At the beginning of 2015, the Tunisian Center for Research and Studies on Terrorism conducted a quantitative scientific study titled “Terrorism in Tunisia Through Judicial Files,” analyzing a broad sample of about 1,000 individuals accused of “terrorism.” The study aimed to establish an understanding of the nature of the jihadist situation in Tunisia by profiling its participants and active members.
One of the key findings of the study indicated that 98.8% of those accused of terrorism in Tunisia held Tunisian nationality, emphasizing the notion that terrorism in Tunisia is a “local product,” as the presence of foreign nationals in the judicial files studied was minimal, often limited to roles in leadership and planning rather than combat and execution. The active jihadist community in Tunisia is predominantly male, with female suspects accounting for only 3.5%, and two-thirds of the total percentage of accused having family ties.
Regarding social status and academic levels, the study revealed that the age group of 25 to 29 years was the most actively engaged and participated in terrorist organizations and operations both within Tunisia and abroad, constituting nearly 29% of all accused individuals. Similar to other countries, the phenomenon of terrorism sees vulnerable socioeconomic groups being particularly drawn to it; the study confirmed that nearly half of those accused were employed, whether skilled or unskilled, and this percentage decreased as one moves up the employment hierarchy.
Tunisians are typically unaccustomed to women being active in this regard; however, sociological analysis of the terrorism landscape reveals that the phenomenon does not exempt women, even if their numbers are small. When other cultural components come together, negative outcomes emerge without gender differentiation. There might be an exception in the shift of women’s roles from indirect participation in terrorism (whether through social media propaganda or logistical support) to direct action, albeit with the same result.
In a parallel context, numerous social studies on terrorism and extremism have concluded that the latter does not necessarily stem from the beliefs held but that the most significant drivers of various forms of extremism are dictatorship and authoritarianism. Conversely, the Tunisian case embodies strange contradictions that have drawn sociologists’ interest. Despite Tunisia being the birthplace of revolutions and the only democracy in the Arab world according to the latest Freedom House evaluation, it has been, according to official figures, one of the main incubators for terrorist organizations both within Tunisia and in nearby conflict zones.
Drying Up Religious Sources
The period following independence up until the onset of the revolution in Tunisia was marked by a strained relationship between the state and religion. The secular project advocated by the founder of modern Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba, faced confrontations with the religious institution, which perceived his project as a Westernizing path undermining the country’s identity and its people—a clash that became one of the foundational elements for the rise of the Islamic movement in the country as a reaction to his propositions and the foundations he set for the state.
Despite his removal from power in 1987, that strained relationship continued under Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, particularly as political momentum regarding religious issues intensified. In the 1990s, he implemented a plan to dry up the sources of religious observance through a comprehensive project that aimed to counter Islamists, who represented the only political adversary capable of troubling his rule. This plan criminalized anything related to religious matters, even in personal spheres; praying became a charge, and frequenting mosques, especially by youth, triggered investigations by security forces. State-appointed imams occupied the pulpits of mosques, speaking only of ablution and glorifying the ruler while prohibiting manifestations of devotion, such as banning beards for men and hijabs for women.
The state’s monopoly on the religious sphere and the repression it exercised pushed many youths to seek alternatives to fill their spiritual void, a trend that intensified at the beginning of the millennium with what some writings referred to as the “Awakening Generation.” This generation, influenced by the Iraq invasion and the humiliation of the nation, sought to fulfill its spiritual emptiness online—a space that could not be controlled or the discourse contained.
In his testimony on a television program, one participant in what was publicized as the “Sousse Events,” involving youth embracing Salafi ideology in 2007 to topple the regime with arms, mentioned that his embrace of Salafi thought emerged during the American invasion of Iraq and that the oppressive nature of Ben Ali’s regime, along with the abuse his security forces inflicted on mosque-going youth and attacks on women wearing hijabs, led to feelings of anger and resentment towards the regime, prompting them to consider targeting its leadership, which drove them to the mountains for training in weaponry.
According to the Carnegie Middle East Center, Ben Ali’s strict control over the religious sphere stifled the emergence of effective religious forces post-revolution. With the fall of his regime and the disintegration of control over this domain, a state of security chaos arose, which radical groups exploited to disseminate their ideas and recruit new members, particularly in light of the oppressive measures Ben Ali had maintained for more than twenty-five years against moderate religious figures, leaving a void where capable opponents to these groups’ ideologies could have emerged.
