The British’s Social and Cultural Structures

By Boudinar Imene

Boudinar, Imen. Social Constructivism in Explaining British Policy Towards the European Union. Doctoral thesis, University of Algiers 3, Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, Specialty: Regional Studies, 2023–2024.

          To start with, in the discipline of International Relations, there are few topics that have been as condemned, misunderstood or poorly utilized as geopolitics. Despite a recent revival of interest, a negative attitude still manifests itself in the early twenty first century.

           In our unstable world, group politico-territorial identities are powerful realities, but geographers have mostly neglected them. The elements and procedures that go into recognizing such territorially linked identities are examined, with a focus on scale and perception. The “legitimacy” of a group’s politico-territorial identity is determined by the level of abstraction and the perspective of the definer. The fundamental issue is determining what constitutes a nation. A nation is just a regionalism at one level of abstraction, but many groups embrace the concept of nation as actuality. Several related topics are also explored in order to grasp the interplay between these points.

           Moreover, in 1975, the United Kingdom reinforced its desire to join what was then known as the Common Market in a referendum. People decided to keep the country’s membership, which it had gained just two years before, by a margin of slightly over two to one. That appeared to be the end of the subject; however the UK was afterwards hesitant to embrace some of the ensuing steps toward tighter European integration. However, during the previous parliament, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), whose main goal was to call a referendum on EU membership in order to obtain a mandate to exit, went from being a minor player in British politics to becoming the third most popular party.

          But what motivates voters’ sentiments toward this issue? Previous study suggests that perceptions regarding the EU, not just in the United Kingdom but across the EU, are shaped by two groups of challenges. The first is about the EU’s instrumental and, in particular, economic benefits (or lack thereof). Voters who believe their country gains economically from membership in the EU are more likely to vote to keep it, while those who believe it loses out are more likely to vote to exit. The second group of worries relates to the cultural ramifications of EU membership. Voters with a strong sense of national identity but little sense of European identity are more likely to question the EU’s right to “meddle” in their country’s affairs, to be concerned that the EU’s activities are endangering their country’s distinctive culture, and to be concerned about the impact of EU migration. As a result, they are more inclined to desire exit from the EU.  Others, on the other hand, feel a sense of European identity and may even appreciate the EU’s impact on their country’s culture and the ability to make decisions collectively.

         Additionally, identity, a term that was not yet included in Williams’ important Keywords: a vocabulary of culture and society (1976), has become a major watchword since the 1980s. Traditional territorialized battles over democracy, political status/citizenship and wealth have been complicated by the struggle over ‘race’, ethnicity, multiculturalism, gender, recognition and a new symbolic economy characterized by the production/marketing of images.

         Above all, the identity discourse has emerged concomitantly with such arguments that the world, particularly the western world, is moving towards a ‘forced’ individualization: people’s lives are increasingly being left as their own responsibility, so that people shape their lives and environments through personal identities rather than through categorizations such as nationality, class, occupation or home region.

          In this chapter, the study is focused on highlighting the importance of geographical, historical, and political aspects of the British social and cultural structures.  In addition to this, in this chapter we tent to clarify the importance of location, identity, norms, language, and religion in shaping national interests and more than this, the foreign policy and behavior of a state.

          It is highly important to mention that Britain is an island and geographically speaking is not related to Europe as a whole continent make them different from Europeans and help them to increase the sense of adventure and discovery what is beyond the water, this pushed them in the past to build up a strong army and established a fleet in order to conquer the world and being the strongest and the empire on which the sun never sets. The EU referendum in the United Kingdom is the result of both long and short-term historical circumstances. The United Kingdom has never been a happy member of the European Union. Because of a fundamentally different history than its continental counterparts, a distinct experience during World War II, and a different sense of its position in the world, Britain stood aside throughout the early years of European integration, it is artificially linked not naturally through the English Channel.

        These distinctions spawned national narratives, which enshrined those distinctions in what we would call the national mindset. Even after entering the EU in 1973, Britain has been an uneasy partner, opting out of many crucial developments such as the Euro currency, the Schengen passport-free zone, and a variety of EU laws.

Section One: The main Determinants Shaping the British Social and Cultural Structures

              In 2001, the British Geographer Brian Blouet*[1] claimed that “The history of geopolitics is a history of bad ideas sometimes mad ideas that have led countries to wars and recessions.” What he omitted in his assertion is any understanding that geopolitics can do two important things: first, it describes geographical patterns of political history; and, second, it formulates explanations which suggest the contemporary and future political relevance of geographical configurations and locations. Thus, it is possible to evaluate how geography conditions, but does not determine, political relations and outcomes.

In short geopolitics, if properly understood, can give judgment in practical conduct.

1-The Role of Geographic factors in Shaping the British social and cultural structures

            Contrary to previous arguments, however, people’s awareness of being part of the global space of flows seems to have generated a search for new points of orientation, efforts to strengthen old boundaries and to create new ones, often based on identities of resistance. It is argued that collective action cannot occur without a distinction between ‘us’ and the ‘other’ but identity movements do not always base their activities on difference as it may be strategically beneficial to stress similarities.

A-Geographical situation of Britain

          The United Kingdom is a sovereign state off the shore of mainland Europe’s northwestern coast. The United Kingdom occupies the majority of the British Isles archipelago, with a total size of approximately 248,532 square kilometers (95,960 square miles), and includes the island of Great Britain, the north-eastern one-sixth of the island of Ireland, and numerous smaller neighboring islands. It is the world’s seventh-largest island nation. The continental areas are located between 49°N and 59°N (the Shetland Islands reach approximately 61°N) and 8°W to 2°E longitudes. The Prime Meridian is defined by the Royal Observatory in Greenwich, in south-east London. The United Kingdom is situated between the North Atlantic and the North Sea, and is only 35 kilometers (22 miles) from France’s northwestern coast, from which it is divided by the English Channel. The Republic of Ireland shares a 499-kilometer international land border with it. The Channel Tunnel, which was bored beneath the English Channel, presently connects the United Kingdom and France. The British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies have their own articles, which can be found below.[2]

[1] *Professor Brian W. Blouet has been with William & Mary since 1989. He serves jointly in the Department of Government and the School of Education as the Fred Huby Professor of Geography & International Education. He obtained both his BA and Ph. D. from the University of Hull, located in the North Eastern region of England. Professor Blouet published his tenth book, Geopolitics and Globalization (Reaktion Books) and a new edition of Latin America and the Caribbean (with Olwyn M. Blouet) in 2001

[2] Eva Maria Asari, British National Identity and the Dilemmas of Multiculturalism, (Routledge :2008),p28.

The map above is an illustration of the geographical position of the United Kingdom, which is made up of four Territories: Wales, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and England, is seen in the diagram above. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is a country in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

        British voters voted for the UK to withdraw from the European Union in June 2016. Britain’s membership was never in line with their national security, especially after the 2011 London riots. The British voted to leave the European Union because they felt their membership had diminished their worldwide significance. Today, France and Germany play key roles in the world, owing to the presence of this union, which includes a huge empire such as the United Kingdom. Those who believe that the English do not want Great Britain’s glory days to return are erroneous.

         The English believe that the return of their glory will be impossible as long as Britain remains a member of the European Union, which means the return of the Commonwealth policy. The first step must be to leave this union in order to rearrange the internal house in Britain, writes Alexis de Tocqueville.  The Scottish people are among the most proud of their identity and nationalism in the world. This was reflected in the results of the referendum within the countries of the Kingdom. The Irish people are no less proud than the Scots of their national identity and independence from the UK. And, the Scottish referendum for independence was a threat for British transitional integrity.[1]

B-Geography and identity

          Traditional approaches to regions and regionalism often celebrated the primordial nature of regions, accentuating their ‘personality’ and the harmony/unity between a region and its inhabitants. Regional geographers were deeply involved in power-knowledge relations when creating bounded ‘orders’ on the earth.

          Relph Ted (1976) provides one of the best analytical accounts of place identity. Critical and feminist geographers have reflected spatiality as part of identity formation. Identity is a key to understanding (ethno) regionalism, nationalism and citizenship for political geographers IR scholars.

         Localized identities are among the most dynamic bases for both progressive political mobilization and reactionary, exclusionary politics. Not only are places/place-based identities contested but also current views on what place or identity mean. The key question in understanding regional identity is how can the sociospatial be conceptualized in relation to the ‘production’ of the individual/collective and vice versa .This ‘dialectics’ introduces action that stems from two intertwined contexts: ‘from above’ and ‘from below’.[2]

1- The Definition on Identity

        A key component of human activity is identity. Well-being depends on having a strong psychological and social identity. Identity threats are serious threats that frequently cause emotional emotions. The memories, experiences, connections, and values that shape one’s sense of self are all included in identity. Even as new characteristics are produced and assimilated into one’s identity, this amalgamation develops a consistent sense of which one is through time.

           Identity can signify many things in many contexts, but for the purposes of this report, the following are pertinent:

In philosophy, identity has been extensively examined, with an emphasis on personal identity difficulties as well as identity as permanence of anything, as being recognised and definable. Although the philosophy of personal identity is a vast field, some of the most important issues are whether there is a persistent identity over time, the significance of personal continuity, the relationship between numerical identity (being the same person) and qualitative identity (being similar to a past or future self), the connections between our minds and bodies, and whether there is even such a thing as a self.[3]

C-The Geopolitics of the British Isles

         First, it marked the beginning of the end of a sectarian zero sum game that has blighted Northern Ireland politics for too long. Second, the decision by the Conservatives to put up parliamentary candidates in Northern Ireland was ground breaking. Geography is inescapable and yet it was the abuse of geography for ideological reasons that were responsible, in part, for this zero sum politics taking root in Northern Ireland in the first place. Politics must be done within geography. It cannot help but be influenced by physical constraints and opportunities.

          Second, the geographical closeness of Ireland to the British Isles is a fundamental fact. The history of the two islands for many centuries is sufficient proof that their destinies are indissolubly linked. It is those facts which govern the problem of British and Irish relations. De Valera’s response was that geography is not destiny; it merely conditions other factors that unfold within a geographical framework.[4]

          Third, there are many historical parallels between the two parts of the United Kingdom. For example, the industrial revolution that only the North of Ireland benefited from had its origins in Scotland. The history of the word Scotus dates back to long before the seventeenth century Ulster Plantation.

          Then, Sir Halford Mackinder’s* 1902 book, Britain and the British Seas, describes a double symmetry of geopolitical relationships within the British Isles. The lowland gap between the southern end of the Pennines, and the northern part of the Welsh Uplands is often referred to as the Cheshire Gap.[5]

           In short, if the United Kingdom’s democratic politics are not to be subservient to sectarian politics, geography must underpin them.

          The geography is a highly important element in terms of analyzing and contextualizing the British policy, because the island culture and its sea power made the British different from Europe, they did not feel that they belong to the European continent, they are socially different for Europeans, they had developed the sense of superiority as if they were better than Europeans because they belong to a strong monarchy. The British Empire had made several wars throughout time. Also, there is not a natural channel between Britain and the rest of Europe.

           Throughout the nineteenth century, the British North American colonies, which remained under British administration following the foundation of the United States of America, continued to attract enormous numbers of settlers. While the majority of the country was colonized by British immigrants, Quebec’s predominantly francophone population remained a significant religious and linguistic minority with its own ethnic identity.

           Accurately, Quebec, on the other hand, was united with Upper Canada by an Act of Union in 1840, and the territory was further expanded when the Dominion of Canada was established in 1867. During the settlement process, indigenous people were displaced, and they finally made up a small percentage of the population.

          In addition, as the British sphere of influence expanded, the concept of imperial purpose became a major component in domestic British society. The ‘Great Exhibition of Works of Industry of All Nations’ (1851) brought the empire to London, reinforcing the British audience’s perception of their own national identity as an imperial power.[6]

          Furthermore, works like Charles Dilke’s Greater Britain (1869) and J.R. Seeley’s The Expansion of England (1883) linked empire to Britishness, or more specifically, Englishness, and argued for the value of Britain’s overseas possessions as well as the English’s unique ability to rule over other people in the decades that followed. John Ruskin explored England’s fate in his first lecture at Oxford University in 1870.[7]

         Besides that, he stated that England “must find colonies as soon and as far as she is able, formed of her most energetic and worthy men; – seizing every piece of fruitful waste ground she can set her foot on, and there teaching these her colonists that their chief virtue is fidelity to their country, and that their first aim is to advance the power of England by land and sea.”[8]

        Britain’s participation in the second Boer War (1899-1902), the culmination of a long era of conflict in southern Africa, took place near the end of the nineteenth century. Volunteers from around the Empire fought on the British side, and the war ended with the defeat of two Boer republics. It was a costly victory, as British “scorched earth” tactics and the use of detention camps resulted in a huge number of Boer casualties, both military and civilian. The initial excitement for the war among the British people and the Empire as a whole dissipated quickly.

         There was no immediate challenge to the Empire, which would continue to expand in the coming decades, but we can see early signs of the political, military, and cultural forces that would eventually bring it down in a fight termed “the first of the twentieth century’s anti-colonial guerrilla warfare.”[9]

D- Landscape and Identity as Expression of National Character

         At the level of international relations, geopolitics is a way of analyzing foreign policy that uses geographical characteristics to comprehend, explain, and forecast international political behavior.

         The most important contribution of geography to the study of national character is appraising the terrain as it reflects the culture of a people. A recent study of the English landscape, co-authored by an American and an English geographer, is illustrative.[10]

         Nationalism is a basically geographical philosophy in that it seeks to unite a self-identified group of people as a “nation” within a sovereign, limited geographical area “state.” Because national identities cannot be completely imagined without the presence of a nationalist territorial ideology, they must continually contend with their spatial representations. Spaces contain limits, texture, and are loaded with meanings that represent many facets of national identity. Within these places, national identities vary substantially, with national identities expressed at the geographic core differing greatly from those displayed at the periphery. Borderlands are formed by the limits of national groups, each with its own sense of identity.[11]

           The largest failing of the 2016 European referendum campaign, which may be blamed on both sides, was the inability to define a coherent view of Britain’s geopolitical relationship with Europe. This is not to say that geopolitics in its contemporary sense which is understood as a synonym for worldwide strategic rivalry. Rather, he is referring to classical geopolitics, which is a synthesis of three subjects: geography, history, and strategy. It emphasizes specific geographical tendencies of political history. It combines geographical linkages with historical causality. It can generate explanations for the current and future political significance of particular geographical configurations.[12]

         What distinguishes geopolitics is that it disregards the artificial limitations of disciplinary knowledge; classical geopolitics embraces a synthetic approach to addressing policy challenges and dilemmas. Furthermore, neither the problems nor the issues respect those artificial borders, nor do the solutions.

