Sudan War: After Two Years of Fighting… Is There a Solution on the Horizon?

The war in Sudan between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is approaching its third year, following a failed attempt by the RSF to seize power, which plunged the country into an open war that engulfed all parts of Sudan. It started in the capital, Khartoum, and the Darfur region, where the RSF tightened its control, except for El Fasher, the regional capital, and some areas around it, as well as large areas in Kordofan and central Sudan, in the states of Al Gezira and Sennar. However, the Sudanese army and its allied factions quickly regained the initiative and began consolidating control over many cities and villages in central Sudan.

The successive and rapid victories of the Sudanese army started from Jebel Moya and Sennar, but Madani was the turning point in the RSF’s rapid retreat, which was unexpected by observers, due to the importance of Madani; this contributed to achieving progress in various fronts of the confrontations.

Despite the fact that achieving a decisive military victory is now one of the most difficult options, the Sudanese army is moving forward in this direction, as evidenced by the statements of the head of the Transitional Sovereignty Council and some political leaders. This is due to the failure of all regional and international attempts to hold direct negotiations between the two warring parties in Sudan, in addition to the emergence of trends within the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) alliance calling for the announcement of a parallel government in areas under RSF control. Therefore, it is expected that the military option will be the most suitable for the Sudanese army to regain control over all parts of Sudan in the coming days; this means that the war will continue for a longer period.

Through this paper, we try to review and analyze the motives and reasons behind the Sudanese army’s reliance on the military option in its war against the RSF.

Background on the Motives and Reasons for the April 15 War between the Sudanese Army and the RSF The question of who fired the first shot in the April/Nisan 2023 war, as well as the reasons and motives for the war, will remain a significant mark in Sudan’s history, as it relates to the consequences of the war on the state and society. Despite the fact that Sudan has never enjoyed stability since its independence from Britain in 1956, the April/Nisan war will remain different in terms of motives, dimensions, context, and geographical scope; as all previous wars were confined to the peripheries of Sudan, in its south, west, and east, where the rebel movements were based on many issues related to development and political participation. However, the RSF is part of Omar al-Bashir’s regime mechanisms; it was effectively used to quash the rebellion in both Darfur and Kordofan, so its rebellion resulted in catastrophic consequences.

After unprecedented media tension and exchange, armed clashes erupted between the Sudanese army and the RSF on April 15, 2023; the battles started within the capital, Khartoum, and the army’s military bases, but soon the armed clashes spread to all cities of Sudan. At that time, questions and narratives related to the motives and reasons for the war began, especially since the relationship between the army commander and the head of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and his deputy, the RSF commander, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, is a deep-rooted and close relationship that was formed since 2003 when they were working in central Darfur areas, and became more consolidated when Abdel Fattah al-Burhan included Mohamed Dagalo in the second military council under his leadership and appointed him as the deputy head of the council; he was not present in the first military council led by Awad Ibn Auf. Had it not been for Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s decisions to abolish Article Five of the RSF law, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo would not have been able to legalize and expand his forces to reach 100,000 soldiers. In addition, Hemeti exploited his influence, benefiting from his participation in Operation Decisive Storm to enhance his position and achieve his ambition to rule Sudan, through forces equipped with heavy weapons and four-wheel drive vehicles, as well as being able to exploit gold mines and export large quantities to the UAE.

Since the October 2021 coup against Abdullah Hamdok’s government, disputes have arisen between the Sudanese army and the RSF, which thwarted efforts to choose a prime minister and form a new government similar to Abdullah Hamdok’s government. In December 2022, the Sudanese factions reached agreements after sessions of meetings and joint gatherings, under the sponsorship of the international quartet that includes the United States, Britain, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, the United Nations, the African Union, and IGAD. The political forces also engaged in the activities of the Framework Agreement Conference; the agreement stated that the army would be subject to the prime minister, and it also emphasized the integration of all armed factions into the armed forces. The proposed timeline for integrating the RSF into the army was the straw that broke the camel’s back, so Mohamed Hamdan wanted the integration process to last for at least ten years to maintain his military influence and protect his economic empire, which would keep him a difficult figure to bypass. On the other hand, some military and political leaders realize that the issue of integration and demobilization within two years is an opportunity to get rid of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo with minimal losses, considering that he does not meet the requirements for enrollment in the Sudanese Military Academy, which requires obtaining a secondary qualification. Politically, he has no chances, which is due to the crimes and violations he committed when he was the right-hand man of the deposed president, Omar al-Bashir, in addition to his participation in dispersing the sit-in in front of the General Command in Khartoum.

