Recently, Israel has achieved a series of striking successes on the Lebanese front. These include the assassinations of Palestinian leader Saleh al-Arouri and Lebanese Islamic Resistance military commander Fouad Shukr, the Pager storm, and the targeting of some of the most important military leaders such as Ibrahim Aqil and Ahmed Wahbi, among others. Most of these attacks have been concentrated in the southern suburbs of Beirut.
First, it is essential to understand the environment in which these events occurred. The Lebanese resistance is not only battling Israeli intelligence but also American, European, and some Arab intelligence agencies. It operates within a complex social and political mosaic that includes more than 42 political organizations and parties, some of which are Christian factions that oppose the resistance and have their own surveillance and security apparatuses. Additionally, there are Lebanese state security agencies, some of which are as hostile to the resistance as Israel itself. Within the Muslim community, there are also factions opposed to the resistance: some are Sunni (such as remnants of Ahmed al-Asir and others like him), while others are Shiite (such as remnants of Sobhi al-Tufaili). Some among these groups may even consider political alliances with Israel and its agencies. This environment is akin to walking through a minefield at night, with thorny and slippery terrains.
The collaboration of these various entities against the resistance is not limited to security matters. There is also a network of media outlets that continuously broadcast material aimed at undermining the Lebanese Islamic Resistance and capitalizing on any setbacks it may face. This media storm thrives within a culture of programming (much like the official Arab and non-Arab media), provocation (as seen in many Gulf-based satellite channels), and vengeance (like Al Jazeera, which has harbored animosity since its failed gambles in Syria during the past decade). This media culture is also fueled by ignorance masked as insight into the deeper truths of the situation.
The above is an attempt to understand the complexities surrounding the resistance in Lebanon, the region, and the world, while acknowledging the factors that contribute to Israel’s success in this environment without overlooking the structural weaknesses within the resistance itself, which I will address later.
On the other hand, I would like to pose a specific question: Has Israel’s perpetual state of war since its establishment 76 years ago, with the intensity of conflicts increasingly causing it harm, been a sign of strategic success or failure? If it is a sign of success, then why does Israel remain the most militarized state globally, with the highest ratio of defense spending to GDP? Why does Israel rank 169th globally in terms of political stability, with a negative stability index that has been at -1.5 since 1996 and has worsened by 62% over the past five years?
Furthermore, has the fact that more than 85% of the Arab population—both elites and ordinary citizens, male and female, rural and urban—remains opposed to normalization with Israel and refuses to accept coexistence with it, been a strategic success or failure for Israel? It was not leaders who defeated the Mongols, Crusaders, Romans, and French and British colonialists; it was the people. Leaders are symbols of national consciousness and sentiment. Salah al-Din did not defeat the Crusaders on his own; he was a symbol of a victorious society. Similarly, the Algerian revolutionary, Arab Mahieddine, did not defeat France alone; he was a symbol of a victorious society. This raises another question: Is the deep and widespread societal animosity in the Arab world toward Israel a sign of its strategic success or failure? Betting on tactical victories is a losing strategy, as every strategist knows. The culture of the people endures far longer than the culture of their leaders.
The foundation of any strategy lies in the long-term. Tactical successes, if not accumulated in a linear direction toward achieving a strategic goal, are nothing more than fleeting victories. The resistance must deepen its strategic focus, regardless of how harsh the current circumstances may be. History is the womb of strategic bets, and Israel, despite its momentary triumphs in the eyes of its settlers, is a barren strategic bet. This is a conclusion echoed by many renowned Israeli scholars, such as Professor Ilan Pappé, Nobel Prize-winning chemist Professor Aaron Ciechanover, former Mossad chief Tamir Pardo, computer scientist and Academy of Sciences president David Harel, former Israeli attorney general Talia Sasson, Israeli novelist David Grossman, and several former prime ministers, including Ehud Barak, Ehud Olmert, and Daniel Levy, who was an advisor to the Israeli prime minister. Other prominent figures include Shimon Peres’s spokesperson Gideon Levy and Rabbi David Weiss, the spokesperson for Neturei Karta, as well as Professor David Passig, one of Israel’s most famous futurists, and many others.
However, this does not negate the need for self-reflection: Why have recent events in Lebanon unfolded as they have? The Israeli side has achieved successive tactical victories that should not be dismissed. These victories have psychological impacts on the resistance’s supporters and call for a reevaluation of the resistance’s security arrangements, including secrecy, concealment, the use of decoys, and expanding the scope of confrontation within the resistance’s capabilities. Moreover, the collection of intelligence must improve.
In my view, restoring the balance in the resistance’s image, both among its supporters and opponents, requires avoiding emotional reactions when making decisions under pressure. Hastily attempting to restore prestige in front of the masses is unwise. Instead, it is necessary to build on the successes achieved so far, such as the continued displacement of settlers, economic exhaustion, and the depletion of human resources, while absorbing the psychological impact of security breaches and maintaining support for Gaza. Any rash decisions made in response to the public’s emotional demands could have consequences worse than the setbacks already experienced. The field is important, but the barn is even more so. After all, “the one who is too hasty neither cuts the land nor keeps the camel’s back unbroken.”
