The Crisis of New Constitutional Amendments in Somalia: Political Implications and Security Threats

On March 30, 2024, Somalia’s bicameral Federal Parliament (House of the People and Senate) approved new constitutional amendments that have sparked widespread controversy in political circles. These are the first amendments to cover four chapters of the provisional Somali constitution, which consists of 15 chapters since its drafting in 2012. The amendments, which the parliament approved, are seen as an attempt to consolidate absolute power for the presidency over other executive and legislative authorities. This has raised concerns among the opposition, especially ahead of the planned 2026 elections. The amendments have also heightened tensions between the federal government and its member states, particularly Puntland, casting uncertainty on the future of Somalia’s federal system.

This paper delves into the essence of the new constitutional amendments and the concerns the opposition has about them. It also looks ahead to the future of relations between the Somali government and federal states, especially with Puntland’s announcement of withdrawing recognition from government institutions and the implicit threat of secession, stemming from political disputes since President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud took office in 2022.

Context and Procedures of the Constitutional Amendments

In 2012, legislators representing Somali clans approved the provisional constitution. An independent drafting committee of 29 members, funded by the United Nations, was responsible for drafting the new constitution, which comprises 15 chapters. This constitution was approved by 825 delegates representing Somali clans. Successive governments focused on revising it to align with the country’s developments, but these efforts did not yield substantial results.

The issue of constitutional amendments in Somalia is tied to the political and security reforms achieved since 2022. However, there are concerns about the agendas behind these constitutional reforms and their suitability for the current circumstances, given that years have passed without significant progress in finalizing the constitution to align it with the political and security achievements in the country. This has kept the provisional constitution ineffective for nearly a decade, despite its contradictions and the constitutional crises it causes due to the confusion of powers between the executive and legislative authorities and between the federal states and the central government.

The task of constitutional amendments has been a primary concern for Somali leaders, with discussions ebbing and flowing during election cycles since 2012. No significant progress has been made in finalizing or urgently amending the constitution, remaining a political project with little tangible outcome. Three main bodies were tasked with reviewing the constitution based on recommendations from the 2023 National Consultative Conference: the “Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission” (ICRIC), the “Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Review,” and the “Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs.” However, after President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud came to power in 2022, he, like other presidential candidates, pledged to reform and amend the constitution. Following his second-term inauguration in May 2022, meetings at the presidential level began, especially between the presidency and federal state presidents, excluding Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni due to emerging disputes between the state and the federal government.

Successive meetings have been held since May 28, 2022, between the Somali president and federal state presidents. These meetings discussed key issues for a significant political and security shift in the country. The National Consultative Council (NCC) meeting on May 28, 2023, resolved the voting system for upcoming elections, initiating a comprehensive reform of the political system with an unprecedented historic agreement ending the indirect voting system in the country. The meeting included (South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen, Hirshabelle State President Ali Gudlawe, Galmudug State President Ahmed Qoorqoor, and Jubaland State President Ahmed Madobe), Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre. The announcement to transition to a direct election system sparked significant debate in political circles, with Puntland interpreting it as bypassing the local constitution and breaking with tradition. The issue of constitutional amendments remained a barrier to organizing direct elections, leading to the appointment of five new members to the ICRIC, chaired by Burhan Adam Omar, who has a legal background and previously served as a professor and dean of the law faculty at Puntland University and a former member of the parliamentary constitutional oversight committee.

In 2024, President Hassan Sheikh intensified efforts to push the parliament to approve the constitutional amendment bill. On January 24, 2023, 180 MPs approved the amendments while 30 opposed, paving the way for a reading of the main articles to undergo significant changes. This parliamentary approval aligns with the outcomes of the National Consultative Conference held in May 2023. The agreement from the sixth council meeting since Hassan Sheikh’s presidency in May 2022 includes bypassing the 4.5 clan-based system, conducting elections via direct universal suffrage starting mid-2024 for municipal and regional elections, transitioning to a full presidential system, and unifying regional election dates. The agreement states, “To align the elections of the Federal Republic of Somalia, the country will adopt a President and Vice President system, elected together on a multiparty basis.”

New Constitutional Amendments: Reform or Undermining?