Since the outbreak of armed clashes, the RSF has been able to tighten control over the government facilities it was responsible for protecting, especially the sovereignty headquarters such as the Republican Palace and all ministries and federal and state government institutions located in Khartoum State. It tried by all means to seize the General Command in Khartoum, as it would mean control over the Sudanese army. It is no secret to anyone that Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, in the early days of the war, was seeking to arrest the head of the Transitional Sovereignty Council and the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese army, but the army’s bravery prevented that, and the battle of the Presidential Guard is the best evidence of that. The RSF failed to seize power since the first week of the war.

In the first year of the war, the RSF sought to impose its control by turning its failed attempt to seize power into open military confrontations throughout Sudan. Its goal was to expand its military control as much as possible; this would give it leverage to enter a political process that would ensure its survival as an independent military force as it was before the April/Nisan war. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo relied on the military superiority of his forces compared to the Sudanese army, which mostly contented itself with defending its military bases and some vital facilities. The RSF managed to control major military bases in several areas, including Nyala, Zalengei, and El Geneina, in addition to the Al-Daein base, and extended its control over some important bases in Madani, Sennar, and Jebel Moya.

Since the Sudanese army announced, on September 26, 2024, a military operation described at the time as the largest since the start of the war; it crossed the White Nile and Halfaya bridges towards Khartoum and Bahri, the RSF’s control began to collapse rapidly in several areas, following the extensive military operations launched by the army in recent months, and succeeded in recapturing large cities such as Wad Madani, Sennar, and El Dinder, as well as areas of Jebel Moya, Um Al Qura, and Um Ruwaba, and culminated its effort by achieving the largest breakthrough in the capital, by breaking the siege on its headquarters in central Khartoum, and on the Signal Corps south of Khartoum Bahri. This is an endeavor that may be completed in the coming days by regaining control over the entire states of Al Gezira and Khartoum; this means that the war will return to its traditional course in both Kordofan and Darfur.

Positions of Sudanese Political Forces Since its independence, Sudan has been witnessing a struggle between conservative forces represented by sectarian and Islamic parties and their allies, and left-wing and nationalist forces represented by communist, Baathist, and Nasserist parties and their allies. The essence of the struggle revolves around power, but its manifestations and fields are diverse, and can be summarized in three main issues: the permanent constitution, the relationship between religion and the state, and national identity. With the outbreak of the April/Nisan war, a new phase began in Sudan; the ranks were divided and the political forces were split into two groups: the first stands with the army and supports the survival of the state and its institutions, in the face of a second group, which, even if it denies it, many indicators confirm that it stands with the RSF and its foreign allies, headed by the formation of a parallel government in areas under RSF control.

The RSF’s agenda coincided with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) alliance “Taqaddum,” that the war against the army aims to eliminate the remnants of the previous regime and work to impose democracy and civilian rule. Conversely, the political forces that stand with the army call the April/Nisan war the “War of Dignity,” and emphasize that they are fighting the RSF, which rebelled against the state, and mercenaries fighting in its ranks. I believe that the political forces’ inability to fulfill their primary role according to the principles and rules of the democratic political process during the transitional period, and their acceptance of the RSF as a political and military actor, provided all the necessary conditions for the outbreak of the war, and later contributed to fueling and escalating it until their role diminished, and perhaps this will extend to the post-war phase.

The post-war task will appear more difficult for civilian political forces in terms of complexity, as well as divisions, and the lack of a comprehensive vision for the issues in dispute, in addition to the army’s ambitions to continue ruling, as evidenced by the amendments made to the constitutional document; it granted broad powers to the head of the Transitional Sovereignty Council to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, state governors, and the judicial system, and a transitional period of about four years, which means that the Sudanese political forces of all types and orientations will have limited roles at the present time, as well as in the post-April 15 war phase.

The army commander, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, presented, during his address to consultations organized by political forces supporting the army in the city of Port Sudan recently, a roadmap for preparing for the post-war phase, which included the most important items: forming a war government in the coming period from independent technocrats to complete the tasks of the transition, and assisting the army and its supporting forces in decisively defeating the RSF in the remaining areas of its presence; this sparked widespread controversy among some political forces that were absent from the meeting, and announced that anyone who abandons carrying arms from the fighters or supporting the militia from the politicians will be welcome, and he also clarified his rejection of any political or regional classification of the fighting battalions, emphasizing that anyone who wants to fight under any banner must put down their weapons. The head of the Transitional Sovereignty Council emphasized that “there is no second chance for the National Congress to return to power on the backs of Sudanese,” calling on those aspiring to rule to compete with other political forces in elections. I believe that Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s statement raised a complex issue with significant differences among political factions, and the repercussions of that will become clear in the coming days, and may affect the course of the armed confrontations.

A new coalition emerged on the Sudanese political scene called the Democratic Civil Alliance of the Revolution Forces (Sumud), and Abdullah Hamdok was chosen as its head, following the dissolution of the Democratic and Civil Forces Coordination itself, after disputes among its components over forming a parallel government. Sudanese political forces – the most prominent of which are the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) alliance parties, civil society organizations, and armed movements – held preparatory meetings, in October 2023, in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, following the outbreak of fighting between the Sudanese army and the RSF, on April 15, 2023. In late May 2024, the Coordination held its founding conference in Addis Ababa, culminating in the founding declaration of the Democratic Civil Forces Coordination “Taqaddum.”

