Sources of Legitimacy and Their Types in Max Weber’s Political Sociology

Max Weber’s works continue to generate increasing interest in various sociological fields. Raymond Aron expressed this growing presence of Weber and his works in an article titled “Our Contemporary Weber” in the 1950s, covering a conference held by the German Sociological Association on Weber to commemorate the centenary of his birth. Aron wondered at the time: What is it that, almost half a century after Weber’s death, sparks all this passionate debate around him? Is it due to his works or his personality?

Aron conveyed the atmosphere of the conference attended by prominent sociologists, historians, and philosophers in Europe, particularly in the West, including Herbert Marcuse, Talcott Parsons, Herbert Lüthy, and the young Jürgen Habermas. One attendee noted that just as there is Marxism everywhere, there is now Weberianism to the same extent. Americans received his work as a science emanating from a scholar, disregarding the politician in his personality, while some seasoned Marxists, including even enlightened ones like Marcuse, were irritated by the astonishing accuracy of many of his sociological predictions and analyses, which made them angry that these predictions did not come from a Marxist sociologist but from someone who never cared about the noise of Marxist ideology and even made it a subject of pathology at times.

Today, more than half a century after this tumultuous conference, Max Weber and his theses remain at the heart of sociological and political debate in the same or even greater way, and a simple glance at what is published annually about him in all European languages is enough to give us a sufficient idea of the magnitude of this interest.

Political sociology holds a distinguished place within Max Weber’s works and continues to provoke discussion and debate among scholars of his thought and those inspired by his sociological, philosophical, and political theses. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the focus of contemporary political sociology hardly deviates from the topics and issues Weber worked on, such as the nature of the modern state and its relationship with the capitalist economy, bureaucratic management patterns, his observation of forms of electoral politics, patterns of power, and forms of legitimacy. It would not be an exaggeration to say that even the largest sociological and philosophical projects had to pass through the gateway of Weberian sociology, whether through inspiration or critique, to build the foundations of their projects.

However, while his sociological works received great scientific acceptance and recognition, such as his thesis on capitalism and the Protestant ethic, the same was not true for his political thought or political sociology. There is a sharp division among scholars of his political works regarding the interpretation of the “gap” between many of the positions Weber took in his political life and some of his ideas about concepts such as democracy, hegemony, and legitimacy. Due to some of his practical political positions, Weber was long considered a “democratic thinker,” but since the publication of his compatriot Wolfgang Mommsen’s book in 1959, it has no longer been possible to ignore his explicit theoretical positions, which some have not hesitated to interpret as anti-democratic and a repulsion towards the concept of “human rights,” as well as an admiration for the charismatic model that, according to some, is not far from the totalitarianism that spread throughout Europe a few years after Weber’s death. This tendency was exemplified in a statement Weber made to General Ludendorff in a conversation with him in 1919, saying, “In democracy, the people elect a leader they trust, and after that, the elected leader tells the people: Now, shut your mouth and obey, for neither the people nor the parties can interfere in the leader’s affairs after the elections… The people have the right to judge after that.”

For many scholars, Max Weber the liberal – who, during the Empire, called for strengthening and supporting parliamentary power – is far less important than Max Weber the reader of Nietzsche, whose project from the beginning was to become the “bourgeois Marx.”

We will attempt below to analyze the concept of legitimacy and identify its sources and types as they appear in Max Weber’s thought. It is known that this classification made by Weber had a significant impact on contemporary sociological works. However, despite the fact that this classification has been the source of all discussions about the concept of legitimacy in political science since the 1950s, there is a general impression that quickly turns into a clear judgment among many scholars that this classification fails in the analytical task that every theory of legitimacy must undertake, which is to formulate a clear criterion that allows us to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate forms of power, then classify all forms of governance that have existed in this century, and most importantly, to enable us to conduct a coherent and consistent analysis of the legitimacy of liberal democracy.

The concept of legitimate domination holds a central place in Max Weber’s political sociology, as his famous classification appears in more than five places in his works and in different contexts. The most mature version appeared in his posthumous book “Economy and Society.” In this context, his classification serves as an introduction and principle for organizing the main chapters that deal with the analysis and order of bureaucracy, patriarchy, patrimonialism, feudalism, and charismatic power.