       Sir Halford Mackinder* was the British thinker responsible for developing geopolitical concepts that are still relevant to Britain’s future relationship with Europe. He was a polymath, a rare breed in British public life. In 1926, he founded the University of Reading and established the School of Geography at Oxford. He was also the London School of Economics’ second Director. Lord Curzon, the then-Foreign Secretary, appointed him British High Commissioner to South Russia in 1919. He was elected to the House of Commons and served as a Scottish Unionist MP for a Glasgow seat from 1910 and 1922.[13]

            Mackinder’s analysis of the historical relationship between the British Isles and Europe has been re-examined. In 1902, he published a book titled, Britain and the British Seas. Britain’s relationship with the rest of Europe is framed by a geopolitical paradox, argues historian Richard Mackinder. He argued that Britain is part of Europe, but not in it. Indeed, analytical terms change, but the point is relevant whether it is France and Germany or the prosperous North and the debt-burdened South. In fact, Boris Johnson has yet to demonstrate that he understands the geopolitical relationship between Britain and Europe. Mackinder, if he were alive today, would have acknowledged the pertinence of the single market for the British economy. They constitute the essence of the policy challenge successive Conservative governments have struggled to resolve. [14]

          That is to say that English and Scottish trade was European before it was Atlantic and remained importantly European even when its dynamic became Atlantic. More, geography cannot be an immutable phenomenon. But it could, in certain circumstances, condition other factors, and its meaning, in a political and strategic sense could change.  

           Mackinder: Economic change does not nullify the significance of geography for politics. What is important is the flow of the grain. He argued that politicians are guided by compelling and guiding forces rather than economic wants and geographical opportunities. British decision makers have placed their faith in negotiating in a manner that is redolent of merchant traders struggling for short-term margins. Ivan Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom between 1932 and 1943, recognized the futility of these negotiating codes.

           The options for Brexit are numerous, and there is little political agreement among the four nations that comprise the United Kingdom. However, the geopolitical fact remains: we are a significant but geographically isolated European state with a history that both ties and separates us. This history will not be forgotten, and fundamental changes in Europe must be founded in what Mackinder referred to as “geographical realities” if peace and prosperity are to be ensured.

          The British government’s approach toward Northern Ireland has been one aspect of Brexit that has been the polar opposite of these “geographical realities.” Brexit has produced geographical determinism in that country. The European Union, the Irish government, and Sinn Fein all think that geography determines political destiny. Prime Minister Boris Johnson has accomplished two things by agreeing to a trade border in the Irish Sea. For starters, he has separated himself from the challenge of preserving the integrity of the British state. Second, he has abandoned the fundamental and everlasting challenge of statesmanship: preserving the unity and integrity of the state that you rule. He has disregarded the most important of all lodestars: there is no such thing as a natural condition. A portion of the British state will be controlled jointly with the European Union as early as January 2021.[15]

        “The island of Ireland” refers to the territory of Northern Ireland, not the whole British Isles. Indeed, at its heart lies the false assumption that because Ireland is geographically an island, it presupposes that political unification is both natural and inevitable. It omits and erases the complex network of human, historical, and socioeconomic associations within the British Isles as a whole.

        Despite, before the arrival of COVID-19, the busiest air route in the British Isles was the one between London and Dublin. These arrangements for Northern Ireland have released a gigantic dissonant fireball in the night of Britain’s false post-Brexit prosperity and security after Brexit. Ipso facto, Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom, but no longer fully in it. Also, the British government has imposed on a part of its own territory the same mutability and paradox that geography conditioned with respect to the relationship between the British Isles and Europe. This conscious political decision has resulted in a qualified status for Northern Ireland.[16]

2- The Role of Historical Factor in Shaping the British policy

         British people had the sense of discovery, what is beyond the water, they developed and established a strong ship and discover what is beyond the water. In addition to this, they built up a strong army this led them the ability of invasion all over the world; this is why the UK is called the Empire on which the sun never sets. Due to its colonies, the UK had the opportunity to spread its language, religion, and the white man culture throughout the world.

A- The Glorious Revolution as the Beginning of the British modern monarchy

        The Glorious Revolution refers to a series of events which culminated in the exile of King James II and the ascension to the throne of William of Orange and Mary Stuart.

       1-Charles I, Cromwell and the Parliament

        King Charles runs into some problems with parliament. He split parliament and England religiously. Both political and religious leaders were mad. King Charles was imprisoned and eventually executed. After king Charles, parliament decided to pass the power to lord Oliver Cromwell to rule. He was pro-parliament .things went from bad to worse under Cromwell reign, because he adopted a military dictatorship way of ruling. Finally parliament had enough and killed him off as well.[17]

       2-Charles II (1635-1685)

     King Charles II, son of Charles I became king along with the parliament. He led England a time in the period of restoration to put the monarchy kach into power .After his death his brother James took the power of England.

3-James II

     James received the throne after Charles II death. He was a catholic king and most of the members of the parliament were protestant .He replaced protestant officials with catholic and created laws more tolerant with them. He imprisoned seven bishops for resisting catholic toleration. He had his own army and this was seen as aggressive act by the parliament. When his wife gave birth a son who was baptizied catholic, Whig and Tory parties set out to find a new king. Seven Whig and Tory leaders send an invitation to William Of Orange and his wife, Mary Stuart, to come England and overthrow James II .

[1] David  Knight, Identity and Territory: Geographical Perspectives on Nationalism and Regionalism , thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, Department of Geography,2021, p515.

[2] Anssi Paasi, ‘Region and place: regional identity in question’, Progress in Human Geography,vol27,n4 ,(2003),p445

[3] Nick Bostrom,  and Andres Sandberg, The Future of Identity, The UK’s Government Office for Science, Oxford University, Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School,2011,p7

[4] Anssi Paasi, ‘Region and place: regional identity in question’, ibid,p449

[5] Geoff Sloan, ‘THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE BRITISH ISLES’,Foreign Policy Research Institute , 2011,p3

* Halford Mackinder, full name Sir Halford John Mackinder, was a British political geographer known for his work as an educator and for his geopolitical conception of the world as divided into two camps, the ascendant Eurasian “heartland” and the subordinate “maritime lands,” which included the other continents. In 1920, he was knighted

[6] John Ruskin, ‘Inaugural’ , ed Lectures on Art ,(London: George Allen, 1904), p.37.

[7]Mairie ni Fhalatuin , the British Empire in the 19th century, Gale A Cengage Company,from:  https://www.gale.com/intl/essays/maire-ni-fhlathuin-british-empire-nineteenth-century , visited: 27/09/2020

[8] Mairie ni Fhalatuin , the British Empire in the 19th century, ibid.

[9] Christopher Saunders , and , Iain Smith, ‘Southern Africa’, in The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century, ed Porter, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.618.

[10] Jan Broek, ‘National Character in the Perspective of Cultural Geography’, Sage Publications,(1969),p8

[11] David Kaplan, How geography shapes National Identities, Vol13,N°4, (Routledge: 2011),p349.

[12] Geoffrey Slaon, The Geopolitics of Post-Brexit Britain, foreign Policy Research Institute, June 11 2020, visited on:20/03/2020. 

[13] Geoffrey Slaon, The Geopolitics of Post-Brexit Britain, Ibid.

* Halford Mackinder, full name Sir Halford John Mackinder, was a British political geographer known for his work as an educator and for his geopolitical conception of the world as divided into two camps, the ascendant Eurasian “heartland” and the subordinate “maritime lands,” which included the other continents. In 1920, he was knighted.

[14] Geoffrey Slaon, The Geopolitics of Post-Brexit Britain, Ibid.

[15] Geoffrey Slaon, The Geopolitics of Post-Brexit Britain,Ibid

[16] Geoffrey Slaon, The Geopolitics of Post-Brexit Britain,Ibid

[17]Nacera Djouimai, conference in Anglo-culture of 2ed year LMD, Algeris2, faculty of foreign language,2019.  

Bloodless Revolution

      William sailed to England with an army and landed at Torbay in Devon in November 1688.James II fled to France on December. The December 1688 Bill of rights declared that James II had abdicated and that the Crown had legally passed to William and Mary and their heirs. In January 1689, William called a parliament which passed the necessary legislation that the revolution required to be successful. The Revolution was Glorious because there was not violence.[1]

[1]Nacera Djouimai, conference in Anglo-culture of 2ed year LMD, ibid.

      The figure above clarifies the bases assumptions and tents to the new constitution of the British modern monarchy.

B- The Restoration (1660) and the Glorious Revolution (1688)

1-The Bawdy House Riots:

      Dissenters were unhappy over pressure from the Anglicans (the Church of England) to conform to their ways. Members of Parliament continued to believe that a nation should be united by one religion, and Parliament was enacting laws strengthening the position of the Church of England, laws that held that those who refused to receive the sacrament of the Church of England could not vote, hold public office, preach, teach, attend a university or assemble for meetings. Dissenting Protestants were also bothered by the appearance of Catholicism among the royals: the mother of Charles II and his wife, brother James and his mistresses were Catholics. [1]

       England’s Protestants saw frivolity and debauchery in the court of Charles II. An outburst against immorality occurred in March 1668 with the Bawdy House Riots. Crowds of young men demolished houses of prostitution in London. On the minds of the outraged was what they saw as the immoral behavior of King Charles II and his court, the king having been engaged in extra-marital affairs with high-profile courtesans. Leaders of the riots were indicted for treason, and this propelled hostility toward Charles among the Londoners to a new high. Again in London, republican pamphlets began to circulate. The riots were perceived as anti-royal demonstrations by working-class apprentices, with echoes of the Puritanism of the Cromwellian era.[2]

2-The Alliance Between Charles II and Louis XIV :

           In secret in 1670, Charles II began receiving money from France’s King Louis XIV, in exchange for Charles making an effort to ease laws against Catholics, to gradually return Britain to Catholicism, to support the French in their continuing hostility toward the Dutch, and to convert to Catholicism whenever he deemed it suitable. The French agreed to send Charles the money annually. In 1672, Charles joined his friend King Louis in another war against the Dutch. That same year, Charles declared laws against Dissenters and Roman Catholics suspended a move of dubious legality because the Constitution provided the king with such power only during a national emergency. [3]

        The bargain between Charles and Louis XIV included Charles providing naval operations against the Dutch, and Charles had plans to invade the Dutch republic. Parliament, however, was unenthusiastic about the war and about fighting on the same side as the great defender of Catholicism Louis XIV. The Scots, who had been trading with the Dutch, preferred peace with their fellow Protestants. In 1673, Parliament voted Charles the money he needed to continue his war against the Dutch, but on condition that he reinstate the laws against Dissenters and Catholics. By 1675, the economic burdens of the war and rising opposition to the war by Protestants and Parliament resulted in Charles agreeing to a negotiated settlement with the Dutch.[4]

2-The Popish Plot and the Rise of Political Parties:

          Hostility toward Catholicism continued and, in 1678, rose to hysteria when news of the existence of a plot to kill the king spread ; though fictitious, the said-plot aimed to murder Protestants, to bring a Catholic army to England from across the English Channel and to burn London again. It was also said to include the invading army placing Charles’ Catholic brother, James, the Duke of York, on the throne. [5]

         Fear and certainty about the conspiracy spread. Some Catholics were arrested on suspicion of being participants in the plot. False witnesses appeared, and thirty-five Catholics were executed. To protect the nation from Catholicism, Parliament offered the Exclusion Act. Catholics were to be excluded as heirs to the crown. Charles believed that it had been his right to chose whomever he wanted as his heir. And with fear of another civil war, Parliament divided into separate political organizations: Tories and Whigs.

        The Tories were largely members of the Church of England. They believed that the Exclusion Act violated the monarchy’s power and was leading to another civil war. They favored law and order above all else. They allied themselves with Charles, who was still the head of the Church of England, and they believed that the Church of England was the teacher of the one true religion and an effective shield against both Catholic absolutism and Dissenter rebellion. The Whigs favored parliamentary power over the power of kings, and they were willing to offer Dissenters more participation in government than were the Tories. Tory and Whig were names originating as insults. Tory was an Irish word for a Papist outlaw. Whig was a name for Scottish Presbyterians and cattle and horse thieves. [6]

        When the fallacy of the Popish Plot had been uncovered, Charles dissolved Parliament and ruled without it, living off the money sent from France, and the Exclusion Act barring Catholics as heirs failed to become law. In February, Charles became ill. His Catholic brother, James, summoned a priest who received Charles into the Catholic Church. Then Charles died, and James became King James II of England. Charles was still firmly in control when he died in 1685.

James II:

         At first, things went well between the new king, James II, and the Parliament, the latter granting the former generous revenue to run his government. James emerged believing that he was home free to exercise the power that he thought the Constitution granted him. He moved to remove restrictions that prevented Catholics from holding public office and serving as officers in the military. In a second Parliament, opened in November 1685, he requested funds for a standing army that would have Catholic officers. His Tory allies abandoned him, King James having lost sight of the importance of considering political allies.