Marginalized Youth in a Marginalized Urban Space
The revolution in Tunisia opened the public sphere to all intellectual propositions without exception. Despite the abundance of ideas, the widespread emergence of jihadist Salafism among youth raised many questions for both state agencies and intellectual elites. It affirmed that reducing the phenomenon to doctrinal and religious elements is merely a simplistic response to a complex issue.
The most prominent study conducted in Tunisia on religious extremism, titled “Jihadist Salafism: Reality and Future,” illustrates that approaching the Salafi phenomenon through a socio-psychological lens confirms that radicalized youth in Tunisia are “marginalized youth in a marginalized urban space,” perceiving the state and society solely through their authoritarian and exclusionary faces. They find no avenue to respond to the state’s physical and symbolic violence except through another form of violence that matches it in strength and challenges it at its core.
According to the same source, most adherents to this extremist thought have low educational qualifications, which assists in adopting a “redemptive ideology” that deludes them into believing they possess the ultimate truth of religion and life. These youths face a triple-layered dual poverty: economic poverty, educational knowledge poverty, and spiritual religious poverty.
Unlike other movements in the country, jihadist Salafist groups have effectively engaged with the marginalization faced by a wide sector of Tunisian youth. They succeeded in creating alternative social systems to pull youth from “social drought” into a state of integration, which were established amidst the absence of the state in rural areas and urban margins, thus becoming a refuge for these youths seeking meaning in their existence—psychologically, economically, and socially.
The Phase of Dawah and Creating a Social Base
After the Tunisian revolution, in the winter of 2011, the Tunisian government enacted a general legislative amnesty, leading to the release of many individuals holding jihadist ideologies from prisons and allowing others to enter the country. With the weakening of the state’s grip following the popular overthrow of the regime, coupled with ensuing chaos, jihadists surged into mosques, reportedly gaining control of more than 200 religious institutions. Dawah tents proliferated in public spaces like never before, and they established social media pages and propaganda media outlets that proclaimed their guiding slogan at the time: “Tunisia is a Land of Dawah, Not a Land of Jihad.”
In their effort to provide an accommodating social base reconciled with their new presence in Tunisian streets, those bearing black flags focused on social welfare alongside their outreach efforts, launching campaigns to assist the needy and distribute aid, particularly in impoverished neighborhoods, which became fertile ground for recruitment and mobilization.
Since then, the jihadist Salafi presence has been free from violent incidents until May 18, 2011, when the first armed clash occurred between security forces and armed groups in what is known as the Rouhia incident, resulting in the deaths of two soldiers. This marked a turning point in the strategy of the movement, transitioning from a phase of advocacy to testing the waters and gauging the readiness of armed groups that were being quietly groomed, and it served as the first indication that the slogan “Tunisia is a Land of Dawah, Not a Land of Jihad” was merely a tactic for buying time.
Despite the dispersion of the movement’s pockets throughout various regions, the issue of unifying under one banner remained a contentious point among jihadist sheikhs until April 2011, when Seif Allah Ben Hussein, known as Abu Iyadh, announced the establishment of the Ansar al-Sharia organization, despite the opposition from the spiritual leader of Tunisian jihadist Salafism, Sheikh Idreesi. Meanwhile, information surfaced regarding this movement’s involvement in setting up training camps in the mountains and forests, leveraging the security vacuum to smuggle weapons from Libya, which was also suffering chaos after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime and the resulting stockpiles of weaponry beyond any form of oversight. Operations targeting security patrols continued throughout 2012 at a sporadic pace.
In mid-May 2012, the organization publicly showcased its scale by conducting its first general conference in Kairouan, central Tunisia, drawing about 5,000 supporters according to the Interior Ministry’s figures, with the organization claiming at least 40,000 participants. Amidst growing feelings of strength, the tactics of Tunisian jihadists shifted from gauging resistance to attempting to create a condition of brutality in preparation for its management.
Creating Brutality for Management
The stage of creating brutality and direct confrontation with the state aimed at exhausting it was founded on two elements: the first involved targeting public figures, which could be considered the most fortified, thereby proving the state’s weakness and instilling fear among the populace. The second comprised organizing operations targeting security and military personnel in an ostentatious manner that went beyond mere killing through ambushes; it included mutilating corpses and filming the operations with high-quality cameras later disseminated on social media.