This same classification is confirmed by the book’s publisher – with slight variations – in the first part of a later edition of the same book, along with the basic sociological concepts introduced in the book’s collection. The classification appears again in another book as an introduction in the context of presenting the terms used in the study of the world’s major religions. It is also found in his book “Politics as a Vocation” as a tool for analyzing the role of charisma within parties and in electoral politics. Finally, this classification, along with the general characteristics of each type, is briefly presented in the article published after his death titled “The Three Types of Legitimate Domination.”

The intensive presence of this classification in Weber’s works indicates its importance across all fields of his economic, political, and religious sociology and the importance of the concept of domination in his thought.

Sociology of Domination: Domination of Legitimacy or Legitimacy of Domination?

According to Weber, domination is a specific form of social action and social relations. It is “a relationship of leadership and obedience such that those who submit to the leadership carry out its instructions without regard to their content.” The existence of individuals with certain characteristics that put them in a position to impose their domination on others in one way or another became a question for Weber, and to clarify this reality, Weber poses the following questions:

What are the personal characteristics possessed by those who issue orders or those who submit to them and carry them out, which make this relationship – which is social in all cases – possible?

What are the historical, cultural, political, social, and economic conditions that make this relationship possible or difficult?

What are the results produced by this social relationship at different levels of social reality?

To answer these questions, Weber worked on developing a conceptual system that includes three central concepts: power, domination, and compliance, which he expresses as follows:

“Power means that chance in a social relationship by which an individual imposes their will despite opposing inclinations, whatever the basis of this chance. We call domination any system that has found this chance in obtaining the obedience of known individuals, and we mean by compliance that chance in finding quick and automatic obedience among many known individuals according to a certain order.”

Weber did not care to simplify the statement and analysis regarding concepts such as power and compliance, as he only spoke about power in the context of its relationship with the economy or the concept of class and party or the system. Likewise, he only approached the concept of compliance in passing in its relationship with the military or religion, for example. Rather, what occupied his scientific and political interest was the phenomenon of domination because it establishes the social relationship itself: on one hand, there is a will to dominate, and on the other hand, there is a (will) to submit and obey.

Weber prefers to use the concept of domination over the concept of power and the concept of authority, which he considers vague and undefined. Additionally, the concept of domination is not necessarily a political concept, and it only becomes so with the existence of a group on a certain territory whose affairs are managed and directed by a group of individuals recognized for this role specifically. Thus, the domination exercised by the head of a family, for example, is not political, first because it only affects a small and limited number of individuals, and second because it does not rely on an administrative body to execute orders.

As for temporary and incidental domination obtained through power or a power relationship, it does not concern sociology according to Weber, but the intended domination is that which is characterized by a sufficient degree of stability and continuity that makes it understandable and interpretable. In other words, the concept of domination only applies to that which is based on the legitimacy of obedience resulting from belonging and conviction in the necessity of this obedience, and not that which is based on fear. In this context, Weber is faithful to the methodology of understanding on which his sociology generally relies, as within consciousness, the representations of those who “accept” domination are formed, and Weber is more concerned with understanding these self-representations of social actors than with describing an external reality of alleged neutrality and objectivity.

Legitimacy, therefore, is the belief in the intrinsic value or the consideration of the social system in which the dominated live. Thus, the dominant gives (meaning) to this domination to which they submit, and it cannot remain merely a habit or a result of instrumental rationality; it must become desirable to them (i.e., the dominated) in the first place, otherwise, the social system based on this domination is prone to instability at any moment. This meaning does not manifest in utility because utility is prone to instability with a mere redistribution of wealth, for example, nor does it manifest in habit because habit can change one day and this system can become unstable again. They must, therefore, (believe) in the legitimacy of this or that system. Weber says:

“A system that is respected only for rational reasons is generally less stable than a system respected on the basis of habit, due to the routine nature of behavior, and because here too, among all particular situations, habit is the most common behavior. However, habit is a less stable system compared to a system based on the appeal of the ideal and the obligation, I mean legitimacy.”

