The Centrality of Abiy Ahmed’s Political Doctrine in Ethiopia’s Maritime Access Issue

Conflicts are often collective phenomena in their impact, but sometimes the influence of an individual actor becomes evident. This influence can be driven by various factors that shape the organized representations of certain traits in the actor’s mind. Among these factors, the “belief system” emerges as a key cognitive variable in explaining behavior, representing a coherent set of values and beliefs.

In highly centralized states, especially those lacking regulatory and institutional constraints, the impact of the political leader is particularly clear. Given their position at the top of the state’s hierarchical leadership, their “belief system” plays a central role in policymaking and conflict management, potentially reinforcing biased behavior instead of optimal decision-making.

Ethiopia appears to be a significant example of this situation. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is a prominent political leader and decision-maker who assumed office in April 2018 after significant changes within the ruling elite. His philosophical ideas and statements provide a basis for reconstructing the key elements of his political belief system, particularly concerning issues in the Horn of Africa, with a focus on the conflict over seaports and military bases, alongside Ethiopia’s renewed ambition to gain access to the Red Sea.

This paper argues that the centrality of Abiy Ahmed’s political doctrine has a clear impact on the Ethiopian maritime access issue. Based on this premise, the paper seeks to identify the foundational aspects of Abiy Ahmed’s belief system and build upon the philosophical and practical variables that shape his political beliefs on this matter.

The Issue of Maritime Access

After Ethiopia lost its maritime access in the 1990s with Eritrea’s independence and the dissolution of the Ethiopian Navy, Djibouti’s port took over Ethiopia’s foreign trade at a significant economic cost. Successive Ethiopian governments have worked on programs aimed at enhancing foreign trade through land connections with neighboring countries, including the construction of roads and their linkage with railway networks, thereby accessing their seaports.

Upon taking power, Abiy Ahmed’s government made significant efforts to regain maritime access both commercially and militarily. In the first months of his administration, plans were revealed to build and develop a naval force. Under the peace agreement with Eritrea in July 2018, Abiy aimed to regain access to the Assab and Massawa ports in exchange for returning disputed lands to Eritrea. However, these plans quickly stalled as his government became entangled in local and regional conflicts, notably the civil war in the Tigray region and military skirmishes along the Sudanese border.

The Tigray War forced Abiy’s government to seek alternatives to the Djibouti port after Tigrayan rebels seized control of the main roads connecting Addis Ababa to the port. This led his government to sign agreements with Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti to secure trade facilities at their seaports.

In late 2023, Abiy heightened his neighbors’ concerns by affirming Ethiopia’s need for maritime access, prompting the Horn of Africa governments to emphasize that sovereign control over their coastlines was non-negotiable. These concerns were renewed in early 2024 when Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with the Somaliland region, granting Ethiopia maritime access and leasing part of the coastline to the Ethiopian Navy. In exchange, Ethiopia reportedly recognized Somaliland’s independence, though Addis Ababa has not confirmed this, which Mogadishu viewed as a hostile act.

At Abiy’s request, Turkey, with Somali approval, recently initiated efforts to defuse the escalating crisis through mediation focused on “ensuring Ethiopia’s maritime access through Somalia while recognizing Somalia’s sovereignty over its territory.”

The Basis of Abiy Ahmed’s Belief System

This section examines the key factors that formed the philosophical framework of Abiy Ahmed’s belief system and how his upbringing in a historically marginalized community contributed to shaping the centrality of his beliefs, which guide his foreign policies and overall political actions.

1. Background and Career Progression

Abiy Ahmed was born on August 15, 1976, in the town of Beshasha in the Oromia region, western Ethiopia, to parents of different ethnic and religious backgrounds: Tezeta Wolde, an Orthodox Christian of Amhara ethnicity, and Ahmed Ali, a Muslim Oromo (Oromos are the largest ethnic group in the country, with a Muslim majority). Abiy was the sixth child of his mother and the thirteenth of his father. He married Zinash Tayachew, who, like him, served in the Ethiopian Defense Forces, and he is multilingual, speaking English, Tigrinya, Amharic, and Oromo.