After marathon discussions marred by physical altercations and chaos in some parliamentary sessions, the parliament approved the new constitutional amendments covering the first four chapters of the provisional constitution with 254 votes out of 275 in the House of the People and 42 out of 54 in the Senate. This was unexpected for opponents of the amendments, as securing two-thirds of parliament votes on these controversial amendments seemed unlikely. However, attention turned to the challenges in implementing the procedures outlined in the new amendments, especially organizing direct elections, transitioning to a presidential system, and limiting political parties to three instead of an open multiparty system.

The four chapters amended include:

1. Declaration of the Federal Republic of Somalia: Covers the basic principles of the state such as religion, language, flag, territory, sovereignty, and people.
2. Basic Rights and Duties of Citizens: Includes the rights, duties, and freedoms of citizens.
3. Land and Ownership: Covers land, natural resources, and the environment.
4. Representation of the People: Defines the general principles of representation, the authority of the people, elections, and the party system.

The fourth chapter, which comprises 14 new articles, is particularly contentious, sparking political opposition. The opposition believes that the parliament, through these new amendments, has ceded its powers to the president, rendering the legislative authority unable to separate powers between the executive and legislative branches.

The contentious amendments that concern the political opposition, including former Presidents Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo (2017-2022) and Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (2009-2012), former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khayre, and opposition MP Abdirahman Abdishakur, include:

1. Transition to Direct Voting System: According to Article 49, the Somali people will choose members of the parliament, the president, municipal members, federal state presidents, and their deputies, with the president having the authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister. This marks a shift from the indirect elections where clan leaders played a significant role since August 2012 elections.
2. Limiting Multiparty System: Based on the recommendations of the May 2023 National Consultative Conference, the number of parties is limited to two, with Article 56 stipulating that only the top two parties in local elections can participate in national elections and be recognized as national parties. This was later amended in Article 54 to allow for three parties based on recommendations from federal parliament members before approving the new constitutional amendments.
3. National Electoral Commission: Article 57 of the new amendments states that the National Electoral Commission will comprise 18 members instead of 15, with commission members electing their chairperson and deputy rather than the president appointing them. This aims to reduce tensions and address opposition concerns about presidential interference in the commission.

Influential Factors in Constitutional Amendments

There are several key factors influencing the constitutional amendment process and parliamentary approval, resembling situations in African countries grappling with civil war or regional divisions. Revising constitutions requires a comprehensive view and forward-looking approach, accommodating future changes in the political system.

Key stakeholders include:

1. Civil Society: Despite President Hassan Sheikh’s statements about presenting the draft amendments to civil society before parliamentary approval, civil society organizations have not yet commented on the new amendments. These organizations can create political and media uproar if they oppose the federal government.
2. Somaliland: Declared unilaterally independent from Somalia in 1991, Somaliland remains a significant political player despite lack of international recognition. With 57 members in the Somali parliament representing Somaliland, their inclusion in the provisional constitution remains a major challenge. The situation parallels Germany’s post-WWII Basic Law, initially provisional but later adopted nationwide after reunification in 1990. Similarly, Somalia’s constitution may remain provisional until potential reunification with Somaliland.
3. Al-Shabaab: This militant group, controlling large areas in southern Somalia, significantly impacts the security landscape but has no political influence, as it refuses negotiations with the federal government. The possibility of future negotiations could introduce another political player, complicating the constitutional framework unless the government can militarily defeat Al-Shabaab.

The constitutional amendment process in Somalia is fraught with challenges, reflecting the complexities of balancing political power, addressing regional aspirations, and ensuring national security.

Constitutional Amendments: Analysis of the Opposition’s Positions

The political opposition’s stance against the new constitutional amendments varied, accompanied by denunciations and sharp criticisms of the committees assigned to review the constitution throughout the process of redrafting the first four chapters and presenting them to the parliamentary chambers for review. The opposition also leveraged digital social networks (Facebook and X) to mobilize local street protests and parliament members to prevent the passage of these amendments. The opposition politician Abdulrahman Abdulshakur bet on the impossibility of gathering two-thirds of the parliament members (219 deputies). Former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, in a press conference in Mogadishu, rejected the legitimacy of passing the new constitutional amendments by an indirectly elected parliament, arguing that the articles being amended were previously voted on by the people in the 1960 constitution, which was adopted in the 1960s. This occurred before the parliament approved the new amendments on March 30, 2024(15).

