the “Belt and Road Initiative” to bolster Beijing’s strategic presence across multiple domains, especially amid growing military cooperation, peacekeeping operations, and support for counter-terrorism and security assistance from China in Africa.

Conclusion

From the above, it can be concluded that the growing political influence of China in Africa coincides with its expanding economic engagements, evolving from traditional diplomatic relations and financial investments to a more proactive approach. This transformation is evident in initiatives such as the establishment of political training institutions inspired by the governance model of the Communist Party of China, Beijing’s increasing role in mediating regional African conflicts, and strengthening relations with ruling political parties in various African countries. The Chinese “Belt and Road Initiative” serves as a strategic platform for enhancing political influence through infrastructure projects and financial support, while China’s growing military presence and arms deals further reinforce this objective.

References

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