Abiy’s mother had a profound impact on his personality, seemingly instilling in him a strong self-belief. He expressed this during his inaugural speech in 2018, stating that she was “the first to predict his leadership of Ethiopia someday.” She named him “Abiyot” (an Amharic word meaning “revolutionary”) in honor of the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie two years before his birth. His family was relatively well-off; his father farmed coffee and owned land and shops, but the nationalization policy following the emperor’s ouster left Ahmed Ali with only his home, shops, and many children to feed.

As the Derg communist government’s repression intensified, Ahmed Ali joined the Oromo Liberation Front and encouraged his young son to change his name from “Abiyot” to “Abiy” to avoid public and political conflicts. At the age of 15, Abiy joined the Oromo Liberation Front at a time when every major ethnic group in Ethiopia boasted an armed liberation movement. After Eritrea’s official secession in 1993, Abiy matured in a country fighting for survival and unity.

After the fall of the Derg regime and the establishment of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1991, Abiy served in the National Defense Forces and later participated in a UN mission from 1995 to 1997 to maintain peace in Rwanda, which had just emerged from genocide. In 2007, he was appointed head of the Information Network Security Agency, responsible for cybersecurity in Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian-Eritrean War (1998–2000), in which Abiy fought on the front lines in the border town of Badme, was a personal tragedy for him. In his 2019 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, he recalled how his unit was entirely wiped out by an Eritrean artillery attack, leaving him as the sole survivor among his peers.

Abiy entered politics in the early 2000s and was elected to parliament in 2010 as a member of the Oromo Democratic Party. He was briefly appointed Minister of Science and Technology in 2016 before becoming Deputy President of the Oromia region and later its Secretary-General in 2017.

He became Prime Minister in April 2018 following the sudden resignation of his predecessor, Hailemariam Desalegn, amid unprecedented popular protests demanding political and social reforms, led primarily by the Oromo ethnic group, to which Abiy belongs and which has historically complained of marginalization.

At the start of his tenure, Abiy implemented a series of wide-ranging political and social reforms, transforming the ruling system from an ethnic coalition to the “Prosperity Party,” which brought together strong ethnic alliances while simultaneously dismantling the influence of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) within the state.

2. Religious Affiliation

Abiy was born to a Muslim father and an Orthodox Christian mother, later converting in his twenties to Pentecostal Christianity, which was an unusual move for someone from his background and symbolized a significant religious transformation in his country.

Abiy’s religious conversion coincided with his transition from military life to politics, where he participated in peace-building initiatives and conflict resolution between Muslims and Christians in his hometown of Beshasha. In 2017, he earned a Ph.D. with a thesis on inter-religious conflict in the Jimma region. He was also the first Ethiopian Prime Minister to join Muslims for a Ramadan Iftar, making his mediation in religious conflicts and emphasis on Ethiopia’s multi-religious character part of his political capital.

Abiy frequently uses religious language in his public speeches, including the phrase “God bless Ethiopia and its people,” and has likened his country to “Christ… who will rise and emerge victorious.” He is known to tailor his religious rhetoric according to the audience. When meeting the Ethiopian Orthodox community in Washington in 2018, he said, “We cannot imagine Ethiopia without the Orthodox Church, it is the nation itself.” However, when addressing the Ethiopian Muslim community in Virginia, he stated, “Islam has a long and rich history in Ethiopia, and Muslims are an integral part of our social fabric. I tell you what Caliph Abu Bakr told the Muslims: If I do well, help me; if I do wrong, correct me.”

While the Ethiopian constitution enshrines the principle of secularism, Abiy’s approach to using religion seems distinctly Machiavellian. He once stated, “The Ethiopian people are deeply loyal to their religion. Its Muslims and Christians adhere strongly to their religious doctrines. Thus, controlling these religions helps control the public and organize the political landscape, legal institutions, and other social values.”

Abiy Ahmed’s Philosophical and Operational Doctrines

This paper uses the “Operational Code” as a methodological approach to study the role of leaders’ belief systems in policy-making. The Operational Code is defined as a set of core political beliefs, including “philosophical beliefs” about political life and “operational beliefs” about the optimal way to achieve goals.

The Operational Code provides answers to a set of belief-related questions, which are crucial in extracting the core dimensions of an individual’s political belief system and understanding its importance in different political situations.

1. Key Philosophical Doctrines of Abiy Ahmed

Abiy Ahmed’s formative years were marked by conflict, both locally, with struggles for power and ethnic grievances, and regionally, with the persistent

tension between Ethiopia and its neighbors. These conflicts have shaped Abiy’s view of the world as a place of constant strife and competition, where power dynamics and alliances are fluid, and stability is a rare commodity.