During a meeting of the leadership of the “Taqaddum” Coordination chaired by Abdullah Hamdok, in December last year, in Entebbe, Uganda, a dispute arose following the adoption by the factions of the Revolutionary Front of a proposal to form a parallel government to strip legitimacy from the government in Port Sudan, and the proposal was referred to a political mechanism that failed to reconcile between those insisting on forming a parallel government in areas under RSF control, and those rejecting it, who believe that going to a government leads to bias towards one of the conflict parties, as it paves the way for the political division of the country, and does not help achieve peace and end the war.

Following a meeting of the leadership of the “Taqaddum” Coordination chaired by Hamdok on Monday, the Coordination announced the “disengagement” between the group calling for the establishment of a government in areas under RSF control, and those insisting on not forming it, with each working under a separate political and organizational platform with new and different names. “With this decision, each party will work, as of its date, according to what it deems appropriate and consistent with its vision regarding the war and ways to stop it, and achieve comprehensive and permanent peace, establish sustainable democratic civilian rule, and confront the plans of the former regime and its dissolved party and fronts.”

Regional and International Roles The conflict has turned into an opportunity for competition for influence in Sudan and its surrounding region between regional and international powers. During the rule of former President Omar al-Bashir, Gulf countries sought to invest in sectors such as agriculture, in which Sudan has tremendous potential. China also invested in the oil extraction sector, and Russia seeks to build a naval base on the Red Sea. The United Arab Emirates supplied the RSF with weapons and military equipment, and on the other hand, Iran sent military support to the army.

Egypt, predictably and traditionally throughout Sudan’s post-independence history, supports the Sudanese army to achieve its security and stability. To achieve this, Egypt supported the transitional period under al-Burhan’s leadership and influenced some political forces, and the RSF continued to accuse the Egyptian Air Force of engaging in military confrontations since the outbreak of the April/Nisan war.

Regional interaction with the war in Sudan varies between attempting to stop the fighting and prevent the spread of chaos across borders, to political and undeclared military support for one of the crisis parties. The UAE is the most prominent regional party intervening in Sudan; it has close ties with the RSF. The UAE has diverse interests in Sudan, including its interest in gold mines, and building the “Abu Amama” port on the Red Sea coast to consolidate its control over the ports extending in the Horn of Africa. Although the Sudanese government did not explicitly mention the UAE, it accused foreign countries of supporting the RSF. The army found Emirati military weapons in the possession of those forces when it captured some of their camps; this indicates that the UAE supplied the RSF with military equipment through neighboring countries of Sudan, such as Chad, the Central African Republic, and Libya.

The Sudanese army obtained Iranian-made drones, which contributed to achieving rapid military progress against the RSF, halting its advance in several fronts, and regaining vital areas in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, in a field advance described as the most significant for the army since the start of the fighting. According to a report by Reuters, Iranian drones of the “Mohajer” and “Ababil” types, manufactured by companies operating under the supervision of the Iranian Defense Ministry, were transferred to Sudan several times since the end of last year via the Iranian airline “Qeshm Fars Air.” It can be said that the resumption of diplomatic relations between Iran and Sudan carries more than one geostrategic dimension, especially from the Iranian side; its strategic vision in the region is based on expanding its naval influence and enhancing its military presence, whether through bases, or through military groups and militias affiliated with it. Tehran seeks to restore the military balance of power within Sudan, seek a new regional ally, turn the page on the 2016 tension crisis, and enhance its presence in the Red Sea region. Iran also seeks to establish a foothold in the Red Sea through its intention to build a naval base in Port Sudan, and infiltrate the Horn and African coast starting from Sudan.

Some reports indicate that the Sudanese government obtained commitments from Moscow for massive military supplies in exchange for guarantees for the establishment of the Russian base on the Red Sea coast, and huge concessions in the fields of mining and agriculture. The Russian-Sudanese agreement will grant Moscow influence and impact on Red Sea security; this will increase Russian effectiveness in the Horn of Africa, and will reflect on Moscow in the African coast.

In a move aimed at restricting the military resources of the Sudanese armed forces, the United States imposed sanctions on prominent military leaders, headed by the commander-in-chief of the army and head of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, and Mirghani Idris, head of the defense industry system, and others. On the other hand, the US State Department also imposed sanctions on senior RSF leaders, headed by its commander, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, and his brother, Abdel Raheem Dagalo. The United States believes that the sanctions on RSF military leaders involved in human rights violations and committing crimes against humanity aim to send a message that the United States will not tolerate violations and crimes. This step comes after all Saudi-American efforts failed to succeed in the Jeddah negotiation platform between the Sudanese army and the RSF.