In the third chapter of the part dedicated to “Sociological Ranks” in his book “Economy and Society,” titled “Types of Domination,” Max Weber attempts to distinguish between forms of domination and their types.

After a long analysis, Weber concludes that in the face of claims of domination, the interpretation of the reasons for submission and obedience is multiple, ranging from interpreting it as “passive habit” to more rational interpretations. However, what is common among all these interpretations and justifications is that “there is a minimum of will to obey, hence an interest (internal or external) in obedience.”

On the other hand, the concept of domination cannot be applied to unequal economic relationships. The possibility of some manipulating economic conditions to influence and direct some social actors cannot be compared to power relationships. Weber says:

“Applying the term domination to economic power resulting from a monopoly that strengthens the possibility of imposing exchange conditions on partners does not go beyond applying the same term to the influence resulting from erotic, athletic, oratory, or other forms of superiority.”

Weber first considers domination a phenomenon with a real existence and not an ideal consideration, as it is not deduced logically or legally from a certain value or criterion, but it exists in reality: it exists whenever there is a claimed authority to issue specific orders that are actually followed on a wide scale.

Weber opposes any normative and standard interpretation of domination and decides that every execution of an order must be described through this concept. However, Weber believes that the external result alone – i.e., the execution of the order – is not enough to understand the different variables of the causal chain from issuing the order to its execution.

The dominant usually needs – to maintain their (chance) in executing their orders by the dominated – an (administrative body). The types of ties that connect this body to the dominant vary according to the types of social action that Weber determined elsewhere. They are:

1- Traditional action dictated by inherited traditions, customs, and beliefs that become second nature. Here, the actor is not driven by a goal or value nor under the influence of an emotion, but simply responds to deeply rooted traditions in their practical life.

2- Affective action dictated by a state of consciousness or a person’s mood at a certain moment, like the slap a mother gives her child whom she thinks is unbearable or the punch a player loses their temper and delivers to another during a football match. Here, the action is not linked to a goal or value but is an emotional reaction from the actor in certain circumstances.

3- Rational action related to a goal/purpose, which, as Raymond Aron sees, matches the concept of “logical action” according to Pareto, and it is the action in which the social actor is aware of the goal and calculates the reasons leading to it, like the engineer building a tunnel or the speculator striving for profit.

4- Rational action related to a value, like dying for the homeland or like the captain who prefers to sink with his ship rather than save himself because that would bring shame. This type of action is rational not because it aims to achieve a specific goal but only to be faithful to the idea of honor or moral integrity.

When the tie between the dominant and the administrative body is material and rational goal-oriented, it produces unstable domination, so sometimes emotional and value-rational motives are added. However, despite the convergence of these interests and rational ties related to a goal, value, and emotion, they do not form a solid foundation for domination. In this case, there is another, more extensive factor that is added, which is (the belief in legitimacy).

Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to say: What occupied Max Weber’s socio-political thought was not the domination of (legitimacy), which remains a very vague concept even in subsequent sociological and political studies, but rather how different forms of domination that have existed throughout human history are (legitimized).

The belief of the dominated is the primary source of legitimacy

Weber believes that experience shows that the possession of more chances for continuity in domination does not depend only on material, emotional, or value-rational reasons. Rather, every domination seeks to instill the consciousness and belief in its legitimacy. Therefore, according to Weber, it is appropriate to distinguish between types of legitimacy according to types of domination.

In this way, domination appears as a distinct form of social action and social relations. This social action takes multiple directions or tendencies. It should be noted here that Weber’s view of legitimization and legitimacy came in a broader and more comprehensive context, i.e., within his research on types of domination and their foundations. His discussion of legitimacy was only a conceptual tool for describing forms of domination, especially legitimate domination.

The central problem in Weber’s political sociology is the problem of legitimate domination and not the concept of legitimacy itself, and as the Canadian sociologist Lawrence McFalls notes, Weber used terms like legitimate/illegitimate only to a very limited extent, whether in his theoretical writings or his polemical writings. When he used them, he used them in different contexts than how they were used in political science later.