In a Facebook post, former President Mohamed Abdullah Farmajo expressed fears about the consequences of the parliament passing the controversial amendments, linking them to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s desire to achieve personal interests and agendas at the expense of the country’s unity and stability. He stated that the federal parliament councils have reached a dead end that undermines the legitimacy of the political system in the country(16).

In a joint statement after the approval of the constitutional amendments on March 30, 2024, former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khayre, Somali politician Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke (a former prime minister), and opposition parliament member Abdulrahman Abdulshakur expressed their fears that the country might be heading towards an uncertain fate. They argued that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud deviated from the path of completing the constitution and chose to write a new constitution, threatening the roadmap for reconciliation and state-building efforts in Somalia. They stated that they do not recognize the new constitutional amendments and that there is no alternative to the provisional constitution consisting of 15 chapters and 143 articles(17).

The political opposition’s concerns about the new constitutional amendments revolve around several key points:

1. Concentrating powers and authorities in the hands of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud while diminishing the parliament’s role in resolving disputes, especially between the executive authorities (the president and the prime minister), in the absence of a constitutional court to contain conflicts among the top authorities.
2. Fears of potential future interference by the presidency in the formation of the National Independent Electoral Commission members (18 members), which the opposition views as a cornerstone of their political struggle against the president to prevent him from gaining privileges and direct influence over the federal electoral commission. The opposition doubts the integrity and independence of the electoral commission if President Mohamud imposes his agenda on it.
3. Doubts about the possibility of holding direct elections in Puntland to elect members of both parliamentary chambers due to ongoing disputes with the federal government. Additionally, concerns about the future representation of Somaliland members in the federal parliament and municipalities and their quotas in the federal government and parliament if direct elections are held and the current clan-based quota system (4.5) for wealth and position distribution, established during the Mbagathi Conference in Kenya in 2004, is abolished(18).

Constitutional Amendments and the Future of the Federal System: Political Implications and Security Threats

First: Political Implications of the Constitutional Amendments on the Federal System

The political system in Somalia remains fragile and unstable, unable to adapt to new changes. The legacy of the military state continues to cast its shadow over the governance system. Every attempt to reform or amend this system triggers an outcry and opposition fears, with voices warning of a descent into chaos. The opposition currently recalls the attempt to extend power for an additional two years, approved by the federal parliament in 2021 during former President Mohamed Abdullah Farmajo’s tenure, which sparked a security crisis in Mogadishu and led the parliament to later rescind the extension. The constitutional amendments recently approved by the parliament are compared to this failed attempt. However, the nature of the opposition, its tribal affiliations, and political backgrounds are entirely different from that period. Nevertheless, the political and security situation slipping into chaos is a possible outcome unless serious understandings are reached between the federal government and opposition leaders.

The political and security implications of the new constitutional amendments on the country’s stability can be summarized as follows:

1. Intensifying Conflicts Between the Somali Government and Puntland:

The relationship between the central government and the regions has been characterized by tensions since the federal model was implemented in Somalia in 2012. These tensions fluctuate with the political climate, sometimes simmering down and other times flaring up like a volcano. Puntland is one of the federal states that balances its relationship with the federal government by either enjoying special privileges or declaring a break and withdrawing recognition from government institutions, refraining from cooperating with the federal government. This is because Puntland has considered itself a semi-independent system since 1998. The “patriarchal” political state that governs Puntland’s relationship with the federal government suggests it ignores its status as part of the federal system(19). Recently, the Puntland administration refused to comply with a federal government decision to close the Ethiopian consulate in Garowe, claiming non-recognition of federal institutions following President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s signing of the new constitutional amendments in April 2024(20).