          In 1686, James was appointing Catholics to office, and those Protestants who objected he dismissed from office. In 1687, James II issued – without consulting Parliament a Declaration of Indulgence. In theory this declaration offered freedom of religion to all. In reality, it was designed to promote the Catholic Church. Seven Anglican bishops were tried for libel for refusing James’ order to read from their pulpit his declaration removing restrictions on Catholics. Oxford University was converted from an Anglican to a Catholic institution. The alliance that had existed between Charles and the Tories was over. People again saw danger in Catholicism and anti-Catholicism increased in England. [7]

     3-The Glorious Revolution

           James II had only two daughters as possible heirs: Princess Mary and Princess Anne. They were Protestant, and some expected that James, aged 51, would eventually be succeeded by a Protestant heir, but when a son was born to James’ wife, this hope among Protestants was dashed. If nothing were done, the crown would become permanently Catholic. Parliament looked for help from Princess Mary, who was in the United Netherlands.  Mary was married to William III, a member of a royal family originating from Orange just north of Avignon in France. He had become royalty in the Netherlands. He was a Protestant like Mary, and he had been recognized by the Dutch bourgeois oligarchy as head of state (stadtholder) for life. William had been looking forward to Mary inheriting the throne in England and to a greater unity between England and the United Netherlands.[8]

          Now with a son having been born to James, William accepted Parliament’s invitation to him and to Mary to rule in place of James. On November 5, 1688, William landed in England at the head of a large army. It was an invasion supported by a good strategy and circumstances: Protestants rose in support of William and Parliament. In Yorkshire, the Duke of Marlborough, John Churchill and most of England’s army switched their loyalty to William. James lacked sufficient forces with which to resist. He feared for his and his family’s safety, and with his wife and son he went into exile in France, where Louis XIV provided them with a pension. These events were called the Glorious Revolution because they were relatively bloodless in contrast to the civil wars in the mid-1600s.

4-The Bill of Rights:

        In February 1689, Parliament, with Tories and Whigs participating created the Declaration of Rights. In December this was amended and became the Bill of Rights, a bill that embodied terms of Parliament’s offer to William and Mary to rule as joint sovereigns. It was a list of grievances against James II, laws agreed to by William and Mary who then became King William III and Queen Mary II. [9]

         Parliament also passed the Toleration Act : people were no longer to be punished if they were not members of the Church of England, and people were not to be compelled to become members of the Church of England. These laws guaranteeing freedom of worship in Britain were uncommon in Europe. Dissenters, however, were still required to pay tithes (fines) to the Church of England, and Catholics and Dissenters remained barred from public office and the universities. The royal family also lived with restrictions: they were not allowed to marry Catholics. And another act declared that no Catholic could become king or queen. It became illegal to dissolve Parliament without its agreement and the king or queen had no political power nor can he or she control army or justice. Parliament ruled the country.

            In England, the religion of the ruled now determined the religion of the ruler, a reversal of the old tradition that the religion of the ruler determined the religion of his subjects. It was also now recognized that the king was subordinate to Parliament. England now had a truly constitutional monarchy. Rather than a monarchy ruling by divine right, rule was seen as a social contract. God was removed from the political equation. Kingship was seen as empowered by man-made laws rather than godly sanctions.  These laws are still applied up to now, and 1688 represents the beginning of modern British History.[10]

C- The British Empire

          Over the course of around three centuries, the crown of Great Britain and the British government brought a system of dependencies—colonies, protectorates, and other territories from all over the world under their control. This system is known as the British Empire.

        The concept of a “British Commonwealth,” consisting of primarily self-governing dependencies that acknowledged an increasingly symbolic British sovereignty, emerged by the 20th century as a result of the policy of granting or recognizing significant degrees of self-government by dependencies, which was favored by the far-flung nature of the empire. The phrase was codified in law in 1931. Currently, the Commonwealth is a free association of independent states that encompasses former parts of the British Empire.

[1] Jane Samson, Reform and Empire, in The British Empire, ed. Jane Samson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.121.

[2] Nacera Djouimai, conference in Anglo-culture of 2ed year LMD, ibid.

[3] Christopher Saunders , and Iain . Smith, Op.cit, p.619

[4] Nacera Djouimai, conference in Anglo-culture of 2ed year LMD, ibid

[5] Andrew Porter, ‘Religion and Empire’, in The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p229

[6] Nacera Djouimai, conference in Anglo-culture of 2ed year LMD, opc.it.

[7] John Ruskin, Inaugural , Ed Lectures on Art, (London: George Allen, 1904), p34

[8] Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 3rd ed, vol. 2, (London, 1784),p440

[9] Christopher Saunders , and Iain Smith, opc.it, p.600

[10] Mairie ni Fhalatuin , the British Empire in the 19th century, Gale A Cengage Company,from:  https://www.gale.com/intl/essays/maire-ni-fhlathuin-british-empire-nineteenth-century , visited: 27/09/2020

The map above is an anachronous map of every official claim to land that the British Empire has ever held, showing the type of holding that each possession had at the time of its territorial, historical, and/or geographic peak. (Remember that the United States and Oregon Territory shared the Oregon Territory, and some people do not regard the Trust Territories that were taken from Italian colonial administration as being a part of the empire.)

1-Origins of The British Empire

       In the 16th century, Great Britain began its first hesitant attempts to found communities abroad. The creation of settlements in North America and the West Indies was the result of increased maritime expansion in the 17th century, which was fueled by commercial aspirations and competition with France. In addition to colonies in New England, Virginia, and Maryland by the year 1670, there were also settlements in the Bermudas, Honduras, Antigua, Barbados, and Nova Scotia. In 1655, the Hudson’s Bay Company conquered Jamaica, and starting in the 1670s, it established itself in what is now northwest Canada. The Straits Settlements (Penang, Singapore, Malacca, and Labuan) fell under British rule as a result of the East India Company’s expansion of its operations into India in 1600. James Island in the Gambia River became the site of the first British permanent settlement on the African continent in 1661. Even though there had been earlier slave trade in Sierra Leone, it wasn’t until 1787 that the area was annexed by the British.[1]

           In 1806, Britain took possession of the Cape of Good Hope, which is currently in South Africa. Under British rule, Boer and British explorers explored South Africa’s interior.

          The crown primarily governed its colonies in the 17th and 18th centuries through trade and shipping. The colonies were given monopolies for their goods, including tobacco and sugar, in the British market because they were seen as a source of essential raw resources for England according to the mercantilist mentality of the time.[2]

        In exchange, they were required to use English ships for all of their trade and to act as markets for British manufactured goods. A closed economy between Britain and its colonies was established by the Navigation Act of 1651 and subsequent laws; all colonial exports to the British market had to be transported aboard English ships, and all colonial imports had to pass via England.

          This system persisted until it was gradually ended in the first half of the 19th century as a result of the combined effects of the Scottish economist Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776), the loss of the American colonies, and the emergence of a free-trade movement in Britain.[3]

2-British Empire Timeline

         To sum up, British Empire is a global system of dependents, including colonies, protectorates, and other territories, that were incorporated under the control of the British government during a period of three centuries.

        Early in the 17th century, private individuals and trading companies established a number of settlements in North America as well as trading posts in the West Indies, South Asia, and Africa.

       The British conquered Gibraltar in the 18th century, founded colonies on the Atlantic coasts of North America and the Caribbean, and started to expand into India. After winning the French and Indian War (1763), the empire took control of India, secured Canada, and the eastern Mississippi Valley.

        With the acquisition of Malta, Ceylon, and the Cape of Good Hope in the late 18th century, it started to consolidate its position in Malaya. In 1788, the British colonized Australia; later, they did the same in New Zealand. In 1839, Aden was taken control of, and in 1841, Hong Kong.

      Later, Britain was in charge of the Suez Canal (1875–1956). Nigeria, Egypt, the regions that would become British East Africa, and a portion of what would become the Union (later Republic of South Africa) were also gained by Europe during the partition of Africa in the 19th century.

          British mandates in German East Africa, part of the Cameroons, part of Togo, German South-West Africa, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and a portion of the German Pacific Islands were established after World War I.[4]

         After the United States obtained independence, Britain progressively developed a system of self-government for various colonies, as outlined in Lord Durham’s report from 1839. Canada (1867), Australia (1901), New Zealand (1907), the Union of South Africa (1910), and the Irish Free State all received the title of dominion (1921). In 1914, on behalf of the entire empire, Britain declared war on Germany; following World War I, the dominions themselves signed the peace accords and became full members of the League of Nations.

        The “British Commonwealth of Nations,” and later, the “Commonwealth of Nations,” acknowledged them as sovereign nations in 1931 under the Statute of Westminster. Thus, as former British dependencies gained sovereignty while maintaining their ties to the United Kingdom in the middle of the 20th century, the British Empire evolved into the Commonwealth.[5]

3- Commonwealth

        The Commonwealth, also known as Commonwealth of Nations and formerly known as the British Commonwealth of Nations (1931–1949), is a free association of sovereign states made up of the United Kingdom and a number of its former dependencies. These states have chosen to maintain friendship and practical cooperation and recognize the British monarch as the association’s symbolic head.

A-The Establishment

       The British Empire gave way to the Commonwealth as an organic development. In the middle to late 19th century, the empire started implementing “responsible government” in parts of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Ireland. Under this system, the governor could only act in domestic matters on the advice of ministers who had the support of the elected chamber. Growing amounts of sovereignty were acquired by these dependent but self-governing states, and only a British veto could limit their independence.

         These dependent but independent states acquired increasing levels of sovereignty, and only a British veto could limit their independence. These states were to be regarded as “autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations,” according to the Imperial Conference of 1926. The decisions adopted at both that and a second meeting were formalized by the Statute of Westminster (1931), which gave each dominion the authority to manage its own domestic and foreign affairs and to create its own diplomatic corps.[6]

       Membership in the Commonwealth was contingent on fealty to the British king for a while after the Statute of Westminster was enacted. However, the fast rise of nationalism beginning in the 1920s in areas of the empire with people predominately outside of Europe necessitated a reevaluation of the Commonwealth’s purpose.

4-The British Empire in 19^th century:

     The nineteenth-century history of British imperialism shows a process of expansion and consolidation, its success all the more impressive given its bleak origins. Following revolution and conflict in North America, as well as the loss of the thirteen American colonies, the idea of empire had lost much of its appeal by the late eighteenth century. Maintaining an empire was no longer considered necessary for growing and preserving Britain’s international trade, and in 1776, the prominent economist Adam Smith stated that “Great Britain gets nothing but loss from the dominion which she assumes over her colonies.”[7]

            However, even as he was writing, new types of colonial dominance were rising in various parts of the globe. Large numbers of people from across the British Isles migrated to the main “white colonies” (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), building institutions and forms of governance that were similar to those in Britain. In India and Africa, a tiny group of colonial administrators and armed forces enforced British rule in areas where the British had previously had little or no influence.[8]

           The Empire’s nominally held territories were not the only places where the British had influence. Following the First Opium War (1839-42), the Treaty of Nanking granted British commercial operations access to China, as well as giving Britain possession of Hong Kong. Despite the fact that China was never colonized or directly subject to British administration, it remained part of the British “informal empire” of influence until the end of the nineteenth century, when Japan’s rise shifted the region’s power balance.

          Britain had political and commercial interests in Latin America and sections of the Ottoman Empire, and frequently intervened in these areas during the century. In response to the social and political instability that accompanied liberation, British territories became Crown Colonies in the West Indies, reversing the trend toward local autonomy seen in other colonial colonies.[9]

        Britain’s involvement in the second Boer War (1899-1902), the culmination of a lengthy period of conflict in southern Africa, occurred near the close of the nineteenth century. On the British side, volunteers from around the Empire fought, and the war ended with the conquest of two Boer republics. It was a costly triumph, as the British “scorched earth” tactics and usage of concentration camps resulted in a large number of deaths among the Boer people, both military and civilian. Initial excitement for the war among the British people and the rest of the Empire gradually faded.[10]

[1] Charles Dilke, Opinions Of The Press on The British Empire,(London: Chatto and Windus,1899),p10

[2] Charles Dilke,Ibid,p13

[3] Charles Dilke,Ibid,p15

[4] https://www.britannica.com/summary/British-Empire.   Accessed on: 14/04/2019

[5] Steve Pincus, Reconfiguring the British Empire, The William and Mary Quarterly , Vol 69, No 1 ,(January 2012), pp. 63-70 

[6] Steve Pincus,ibid,p73.

[7] Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations , 3rd ed, vol 2 ,(London: 1784),  p.443.

[8] Adam Smith,ibid,p444

[9] Jane Samson, Reform and Empire’, inThe British Empire, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p121

[10]Mairie ni Fhalatuin , the British Empire in the 19th century, ibid.

The map above is an illustration of the British Empire in the 19^th century.

3- The Role of Political Factor in shaping the British Social and Cultural Structures

        The United Kingdom is a devolved unitary state ruled by a parliamentary democracy inside a constitutional monarchy in which the monarch, presently Queen Elizabeth II, is head of state and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, currently Boris Johnson, is head of government. The British government, on behalf of and with the assent of the queen, and the devolved governments of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland exercise executive power. The two chambers of the United Kingdom Parliament, the House of Commons and the House of Lords, as well as the Scottish and Welsh parliaments and the Northern Ireland Assembly, have legislative power. The

judiciary is separate from the executive and legislative branches. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom is the highest court in the country.

         The British political system is divided into two parties. The Conservative Party and the Labor Party have been the two major parties since the 1920s. The Liberal Party, along with the Conservatives, was the other main political party in Britain until the Labor Party rose to prominence.

         While coalition and minority governments have been a feature of parliamentary politics on occasion, the first-past-the-post electoral system used for general elections tends to maintain these two parties’ dominance, even though each has relied on a third party, such as the Liberal Democrats, to deliver a working majority in Parliament in the past century. From 2010 until 2015, a Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition administration served as the country’s first since 1945. Following parliamentary elections on 7 May 2015, in which the Conservative Party secured an overall majority of seats, 330 of the 650 in the House of Commons, the coalition came to an end.

          The United Kingdom’s constitution is uncodified, consisting of constitutional conventions, legislation, and other features. Other countries, particularly those that were once part of the British Empire, have adopted this governing system, known as the Westminster system.

A-The British’s political system

         The current British monarch, Queen Elizabeth II, is the country’s head of state. Despite her lack of active involvement in administration, the Crown remains the source of ultimate executive power over the government. These powers are known as royal prerogative, and they can be utilized for a wide range of actions, from issuing or withdrawing passports to dismissing the prime minister or declaring war. The monarch directly assigned the powers in the name of the Crown, which can be given to various ministers or other Crown officers, and which can be used to circumvent Parliament’s permission.[1]

1-Her Majesty’s Government

        The monarch appoints a Prime Minister as the head of Her Majesty’s Government. The leader of the party with an absolute majority in the House of Commons is chosen to be the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister then selects the other Ministers which make up the Government. All major parties have whips, who try to ensure their members vote according to party policy.