In a chapter titled “Illegitimate Domination: Classification of Cities” in his book “Economy and Society,” Weber compares medieval cities with ancient cities and concludes the importance of the cruciform city form and its role in the transition to a (referendum form) in its management, which paved the way for the emergence of the contemporary idea of the city as a free partnership of individuals. Unlike what some have argued, he does not legitimize or consider in this chapter a form of violent revolutionary domination as much as he describes a new and conscious form of domination that breaks with the old legitimacy based on traditional aristocratic and religious power. He describes the Italian Popolo, which formed municipal power in various Italian cities at the beginning of the fourteenth century, as the “first conscious and revolutionary illegitimate political partnership,” and he uses the term illegitimate here to describe a domination that consciously breaks with the demand for legitimacy of an old type. (For the illegitimacy of the new domination only exists in opposition to another domination that claims to be legitimate, and this means that the concepts of legitimate and illegitimate are, for Weber, relative, self-referential, and normative concepts, i.e., they are value judgments and not facts with analytical validity.)

However, the matter has reached the point in some political science circles of talking about the legitimacy of a political system as if it were an existing characteristic, the absence of which necessarily leads to a “legitimacy crisis.”

Thus, types of legitimate domination correspond to types of social action as Weber presented them in his book “Economy and Society,” where there are three types of legitimate domination: traditional domination, rational domination, and charismatic domination.

Traditional domination is based on the continuous belief in the sacred nature of traditions engraved in memory and the deeply rooted habit of respecting them. In a society characterized by personal relationships and cohesive due to shared beliefs, we find that stability is preferred and prioritized over renewal, and therefore, respect for social hierarchy according to these deeply rooted beliefs becomes a tool for maintaining and ensuring domination. Therefore, any governance system that possesses these deeply rooted traditions with shared beliefs derives from them an increasing legitimacy, becoming in a sense a type of natural power, i.e., power whose basis and origin are not subject to questioning and doubt.

Rational domination is based on the belief in the legitimacy of the law and is related to the concept of a society based on contract and legal equality among its individuals. This domination is characterized by strong institutional character and also by bureaucracy, which is a fundamental characteristic of political power based on rationality. General and impersonal rules take the place of privilege and favoritism, and political employment is based on competence rather than kinship and nepotism. Both the ruled and the rulers find themselves driven to rational behavior, i.e., they act to achieve their goals and purposes in a rational manner regulated by the known rules of the game.

Charismatic domination falls into a high degree of emotionality. The power of the dominant over the submissive is based – as Weber says – on an (emotional community) and on an extraordinary and sacred submission by the submissive to the heroic, religious, oratory, and exceptional virtues of a certain person. The democratic or traditional leader can rely – if they want to impose themselves – on the voluntary (self-sacrifice) that drives the submissive to absolute devotion moved by enthusiasm or necessity. Charismatic domination employs all tools and means to enchant the submissive with the personality of the dominant and attract them to admire it, which can disrupt the other two types of domination, i.e., traditional and rational domination. Thus, religious or traditional leadership based on traditional domination can turn into charismatic leadership, causing traditional legitimacy to fade in favor of charismatic legitimacy, or democratic leadership can slide towards a referendum system that suspends existing legal rules.

However, more importantly, these types of domination cannot establish their legitimacy on external material foundations alone but must have the (belief) of those submissive to them in their legitimacy. In his theorization of the problem of legitimacy, Weber was thinking of a driver of social change based on an intrinsic intentional logic. Weber says:

“Experience shows that no domination can rely solely on material, emotional, or rational motives for its continuity and survival. On the contrary, all types of domination seek to instill the belief in their legitimacy among those submissive to them.”

However, this does not deny the existence of other material reasons, for example, that may be the cause of the emergence of certain forms of domination, as we notice, for example, when Weber goes to explain the intensification and rise of bureaucracy in the United States by external factors without resorting to the concept of legitimacy based on self-belief. This reinforces the vague and inconsistent image that political sociology at Max Weber is accused of.

