Over the past three decades, what is known as “al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM) has managed to expand from North Africa into West Africa, aiming to establish a widely influential terrorist empire in collaboration with other terrorist organizations, particularly given the fragile geopolitical landscape of the region, which is marked by security, political, economic, and social crises. This organization emerged in 2006 following the announcement of the “Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat’s” loyalty to al-Qaeda, as the activities of this group were primarily concentrated in North Africa, especially Algeria. Since then, this al-Qaeda branch has geographically extended to join a terrorist alliance led by the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims in 2017 in the Sahel and West Africa.
In this context, Caleb Weiss presents, in his report titled “The Imperial Playbook of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” a detailed explanation of the mechanisms employed by the organization to achieve such a degree of expansion from the Islamic Maghreb to North and West Africa, relying on a range of primary sources of terrorist propaganda and historical research. The report lays out five mechanisms for al-Qaeda and its branches and allies to achieve this geographical expansion:
- Establishing friendships or creating armed groups operating within the context of conflict.
- Integrating themselves into the communities where these armed groups exist.
- Exploiting grievances from these communities to gain sympathy.
- Responding to internal or external opposition in a negative or aggressive manner.
- Looking towards new communities once their base is secured.
Stages of Expansion:
Al-Qaeda utilized “The Imperial Playbook of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (or parts of it) to expand and transition from Algeria to North and West Africa over five different historical periods. It is likely that al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups in the region will continue to employ this playbook as they pursue their contemporary expansion in West Africa. These stages can be detailed as follows:
Stage One (1992-1998): The report designates this stage as “The Arrival of al-Qaeda.” It was during this period that the organization first moved into the Sahel region in 1993 and 1994, supporting the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in its fight during Algeria’s black decade. The ties between this group and al-Qaeda were initially formed in Afghanistan but were solidified mainly through Sudan and Niger. Additionally, the GIA utilized al-Qaeda’s networks in the Sahel, Niger, and Nigeria to acquire a safe rear base and a steady supply of weapons, money, and support. However, these networks were later seized by its splinter group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.
Stage Two (1998-2006): Dubbed “Establishing an Official al-Qaeda Branch and Moving South,” this stage saw the emergence of the splinter group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, with the aid of al-Qaeda. Like its predecessor, the group initially viewed the Sahel as a viable rear base for its mission focused on Algeria. However, as its leaders, based in the Sahel, began marrying local tribes and families, providing social support to local populations, and establishing deep ties with power brokers, politicians, and local criminals, the Salafist Group started to attract large numbers of local recruits and collaborators in the Sahel. This influx of Sahel residents significantly transformed the identity of the Salafist Group, shifting from an organization concentrated on Algeria to one expanding its activities across North Africa, leveraging the grievances of Sahel nations generally. With this transformation, the group’s leadership found the Sahel a suitable terrain for kinetic operations, starting with attacks in Mauritania in June 2005.
Stage Three (2006-2012): This phase marks al-Qaeda’s expansion into West Africa, referred to as “Initial Expansion in the Sahel and State-Building.” During this time, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat officially adopted the name al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. In 2007, local efforts to establish a Mauritanian branch were intensified, while the organization began targeting Malian forces in 2009. The increasing social integration within the Sahel led to more local recruits, which resulted in al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb forming several local brigades in the late part of the decade and the beginning of the new millennium. With the outbreak of the Tuareg rebellion, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb seized the opportunity to increase its integration in northern Mali, arming the Tuaregs to seize half the country in mid-2012. Ultimately, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb turned against its former allies and took control of northern Mali. Around the same time in 2012, the organization helped establish the al-Qaeda-affiliated “Ansaru” group within Nigeria.
Stage Four (2013-2017): This period is characterized by “Rebuilding al-Qaeda in the Sahel” and consolidating its forces away from its historical operational areas in Mali, particularly in Burkina Faso and Niger and beyond. This was achieved through the merger of the “Masked Brigade” and the “Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa” to form a new group called “The Macina Liberation Front” in 2013. Between 2014 and 2015, the “Ansar Dine Movement,” one of the al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations in northern Mali, emerged. In 2016, al-Qaeda members in Mali assisted local jihadists in Burkina Faso to form the first jihadist organization there, known as “Ansar Islam.”