2-The Prime Minister and the Cabinet

        The Prime Minister appoints and dismisses the members of the Cabinet, which is the body of the queen’s Government that makes decisions collectively and is made up of the Prime Minister and other ministers. He also has responsibility over how the Cabinet Agenda is carried out. The Prime Minister, who chairs the Cabinet, even calls for unanimity. The Prime Minister makes the offers, which the members of the Cabinet might accept or reject. This demonstrates how the Prime Minister is distinct from other actors like departmental ministries in terms of power.

       The Prime Minister is the de facto leader of the UK. He or she exercises executive functions that are nominally vested in the sovereign. They are responsible for chairing Cabinet meetings, selecting Cabinet ministers (and all other positions in Her Majesty’s government), and formulating government policy.

         The Prime Minister is the senior Cabinet Minister. They are theoretically bound to make executive decisions in a collective fashion. The Cabinet consists of Secretaries of State, the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain and Ministers without portfolio. Meetings are typically held weekly, while Parliament is in session.[2]

          With a 70-year reign, Queen Elizabeth II is the longest-reigning monarch in British history. The Queen is a constitutional monarch, which means that although she is Head of State, the power to make and pass laws rests with an elected Parliament rather than the Sovereign.

         The Monarch also performs less official tasks as the “Head of Nation” in addition to these State obligations. The Sovereign serves as a focal point for national identity, unity, and pride; it conveys a feeling of stability and continuity; it formally acknowledges success and greatness; and it promotes the notion of volunteerism.

         The monarch, who guards the nation’s Constitution, can utilise these rights to name and remove ministers, call sessions of Parliament, and grant royal assent to legislation approved by those bodies.[3]

      The Army, Navy, and Air Force are under the command of the Queen. The Queen holds numerous honorary grades and military posts. Elizabeth, a princess, served in the military, as did her father and numerous other members of her close relatives.

3- Government departments and the civil services

           The Government of the United Kingdom contains a number of ministries. These are led by a Government Minister who is often a member of the Cabinet. Several government departments have responsibilities that mainly focus on England, with devolved areas having responsibility for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

          Ministers’ decisions are made by senior civil servants working for the Government of the day. The Civil Service’s constitutional role is to support the Government, regardless of which political party is in power. Unlike some other democracies, civil servants remain in post upon a change of Government.[4]

4- The British parliaments

1-House of commons

      There are 650 constituencies in the United Kingdom. Each constituency elects a Member of Parliament (MP) to the House of Commons. At the 2017 general election, all but one – Sylvia Hermon – were elected as representatives of a political party. As of 2019, there are 11 independent MPs, who have chosen to leave their party.[5]

         A government is not formed by a vote of the House of Commons, it is a commission from the monarch. One party usually has a majority in Parliament, because of the use of the First Past the Post electoral system. In exceptional circumstances, the monarch may ask someone to ‘form a government’.

2-House of Lords

        The House of Lords was previously a largely hereditary aristocratic chamber. It is currently midway through extensive reforms, the most recent of which were enacted in 1999. Lords Temporal and Lords Spiritual are two very different types of member. The Lords Spiritual represents the established Church of England and number 26: the Five Ancient Sees.  The House of Lords has the power to review legislation introduced by the House of Commons. The Lords can delay legislation if it does not approve it for twelve months. Use of vetoes is limited by convention and the operation of Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949. However the Lords retain a full veto in acts which would extend the life of Parliament beyond 5 years.   The House of Lords was replaced as the final court of appeal on civil cases within the United Kingdom on 1 October 2009, by the Supreme Court.[6]

B-Scottish Government

         A bill is an idea for a new law or a significant amendment to an already existing one. The Scottish Government is responsible for most bills’ introduction into the Scottish Parliament, and the process starts with the creation of policy. After being approved by The Queen and the Scottish Parliament, a bill becomes a law.

          All matters not explicitly reserved to the United Kingdom Parliament in Westminster under the Scotland Act are the responsibility of the Scottish Government, including NHS Scotland, education, justice, rural affairs, and transportation. It is in charge of a £25 billion budget every year.

         The First Minister is in charge of the government, which is backed up by a number of Ministers who each have their own portfolios and responsibilities. The Queen appoints a member of the Scottish Parliament as First Minister. Following that, the First Minister picks their Ministers (now known as Cabinet Secretaries) and junior Ministers, with Parliament’s assent. [7]

        In a referendum held in Scotland in September 1997, voters approved devolution. The Scottish Parliament was subsequently founded by the UK Parliament’s 1998 passage of the Scotland Act, which became effective in 1999.       The Scotland Act of 1998 makes sure that any laws made by the Scottish Parliament that are incompatible with ECHR rights can be challenged in court and overturned. Ministers in the Scottish Government are “powerless to act” in a manner that infringes on these ECHR rights.[8]

        In a referendum held in September, the devolution plan was adopted by 44.87 percent of voters, or 74.3%. The Scotland Act of 1998, which established an elected Scottish Parliament with power over the majority of domestic policy, was later passed by the UK Parliament.

      Edward III was compelled to sign the Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton on May 1st, 1328, as a result of Robert’s or his war chiefs’ repeated invasions of the north of England, which culminated in the Battle of Stanhope Park, where the English king came dangerously close to being taken. This acknowledged Scotland’s independence and the monarchy of Robert the Bruce. Before it actually occurred in 1707, the idea of uniting the kingdoms of Scotland and England had been floated for one hundred years. Throughout the 17th century, suspicion and mistrust existed between the two nations, preventing the union.

        The Scotland Act of 2016 establishes a variety of financial measures and authorities and grants the Scottish Parliament a number of additional powers. Among these is the delegation of the authority to set rates and bands for earned income under the Income Tax Act.[9]

1-The Scottish Parliament

        In 1999, the Scottish Parliament was founded. There are 129 elected members of it, known as MSPs or Members of the Scottish Parliament. The Scottish Parliament has the authority to enact laws on a variety of topics known as devolved concerns. Some matters involving Scotland that affect the UK or the world continue to fall under the exclusive purview of the UK Parliament.

These are referred to as reserved topics and include social security, immigration, foreign affairs, and the military.

[1] Christopher Marsicano, ‘The Political System of the United Kingdom An introduction to the politics and parties of Great Britain’, Venderbilt University press , (2016),p30

[2] Christopher Marsicano,ibid,p33

[3] ,Jubilee Resource, The Role Of The Queen,Windsor Castle, Royal Collecction Trust,(2018),p3

[4] Jane Samson, Reform and Empire, inThe British Empire’,opc.it,p124

[5] British parliament, history.com editors, from : https://www.history.com/topics/british-history/british-parliament, visited:30/09/2020

[6] British parliament, history.com editors, ibid.

[7] How the Scottish Parliament Works, The Scottish Parliament, Parliamentary copyright, Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body 2014,5th ed,( October 2014),p4

[8] How the Scottish Parliament Works,ibid,p6

[9] https://www.gov.scot/about/what-the-government-does/#:~:text=The%20Scottish%20Parliament,making%20body%20for%20devolved%20matters, accessed on 20/04/2019 at 20h552

The diagram above shows that the Scottish Government is a separate organization from the Scottish Parliament, with a different role and different functions.

2-The Scottish independence’s impact on the UK

        The repercussions of independence, if it happens, might be tremendous, as the Scottish parliament elections show a majority in favor of leaving the UK.

          The Scottish Parliament is the national, unicameral legislature of Scotland. It is located in the Holyrood area of the capital Edinburgh. MSPs are elected for four year terms under the mixed member proportional representation system. Members represent individual geographical constituencies elected by first-past-the-post. The Scottish Parliament was established by the Scotland Act 1998 and its first meeting was on 12 May 1999. The parliament has the power to pass laws and has limited tax-varying capability.

         The resurgence in Celtic language and identity has contributed to forces pulling against the unity of the state. Nationalism (support for breaking up the UK) has experienced a dramatic rise in popularity. The SNP capitalised on the collapse of Liberal Democrat support to win the first ever outright majority at Holyrood. SNP came to power in 2011 and pledged to hold a referendum on Scottish independence. In the wake of the defeat, membership of the SNP surged to over 100,000 – overtaking the Liberal Democrats as the third largest party in the UK by membership.[1]

       In a nutshell, separatist feeling exists in Wales too; furthermore, Wales is underdeveloped comparing England and Scotland

          Both the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the Green Party won 72 seats in the 129-seat parliament, campaigning on a promise to call a second independence referendum for Scotland. In the 2014 referendum, 55% of voters chose to remain in the UK, however after Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic, which has seen the UK experience a high death rate from the disease, opinion polls estimate that support for independence has risen to roughly 50%.[2]

        This raises the chance that a second referendum may result in Scotland becoming an independent country, with the UK losing 8% of its population and roughly one-third of its landmass, as well as having a significant impact on the UK’s global role. Alistair Burnett speaks with Dr Kirsty Hughes, director of the Scottish Centre for European Relations, and Philip Rycroft, former senior civil servant who worked as permanent secretary in the Department for Exiting the European Union from 2017 to 2019.[3]

          The biggest impact will be on perceptions of Englishness among the English themselves, who make up 85 per cent of the UK’s population, and the projection of Englishness as a national identity.

          Scotland has traditionally played a larger role in the international projection of the United Kingdom’s image than its population size would suggest. Scotland has a significant cultural influence on the United Kingdom, and Scottish items are an important element of the British brand; removing them would detract from that brand.[4]

          The most significant impact will be on conceptions of Englishness among the English, who account for 85 percent of the UK population, as well as the projection of Englishness as a national identity. For 300 years, that identity has been submerged into British identity, and Scotland’s exit would initiate a process of reflection whose end is difficult to anticipate, but which, I believe, would have a significant psychological influence.[5]

         According to Kirsty Hughes, it would be a major shock to the rest of the UK, but England is a massive country, and its soft power will continue to exist whether Wales and Northern Ireland are included or not. It will have to reconsider its own identity and what that entails for projecting soft power around the world.

         From the outside, the rest of the United Kingdom would be viewed in a totally different light. When analyze the speech of diplomats and others in the European Union (EU), they said the UK’s disintegration would be a national shame, and some even said it would be retaliation for Brexit. Others are shocked and perplexed by what they see as Brexit’s self-harm, and the thought of this old state dissolving would confirm their belief that the UK is in chaos.

        It would be critical for an independent Scotland and the rest of the UK to form a security relationship as quickly as possible, both militarily and in terms of counter-terrorism and policing. Scotland would be the UK’s second land border, and the integrity of the islands’ defense will be dependent on the two working closely together, therefore the outcome of the independence negotiations will be crucial.[6]

        The United Kingdom’s disintegration could have an impact on the United Nations Security Council. The world has changed dramatically since the Security Council was formed, and Scotland’s departure could be a symbolic watershed moment in the post-World War II order, providing an opportunity for proponents of Security Council reform to raise the question of whether the United Kingdom should remain a permanent member.[7]

          Any impression of a breach in defence capability, even if only briefly, would be welcomed by governments that want to see the UK’s ability to project hard force weakened, therefore the nature of the independence negotiations cannot be overstated. If it was acrimonious, both sides’ security would be jeopardized, and there would be a tendency, as we saw with Brexit, to approach negotiations with a sense of rage.

           Scotland represents about eight per cent of the UK’s economy; however Scotland has one-third of the UK’s landmass and a much larger proportion of the UK’s natural resources, including renewable energy. So what would be the economic impact on the UK of the loss of Scotland?

           It would not be harmed considerably. The loss of Scottish economic capabilities, including as natural resources and some iconic items, as well as its capability in the research base and the abilities of the Scottish population, will inevitably cause some harm. However, because the UK has a far larger economy, these losses would be absorbed and would not have a major impact on the rest of the UK’s economy over time.

          The best precedence for states breaking away from larger groupings and re-establishing themselves would be the Irish a century ago. Ireland has received high acclaim for its diplomacy during the Brexit process, and it has received the support it sought from the rest of the EU, but in Dublin, many remark, “But the UK is family.”[8]

         There is the UK’s Common Travel Area, which an independent Scotland would likely be a part of as well. You can hear discussions of multi-level identity and governance in Ireland, which you can hear to some extent in Scotland. England and Wales could think a lot more about it, but there appears to be a fear that if they do, it will assist the independence movement in Scotland.[9]

3- Britain’s Scottish Future Relationship

      During the course of our investigation, we heard a number of suggestions for how to improve intergovernmental relations in the United Kingdom. These included everything from bettering civil service training to reexamining the Scotland Office’s function. However, witnesses consistently stated that these are primarily technical measures that can only go so far. The basic difficulty, according to what we’ve heard, is how to build and entrench a solid connection between the two governments, one in which both parties trust and respect each other.[10]

         A stronger relationship would not mean that the two governments would no longer disagree. Effective intergovernmental interactions, according to Professor Gallagher, are not the same as intergovernmental agreement, and there are limits to the compromises and resolutions that intergovernmental relations can broker. Professor Gallagher claimed that “people are permitted to disagree,” and that disagreement should not be viewed as a failure of intergovernmental relations in and of itself.

         This is especially true in the situation of Brexit, when the two governments’ policy goals are so dissimilar that, as Professor Gallagher put it, “no system of intergovernmental interactions was going to be able to reconcile them.”[11]

         At a time when cooperation and confidence are most needed, the relationship between the UK and Scottish governments has been put under renewed strain. The current intergovernmental relations structure is unable to withstand the pressures that are being placed on it. While we acknowledge that disagreement between the UK and Scottish governments is unavoidable and acceptable, we feel that the frequency and nature of recent conflicts has been worsened by a fundamental and avoidable lack of confidence in the relationship.

         The two governments must have a strong enough connection to withstand disagreements. We recommend reforms in the remainder of this report to strengthen the machinery and governance systems that enable intergovernmental relations. None of these measures, however, can be successful until trust is reestablished through a fundamental shift in both governments’ methods.[12]

       To sum up the following points highlight the difference between the Scottish Parliament and Government

4-Scottish Parliament

•is the law-making body in Scotland for devolved matters and scrutinises the work of the Scottish Government

• is made up of the 129 MSPs

• elects a Presiding Officer who chairs meetings of the Parliament and represents the Parliament externally

• is located in the Scottish Parliament Holyrood building at the foot of Edinburgh’s Royal Mile.