On the other hand, we cannot delve into the real and actual motives of this belief, as the real motives for obedience can be multiple, but this multiplicity has no sociological meaning since sociological understanding does not necessarily require that we (revive or reconstruct the real motives of a certain social action).

The search for legitimacy is endless, and what interests Weber is not knowing whether a claim of legitimacy succeeds or fails in the continuity of domination, but rather (how) the form of this claim contributes to shaping and organizing relationships within this domination. This drives him to establish his classification of domination on three abstract forms that a claim of legitimacy can take.

Weber’s analyses confirm that there is no self-sufficiency in any of the three forms of legitimacy, as under traditional domination, the dominant claims to represent a principle whose validity stems from its antiquity, while the charismatic dominant claims that a new principle that breaks with the past stems from their exceptional personality, and finally, rational domination based on a set of rules accepted by everyone claims to be above all individuals.

Therefore, we cannot talk about traditional, charismatic, or rational legitimacy as if it were a reality, as a monarchical system based on hereditary legitimacy, for example, cannot do without, from time to time, invoking the (exceptional qualities) of the king’s personality or attempting to rationalize administrative management, otherwise it will be at risk of sliding towards complete irrationality, just as rationalized bureaucracy quickly turns into a frozen tradition in the absence of a charismatic push. Similarly, if administrators under a revolutionary system continue to work only for and within what is political without inoculating it with a rational push, it will quickly fall into chaos.

There is, therefore, a continuous slide from one type to another among types of legitimacy, and what interests Weber is understanding the changing manifestations of different forms of legitimacy in order to describe how the disorder inherent in each type and the tensions between them arise. This is what he did in his analysis of the Reich system under Wilhelm II, which was on its way to collapse. What is striking in that analysis – as Lawrence McFalls says in his aforementioned article – is his not describing that system as illegitimate despite his radical critique of it, as this normative evaluation of legitimate/illegitimate has no analytical value for Weber.

Consequences of the Charismatic Model and Critique of Weber’s Political Sociology

The concept of legitimacy or legitimate domination has been met with much criticism, starting from the paradox embodied in this compound term, which combines domination and legitimacy in a concept that aims to provide a coherent description of social phenomena or rather certain representations of these social phenomena, passing through the attachment of the concept of legitimacy to the self-belief of social actors without regard for objective and legal determinants, and reaching the exaggeration in the psychological interpretation of the issue of accepting domination by the dominated, as if the belief expressed by the dominated – as a result of accepting the existing order – legitimizes the power of the existing order and the power of the stronger.

Perhaps what exposed Weber’s concept of legitimate domination to severe criticism, in addition to its ambiguity, is the ideological investment and even exploitation it was subjected to after his death, to the extent that it was said that “Weber’s death on June 14, 1920, marks the beginning of his works in every sense of the word beginning.” Various readings – especially those that took place under the Weimar Republic – worked to appropriate many Weberian concepts, including the concept of legitimate domination, the concept of charisma, and the concept of plebiscitary democracy, for practical and political purposes, or, for some others, to push their theses that aimed to understand and interpret that historical moment sociologically and legally. Thus, Hans Kelsen’s reading emerged, which paradoxically resulted in Weber being one of the great theorists of democracy, and Carl Schmitt’s reading, who would push the Weberian charismatic model to the limits of presidential totalitarianism, in addition to Richard Thoma’s reading, which translates Weber’s concern with clear words about the elitism of democracy, its aristocracy, and the dominance of the best within it.

The ambiguity of the Weberian terminology and the intertwining of his classifications, in addition to his political and intellectual hesitation towards a set of concepts, cannot be overlooked in the occurrence of such ideological and political exploitation of his sociological and political thesis. Above all, the role of his political engagement and the intertwining of his practical ambitions with his theoretical inclinations in creating the ambiguity of his position from liberal and democratic thought cannot be overlooked.

Weber was inclined towards a parliamentary democracy governed by a strong president with charismatic appeal that enables him to mitigate the intensity of parliamentary disputes, as Weber was opposed to the pure parliamentary system represented at the time by the Third Republic and had publicly stated in 1918 that “the parliamentary system and with it party disputes can be avoided if the unified executive council of the Reich is in the hands of a president elected by the entire people,” hoping that there would be a “president based on the revolutionary legitimacy of popular elections.” He was thus inclined towards what he called plebiscitary democracy, where the president, with his required charisma, has domination and power that surpasses the power of the parliament.

