The Syrian coast witnessed violent sectarian clashes between March 6-10, 2025, following military confrontations between remnants of the former President Bashar al-Assad’s regime and security forces loyal to the new Syrian administration. These clashes resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians, with the number possibly exceeding a thousand, as well as dozens of casualties among the general security forces and rebels aligned with the previous regime. These events represent a turning point, and their direction will be determined by the behavior of the influential political forces in Syria, especially the new administration led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
Background and Implications of the Syrian Coast Events
In recent weeks, attacks carried out by groups of remnants of the former regime against the general security forces of the new Syrian administration have intensified in the coastal regions of Syria. The administration, which succeeded in avoiding widespread sectarian violations on the eve of the regime’s fall, had called on the remnants of the regime to settle their status and surrender their weapons immediately after its collapse. Tens of thousands of army personnel, security agencies, and the Ministry of Interior, which was effectively dissolved upon the regime’s fall and officially at the end of the “Victory Conference” held by armed factions on January 29, 2025, complied. They chose Ahmed al-Shara as the transitional president during the conference. These individuals were granted temporary cards allowing them freedom of movement, without being exempted from legal prosecution in case of committing crimes.
The settlements also included several high-ranking officers and officials of the former regime, some of whom are believed to have reached settlement agreements to avoid fighting during the “Deterring Aggression” operation, such as Brigadier General Talal Makhloof, the commander of the 105th Brigade in the Republican Guard. According to the Governor of Latakia, more than 85,000 individuals applied for status settlement, while thousands others rejected the settlement or surrendering their weapons and sought refuge in the mountains upon the entry of the military operations administration into the coastal regions of Syria. It is believed that some of them are wanted for major crimes committed during the conflict that lasted over 13 years, leaving them with no choice but to fight or face justice.
The comprehensive and non-selective dissolution of the army and the dismissal of tens of thousands of state institution employees were controversial measures, especially since the new administration is neither capable nor does the Syrian economy currently have alternatives to contain the resulting damage. It also expressed a position of alienation towards state institutions in general, not just the regime.
In the first weeks after the regime’s fall, the attacks by the remnants against the new authorities aimed to pressure for a settlement leading to a general amnesty. However, the situation escalated and became more organized in the last week when these remnants launched a coordinated military operation involving thousands of elements under the command of what was called the “Military Council for the Liberation of Syria,” a military framework announced by Colonel Ghayath Dalla, a former officer in the regime’s army and the commander of the so-called “Al-Ghayth Militia” operating within the ranks of the Fourth Division, led by Maher al-Assad, the brother of the former regime’s head. The new administration’s forces responded with an attack that did not spare civilians.
The remnants’ attack included all major coastal cities in Syria (Latakia, Tartous, Jableh, and Baniyas) in an attempt to seize control of their centers, while fierce battles took place in the countryside of these cities, resulting in the deaths of dozens of security forces, most of whom fell in well-prepared ambushes. Due to the intensity of the attacks and the small number of its elements, the government had to resort to undisciplined opposition factions to repel the attack, some of which committed sectarian massacres in the Alawite regions and villages they entered. Some units of the general security forces also participated in clear revengeful behavior. The images showed horrific scenes of entire families being killed, in addition to sectarian humiliation.
This behavior revealed a significant gap between the media discourse of the leadership in Damascus and the culture of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s elements; these individuals did not transform into responsible soldiers in a national army simply by being named as such. Many civilians from the provinces of Idlib, Hama, and others headed to the coastal regions to help the government repel the attack in a clear sectarian mobilization. The initial statements from the officials welcomed it as an expression of the unity of the people and the state. These massacres resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Alawite civilians, including women and children, while thousands fled to the mountains or crossed the border into Lebanon. The actual numbers are still unknown as they may exceed a thousand, and the media was prevented from moving and covering the events freely. Most of the videos relied upon were taken by the fighters of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham themselves. In turn, the remnants of the regime targeted families on public roads between Latakia and Idlib.
In an attempt to win over the Alawite sect, which was completely dependent on the state for job opportunities and income sources, the rebels from the remnants of the former regime exploited the feelings of fear and exclusion that were prevalent among the Alawite community after the dissolution of the former army and its security agencies, in addition to the arbitrary dismissal policies adopted by the new administration under what it considered as fighting corruption, nepotism, and reducing financial burdens, although sectarian considerations were evident in the dismissal processes, their success remained limited.