-Scottish Government

 •is responsible for developing and implementing policy on devolved matters

 • is normally formed from the party holding most seats in the Scottish Parliament

 • is led by the First Minister, and comprises Cabinet Secretaries and Ministers chosen by the First Minister

 • is located in buildings across Scotland, with its main offices in central Edinburgh and Glasgow.

C- Ireland Government

        Ireland is a sovereign, democratic republic with a parliamentary system and belongs to the EU. Ireland is a republic with a constitution and a parliamentary form of government. The President of Ireland, the Dáil Éireann (House of Representatives), and the Seanad Éireann, the two Houses of the Oireachtas, make up the bicameral national parliament known as the Oireachtas (Senate). Ireland departed the Commonwealth of Nations in April 1949 after being declared a republic and given the name “Republic of Ireland.”

         It did not formally affiliate itself with either the Warsaw Pact or NATO. Due to its sovereignty claims over Northern Ireland, which was governed by the United Kingdom, a NATO member, it declined to join. Ireland made a proposal to form a separate alliance with the US, but this was rejected.

         Following the Anglo-Irish War, the majority of Ireland won its independence from Great Britain. The Irish Free State was first established as a Dominion in 1922, but once the Republic of Ireland Act was passed in 1949, it attained complete independence.

       The president and republic were created by the 1937 constitution. As a result, the UK monarch’s role as head of state and the dominion status were terminated. Ireland proclaimed itself a republic in 1949, withdrew from the Commonwealth, and adopted the name Republic of Ireland. Ireland became a member of the UN in 1955.[13]

          The Executive and Assembly of Northern Ireland have powers that are similar to those that have previously been transferred to Scotland. The Northern Ireland Executive is led by a diarchy, with Arlene Foster (Democratic Unionist Party) and Michelle O’Neill (Sinn Féin) most recently serving as First Minister and Deputy First Minister, respectively.[14]

         The Irish Free State was first established as a Dominion in 1922, but once the Republic of Ireland Act was passed in 1949, it attained complete independence. Northern Ireland is still a constituent nation of the United Kingdom. Within the Irish province of Ulster, the region that would become Northern Ireland had a Protestant and Unionist majority that desired to keep ties to Britain. This was largely because of British colonization in the 17th century. It also included a sizable proportion of Catholics and Irish nationalists, though.

In the meanwhile, the British parliament approved the Government of Ireland Act 1920 in 1920. The remaining 26 counties (Southern Ireland) would be governed from Dublin, while the six northeastern counties (Northern Ireland) would be divided into two autonomous UK territories.[15]

            The UK government passed legislation stating that even though the Republic of Ireland was no longer a British dominion for the purposes of British law, it would not be treated as a foreign country when Ireland declared itself a republic in 1949, making it impossible for it to remain in the British Commonwealth.

        No additional border checks on goods travelling between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland were agreed upon during discussions between the EU and the UK (ROI). Avoiding a sharp border between NI and the ROI is the protocol’s main goal makes sure the EU’s single market for products is honest.

          Before the Brexit, it was simple to move goods across this border because both sides abided by EU regulations. Because Northern Ireland shares a land border with the Republic of Ireland, a member of the EU, special commercial arrangements were required after the UK exited the EU.[16]

E-The EU institutions and its characteristics

1- Political:

European Parliament :

      The European Parliament originally had a mostly advisory role in the EU; however, with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, it became an important legislating partner to the Council. The Parliament is currently made up of 785 members, elected directly by the population of the member states once every five years. [17]

         Its major functions are to pass laws in conjunction with the Council and adopt or reject the EU budget. Parliament does not initiate legislation, but it may ask the European Commission to do so. Parliament is also responsible for holding the Commission politically accountable, and members of Parliament may question Commissioners regarding various policies. Parliament also has the power to dismiss the Commission by adopting a motion of censure.[18]

European Commission :

        The European Commission acts as the executive of the European Union, and it is the only body that may propose new legislation. The Commission is made up of 28 commissioners, one from each member state. Each one is appointed in consultation with the member states and Parliament, although the Commission’s purpose is to represent the European perspective as a whole, rather than the perspectives of individual member states.

        A new Commission is appointed every five years. The Commission is divided into departments, each of which is responsible for proposing new legislation and policies in a given area. The Commission also plays a major role in implementing and enforcing EU directives and regulations and it represents the EU in international negotiations.[19]

Council of the European Union :

       The Council of the European Union, also known as the Council of Ministers, is the main legislative body of the EU, along with the Parliament. It is made up of 28 “ministers,” one from each member state, who are assigned specific issue areas. Its chief responsibilities include passing laws (often, but not always, in conjunction with Parliament), coordinating economic, foreign, and criminal justice policy, and making treaties. Member states with larger populations receive more votes, but most decisions require assent by qualified majority voting, which requires not only assent by a majority of member states but also a minimum of 260 (out of a total 352) votes, though some require unanimity.[20]

2- Legal:

European Court of Justice :

     The European Court of Justice is the major judicial body of the EU. It is made up of 28 judges, each one appointed by a member state in consultation with the other member states for six-year terms. For convenience, cases are typically decided by smaller chambers of judges, and the Court is assisted by advocates-general who present the issues of law in the case. The ECJ decides cases arising from EU law including, but not limited to, disputes about interpretation and application of treaties and/or failure to implement EU legislation. It may decide cases arising between member states, EU institutions, businesses, and individuals, and its decisions are binding.[21]

European General Court (formerly Court of First Instance) :

      The European General Court is the lower court to the ECJ. (Prior to the Lisbon Treaty coming into force on Dec. 1, 2009, the court was called the Court of First Instance.) It was created with limited jurisdiction in 1989, but in 2001, its jurisdiction was expanded to cover most issues that can be decided by the ECJ. However, the Court of First Instance does not decide cases brought by the member states. The Court’s decisions are subject to appeal to the ECJ, and like the ECJ, it is made up of at least 28 judges (at least one per member state), each one selected by a member state.[22]

3- Financial:

European Central Bank :

           The European Central Bank is charged with setting and implementing monetary policy and is responsible for issuing the Euro. The purpose of the European Central Bank (ECB) is to maintain monetary stability in the euro area by ensuring low and stable consumer price inflation. Stable prices and low price inflation are considered vital for sustained economic growth as they encourage enterprises to invest and create more jobs, thus raising living standards for Europeans. The ECB is an independent institution and takes its decisions without seeking or taking instructions from governments or other EU institutions.[23]

          The ECB was set up in 1998, when the euro was introduced, to manage monetary policy in the euro area. The primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability. This is defined as a consumer price inflation rate of less than, but close to, 2 % per annum. The ECB acts to support employment and sustainable economic growth in the Union.[24]

European Court of Auditions:

 The European Court of Auditors (ECA) is the independent external audit institution of the European Union. It checks that the Union’s income has been received correctly, that its expenditure has been incurred in a legal and regular manner and that financial management has been sound. It performs its tasks independently from the other EU institutions and governments. In doing so, it contributes to improving the management of European Union funds in the interests of its citizens.[25]

           The European Court of Auditors’ main role is to check that the EU budget is correctly implemented, in other words, that EU income and expenditure is legal and regular, and financial management is sound. This work helps to ensure that the EU is managed efficiently and effectively. To carry out its tasks, the ECA undertakes detailed audits of EU income or expenditure at all levels of the administration of EU funds. It carries out on-the spot checks at the organisations managing the funds, or the beneficiaries receiving them, both in the EU Member States and in other countries. Its findings are published in annual and specific reports, which draw the attention of the Commission and the Member States to errors and weaknesses found, and make recommendations for improvement.[26]

                The European Court of Auditors also gives its opinion on new or revised EU regulations with financial impact at the request by the other EU institutions. The ECA can also issue position papers on other issues on its own initiative.

         The European Investment Bank:

The European Court of Auditors (ECA) is the independent external audit institution of the European Union. It checks that the Union’s income has been received correctly, that its expenditure has been incurred in a legal and regular manner, and that financial management has been sound. It performs its tasks independently from the other EU institutions and governments. In doing so, it contributes to improving the management of European Union funds in the interests of its citizens.

Another key function is for the European Court of Auditors to help the budgetary authority (the European Parliament and the Council) by providing them with an annual report on the implementation of the EU budget for the previous financial year. The ECA’s findings and conclusions in this report play an important role in Parliament’s discharge decision on the Commission’s handling of the budget.[27]

 The European Court of Auditors also gives its opinion on new or revised EU regulations with financial impact at the request by the other EU institutions. The ECA can also issue position papers on other issues on its own initiative.

[1] Sadiya Akram, Recognizing the 2011 UK Riots as political protest, University of Canberra, Australia , Institute for Governance ,2014,p375.

[2] Sadiya Akram,ibid,p380

[3] Bojana Perisic, ‘Britain and Europe: a History of Difficult Relations’, Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, Berlin, (March,2010),p9

[4] Bojana Perisic, ibid, p11

[5] Bojana Perisic,p11.

[6] NiraYuval Davis, ‘Belonging and the politics of belonging’, Patterns of Prejudice, Routledge, Vol40, No 3, (2006),p198.

[7] John  Berghman, ‘Observatory on national policies to combat’, Commission of the European Communities, 2018,p99.

[8] John  Berghman, , ibid, p108.

[9] NiraYuval Davis, ibid,p199

[10] The house of commons, the relationship  between the Uk and Scottish government, House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee, 2019, p 9

[11] The house of commons, the relationship  between the Uk and Scottish government, ibid, p10

[12] The house of commons, the relationship  between the Uk and Scottish government, ibid, p22

[13] Ireland In Brief, A general overview of Ireland’s political, economic and cultural life, Iveagh House, headquarters of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Dublin ,January2013,p30

[14] Ireland In Brief,Ibid,p39.

[15] Cabinet Office, the Northern Ireland Protocol, December 2020,p20

[16] Cabinet Office,Ibid,p24

حسين بوقارة , التكامل في العلاقات الدولية , (كلية العلوم السياسية و الإعلام سلسلة دراسات دولية) ,  رقم 3 , مخبر البحوث و الدراسات في العلاقات الدولية , 2008 , ص82[17]

[18] Elizabeth Bomberg, and  Alexander Stubb, The European Union: How does it work? , (New York: Oxford University press,2003), p46

[19] عائشة خلوفي، تأثير التكتلات الاقتصادية الإقليمية على حركة التجارة الدولية- دراسة حالة الاتحاد الأوربي-، رسالة ماجستير غير منشورة، جامعة سطيف، كلية العلوم الاقتصادية والتجارية وعلوم التسيير، 2011-2012 ،ص 52

[20] Peter Lang, L’idée Européenne : entre guerre et culture, de la confrontation à l’union, (France :Amazon) , 2012, p 118.

[21] Elizabeth Bomberg, and Alexander Stubb, ,ibid,p47.

[22] Olivier Dabène, ‘Principale approches théoriques’, Opalc, 2/11 /2009, http://www.Opalc.org, vu :03/10/2020

[23]Union Européenne, ‘Le traité établissant une Constitution Européenne’, Office des publications de l’UE , Berlin, Allemagne, 2005, p 19.

[24]Union Européenne, ‘Le traité établissant une Constitution Européenne’,Ibid, p22.

[25]Paul Milan, Le Projet d’une Europe politique depuis 1948,ibid, p17.

[26] Olivier Dabène, ‘Principale approches théoriques’,ibid.

[27] Peter Lang, L’idée Européenne : entre guerre et culture, de la confrontation à l’union, opc.it, p122.

F-Britain’s policies towards the UK’s countries

         Liberal democratic governments should legislate without the public justification of policies and decisions. Historically, security has often been shielded from the public eye, confined to the military and secret intelligence. The wider political class was traditionally kept at arm’s length from security governance through mechanisms of official secrecy.

          It is difficult for democratic deliberation on security to proceed in an informed, balanced, and rational way when faced with the rhetorical temptations of scaremongering and scapegoating. At its core it remains an institutionalized part of state authority, arguably the raison d’être of the state itself.

          Proponents of independence call for novel ways of organizing social, political, and economic life. The Scottish referendum created the opportunity to re-examine the workings of every part of the modern state. Would a new beginning offer the chance to create better ways of doing things?

           A single intelligence agency could have been a more efficient way to tackle security issues in a world where the lines between domestic, foreign, and signals domains are increasingly blurred. If ended, this may have posed problems, such as the concentration of powers of state intrusion in a single agency, but it could also have been more efficient.[1]

         Many of the structures and constraints of twenty-first century security governance are deeply embedded in our physical, economic and political landscapes. Embarking on a new path entails a continuing negotiation with the old.[2]

          The 2014 Referendum on Scottish independence which had threatened the territorial integrity and the loyalty to English Monarchy, and this had sparked the debate on every dimension of modern statehood. Aside from Trident, the issue of security was relatively neglected in the campaigns. In this volume Andrew Neal collates a variety of interdisciplinary perspectives on security and constitutional change in Scotland and the UK.[3]

           In EU parlance Scotland is defined as a ‘region’ while the UK is the member state. A more accurate description of Scotland would be as one of the EU’s ‘legislative regions’. Under the 1998 Scotland Act legislative competence over a range of policies was devolved to the Scottish Parliament. Scottish devolution was intended to enable the Scottish Parliament to design policies that better suited the needs and aspirations of Scotland’s economy and society.

         However, the exercise of legislative competence across the range of devolved competences was, and remains, subject to compliance with EU law. Under the EU Treaties each of the policy areas above, in whole or in part, falls within the legislative scope of the EU level of governance. Crucially because domestic law cannot conflict with EU law, EU membership effectively constrains the exercise of powers assigned to regional legislatures across the EU.[4]

          The topic of the overriding authority of EU law over national law is addressed in the ‘sovereignty’ section of the Brexit discussion in the United Kingdom. However, as previously said, there is a ‘sovereignty’ dimension to the discussion in Scotland. If the UK leaves the EU, greater ‘sovereignty’ in the form of enhanced powers over devolved areas will flow to the Scottish Parliament, just as a greater degree of constitutional sovereignty nominally returns to Westminster.

