When the United Nations General Assembly approved the partition plan for Palestine in 1947, Brazil was chairing the meetings. The Brazilian representative delayed the vote several times to ensure the maximum number of votes in favor of the partition. From that moment until 2002, Brazilian policy largely aligned with the American stance in its relationship with Israel. However, when President Lula da Silva took office in Brazil in 2002, the Brazilian stance became less biased towards Israel. This shift also led to a more neutral international approach amid the global power struggles.
However, this approach was not linear and experienced fluctuations, particularly during the 2019-2022 period, due to the policies implemented by the Brazilian right under President Jair Bolsonaro. After Lula da Silva’s return to the presidency in early 2023, Brazilian policy reverted to a less biased stance towards Israel, especially in dealing with the consequences of the Al-Aqsa Flood.
Brazil holds significant weight in Latin America, covering about 47.8% of the continent’s area, with a population of nearly half of the continent’s total (214 million out of approximately 434 million).
Determinants of Brazil’s Foreign Policy Toward the Palestinian Issue:
Three variables play a significant role in shaping Brazil’s policy towards Palestine:
Influence of the Brazilian Agricultural Lobby: The trade relationship, especially in agricultural food products and investments, is a central factor in Brazil’s policy towards the Middle East. Agriculture represents 27% of Brazil’s trade, distributed as follows: $18 billion with Arab countries, $2 billion with Iran, $2 billion with Israel, and around $30 million with the Palestinian Authority. This means Israel’s trade with Brazil is 60 times that of the Palestinian Authority’s. Moreover, Israel was the first country outside South America to sign a trade agreement with the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) in 2007, in which Brazil is a key member. This agricultural sector has highly influential lobbying groups within the government, with 300 members of the Brazilian legislative authority (two-thirds of the members) affiliated with it. This allows them to block any policies that might affect their interests in the agricultural sector. An example of their influence was the obstruction of Bolsonaro’s decision to move the Israeli embassy to Jerusalem after receiving a warning letter from the Arab League stating that it could impact trade relations between Brazil and Arab countries. Consequently, Bolsonaro opted to open a trade office in Jerusalem instead of moving the embassy.
The Rise of Christian Zionism: Political sociology studies in Latin America reveal a growing shift from Catholicism to Evangelicalism, which could expand the potential for a shift towards “Christian Zionism” within the Evangelical movement. This ideology advocates for the establishment of a “Jewish state” in the Promised Land in preparation for the return of Christ. Some studies estimate that their proportion in Brazil will reach 40% over the next decade. Within this Christian Zionist movement, the “Pentecostal Movement” is prominent, supporting Bolsonaro and Israel. The danger of this movement lies in its deep penetration into power circles, with its members occupying 25% of the seats in Parliament and 17% of the seats in the Senate.
Security Relations Between Brazil and Israel: The 1970s marked the beginning of security relations between Brazil and Israel, as right-wing regimes in Latin America faced severe leftist pressures, leading them to seek assistance from the United States and other powers, including Israel. These security ties have been solidified since 2008, to the extent that Lula da Silva, a leftist, continued this policy during his second term (2007-2010) when he signed a security cooperation agreement with Israel to benefit from Israel’s technological advancements. In 2014, Brazil hired an Israeli security and defense systems company to manage and coordinate security during the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, and this relationship continues today.
Impacts of Brazil-Israel Relationship Determinants on the Al-Aqsa Flood Consequences:
Understanding Brazil’s stance on the consequences of the Al-Aqsa Flood is difficult without considering the three variables mentioned earlier. These have led to what Brazilian researchers call “equidistant diplomacy,” characterized by not clearly aligning with either side of the conflict, regardless of the ruling faction.
This diplomacy is reflected in the fact that the right-wing, which supports Israel (the Liberal Party), has retreated in some positions from the expected level of support for Israel. Similarly, the left-wing (currently the ruling Workers’ Party) has not supported the Palestinian side to the expected degree. The following examples illustrate the concept of relative equidistance:
The ruling Brazilian left accused Israel of genocide in Gaza, describing it as a “Holocaust,” and supported South Africa in raising the issue before the International Court of Justice, expressing its alignment with the BRICS group, which includes both countries. Additionally, it blocked the implementation of an Israeli arms deal for Brazil in May 2024, continued to criticize the expansion of Israeli settlements, demanded acceptance of the two-state solution and the Palestinians’ right to self-determination, and contributed to drafting and supporting UN resolutions (in the General Assembly or Security Council) to cease fire in Gaza. However, Lula da Silva condemned the resistance’s attack on October 7, 2023, calling it a “terrorist act” while noting that the Israeli response was “disproportionate to the Palestinian action.” Although Lula recalled his ambassador from Israel, he did not sever diplomatic relations, and the activities of the trade office in Jerusalem continued as usual. The security relationship was “suspended,” but food trade between the two sides did not stop, even though Israel delayed the departure of some Brazilians from Gaza after the fighting broke out, allowing them to leave only after more than a month while permitting other nationalities to exit earlier.
The right-wing opposition, known for its closeness to Israel, organized successive meetings with the Israeli ambassador and opened venues for screening films “claiming to depict terrorist operations carried out by the resistance.” Additionally, a Brazilian state granted Benjamin Netanyahu honorary citizenship, and Bolsonaro’s wife voted in the last elections wearing a shirt bearing the Israeli flag. This is an extension of adopting U.S. President Donald Trump’s positions, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and supporting the Abraham Accords between Arab countries and Israel. Bolsonaro even denies the existence of a country called Palestine. Furthermore, Netanyahu was hosted as the first Israeli prime minister to visit Brazil. However, Bolsonaro did not decide to move the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem after receiving warnings from the agricultural lobby, as previously mentioned.
Conclusion:
The aforementioned factors highlight Brazil’s significant influence, especially in Latin America, and the presence of intertwined factors affecting decision-making. There is a favorable environment to support the Palestinian cause under Lula da Silva’s presidency, especially due to the heinous Zionist practices and the war on Gaza. This necessitates increased attention to developing relations with Brazil both officially and publicly, including expanding activities and events in Portuguese, exchanging visits, and engaging directly with Brazilian agricultural lobbying groups through Arab diplomats. Additionally, it is crucial to activate the role of Arab Christians, particularly Palestinians residing in Brazil, in communicating with Brazilian Christian sectors, especially the Catholic community.