The sectarian massacres on the Syrian coast, which targeted isolated civilians, revealed a high level of sectarian tension within Syrian society, deepened existing divisions, and caused significant damage to the image of the new Syrian government and its efforts to unify the country and lift international sanctions (especially American ones). The government, realizing the extent of the damage to its credibility due to its failure to prevent the massacres committed by factions aligned with it, quickly formed an investigation committee into these events and pledged to hold those responsible accountable. It also established a committee to maintain civil peace on the coast, including representatives from the region.
Pitfalls of Sectarianism
Sectarianism is not a new, sudden, or exceptional issue in Syria, and dealing with it from this perspective is a process of denial. The denial process spares political, media, and cultural leaderships from confronting its danger. Syria has experienced the eruption of sectarian violence at many turning points in its history, and we are not reviewing this history. However, the phenomenon takes a dangerous dimension in the stage of the spread of populist discourse, social media, and the welcome of mass participation in revolutionary discourse.
It is no coincidence that the beginnings of the revolution carried sincere slogans such as “No to sectarianism,” as activists realized its danger and the fear of its eruption if the regime fell. Years of rule by the Assad family and the clique that shared its rule’s privileges from all sects led to the employment of large segments of Alawite individuals in state institutions, especially security agencies, out of loyalty motives. Most of these individuals were not rulers, but rather the ruled. Under these long decades of oppression, a gradual process occurred to transform Sunni Syrians into a sect; the oppressed majority sect, especially since some believed that the rulers were Alawites and the ruled were Sunni Muslims, simplifying the nature of the ruling system to the point of blindness and ignorance, ignoring the injustice faced by Kurds, Druze, and Alawites themselves.
This reminds us of the transformation of Iraqi Shia into an oppressed sect under what was considered Sunni minority rule in Iraq (a discourse that found acceptance in the West as well). Political, social, and cultural forces from all sects and affiliations were active in Syrian society, resisting these generalizations, including men and women who spent decades in Assad’s prisons. On the other hand, there were organized political forces promoting sectarian discourse for mobilization purposes, sometimes retreating from it, and then adopting it again.
With the revolution turning into armed violence, killings on a sectarian basis were carried out by regime militias and opposition factions alike. This phenomenon is not new, therefore. However, the forces supporting the revolution often ignored the sectarian discourse and practices of the armed factions, especially the Islamic ones that did not adopt the revolution’s discourse in the first place, fearing division and indirectly serving the regime.
After the regime’s collapse, a feeling spread that the rule had shifted from the Alawite minority to the Sunni majority; a false feeling. Sunnis are also ruled today, just like the rest of the sects. It is true that the current rulers are Sunni in their origins and beliefs, but they represent a small minority in number and doctrine compared to the vast number and diversity of Syrian Sunnis. In any case, it is not permissible to measure things by these standards, but those who use sectarianism fall into this contradiction. The promotion of these notions, which aim to make Sunni sectarianism the main base of the ruling system, must be stopped.
First, because this is not enough; Sunnis do not live on sectarian identity, they need sources of decent living and citizenship rights. Sectarianism and identity politics may distract from these demands for a short period.
Second, this discourse pressures the current administration to adopt a “us” and “them” approach (implicitly) towards the rest of the Syrian people’s factions, making the state a social party before it begins the process of building it, after it destroyed most of its institutions. Instead of the relationship between the citizen and the authority, and civil society institutions and the authority, the demands become a type of conflict. This can only be resolved through settlements without a process of integration into a “single Syrian people” (as in the famous slogan), leaving nothing but a name given to a gathering that is fragmented in reality. It is necessary to confront this danger before it escalates.
Third, it is not permissible to say that the administration does not recognize a majority and a minority and at the same time deals with itself as the majority and the rest as minorities. In this case, the only solution is allocation; it is not permissible to impose a certain character on the state (some consider it a majority character, although it is not), and then demand those who have become “the others” to integrate under it. It is either a state of citizenship or allocation (implicit or explicit), and those who cannot accept the terms of citizenship and a nation of citizens must accept allocation. Finally, political sectarianism means lurking violence, and its main expression is the constant fear that people live in some regions; because they are not safe for their lives and property, and it can emerge from hiding in city alleys at night, or in raids between conflicting forces, or explode in the form of bloody massacres that are a stain of shame. The evidence of the depth of the crisis is that there are those who defend what happened or justify it after the facts have been revealed.