         Opinion polls can help build a picture, but we should be wary about extrapolating too much from announced voting intentions and attitudes in hypothetical scenarios. This is especially true when attempting to determine the implications of a vote to leave the EU for the UK’s constitutional destiny. Contested constitutional change is always risky, as the 2014 indyref demonstrated, but at least there was a prospectus for independence to discuss. We know very little about what a rejection of the UK’s EU membership will entail because the next referendum is a vote to ratify the UK’s EU membership.           If the UK votes to leave, it may become entangled in acrimonious or protracted negotiations.[5]

         What would independence look like if Scotland was not a member of the EU and the rest of the UK was not? This would be subject to multiple sets of negotiations. It is unlikely that the 2014 White Paper’s plans for Scottish independence today would be viable options. In 2014, the Scottish Government’s White Paper had envisaged a form of independence that maintained close links with the rest of the UK. A partnership of this nature would be unlikely to be compatible with Scottish EU membership if the UK withdraws from the union. Scotland’s position within the EU would also come under scrutiny. Scotland’s membership of the European Union would come under scrutiny if the rest of the UK withdraws from the EU.

         A future Scottish Government seeking to negotiate an EU membership deal may face stricter terms in relation to the single currency, the budget and compliance with fiscal rules. A future Scottish Government seeking to negotiate EU membership within the context of ongoing or recent negotiations on the UK’s withdrawal may face stricter terms, for example, in relation to the single currency, the budget or compliance with fiscal rules. Scotland’s likely position within the EU would also come under scrutiny.[6]

Section Two: The Main Social and Cultural Features of British national character

          To begin with, the geographer’s interest in national character originates from his long-standing fascination with people’s interactions with their environment. Each community views the environment through its own cultural lenses and shapes the land to suit its needs and preferences. As a result, the “cultural landscape” shows the character of the people in a variety of ways to the educated observer. Geographers’ favored technique, the regional approach, reveals meaningful localized patterns. Provincialism is weakened by modern civilization, but it is not eliminated. As a way to understand subcultures inside a country, “electoral geography” and the regional novel are discussed.

          Indeed, as a technique of comprehending subcultures inside a country, the question is whether “national character” is mostly determined by the dominating region’s value system and style. If this is the case, national character may shift as action centers shift. The common assumption that the physical environment influences, if not decides, national character has persisted since ancient times. It provides an intriguing but elusive problem to the academic. Perhaps the renewed interest in ecological thinking will spark fresh ideas.

A- The Definition of National Character

          National character is a term used to describe the shared values or perceptions of personality traits shared by citizens of a specific nation, or by any other group of people. Examining the conflicts that underlie the political and social structures of contemporary states is one of the fundamental goals of national-character studies. Social tensions are most noticeable in civilizations that are undergoing fast change. Factors determining national character are mainly; geographical, economic, social, cultural, historical, religions, political, language and technological.[7]

         National Character describes the generally useful personality traits and patterns that are the norm among an adult population. The underlying presumption is that almost everyone behaves in accordance with the established social norms. When the majority of the population resides in a single geographic area and the group is politically recognized, the agglomerated features are taken into account. It has also been emphasized how history and the legal system affect how a nation’s character is formed.[8]

Hans Kohn stated:

        “Life in a common territory, subject to the same influences of history and legal systems, produces certain common attitudes and traits, often called national character.[9]

1-Significance of the Study of National Character

1-Scholarships in the East: Ever since the rise of the western imperial powers, the west has shown an interest in studying colonial cultures. Institutions were created and people were helped for the stated goal.

Through repeated trips and invitations to go to their masters’ nation, the western professors built relationships with the intelligentsia of the colonies. The data was then used to inform decisions.

2-The globe was split into two major factions after World War II: 1. The Americans and/or Capitalists, and 2. The Russians and/or Communists. The effective penetration and appropriation of political power by Socialists in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world served as a warning to the capitalists led by America to stop this challenge both politically and ideologically. The Cold War era improved our understanding of many nations and their inhabitants.

3- Our understanding of what makes a nation unique and what is largely universal in human civilization is aided by national character.

4-Without a thorough grasp of the national character, any successful economic and political planning or national strategy can be developed.

5-After having a thorough awareness of the countries and the national character with which they are associated, good international relations and foreign policy of a country are also achievable.

6-Any consideration given to local entities may be eroded in the current trend of globalization, which entails the establishment of supranational entities. On the contrary, it improved sensitivity to “others”.[10]

7-Any major interactive event, like as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup, greatly benefits from the presentation of national emblems and iconography.[11]

        All in all, developed nations keep a database of their supposedly good national characteristics. For instance, how the national character of Japan contributed to its economic success. The less developed nations tend to focus on the negative facets of their national character. Also, when nations stay behind in economic progress, their national characteristics are referred to as barriers. The subjects begin to view the world from the perspective of their masters.

2- Problems in the Study of National Character

1- Generalization disregards specificity and individuality

2- An explanation must constantly make reference to generalization: All sciences ignore specifics and uniqueness in favor of the assumption that generalization about their subject matter is achievable. Even though every piece of iron is different, it can all be categorized according to mass.

3- There is no way to generalize about people.

4- This objection has no merit if the first supposition remains true. Generalization is a presumption shared by social scientists.

5- Differences between national groups: Forms of potential group differences.

6- There are variances that are both total and partial.

7- Complete and minor contrasts

9- These group distinctions cannot be taken as total distinctions. Because there are disparities within the groups, these group differences can be disregarded.

10- Changes to characteristics include: Change: Over time, certain national characteristics are undergoing change. National group judgments were frequently seen as unreasonable in the eighteenth century.

The world’s features are not simply subject to historical change on a national level. Racial and national features are inborn; those ethnic groupings have particular psychological traits.[12]

11- The evolution’s Ethnocentrism, that is to say that Ethnocentrism is the phenomena in which a group believes that its own norms are appropriate for others, for example, Italians are devout and Chinese are superstitious. The second is a recognized reality that Westerners accept, whereas the first is not supported by science.[13]

       All in all, group assessments are illogical; it involves various evaluations that correspond to the judge’s standards. It is proposed that categorization and other criteria must be considered while making judgments regarding groupings.

B- The Role of National Character in Shaping Foreign Policy

      The set of values, interests, and objectives that a nation promotes in its dealings with other nations is known as its foreign policy. Examining the conflicts that underlie the political and social structures of contemporary states is one of the fundamental goals of national-character studies.

          In cultures that are undergoing fast change, social conflicts are particularly noticeable. For instance, one sort of social tension that is regularly seen stems from an elite’s systematic attempts to develop certain patterns of directed social change, despite the lack of enough people with the training and social experience necessary to accomplish the elite’s goals.

           In a thorough investigation of economic and social change in a number of distinct societies, Hagen (1962) persuasively discussed the connection between personality traits and various economic traditions, such as colonialism or feudalism, and the ways in which they either support or obstruct economic development. This study serves as an example of how national character factors are significantly influencing the development of economic and political science theoretical frameworks.[14]

          All in all, a state’s foreign policy is primarily influenced by a variety of elements. It can be argued that a nation’s national identity influences the goals that are set and the course or plan of action that is suggested for its foreign policy, even though it is not entirely decisive.

         A State’s national identity expresses the following three qualities: First, based on a variety of circumstances, events, turning points, etc., national identity is a “historical fact.” A State has multiple national identities, just like individuals do. It might have multiple allegiances, and one aspect of its “personality” might be present one moment but not the next.[15]

       This indicates that identity is dynamic, that is to say that it exhibits a number of shifts and continuities over the course of history.

       Second, national identity involves a context that derives from an institutional framework; in other words, it is developed over time through a series of events and ultimately manifests in the conformity of specific state institutions and policies as well as the emergence of unique political personalities.

         Thirdly, it conveys a “relational reality” in which identity is not formed in a vacuum but rather involves interaction, contact, and communication with many different outside parties. Nations respond to the “who are we?” dilemma by differentiating themselves or by feeling like the other states. Furthermore, a state’s identity and the direction of its foreign policy can be greatly influenced by how “others” view and treat that state.[16]

        In conclusion, interactions with counterparts who live overseas as well as internal procedures contribute to national identity. Its creation is therefore connected to concerns with one’s own self-perception and self-representation, as well as one’s perception and depiction of “others.”

         A strong sense of national identity aids in the better, simpler, and more active defense of a nation’s vital interests since the identity of a State influences the definition and extent of national interests and, subsequently, the framework and character of its foreign policy. The definition and redefining of a state’s strategic alternatives in light of the changes to the international system hinge on this topic. The greater the level of national unity, the fewer the costs, and the greater the potential gains for this nation in the international sphere.[17]

         To sum up, because Britain falls under the category of what many academics refer to as “rising power” due to its size, economic strength, military might, and political aspirations, the relationship between identity and foreign policy in this situation is particularly interesting. As a result, it is assumed that it wants to take on leadership positions in institutions of global governance and alter the balance of power in the international system.

          However, there is a disconnection between a nation’s aspirations and its capacity to carry them out. Resources and ambition are not the sole requirements for effective leadership; a nation also has to win over its subjects. The ambitions of Britain to regain its position as a great power are severely constrained by the absence of support from the surrounding nations.[18]

       In a nutshell, the identity of the British, their historical ties to those nations, and their foreign policy goals are all factors in this “issue.”

C-The Significance of Social and cultural structures

       House argues that social structure reflects what members of a social system do collectively, whereas culture reflects what members of a social system believe.

         The structure of social ties within a society is referred to as its social structure. Such a structure governs social interactions and provides instructions within cultural norms for achieving cultural values-based objectives. Social structure generally keeps society stable.

         Culture has intrinsic value, but it also has significant social and economic benefits. Culture improves our quality of life and boosts overall wellbeing for both individuals and communities through better learning and health, higher tolerance, and opportunities for social interaction.[19]

         Culture is influenced by social structure and is defined as group-specific behavior that is passed down through social learning. However, if people interact more frequently with others who exhibit similar behaviors or if cultural symbols are used to identify groups, culture itself may have an impact on social structure.

         The patterns and connections that exist within and within communities are referred to as social structures. Social structures are repeated behaviors that exist within a particular group. Despite being broad and complicated, social systems can be separated and interpreted in a variety of ways.[20]

        As a result, social structures have a big impact on bigger systems like the legal, political, economic, cultural, etc. Another way to think of social structure is as the foundation upon which a society is built.

1-The British national character

        Yes, the UK still has the fifth- or sixth-largest economy in the world, is a major commercial power, a cultural force, and a major military power with a permanent place on the UN Security Council and access to nuclear weapons.

         The UK is also confronted with significant limitations on economic development, government borrowing, diplomatic influence, and national cohesion, rather than claiming its “assured role” as a “global power.” This situation has been made significantly worse by the current global pandemic of

the illness brought on by the novel coronavirus COVID-19, not the least of which is the administration of Boris Johnson’s inept, if not heartless, early response.

         As a result, the establishment of national character is dependent on the influence of dominant groups whose habits and social beliefs have a long-term impact on society. Following generations and waves of immigrants acculturate to the prevailing environment through a continuous process of socialization, resulting in national character as a durable and forceful manifestation of national culture.[21]

          As a matter of a fact, the combined nations’ history, its historically Christian religious life, its connection with European cultures, the traditions of England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, and the impact of the British Empire all had an impact on British culture. Although British culture as a whole is different, the cultures of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland are diverse, with varying degrees of overlap and uniqueness.[22]

         Moreover, the modern novel was invented in Britain, and playwrights, poets, and authors are among its most prominent cultural figures. The Industrial Revolution began in the UK and had a profound effect on the family socio-economic and cultural conditions of the world. Sport is an important part of British culture, and numerous sports originated in the country. The UK is home to some of the world’s oldest universities and contributions to philosophy, science, technology and medicine. Some sports are played in the UK and former colonies.

         The Industrial Revolution began in the UK and had a profound effect on the world. Sport is an important part of British culture, and numerous sports originated in the country. As a result of the British Empire significant British influence can be observed in the language, law, culture and institutions of its former colonies, a subset of these states form the Anglo-sphere, and are among Britain’s closest allies. Sport is an important part of British culture, and numerous sports originated in the country.[23]

          In addition to this, The United Kingdom has been declared a “culture superpower,” with London being dubbed a “global cultural capital.” In a global opinion poll conducted by the BBC in 2013 and 2014, the United Kingdom was ranked third most positively perceived nation in the world after Germany and Canada.[24]

          However, given the importance of such cultural elements, sociologist Alex Inkeles defines national character as “relatively durable psychological characteristics and patterns that are modal among adult members of… society.” National character reflects the collection of psychological and social qualities shared by a particular national population, given that societies are made up of individuals and that living circumstances produce distinct patterns in the personalities of their members. Indeed, each society has a distinct “national character” that distinguishes it from others, making this term a subtle but obvious cultural and value identifier. Additionally, a public house, also known as a pub, is a place where alcoholic beverages can be consumed on the premises. The traditional pub was first found in Britain and areas influenced by Britain. [25]

         England’s contribution to British and international culture is just too extensive to be covered in this article. Historically, England was a highly homogeneous country with consistent customs, but as the British Empire grew and the country absorbed people from all over the world, English culture was enriched by varied contributions from Afro-Caribbeans, Asians, Muslims, and other immigrants.

          The same social and cultural diversification has occurred in other regions of the United Kingdom, with the result that England is not often distinct from Wales, Scotland, or even Northern Ireland. Fish and chips have given way to Indian, Chinese, and Italian cuisine, guitar-based rock has blended with South Asian rap and Afro-Caribbean salsa, and the English language itself abounds in neologisms borrowed from practically every one of the world’s tongues.

        Cultural values influence what people, and thus states, want and think in international affairs, sometimes unknowingly. It influences the methods of statecraft employed, the national image sought, and the value placed on values such as peace, freedom, and development.

D-Social and Cultural bases of Brexit

          The argument in favor of Leave (or Remain) is multifaceted. Voters’ perceptions of a wide range of problems, including the economic repercussions of Brexit, immigration and its effects, Britain’s ability to enact its own laws, etc., were influenced to varying degrees and in different ways. Likewise, there are various perspectives on Brexit. However, they can be broadly divided into two categories.

         The first, and possibly most popular, story begins with the finding that economically depressed places likely to have larger Leave-vote shares. The implication that follows is that a significant portion of Leave voters are those who feel left out of the economic boom brought on by globalization in general and European integration in particular. According to this narrative, voters’ financial conditions and perceptions of their material interests contributed to the referendum result.