2. Tensions Between the Somali Government and Other Federal States:

The relationship between the Somali government and other federal states, such as Hirshabelle and Galmudug, dominated by the Hawiye clan, as well as South West State, inhabited by the Rahaweyn clan, and Jubaland, home to the Darod clan, particularly the Marehan and Ogaden sub-clans, is less tense. However, the current relationship between the government and these states is marred by ambiguities and doubts regarding the implementation of the constitutional amendments, especially concerning the organization of direct elections allowing people to elect local parliaments and state presidents. However, the presidents of these states seek to extend their terms by an additional two years or at least one more year. Jubaland’s President Ahmed Madobe, for instance, is attempting to extend his presidency for a fourth term through non-transparent elections, hindering the implementation of the recent National Consultative Conference outcomes if he tries to stay in power for a new term(21).

These tensions highlight the failure to hold the consultative conference called by the president in late April 2024 due to disagreements between the Somali government and state presidents, identified in the following points:

• Extending the terms of federal state presidents by two additional years and conducting parliamentary and presidential elections simultaneously nationwide in 2026. This is a core issue of disagreement between the Somali presidency and state presidents, most of whose terms have ended or are nearing their end, particularly Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe, whose term ended in August 2023 but was extended for a year until November 2024. He is expected to organize direct popular elections under the federal government’s supervision, as agreed in the National Consultative Council meetings. However, President Madobe is reluctant to conduct such elections(22).
• Disputes over the National Independent Electoral Commission assigned to organize federal and state elections, as state presidents do not see the benefit of accepting a national electoral commission overseeing elections in federal regions. Instead, they prefer federal electoral commissions independent of the central government, as is currently the case. They also object to including three members from Somaliland in the National Independent Electoral Commission. The National Consultative Council agreement stipulated that the commission consists of 15 members, amended to 18 members, and approved by the parliament within the new constitutional amendments without consulting them. Moreover, they call for “leadership” instead of state presidents.
• The Gedo Region crisis between the federal government and Jubaland, where President Madobe expected the crisis to be resolved according to his political proposals. Still, the federal government paid no heed to his recommendations, which Madobe considered a negative stance from the federal government.

President Mohamud issued an open letter to federal state presidents, affirming his government’s commitment to improving relations with federal states, especially Puntland, and highlighting the federal government’s efforts to enhance relationships with regional states(23).

Second: Security Threats Posed by the New Constitutional Amendments

1. Security Tensions in Federal States:

Following the new constitutional amendments, efforts by federal state presidents to extend their terms by two additional years have dominated the local media, coinciding with the promised direct elections in 2026. This idea will undoubtedly anger opponents and politicians in those states, particularly in Jubaland and South West Somalia, potentially rekindling scenarios of confrontations and security disturbances, bolstering opposition to the constitutional amendments against the federal government.

2. The Risk of Dividing the Armed Forces:

If the opposition and the federal government fail to agree on a specific mechanism for implementing or rejecting the constitutional amendments, it could lead to significant divisions within the Somali army, with factions supporting or opposing the amendments. This is due to the army’s composition of clans and tribal militias, which do not necessarily pledge allegiance to the federal government but may follow the demands of tribal or political leaders in case of exacerbated crises and conflicts among the political components in the country.

3. An Opportunity for Al-Shabaab:

Al-Shabaab, currently under military pressure from the Somali army and tribal militias, may benefit from intensified conflicts between the federal government and the opposition and state presidents. This could lead to a reduction in military operations against Al-Shabaab, providing them a golden opportunity to regroup and regain territories seized by regular and tribal forces, considered a military and political setback for the federal government.

Conclusion

In Africa, amending constitutions is a challenging process that inevitably causes political noise, uproar, and protests on all fronts. These constitutional amendments, whether approved by the parliament or through popular referendums, are often seen as a means for the president to dominate other state components, including political parties and legislative and executive councils

. In Somalia, the recent constitutional amendments quickly took a new turn and were interpreted as part of a power struggle to marginalize the opposition and strengthen the presidency’s influence. Instead of paving the way for political reforms and security stability, these amendments could potentially turn the situation upside down, exacerbating conflicts and tensions in a country still suffering from the legacies of a military state, civil war, and political and tribal divisions. Abandoning the 4.5 clan-based quota system, which has been the basis for distributing key positions and wealth in the country for a short period, is a difficult and challenging attempt. These constitutional amendments could set the stage for a new beginning of political chaos and instability if political parties and stakeholders do not agree on specific mechanisms to implement a shared roadmap for transitioning to a direct voting system, avoiding a new trap of political and security chaos.