The ongoing developments in Syria, particularly the offensive launched by armed factions against the Syrian army in the northern and central parts of the country, have revived memories in Iraq of the fall of Mosul in 2014 to the terrorist organization ISIS. This concern is rooted in two key issues: first, the situation in Syria could reactivate ISIS, whether from outside Iraqi borders or from within. Second, Iraq fears that the regional escalation could make it a target for further chaos following Syria, especially if it is placed on Israel’s list of future targets.
In this context, Iraq is taking several preemptive measures, including security protocols, especially tightening border security with Syria, as well as engaging with regional and international actors, particularly coordinating with both Iranian and Syrian sides.
Iraq’s Security Approach:
Iraq’s approach to the ongoing developments in Syria is primarily security-focused, which can be summarized as follows:
- War on Terrorism: Based on an analysis of security and military discourse and Iraqi movements, it seems that the primary concern is the war on terrorism, specifically targeting ISIS. Iraq claims to have eliminated what it termed the “Wali of Iraq” in ISIS, in addition to several senior leaders of the organization, through a joint operation with the international coalition against ISIS, approximately one month before the current developments in Syria.
Consequently, the Iraqi side does not address other security dimensions, such as the military supplies transported by Iran to Syria through Iraq, although it is believed that Israel and the United States are monitoring Iranian movements more closely than ever following the October 2023 attacks, leading Israel to increase its strikes accordingly.
Notably, the Iraqi army is currently leading the security scene, without neglecting the role of the “Popular Mobilization Forces” (PMF), which are collaborating with the army to secure the borders. The military has bolstered its border forces with three brigades, in addition to two brigades from the PMF.
This effort to enhance border security with Syria includes the construction of a long concrete wall over the last two years, which stretches approximately 360 kilometers (covering nearly half the shared border of 610 kilometers), extending from Sinjar to Al-Qaim. It is equipped with thermal surveillance cameras, trenches along the border, fortified watchtowers, and drones to monitor the area.
It can be envisioned that the ground transportation of Iranian weapons to Syria, particularly towards Aleppo, will face significant challenges due to the control of the “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” terrorist factions over the main roads, especially the Aleppo-Damascus route, after taking control of the city of Saraqib in Idlib province. Even if air transport is utilized, similar challenges would arise.
Moreover, smuggling through the Al-Bukamal region may encounter additional obstacles due to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) deciding to cut off routes towards Raqqa as a security measure. Additionally, the U.S. presence in the northeastern part of Syria and within SDF geography will further tighten these measures.
- Multilateral Security Coordination: Naturally, the Iraqi government is coordinating with various parties, even those with conflicting interests at the current stage. It is collaborating with Iran, and the connection between Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani was among the first steps taken by Assad after the armed factions took control of Aleppo.
While the focus on the border is a preventive measure, it is only partial in light of various security issues. Iraqi observers believe it is not sufficient to prevent the contagion of the Syrian situation from spreading to Iraq. Nevertheless, a statement from the military meeting in Iraq emphasized important intelligence operations concerning borders with neighboring countries, indicating coordination with Syria, Iran, and Jordan, though it remains unclear how efficient such an intelligence system can be; that is, it is uncertain whose priorities this collaboration will serve.
Currently, Iranian and American interests are conflicting, which will require the Iraqi government to act as a balancing factor between the two sides rather than merely a “mail carrier” among the various parties. A statement from the White House regarding the ongoing developments in Syria highlights that Iran’s role there is a primary cause of the situation.
Another point of weakness relates to the positions of the Iraqi militias, which do not necessarily align with the official Iraqi stance. Although the common goal is to support the Syrian government, the Iraqi government may not seek direct involvement in Syria, nor does it want Baghdad to be drawn into a conflict due to the actions of uncontrollable outside factions. While the Iraqi government can manage the “Al-‘Atabat Forces,” which indeed operates alongside the army, it cannot exert control over the “Wilayati Mobilization,” particularly the “Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq” militia, which will remain under Iranian command in terms of operations in Syria, especially as this militia acts as the spearhead for Iranian interests following losses sustained by Hezbollah.
The Iraqi government may distribute its role between both sides—engaging with the Syrian issue from a security perspective, collaborating with the U.S. and the international coalition on terrorism, while simultaneously supporting Iranian actions in Syria to secure the Syrian regime’s position there.
An additional challenge relates to sectarian balances, which is a crucial factor in Iranian and allied policies. They may perceive a significant Sunni weight in Syria favoring “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” as detrimental to the sectarian balance established by Iran and its proxies in Syria over almost a decade. If this does not alter those dynamics, at minimum, it could motivate ISIS to rise again against those Shiite militias in Iraq.
The Concern of Regional Escalation:
Israel is closely monitoring Iraq in the aftermath of October 7, 2023, viewing it as a pro-Iran arena and a critical logistical factor in the Iranian military structure in the region. Recently, there has been recurring speculation in local reports about the possibility of Iraq entering direct confrontation with Israel. Several indicators can be considered in this context:
- Syria has been the main link between Iraqi militias and Iran since the 2014 crisis, which predates the Gaza crisis. Many Iraqi militias operate in Syria beyond the control of the Iraqi state, yet they remain under its responsibility and sometimes act against the government’s direction. In this regard, the Iraqi cleric Ali al-Sistani had issued a fatwa demanding that weapons should be confined to the state, without any genuine response from those allied factions.
- Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has asserted in his political speeches that Iraq is among the arenas with which Israel is in conflict and from which it receives threats. Additionally, the U.S. administration announced last November that it had been working to prevent Israel from conducting military operations in Iraq in response to attacks by the so-called “Islamic Resistance Factions.” This could imply that Washington may not intervene if Israel undertakes such a step. However, if Tel Aviv currently perceives that other parties might engage in conflict with Iraqi factions, it may let “pottery break potteries.”
Militia Threat:
The militias operating outside state control remain a significant challenge for Iraq, particularly concerning their roles beyond the country’s borders. They will be difficult to contain as long as there is Iranian demand for their activities, especially given the strong sectarian link. For example, leaders of the “Wilayati Factions” threaten to become involved in the Syrian arena if “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” targets shrines in Syria, in retaliation for remarks attributed to “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani, who stated, “We will not stop until we reach Damascus.”
The current situation in Syria and its implications for Iraq might temporarily hinder Israel from engaging in direct confrontation in Iraq. However, if Iraqi militias elevate their threat levels against Israel, this could alter the situation, prompting actions to target them in Syria.
Terrorism could pose the primary danger threatening Iraq, considering that terrorist organizations are in a competitive state and may see the situation in Syria as an opportunity to reestablish themselves in previously occupied territories, including, of course, Iraq.