         But in addition to objective factors, Brexit also has a subjective component. This second story discusses cultural concerns and national identity, such as whether or not people identify as English, Scottish, British, European, etc. According to this perspective, Brexit is being driven by the rise of English nationalism, whose appeal extends far beyond the economically disadvantaged.[26]

      So, Brexit “is a vote against globalization and its uneven impact on different sections of the country,” according to supporters

Section Three: The Impact of Social and Cultural Structures on British Foreign Policy

        Every nation in the globe has a specific international policy, as always, all nations comparable strategies and methods for dealing with other nations on a political, economic, and socially ,also, each nation has its unique form, nature, and circumstances when it comes to international relations with regard to its foreign policy. In this section of the study; it will examine how British foreign policy is structured.

          The UK’s foreign policy is traditional in nature. In other words, the process that demonstrates how British foreign policy operates depends on the institutions that have been included. In order to be clear, there are primarily two institutions involved in policymaking. The Prime Minister’s Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office are two of them (FCO). The fact that other ministries are taken into account during the policy-making process makes it even more customary. All of those institutions do work together, after all. The true partnership lies in the well-organized and evenly allocated missions and affairs.[27]

        The restructuring of the European international order after 1989, according to William Wallace, has profoundly altered the setting in which British foreign policy must be conducted. Behind these rapid changes in Britain’s political and security environment, more gradual technological and economic shifts have weakened the assumptions that have underpinned British foreign policy. Changes in social and economic conditions have also influenced the nature and cohesion of the British state, which foreign policy is meant to serve.

       The British Government, which continues to devote significant ministerial time and public funds to national foreign and defense policies, must now persuade audiences both inside and outside the country that it still has a distinct perspective on common security and economic concerns. Britain’s high international status was recognized not only by the “old” and “new” Commonwealths – the old refers to the ex-colonies of white settlement where the British Crown and British power enjoyed most respect. Others admired Britain precisely for rejecting such overtures from Russia and the United States.[28]

          British diplomats made an outsized contribution to the establishment of the Bretton Woods system and the United Nations. They would have helped build the European Coal and Steel Community had the UK government chosen to join it.

          British foreign policy first aimed at achieving a balance of power within Europe, with no single country gaining supremacy over the continent’s affairs. This doctrine served as a significant reason for Britain’s wars against Napoleon, as well as its participation in the First and Second World Wars.[29]

         Foreign policy means promoting international peace and a secure global environment, keeping the balance of power among nations, solving international difficulties in collaboration with allies and advancing democratic values and human rights

        David Frum’s new book, The State of British Foreign Policy, argues that the focus of discourse analysis in Britain is no longer civil society but rather “the foreign policy elite” convenient shorthand for texts produced by influential individuals embedded in Whitehall, Westminster and the media.[30]

         British foreign policy is viewed as a dynamic, three-way interaction between decision-makers, discourses of British identity into which decision-makers are socialized and within (or against) which foreign policy is made, and broader processes generational, cultural, and international that confront decision-makers with various challenges within this connection.[31]

        In the past, researchers of international relations (IR) have tended to see governments’ foreign actions as the result of logical calculations based on objective self-interests. Some of these were centered on the objectives of national leaders with the authority to shape history as they saw fit. Others got started with alliances and groups with both domestic and international interests.

        Others, such as the regional and global distributions of material power that exist in objective reality, highlighted the national interest as it is affected by systemic opportunities and restrictions. However, during the 1990s, the idea of self-interest has significantly given way to the idea of identity and related “constructivist notions.”

        The EU referendum debate in 2016 demonstrated the significance of national identity, internal politics, and psychological perceptions of reality, rather than just objective interests.[32]

      There is much to be said about the importance of each of these factors in the making and shaping of British Foreign policy. After the Cold War ended, Britain realized it needed to establish a new role for itself, and concluded that acting as “a connection between Europe and the rest of the developed world” would be effective, but the issue was that this new role didn’t fit with the dominant “national identity.”

        The British policy and political elite appeared to be split between “Anglo-Saxon” and “European” identities and identifications, with the former having “all the better tunes,” regardless of the current crises or the ruling party. It was a wonderful concept to serve as a link between Europe and the rest of the (developed) world, but the British were not particularly adept at it due to, among other things, “the myth of English uniqueness – a free country confronting an unfree European continent.”

         Anglo-Saxons currently support Brexit and celebrate the country’s exit from the EU as the start of a major new chapter in British involvement with what Churchill referred to as the open sea. Therefore, “Remoaners” (also known as “Bremoaners”) are people who worry about a divided and unsteady Britain that is being influenced by geopolitical forces beyond of its control.[33]

     Similar to this, scholars view Britishness as a composite identity that includes empire and/or its transnational afterlife in addition to the various selves of the British Irish state as a whole and its constituent territories, each with their own unique national contents and contestations.

         Ted Hopf contends that in order to create meanings, constitute actions, coordinate their efforts, and stake out positions in political life, foreign policy decision-makers rely on national identity categories classifications associated to the nation and citizens of the nation. Such practises tend to be located in certain discursive formations, or discourses, through which people express their experience of living in and belonging to nations, even while they are strategically positioned, fractured, and intensely contextual.[34]

       There is a large body of research that may be used to investigate how national identity affects foreign policy decisions.  In brief, the traditions that are presented about “the nation” explicitly help to establish national identity. Identity and foreign policy are related because: “States cannot live without a sense of identity, an idea of what distinguishes their government and their citizens from their neighbors, and of what unique contribution they have to give to civilization and world order.

       National identity is described as “a political and cultural process that prevails in foreign policy during moments of crisis” in identity-based explanations of British foreign policy, which more openly rely on discursive fit than other explanations. She argues that the utter misfit between the new monetary structure and the dominant national identity in Britain at the time namely, a self-referential, particularist, and conservative “ethos of Englishness” was the reason the pound-versus-euro debate of 2003, to use one of her case studies, was never much of a debate.[35]

       The similar defense might be made for “England’s Brexit,” or for the inability of the official and unofficial pro-EU positions of the UK to overcome what many academics contend were deeply ingrained and primarily English objections to “loss of sovereignty.” As a result, one important factor in remains’ defeat in both the 2016 referendum and the 2019 general election was the extent to which people in “England without London” and several English-speaking regions of Wales believed that Britain was exceptional.

         The significance of this dynamic is also recognized in role-theoretic approaches to British foreign policy. Role conceptions, or (discursive) self-understandings about the state’s international role and purpose; role performances, or enactments of roles through policy choices and outputs; and role orientations, or foreign policy tactics that take into account one’s material and social constraints, are some analytical links through which they accomplish this.

       Discursive fit can and frequently is thought of as a causal process. After that, fit does there exists a relationship between existing discourses and foreign policy on the one hand? Not, and cannot, imply a perfect one-to-one linear match between a certain structure of a particular foreign strategy and national identity.[36]

       Discursive fit, on the other hand, refers to how dominant discourses create the truths and realities within which policy is created and destroyed. This is the reason that many constructivists if not the majority distinguish between why and how (or how-possible) questions.

            The Government’s foreign policy is perhaps best summarized by the Foreign Secretary’s introduction to the 2012 Foreign Council Organization FCO Departmental Report:

                British foreign policy promotes the enlightened national interest while standing up for freedom, fairness and responsibility. It should extend its global reach and influence and be agile and energetic in a networked world. It will use their diplomacy to secure their prosperity; build significantly strengthened bilateral and multilateral relations for Britain; and harness the appeal of their culture and heritage to promote their values, including human rights. They must make the most of the abundant opportunities of the 21st century.[37]

       To sum up, British foreign policy is a dynamic, three-way interaction between the decision-makers themselves, British identity discourses into which they are socialized and within (or against) which foreign policy is made, and larger processes generational, cultural, and international that present the decision-makers with various challenges within this connection.

       The bad international adaptations made by Britain after 1945. Although identity, rhetoric, and habits are increasingly frequently taken into account in British foreign policy studies, they are rarely attempted to be recovered inductively, much less over time and across the elite mass gap. From a theoretical and analytical perspective, this is a missed opportunity because only a broad lens can reveal the patterns of change and continuity in the aforementioned structures as well as identify pertinent analogies between them.

A-The British Foreign policy toward the European Union

         To be valid, with the collapse of the Maudling negotiations, Britain was forced into an unprecedented re-evaluation of its policy towards western European integration. The failure combined with the dissolution of the European Payments Union (EPU) created a significant change in Britain’s post-war international relations.

        Diplomatic historians have failed in their analysis of the formation and growth of the EEC. Alan Milward’s analysis of Britain’s economic policies towards western European integration in the 1950s is seminal. This paper aims to analyse the dichotomy in the historiography of British policy from 1950 to 1955. Historians need to provide an overarching analysis of British policy from 1955 to 1958. There are both economic and diplomatic determinants, as well as wider considerations such as defence policy. To meet the requirements Milward has suggested, historians need a new understanding of the dynamics of western European integration.[38]

         Economic historians focus on British external economic policy in relation to Western Europe diplomatic historians look at British attitudes towards the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Defence Community and the Western European Union. David Milward argues that Britain’s post-war tradition in external economic policy was crucially different to that of its western European partners.

        Whereas the latter placed emphasis on the development of commercial economic policies, Britain pursued a reactionary financial economic goal of re-establishing sterling as an international currency via sterling-dollar convertibility.

        The convertibility of sterling was paramount for London. This fundamental policy was revealed in Britain’s attitudes towards the European Payments Union. Milward sees ROBOT as an example of Britain’s reluctance to submerge itself in a European payments system and as an attempt to elevate British economic power via the strength of sterling.

           Britain’s disregard for her western European partners developed into a misunderstanding of their aims. The ‘Collective Approach’ was inimical to closer western European integration and fell foul of American policy aims. Britain was left isolated in a Europe of nation-states pursuing integration policies through the expansion of intra-Western-European trade. The British policy towards western European integration from 1950 to 1955 was remarkably consistent. Policy was one of benevolence towards, but non-involvement in supranational European schemes. Successive British governments saw Atlantic and Commonwealth rather than European co-operation as most efficacious form of international relations.[39]

           British foreign policy foundations, diplomatic historians suggest, separated Britain from the Six from the outset. Britain’s priorities were relations with the Commonwealth and the U.S., factors which would remain sacrosanct throughout the 1950s. Also, Britain followed a different pattern of commercial relations than her European neighbors.

        Another tenet of Britain’s policy towards western European integration developed from 1950/51: the desire to associate with the Six rather than join their schemes. This was at the base of the ‘Eden Plan’ in 1952 and the official policy London pursued towards the Six’s plans for a European Defence Community from 1950 to 1954. The failure of the EDC Treaty in 1954 is viewed as a triumph for British policy towards western European integration.[40]

        What is necessary for a comprehensive analysis of British policy towards western European integration in the 1950s is a combined examination of the economic and diplomatic accounts. Justice cannot be done to such a task in this paper, but some speculative suggestions can be offered at the best of times.[41]

         The impact of foreign policy on western European integration up to the 1950s needs to be balanced with economic and diplomatic considerations.  Milward’s analysis of British foreign policy in the post-war period is indispensable when extrapolated into the second half of the 1950s when economic questions were of greater political significance. In the United Kingdom, trade and industry had a lesser place in policy formulation than the status of currency.[42]

         Britain’s post-war sense of ‘difference’, of being ‘with but not of’ Europe was part of the official psyche and was a bipartisan political phenomenon. National interest led Britain in a different direction from her western European partners. Britain would not necessarily have joined a European federation even if it was guaranteed to succeed in the long run.

B- British policy towards western European Integration 1955 to 1959

        The classic view of British policy, presented by Miriam Camps in 1964, suggests that the European Free Trade Area represented a real and substantial shift in Britain’s attitude towards Europe.

       The European Free Trade Area did represent a shift in the British government’s attitude towards Europe, but not as fundamental a conversion as John Camps suggests. It was indeed a revision of British policies towards trade in manufactured products, but beyond that, attitudes towards integration remained cognate with those of the 1950s and before.[43]

       In June 1955 the Six ECSC powers met in Messina to examine the idea of a European Common Market, this marked la relance Européenne, the relaunch of the European idea. Britain’s participation in the consequent Spaak Committee has been treated to archival research.

      It is not too difficult to imagine British officials extrapolating the EDC/WEU example of 1954 into 1955/56. In other words, with the collapse of the European Common Market, Britain’s “fresh proposal” could be implemented to draw western Europe back under British leadership. The decision to not participate in the Common Market was taken on political grounds. This established a principle which would characterize the formulation and negotiation of the European Free Trade Area. There was no detailed British analysis of manufacturing costs comparable to similar inquiries in France, and no doubt elsewhere.[44]

C-The beginnings of changes in the British policy

         Plan G was a reactive policy decision based on the negative consideration expressed succinctly by Peter Thorneycroft in May 1956, “We cannot afford to let the Six succeed or fail without us”. This is not to suggest that London aimed to sabotage the Six’s plans, but that it was forced into reacting to Messina’s success.

          Macmillan’s priority was to ensure Britain’s position as a world power of the second rank. The emphasis was on Britain’s economic strength as a basis for her foreign policy goals. With these economic foundations, the two main political aims could be pursued in concert with Britain’s allies.[45]

           There is no doubt that sterling convertibility received a higher priority in British policy than the proposal for a European Free Trade Area. Two events in 1958 were of great consequence in the development of Britain’s economic policy and attitudes towards western Europe. The first was the re-establishment of convertibility and the second was the collapse of Maudling negotiations.

          British policy towards Western Europe in the 1950s was shaped by the experiences of December 1958 and lessons learnt from the European Free Trade Area negotiations with western Europeans. Britain’s signature on the Stockholm Convention for a European Free trade Association in November 1959 led to its application for membership of the EEC in 1961.[46]

         In 1959 West Germany’s exports of manufactured goods were higher than those of the United Kingdom for the first time since World War II. Britain’s World Trade Organization (WTO) officials had stressed that convertibility was not an end in itself, but a means to an end – namely trade. In their report on Britain’s external economic aims in 1958, they said: “We essentially live by buying, processing and selling; thus we must import”. As the EEC’s commercial power began to dawn on London, and as Britain’s trading patterns began their move towards Western Europe, trade, rather than the means, began to assume greater importance. [47]

        To sum up, British policy in the 1950s was not simply an economic or purely a diplomatic viewpoint. There were a broad range of policy considerations all of which need to be analyzed. Only by achieving this historians will be able to make a contribution to a greater understanding of western European integration.

