On October 28, 2024, the presidency of Chad announced a terrorist attack on a military base housing 200 soldiers located on Barkrim Island in the western Ngoubou region of Kaya, near the Nigerian border and 204 square kilometers northwest of the capital N’Djamena. The attack resulted in the deaths of approximately 40 Chadian soldiers and injuries to 20 others, with the terrorist elements taking control of the military base, enabling them to seize weapons and set fire to vehicles equipped with heavy arms before their escape. The Chadian government did not attribute the attack to any specific terrorist organization, while local sources accused Boko Haram fighters of involvement due to their repeated attacks in the area and their presence there for years.
This attack is considered the worst faced by Chadian soldiers since 2020, when 100 soldiers were killed in a similar assault on “Bohoma Island” in Lake Chad, prompting former President Idriss Déby to launch a military operation dubbed “Bohoma’s Fury” against terrorist elements.
The attack highlights the rising frequency of terrorist assaults in the Sahel region, especially as countries like Mali have also faced terrorist attacks from active terrorist organizations there, notably Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Such developments enhance the influence of terrorist groups in the region, potentially threatening an increase in regional security instability in the Sahel in the upcoming period.
Revealing Implications
The terrorist attack in Chad carries several revealing implications for the current terrorist landscape in the Sahel, and its connection to the state of governance in N’Djamena since the rise of Déby Jr. to power. Key implications include:
Escalation of Terrorist Activity: This attack is among the most violent terrorist assaults targeting Chad this year. It is part of a recurring pattern faced by the Chadian state, which grapples with ongoing insurgency in the western part of the country near the Nigerian border. In June 2024, approximately nine people were killed and 40 others injured in explosions targeting an ammunition depot in the capital N’Djamena. In March of the same year, a Boko Haram-linked terrorist attack resulted in the deaths of seven soldiers, raising concerns over the rise of violence in the Lake Chad region. This comes at a time when the Chadian military has recently inflicted significant losses on Boko Haram in coordination with regional armies such as those of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin, suggesting the recent attack may be a retaliatory response against the Chadian army.
Revival of Boko Haram’s Influence in the Lake Chad Region: Boko Haram is attempting to revive its ideological appeal in the area, to partly divert attention from ISIS, which currently dominates the terrorist landscape in the Sahel and West Africa. Boko Haram aims to convey a message to the world that it remains capable of targeting Lake Chad Basin countries, highlighting that it has not lost its strength or regional influence, and continues to conduct various operations and terrorist attacks. Evidence of its expanding activities is visible in the Lake Chad area, where its fighters have been involved in numerous attacks in other regional countries, including a terrorist attack in Nigeria in September 2024 that resulted in the deaths of around 100 people.
Concentration of Terrorist Elements in Lake Chad: A significant number of Boko Haram fighters are hiding in the small islands scattered across the vast waters and marshes of the Lake Chad region, serving as a sanctuary and hideout for these terrorists and others like ISIS. This facilitates their involvement in executing consecutive terrorist attacks against military sites and targets in the countries bordering Lake Chad, particularly Chad. This represents a regional threat to the stability of the area.
Deterioration of the Chadian Regime’s Challenges: Terrorist attacks in N’Djamena exacerbate the political and security burdens diminishing the legitimacy of the ruling regime, which is surrounded by additional regional crises. This prompted Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby to launch a military operation named “Haskanit” following the October 28, 2024 attack, aiming to pursue Boko Haram fighters in Lake Chad and respond forcefully to the terrorist assault in the country. This move extends from the military operation initiated by the Chadian army in July 2024 against terrorist organizations within the forests and islands in Lake Chad, aiming to reassure the Chadian public that the ruling regime is firmly facing terrorist threats.
Embarrassment for Chad’s International Allies: This terrorist attack underscores the diminishing effectiveness of the role of Chad’s international allies, particularly France and the United States, which are viewed as crucial partners for N’Djamena in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel and West Africa. This may accelerate a shift in the Chadian ruling regime’s alignment towards a Russian ally, similar to some Sahel countries like Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, at the expense of traditional allies.
Potential Concerns
The recent terrorist attack in Chad opens the door for further predictions regarding the future of terrorism in Chad and its implications on local, regional, and international levels, as well as the impact on the future of the region. Key potential ramifications include:
Increased Internal Pressures on the Chadian Regime: This attack raises the likelihood of terrorist elements being involved in a series of consecutive attacks within Chad in the coming period. This may lead political opposition to exploit the situation to stir public sentiment against the ruling regime, alongside rising anger and dissatisfaction within the military ranks due to the political leadership’s failure to effectively address terrorist threats, especially given the existing dissent among some Chadian military officers regarding Chad’s stance in the ongoing conflict in Sudan. This could threaten the political legitimacy of President Mahamat Idriss Déby in the country.
Urgent Measures by Chadian Authorities: The troubling security context in Chad could lead to exceptional measures aimed at mitigating security threats within the country, such as imposing movement restrictions near military sites, curfews, enhancing military presence in the western part of the country, and increasing armament for the Chadian army to better address internal and regional security challenges, through expanding international alliances for the Chadian state.
Rising Security Threats in the Region: Boko Haram’s recent attack in Chad may serve as a stern warning to regional countries that they remain targets of the group’s fighters. This contributes to creating a more tense regional environment in terms of security, amid the rising activity of terrorist organizations that view the region as a safe haven for their elements and an open target for their repeated terrorist operations against military and civilian targets.
Chad Seeking Regional Alliances to Combat Terrorism: The troubled regional security context may prompt Chad to attempt reviving some regional security initiatives, such as the G5 Sahel group. N’Djamena might seek to join a confederation of Sahel states alongside Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, benefiting from the positive relations that these three coalition countries have developed with Moscow, with which N’Djamena has been increasingly aligning in recent times.
N’Djamena’s Engagement with New International Allies: Chad may look for a new international partner to increase its reliance on external actors for funding and training its military, which could enhance its international alliances in the fight against terrorism. The Russian ally appears to be the closest option, especially amid reports indicating a clear rapprochement between the two countries recently. This may provoke discontent among both the United States and Western powers, including France, leading to a new round of Russian-European/French competition in the Sahel and West Africa.
Escalating Humanitarian Crises: Terrorist attacks drive many locals to flee and displace from their areas to escape fighting and the violations committed by terrorists, including killings, theft, looting, and sexual assaults. This exacerbates humanitarian crises within Chad, which hosts thousands of refugees due to regional conflicts in neighboring countries like Sudan. As terrorist attacks in the Lake Chad Basin continue, the trend of displacement is likely to rise. The International Organization for Migration reported in June 2024 that over 220,000 people were displaced due to assaults from armed groups in Lake Chad, with expectations of increasing numbers in the future amid regional instability, further burdening the security and economic capacities of regional governments and impacting their internal stability.
In summary, it seems that Boko Haram is striving to reclaim its position as a leader in the African terrorist landscape through the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, which remain pivotal arenas for terrorism in Africa in recent years. This opens the door for fierce competition between Boko Haram and ISIS for dominance in the region. On the other hand, this jihadist rivalry intensifies competition among international and regional powers keen to engage in the region to combat terrorism, with Russia appearing to gain an edge as it seeks to enhance its influence and presence, while the role of Western powers, primarily France, has been declining in recent years, complicating regional interactions in the future.