Possible Scenarios With the war entering its third consecutive year without interruption, and the insistence of both parties on achieving victory and military decisiveness, the issue of finding a settlement for the crisis seems far-fetched. With the Sudanese army relying on the military option, based on the factions fighting alongside it, and the opening of supply and logistics chains, we will review the possible scenarios for the war in Sudan for its third year.

Scenario One: Military Decisiveness

This scenario is the most likely. Recently, the Sudanese army managed to achieve successive and rapid victories in both Sennar and Al Gezira states, and thus tightened control over all cities and villages of Al Gezira and Sennar, and the White Nile state became almost free of the RSF after regaining control over Al Qatina city, which witnessed a series of crimes and violations during the RSF’s control over it.

I believe that the battle of central Khartoum is the fiercest and most complex; it includes the headquarters of government facilities and sovereignty ministries, including the Republican Palace. Therefore, the army’s consolidation of control over it will be symbolic for the government and the key to victory for regaining all areas of East Nile and Jebel Awlia.

Considering that the army will be freed from the constraints of fighting within cities, which limited its ability to use its heavy weapons and artillery, the ethnic and tribal composition of the Darfur and Kordofan regions, the legacy of the bloody conflict, and the motives of revenge and retaliation, will make the chances of the joint forces’ retreat limited. On the other hand, this will strengthen the hypothesis of the RSF’s division and the factions allied with it, as happened in the Justice and Equality Movement led by Suleiman Sandal. Based on this, the RSF will remain pursued, posing no security threat, and concentrated in some areas of Darfur, like the armed movements in recent years of the Darfur war.

Scenario Two: Division

This scenario is catastrophic for Sudan; it will lead to a state of collapse and fragmentation and tearing of the Sudanese state, similar to what happened in Somalia and Libya; where there will be no central authority, and parts of the state will be under the control of the RSF and its allies, especially in Darfur and Kordofan. The RSF seeks to consolidate its influence through the political announcement launched in Nairobi, on February 23, 2025, with the participation of some armed factions and political forces, and the announcement of a parallel government in areas under RSF control, following the Libyan model. If this happens, it will be the first step towards comprehensive division, with the need to consider that the Popular Movement (Al-Hilu wing) adopts separatist ideas in case secularism is not adopted as a ruling option. In addition to the above, this scenario allows for the expansion of foreign interventions; this enhances the motives for secession, but any government formed in Darfur or South Kordofan will not be able to achieve any successes on all levels, especially in providing basic services such as security, education, and health, etc.; as the civilian administrations formed by the RSF in Madani, Nyala, Zalengei, El Geneina, and Khartoum failed.

Scenario Three: Settlement

This scenario relies on the international community, the African Union, and neighboring countries pressuring the two conflict parties in Sudan to sit at the negotiating table and stop the fighting. Saudi Arabia, in cooperation with the United States, led numerous attempts to bridge the gap between the Sudanese army and the RSF, and succeeded in completing more than one ceasefire following hosting meetings of the disputants in the city of Jeddah, but failed to achieve a significant breakthrough that would lead to a permanent cessation of fighting.

Among the regional initiatives, the initiative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa stands out; it announced the formation of a quartet committee to investigate ending the fighting and addressing the crisis in Sudan. However, the initiative has not yet succeeded in holding direct meetings between the two conflict parties, especially with the Sudanese government’s objection to Kenya’s chairmanship of the quartet committee, which includes South Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia.

I believe that the Jeddah and IGAD platforms can effectively contribute to bringing the views of the Sudanese factions closer, whether they are military or political, especially since the African Union held lengthy sessions to develop a roadmap for the Sudanese crisis, but it has not moved forward towards national consensus.

Conclusion The successive victories achieved by the Sudanese army against the RSF reflect a shift in the military balance of power in favor of the army, as the defense plans for its positions, adopted since the beginning of the war, have proven their success and effectiveness. Despite the fact that all indicators confirm that the RSF will retreat, and its fate will be like that of the armed movements that rebelled against the Sudanese state before; it will remain pursued in the peripheries of Sudan, the day after the war will represent a great challenge.

The challenge lies in the relationship between the army and its allies from the armed movements, as well as between the political forces, regarding the issue of power and completing the structures of governance; as each party seeks to monopolize it. Therefore, I believe that the day after the war will be like a ticking time bomb capable of exploding.

In this context, the optimal solution to the Sudanese crisis after military decisiveness lies in opening up to a Sudanese/Sudanese dialogue, which sets the general concepts for the issues of power, the form of the state, the system of governance, and the relationship between religion and the state. I believe that the Constituent Assembly will be able to reach agreements, as it represents the popular will. If the political forces do not agree on this, the crisis will remain unresolved.