D-The British Foreign Policy in the 21^st century

           Any policy that a nation develops, implements, and defends can be impacted by a variety of political, economic, social, and cultural events. Since the end of the Cold War, Great Britain, a great European nation, has seen some changes (1990s). Furthermore, both domestically and internationally, the British policy climate has changed during the past few decades. Thus, the foreign policy has gradually begun to take on a new form. Beginning with the 9/11 attacks, progressing through the premierships of Blair and Cameron, stopping at the Arab Spring, and most importantly, the relationship with the EU nations during those few decades.

       Before checking those areas of practicing policies, it is important to review the perspective that the British foreign secretary, Jack Straw, foreshadowed in 2003:

“Since 1997 the Labour Government has helped to reshape Europe after the cold war. We have championed wider EU and NATO membership and confronted dictatorship in Kosovo. Outside Europe we have used our leading role in the UN, the EU and other international bodies to promote peace and security in Sierra Leone, East Timor, the Middle East and the sub-continent. We have joined military action to confront terrorism in Afghanistan and to enforce Security Council decisions in Iraq. Across the world we have worked to alleviate poverty and defend human rights.”[48]

         Such a foreword appears to be able to influence UK foreign policy in the twenty-first century. It would have reviewed Britain’s involvements and contributions to international politics and diplomacy at that period. The context and aspirations for UK foreign policy at the turn of the century, however, will be revealed through the following subtitles.

1-The Anglo-American Relationships

         Britain has been the United States’ closest ally and partner over the past century and since the turn of the century. Since the American Revolution in 1775, or even before, the Anglo-American connections have been “unique.” Through hostility, collaboration, and close friendship, their special relationship has endured. Economic growth in the opposite country has always coincided with relative economic deterioration that one of them may experience. As a result, Anglo-Americans and Americans had close economic and political relations during the 20th century. Despite the rifts in these relationships, US and UK collaboration in international security and defense has continued.[49]

The British Foreign Affairs Committee drew a conclusion in its February 2002 report that may summarize the shift in the special relationships’ policies by the start of the third millennium:

“The need for it (the Anglo‐American relationship, U.L.) to remain aforward‐looking relationship is just as important in the 21st century…. There can be no more important relationship for the United Kingdom” (Foreign Affairs Committee).[50]

          That casts a shade on several flaws in the alliance policy between the UK and the US at the turn of the 20th century. Although the UK-US hegemony was considerably more significant to one nation than to another, it is reflected in the leadership and partnership in several organizations like the NATO. The Foreign Affairs Committee emphasized how crucial this was for Britain.

        In her 2007 book “Old World, New World,” Kathleen Burk examines the history of Britain and America during the previous four centuries. The levels of politics, war, and diplomacy are addressed. Her main claim that “the United States and Great Britain had always been competitors, being driven together as friends only when there was a threat larger than each could handle alone” also serves to distinguish her story (644). When Burk reaches the Blair-Bush era, he emphasizes the military and economic collaboration at the start of the twenty-first century.[51]

         Generally speaking, the goal of British and American cooperation has always been to maintain and strengthen both nations’ dominance. For Britain, one of the “three circles of influence” has always been the special relationship. The Commonwealth, an international organization with 53 members, the majority of which were former British Empire countries, and its links with Europe were two other circles in which Britain had relationships. According to Reynolds, Britain is viewed as a power that operates in those circles as a fulcrum inside of a wheel. [52]

       Europe is one of the other rings, as was already indicated. Then, how would you characterize the past few decades of relations between Britain and Europe?

2-The British-European Relationships

         Over the past two decades, there have been some changes in the setting of British foreign policy. Similar to the ties with America, Britain has problems, relationships, and tensions with other European nations. British foreign policy’s aims and procedures came under growing criticism in the later decades of the 20th century, particularly in the European domain. The Conservative Party has since developed a greater mistrust of diplomacy and diplomats. Furthermore, the British-European field has been affected by the overall resurgence of public interest in international policy.[53]

         A crucial component of British foreign policy has always been the country’s involvement in Europe. The UK’s participation in the EU played a role in the implementation of its foreign policy’s national interests. Since 1973, the British economy has prospered thanks to its membership in the European Economic Community. Because British businesses, services, and products accounted for a significant portion of the European market, Britain actively participated in the EU by starting the EU economic reform (Straw 35). Another commitment to Britain’s participation in Europe was the transfer of national interests to the EU level.

     Despite having started European security and defence policy, Britain’s commitment to NATO demonstrated the importance it placed on NATO over the EU, particularly in terms of defense policy. Despite setting priorities in its foreign policy, Britain continued to oppose EU initiatives that limited British sovereignty. Briefly stating the British foreign policy towards Europe, Kristina Primantait says:

“British foreign policy towards Europe in the 21st century could be characterized using the term “pragmatism”. The term “pragmatism” means that

Britain chooses such EU areas where it sees a potential to take a leading role which lets to implement its foreign policy’s goals and priorities.”[54]

         Her statements give the impression that pragmatism in British foreign policy is not a set principle that the country’s prime ministers always adhere to or hold dear. Instead, the argument for British policy in the European agenda has emphasized objectives that support British objectives in Europe.

3- The Britain’s Relations with Other Countries

      Britain pushed on and subsequently supported other nations’ democratic rights throughout that time. These remarks also illustrate how the British government’s justification for its foreign policy toward other countries was its emphasis on human rights.

        The Arab Spring, which began at the beginning of this century and included the upheavals in Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and other nations, emerged at the turn of the first decade. The foreign and security policy faced a difficulty with the latter.  However, for Britain, any involvements, claims, or promises were justified on the one hand by the demand for human rights and, on the other, by assisting nations in choosing their own leaders and political systems. However, there have always been plans to establish imperial relations with troublesome governments. [55]

          To conclude, every era of rule has different characteristics. In other words, each leader has a unique influence on the formulation, processing, and application of policy. Many Prime Ministers, including Winston Churchill, Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair, and others, have had an influence on British foreign policy during their numerous premierships in the country’s history. The next chapter introduces a notable prime minister in the history of British foreign policy, particularly in the relations between Britain and Europe, using the previous chapter of the study as background.

Chapter’s Conclusion

          To conclude, Identity matters the need to express who we are as individuals and groups is one of the strongest societal forces in experience. Foreign policy argues that national identity plays an important even crucial in both public and foreign policy, as well as affecting state behavior and international patters , may strike many as obvious. For those outside mainstream IR, ideas, ideologies, histories and institutions have always been a natural source for substance of public and foreign policy.

          Additionally, National identity if anything may appear to be overdone in many fields, seized upon as an easy even trendy method of explaining the apparent oppositions of social fluidity and permanence, Equally, Foreign policy studies is a natural arena in which to examine the cultural imperatives that drives the domestic and discursive dynamics of each nation state in its international interactions.

         Using a conceptual foundation based on neoclassical realism , the central aim is , therefore, to suggest that national identity determines a critical mass of cultural self-reference and self-preference, which when politicized, gives substantive content to the national interest and justificatory form to its foreign policy. National identity is thus situated between external influences upon the British pursuit of power and security and the domestic contextual influence upon four specific foreign policy outcomes. The case studies provide evidence that national identity informs foreign policy during times of high crisis and less fractious periods, and that it does so in ways that allows both consensus and divisions to arise over the particular forms of identity selected to underwrite foreign policy.

         The cases including the first or Second World War would be methodologically unwieldy and would not necessarily reveal   the unquiet relationship between assumptions of Englishness and their impact on British foreign policy orientation. Both English and British national identity has reliably informed the strategic content of British foreign policy in terms of an exceptional sense of the national self. Naturally, British foreign policy has on occasion been at odds with either public consensus or with majoritarians forms of self reference in defining national power and determining its use.

            Initially, British foreign policy aimed to achieve a balance of power within Europe, with no single country gaining supremacy over the continent’s affairs. This doctrine served as a significant reason for Britain’s battles against Napoleon, as well as its participation in World Wars I and II. The EU’s common foreign and security policy is built on diplomacy and adherence to international rules in order to resolve problems and develop international understanding. The EU’s international influence is bolstered through trade, humanitarian aid, and development cooperation.

          The expansion of British foreign territories for bases and markets, or as a means of extending influence, such as in South Africa or the Far East, occurred in the early nineteenth century. Britain needs to increase its export markets as well as acquire new sources of raw materials.

Source

[1] Edward Neal, Security in small nation, ( Cambridge: Open Book Publishers,2017),p59

[2] Edward Neal, ibid,p68.

[3] Charlie Jeffery , and Ray Perman, Britain’s Decision Facts and Impartial Analysis for the EU referendum on 23 June 2016, (Edinburgh: The David Hume Institute,2016),p17

[4] Charlie Jeffery ,and  Ray Perman,ibid,p18

[5] Chatham House, ‘Scottish independence will impact the UK’s global role’, from: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/05/scottish-independence-will-impact-uks-global-role, visited on : 28/08/2020

[6] Charlie Jeffery , and Ray Perman,ibid,p26.

[7] Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, National Character and International Relations, SAGE JOURNALS, International Studies New Delhi, vol 14, no 2, (April-June 1975),p17

[8] Dean Peabody, National Characteristics,(London:University of Cambridge 1985), p.419

[9] Hans Kohn, The idea of nationalism, New York, Macmillan, 1952.cited by Habibul Khondker, The Construction of National Character in the Interface of Global and Local Traditions a paper presented to the 13th World Congress of Sociology Bielefeld, Germany, p.2

[10] Raffiuddin  Khan, The Problem of National Character of Pakistan , Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1963, p.12

[11] Raffiuddin  Khan,ibid,p13

[12] Hans Kohn, The idea of nationalism,Ibid,p4

[13] Hans Kohn, Ibid,p5

[14] Srdjan Vucetic, National Identity and British Foreign Policy, Paper prepared for the 2020 Britain and the World Conference, University of Plymouth, 17‐ 19 June 2020,p2

[15] Amin, Maalouf, In the name of identity: violence and the need to belong, Translated by Barbara Bray (London: Penguin Books; 2013), p 5

[16] Amin, Maalouf,Ibid,p8

[17] Schrim, Stefan,  “Leader in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance”, European Journal of International Relations ,vol 16,n2, (2010), p 199

[18] Tsygankov Andrei, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), p26

[19] Carter Hanry , A History of Britain, 1876-1953, 2^nd ed, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1948),p67

[20] Christopher;Coupler,and  Brian Turner, Making Modern Britain: British Social and Economic History From the 18^th century to the present day, (London: Collins Educational;1997),p17

[21] Alex Inkeles, National Character, (New Brunswick: NewJersey, Transaction Publishers, 1997),p 17.

[22] Allan Littele, ‘Scotland and Britain cannot be mistaken from each other’, BBC News,(6june 2018), visited: 30/08/2020

[23] Simon calder, ‘London , the capital of the world’, The Independent, London, (22 December,2007), visited of : 29/08/2020

[24] Allan Littele, ibid.

[25] Alex Inkeles, ibid,p19

[26] Morgan Hederson , ‘Understanding The Social and Cultural bases of Brexit’, Social Research Institute, University College London, London, UK,(2019),p831

[27] Foreign Affairs Committee, “British‐US Relations,” Response of the Secretary of State

forForeign and Commonwealth Affairs, Second Report, (The Stationery Office: 2002).

[28]Mark Garnett, and others, British policy since1945, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), p 69

[29] Srdjan Vucetic, Op.cit,p20

[30] Mark Garnett, and others,Ibid ,p71

[31] Srdjan Vucetic, opcit,p38

[32] Martina Álvarez Portas,  National identity and Foreign policy: a brief analysis of their connection in Russia,Opinion Paper journal,(2020),p2

[33] Schrim Stefan. “Leader in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance”, European Journal of International Relations ,vol16,n°2 ,(2010), p199. 

[34] Ted Hopf, Reconstructing the Cold War: The Early Years, 1945–1958, (New York: Oxford University Press,2012),p305

[35] Ted, Hopf, Ibid, p309

[36] Martina Álvarez Portas,  Ibid, p5

[37] Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union Foreign Policy, HM  Government, July2013,p13

[38]  James  Ellison, ‘Explaining British Policy Towards European Integration In The 1960’s,  thesis to the European Integration and Domestic Policy-making Research Group, Centre for European Studies, Harvard University, 9 May 1995, visited on: 09/09/2020,p8

[39]James  Ellison,ibid,p9

[40] Holger Molder, ‘British Approach to the European Union: From Tony Blair to David Cameron’, Researchgate,  (2018), p8

[41] Jeremy Richardson, ‘Brexit and the British Policy Style: Back to Governance?’, Researchgate, (2018),p13

[42] Holger Molder, ,ibid,p13

[43] Holger Molder,ibid,p15

[44] Nira Davis, ‘Belonging and the politics of belonging’, vol40 , N°3, Routledge, 2006,p19

[45] Nira Davis,ibid,p22

[46] James  Ellison, opc.it,p11

[47] Jeremy Richardson, Op.cit,p14

[48] UK International Priorities: A Strategy for the FCO. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The

Stationery Office. 2003.

[49] David Reynolds,  ʺThe Special Relationship: Rethinking Anglo‐American Relations,ʺ International Affairs vol65, n°1,(1989),p 89

[50] Foreign Affairs Committee, “British‐US Relations,” Response of the Secretary of State

For Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Second Report, (The Stationery Office: 2002).

[51] Kathleen Burk,  Old World New World, The Story of British and America,  (London: Little Browm,2007),p91

[52] David Reynolds,  Ibid,p 94

[53] Christopher Hill, The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy. (Routledge:London, 2002),p68

[54] Kristina Prišmantaitė, “British foreign policy in the 21st century: priorities and challenges”. Global

Academic Society Journal: Social Science Insight, Vol. 2, No. 7,(2009), p51

[55] Oliver Daddow,  Jamic Gaskarth, British Foreign Policy: The new Labour Years, (Palgrave

Macmillan:London, 2011),p104