Stage Five (2017-2021): Marketed in the report as “The Transformation of al-Qaeda into a Full Coastal Project,” this phase witnessed the largest expansion of al-Qaeda to date. By 2017, the Ansar Dine groups and their subgroups, along with the Saharan wing of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Macina Liberation Front, publicly merged (excluding Ansar Islam) to form the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM). Since then, JNIM has expanded into farther regions through central and southern Mali, consolidating itself in local communities and conflicts to build public support.
Proposed Responses:
The report presents several recommendations for local and international policymakers to address the political implications of al-Qaeda’s expansion from the Maghreb to North and West Africa, notably:
Recognizing the Expansion Model: The success of the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, as a branch of al-Qaeda, in expanding into West Africa represents a model for other al-Qaeda branches worldwide, including the “Al-Shabaab” group in Somalia, directly involved within the clan system. The Pakistani Taliban has recruited many powerful clans in tribal areas that worked in its favor while local tribal relationships provided “al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula” (AQAP) with significant influence to varying degrees throughout its existence. Thus, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims serves as a model for how the global al-Qaeda network spreads, as issues, grievances, politics, and local complaints are weaponized and exploited for its own advantage.
Understanding Intricate Relationships: The report urges policymakers to put in greater effort to understand the hierarchical structures and highly complex relationships among al-Qaeda in the Sahel, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, and the global al-Qaeda network. Although these organizations operate relatively clandestinely, this does not imply a weakening of the ties between them. For instance, when Abu Obeida Yusuf al-Anabi was appointed as emir of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb following the death of Abdelmalek Droukdel in June 2020, who was one of the senior leaders of the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, Qutaiba Abu al-Nu’man al-Chenqiti (also a religious figure in al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) announced al-Anabi’s appointment. Furthermore, local fighters continue to venerate global al-Qaeda leaders in propaganda videos, showcasing the ideological closeness and attraction that al-Qaeda demands within the group. Finally, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims continues to receive accolades from other official al-Qaeda branches, such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, while it identifies itself as a branch of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in its official outputs.
Negotiation Approach Requirements: Weiss’s report raises arguments regarding negotiating with al-Qaeda groups, noting that various countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and even France have either contemplated or actually negotiated with al-Qaeda to curb terrorism in the Sahel region. For its part, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims has positioned itself as ready to negotiate, albeit if France exits the region. Regardless of the group’s willingness to negotiate a power-sharing agreement with Sahel countries, it is clear that many local nations are eager to pursue this course with the local al-Qaeda branch. At the same time, other countries, such as European members of the French military task force (Takuba) and the United States, have preferred a military-focused approach to combat the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims. In both pathways, the report recommends that policymakers consider al-Qaeda’s long history in the Sahel, particularly given the departure of European powers, including France and its allies in the Takuba task force from Mali. In this regard, it’s essential to consider how the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims has utilized local peace agreements, possibly as a model for how a broader and more comprehensive peace agreement could enhance its power. For example, since 2017, the International Crisis Group has documented at least 12 local peace agreements between the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims and various armed groups and militias.
Questions of Success Against the Al-Qaeda Branch: In conclusion, the report poses questions that it finds essential for local and international policymakers to answer: Does a national or international peace agreement with the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims constitute success? If so, what conditions must be met and maintained for any agreement to be deemed successful? Is success merely military achievements or the removal of certain jihadist leaders from the battlefield? Does success involve building government capacity in the Sahel to address the various root causes of conflict? Or does success lead to the deterioration of the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims through purposeful fragmentation and/or counter-messaging to deter new recruits?
The report argues that the international community has not reached a consensus on a unified definition of what “success” looks like. Nonetheless, the author notes that any measures to define success against the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims should take into account the history of their operations, activities, and agendas in the Sahel and beyond, which have directly shaped their trajectory today.
Source:
Caleb Weiss, “AQIM’s Imperial Playbook: Understanding al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb’s Expansion into West Africa,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, United States Military Academy, April 2022.