His belief in Ethiopia’s historic and rightful place as a dominant power in the Horn of Africa underpins his approach to foreign policy. This is coupled with a deep conviction that Ethiopia’s survival and prosperity hinge on its ability to assert itself in the region, particularly in securing access to the sea, which he views as a matter of national security and sovereignty.

Abiy sees himself as a visionary leader, destined to restore Ethiopia to its former glory and lead it towards a future where it is not only secure but also a regional leader. This belief is reinforced by his religious faith, which he interprets as a divine endorsement of his mission.

2- Major Beliefs of Abi Ahmed’s Performance

Abi Ahmed’s foreign policy revolves around achieving the goal of maritime access, through his government’s efforts to gain influence over the management of the five main ports in the Horn of Africa (the ports of Djibouti, Massawa, and Assab in Eritrea, Berbera in Somaliland, and Lamu in Kenya).

However, Abi Ahmed does not have a single, uniform political vision for achieving maritime access. It can be said that the contents of his vision differ between what he proposed in the philosophy of “synergy” at the beginning of his rule and the “National Interest of Ethiopia” document proposed by his government at the end of 2023.

The concept of “synergy” is based on three interconnected pillars: building a strong democratic system, a vibrant economy, and regional integration with openness to the world. Regarding the third pillar, he believes that interdependence reduces the likelihood of conflicts, and to illustrate this, he often uses an African proverb: “If you want to go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go together.” The “National Interest” document is based on a list of priorities, including:

• Cooperation with regional countries to ensure access to the ports.
• Enhancing Ethiopia’s regional influence and its interests in the Red Sea.
• Securing Ethiopia’s right to use the Nile River.
• The African Union having final authority over water, sea, and coastal resources in Africa.

Nonetheless, Abi Ahmed does not rule out entering into a “calculated” regional risk, but he usually mixes political realism with determination to achieve goals. For example, in light of Ethiopian-Eritrean tensions at the end of 2023, he stated that “Ethiopia has never invaded any country and will not do so in the future,” despite his previous talk about demographic links and historical maps that support Ethiopian claims to Red Sea ports in Eritrean territory.

This does not mean he rules out using force for maritime access purposes. He believes that depriving Ethiopia of its “natural rights to direct access to the Red Sea” means that “entering into conflict is a matter of time,” warning: “If we do not find an alternative through dialogue, it could be dangerous… Ethiopia’s quest for maritime access should be achieved peacefully.”

However, in his view, force is not the only tool for achieving goals; it is a multi-dimensional concept that includes bargaining. This is evident in his discussion about “Ethiopia’s importance as a major water source for neighboring countries” and his proposal to address maritime access by offering compensation, such as “sharing the benefits of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam or obtaining a percentage of Ethiopian companies’ profits.”

Conclusion

With the paper confirming the validity of the fundamental hypothesis related to the clear impact of Abi Ahmed’s political doctrine on maritime access issues, several conclusions are drawn, including:

Ultimately, Abi Ahmed’s political doctrines indicate that he will not retreat from achieving maritime access goals, which extend beyond Ethiopian national interests related to finding commercial alternatives to Eritrean and Djiboutian ports, to a desire for a military presence on the Red Sea coast. It is likely that these efforts will remain contingent upon his continued stay in power.

Abi Ahmed’s political doctrine did not emerge from nowhere; it is a product of his environment, particularly influenced by his mother’s whisper to him in childhood that he “would be the seventh king of Ethiopia,” alongside his religious belief as a Pentecostal Christian in the ability to achieve miracles, and his belief that he is divinely tasked with resurrecting the Ethiopian Empire, with the Red Sea representing its natural geographical boundaries.

Abi Ahmed’s doctrine revolves around a “central duality” of philosophical and performance beliefs: the “inevitability” of accessing the Red Sea and the optimal use of the Nile River.

Abi Ahmed believes that maritime access is an “existential issue” for his country, and that it has the right to maritime access “peacefully” or by “force,” and that failure to secure maritime access may lead to conflict in the future.

Abi employs “tactical flexibility” in achieving his goals, depending on the nature of stakeholders’ responses, as he has shown a tendency to retreat when faced with solid positions, and at times uses the principle of “bargaining.”

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