The first acts of political assassination targeted leftist leader Chokri Belaid on February 6, 2013, outside his home in a precedent-setting incident. Just six months later, Tunisia witnessed a second political assassination targeting opposition figure Mohammed Brahmi, plunging the country into chaos that nearly obliterated the entire democratic transition as the opposition called for dismantling all institutions birthed by the founding assembly elections.
In parallel with the assassinations, terrorist attacks increased in both scale and frequency in 2013, with one of the most significant and impactful on the Tunisian street being the targeting of a military patrol stationed in Mount Chaambi (southwest), resulting in the deaths of eight soldiers simultaneously, with their bodies desecrated, foreshadowing subsequent operations based on meticulous planning, surprise, and direct confrontation.
The escalation of confrontation with the Tunisian state, which hesitated in responding to this movement’s expanding influence, prompted then-Prime Minister Ali Larayedh to declare Ansar al-Sharia a terrorist organization after substantial evidence emerged confirming its involvement in the terrorist operations witnessed in the country and overseeing arms depots. This action tightened the noose around those who had been openly traversing the country, making them officially targets for the nation’s security apparatus.
The Phase of Infiltration Operations and Lone Wolves
Terrorist operations continued at a gradually diminishing pace, particularly in their organized forms, slowly transitioning to the use of landmines in the mountains and sporadic independent operations. The main turning point was the attack on the “Bardo” Museum in the heart of Tunis, just meters away from the parliament building, marking the onset of a phase that combined the lone wolf strategy with infiltration operations.
Around noon, three armed individuals with Kalashnikovs and hand grenades attempted to enter the premises of the People’s Assembly where a session was underway regarding an anti-terrorism law, attended by the Minister of Interior, Minister of Justice, diplomats, and military and intelligence leaders. After failing to breach the assembly’s courtyard, they shifted to the adjacent Bardo Museum, murdering 22 individuals, including 20 tourists, and injuring 42 others. They subsequently took refuge inside the museum with dozens of hostages before being neutralized by Tunisian anti-terror units.
A similar event transpired in the coastal city of Sousse, where an armed individual infiltrated a hotel, killing everyone he encountered, while another incident involved a suicide bomber detonating himself on a presidential security bus, culminating in the most recent attack on Habib Bourguiba Street.
The Quagmire of Terrorism Persists
These shifts in terrorism tactics in Tunisia from direct confrontations and ambushes to infiltration and lone wolf strategies can be understood as a direct result of the recovery of security apparatuses and their success in tightening the grip on these groups; however, security measures alone are insufficient.
Recent survey findings in the country indicate that more than 80% of Tunisians believe the situation is not heading in the right direction. This pessimism is understandable given the ongoing deterioration of purchasing power due to the continued decline of the dinar against international currency markets and an unprecedented trade balance deficit. The difficult economic situation has eroded the middle class, which was a key pillar of social stability in Tunisia. According to figures from the National Institute of Statistics, poverty now encompasses 1.7 million Tunisians, including 300,000 citizens living below the poverty line.
While the central slogans of the revolution in Tunisia revolve around employment, freedom, and national dignity, the current reality falls short of these aspirations. Excluding the realm of freedoms which has significantly improved in the new Tunisia, job and dignity demands remain unaddressed, with the unemployment rate among university graduates standing at 29.2% according to the latest population and employment survey.
Among the alarming indicators is the general apathy towards the political process in the country, evidenced in the latest electoral exercise, where more than two-thirds of voters abstained from polling stations despite the local nature of the elections (municipal elections). The International Crisis Group, in its latest report on Tunisia, viewed this as a sign of the significant gap and lack of trust between the populace and the political class.
The declining trust in the existing democratic process, unable to resolve economic and social issues, can only widen the social margin, particularly among youth disenfranchised within their own country. This reality positions them, particularly amid rising frustration and pessimism, as prime targets for terrorist movements that excel at exploiting such vulnerable groups, which the state has thus far failed to integrate into the national social fabric. Given the current Tunisian landscape that mirrors the previous context fostering extremism and violence, the ongoing stagnation in reform pathways coupled with mounting social resentment toward the political process and concurrent economic reform can only yield one undeniable truth: the quagmire of terrorism has not yet run dry.