International Reactions
The sectarian massacres witnessed in the coastal region were met with a wide wave of condemnation, especially from international forces. In a tweet on the platform “X,” the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, stated that his country “condemns the radical Islamic terrorists, including foreign jihadists who killed people in western Syria in recent days, and that the United States stands with religious and ethnic minorities in Syria, including Christian, Druze, Alawite, and Kurdish communities, and extends its condolences to the victims’ families,” and that “it is incumbent upon the transitional authorities in Syria to hold the perpetrators of these massacres against minorities accountable.”
As for Russia, its Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov described what happened as an “unacceptable eruption of violence,” and that Russia “is concerned about everything happening in Syria,” and that it “is making efforts with the international community to ensure security for all sects and factions and make Syria free from terrorist threats,” and that it “is consulting with the United States at the United Nations,” where “work is being done on formulating appropriate responses.” Hundreds of Alawite civilians sought refuge at the Russian military base in Latakia during the sectarian events. Meanwhile, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, expressed receiving “highly disturbing reports of entire families, including women and children, being killed,” and that “prompt, transparent, and impartial investigations into all crimes and other violations must be conducted, and those responsible must be held accountable in accordance with international law standards and rules. Transitional justice is an urgent need.”
The Security Council held a closed session on March 10 at the request of Russia and the United States to discuss the security developments on the Syrian coast, amid calls for “holding the involved parties accountable and engaging in a political process that ensures minority rights.” The European Union issued a statement expressing its “strong condemnation of the recent attacks on the transitional government forces in the coastal regions of Syria, which reports attributed to elements loyal to Assad, and all acts of violence against civilians.” It called for the “need to protect civilians in all circumstances with full respect for international humanitarian law.” It also urged “all external actors to fully respect Syria’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity.”
Germany, France, and the UK issued similar statements, and news of the massacres on the Syrian coast weighed heavily on the meeting of Syria’s neighboring countries held in Amman on March 9, attended by foreign and defense ministers, as well as chiefs of staff and intelligence agency heads from Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. The meeting affirmed that “Syria’s security and stability are a pillar for security and stability in the region,” and condemned “attempts targeting Syria’s security and terrorism in all its forms, and cooperation in combating it militarily, security-wise, and ideologically.”
As for Israel, it exploited these events and tried to benefit from them, as the Israeli Security Minister, Israel Katz, accused the Syrian government forces of committing “atrocities against Alawite civilians,” and reiterated that Israel “will protect itself from any threat coming from Syria,” and that “the Israeli army will remain in the buffer zone and on the Golan Heights, and continue to protect the settlements in the Golan and Galilee,” and that it will work to keep southern Syria free from weapons and threats, pledging to “protect the Druze population in the region, and anyone who touches them will pay the price,” as he put it.
Conclusion
The sectarian violence events that the coastal cities and countryside of Syria witnessed, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of isolated civilians, caused significant damage to the Syrian transition process that began after the fall of the Assad regime, the direction of which is still unknown; there is no answer to the question: transition to what? These events deepened the divisions between factions of Syrian society and showed the government’s inability to protect its citizens, and dissipated all the efforts it made over the three months since the regime’s fall to appear as a responsible and capable government of avoiding sectarian violence. It did not address the root of the problem related to sectarianism, which seems to be a common and openly stated issue in some circles, and even coincides with the support of the new administration in the eyes of some.
The issue of sectarianism and the illusory equation of the sectarian majority with the political or ruling majority cannot be ignored. The issue of equal Syrian citizenship, which includes equality in rights and opportunities to participate in state institutions, must be confronted, where appointments seem to be made based on loyalty rather than competence. The coastal events may have caused significant damage to the government’s efforts to lift sanctions, especially American ones, as Washington considers the protection of minorities a primary condition for lifting them. Lifting American sanctions is essential for reviving the Syrian economy destroyed by the war, for reconstruction, and for the success of the new government in dealing with the difficult living challenges.
Despite the Syrian government’s quick action to contain the damage, by acknowledging the occurrence of sectarian violations and pledging to investigate the coastal events through the establishment of an investigation committee and holding those responsible accountable, restoring the trust of Syrians requires taking additional important steps, foremost among them involving all factions of society in the political process, forming a representative government away from exclusion and monopoly, criminalizing sectarian incitement, including what is continuously happening on social media, dealing with all Syrians as equal citizens in rights and duties regardless of their sectarian, religious, and ethnic affiliations, which should not appear as a favor or honor, and accelerating the launch of a transitional justice path that ensures the accountability of criminals, limits acts of revenge outside the legal framework, and turns the page on the former regime and its violations.