However, we believe that it is a simplification to consider Max Weber’s political sociology merely one of those anti-democratic theories that spread in the nineteenth century. His analyses of the oligarchic tendencies of (democratic) systems and organizations are intertwined with his analysis of the internal contradictions of contemporary principles of legitimacy, so it is necessary to distinguish within his sociology of domination between what is based on the analysis of contemporary representations and what is based on reconstructing the dynamics of social conflicts. In no way should this Weberian project be approximated or compared to the totalitarian model, because simply put, the experience of totalitarianism is a subsequent experience that Germany and Italy before World War II, as well as the Soviet Union and others, would know. This model never belonged to the horizon of sociological thought of that period.

However, as Mommsen himself says, perhaps the constitution of the Fifth Republic under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle was the closest to what Max Weber’s plebiscitary democracy aspired to, and perhaps if Weber had lived until 1933, he would have realized the far-reaching and dramatic consequences of the presidential charismatic model that he had always aspired to.

Footnotes

*) An academic from Tunisia residing in Brussels.

Raymond Aron; Les étapes de la pensée sociologique-1, Edition Gallimard, 1967, p564

2- See a review of the events of this conference in the article mentioned above.

3- We mention, for example, the works of the Frankfurt School, which took Weber’s works as a symbol of the miserable consequences of contemporary rationality, and the works of Jürgen Habermas, Carl Schmitt, and Talcott Parsons, who translated Weber into English. As for Pierre Bourdieu, he owes much to Max Weber in building his concept of (symbolic capital). We mention the philosophical works of Merleau-Ponty.

W.Mommsen; Max Weber et la politique allemande 1890-1920-4, trad., Paris, Puf, coll. “Sociologie”, 1986.

M.Weber: Gesammelte Politische Schriften-5, Tübingen 1988, p499

6- Philippe Raynaud; Max Weber et les dilemmes de la raison moderne. Presses Universitaires de France, p158.

7- David Beetham; Max Weber et la légitimité politique; dans Revue européenne des sciences sociales, Tome XXXIII, 1995, N°101, pp 11-22.

8- Wirtschaft und gesellschaft, Tübingen, J.C.B.Mohr

We rely in this article on the German original and its French translation under the title:

Economie et Société, Paris: Pocket, 1995.

9- Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligion.

Politik als Beruf.-10

Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft.-11

Herrschaft.-12

13- Wirtschaft und gesellschaft, Tübingen, J.C.B.Mohr, p 549.

Dirk Kaesler: Max Weber: sa vie -14, son oeuvre, son influence, Paris: Fayard, c1996, p187.

15- Wirtschaft und gesellschaft, p28.

• Dirk Kaesler; ibid p 187.-16

*) Territorialität/Territorialité

17- Weber defines the social system as follows: “The meaningful content of a social relationship, where action is directed based on discernible rules.” See:

Max Weber: (les concepts fondamentaux de la sociologie), Economie et Société, tome 1, Plon, Paris, 1995, p65

• Economie et Société -18, T1/ p65.
• Dirk Haesler -19, p188.

20- Economie et Société, p286.

Raymond Aron; Les étapes de la pensée sociologique -21, Edition Gallimard, 1967, p500.

Max Weber was keen on classifying phenomena according to what he called pure types, which, according to him, represent the only method that allows us to respect the infinite plurality of values that guide sociological research. The pure or ideal type is a representation of reality, a representation that must be partial and biased, and it is embodied in the choice of some variables at the expense of others that do not fall within the researcher’s interests. See:

Madeleine Grawitz: Méthodes des sciences sociales. Précis Dalloz, 1993, p 101

ibid, p500.-22

*) legitim/nicht legitim

23- Laurence McFalls: L’Etat bâtard: illégitimité et légitimation chez Max Weber dans La légitimité de l’Etat et du droit Autour de Max Weber, sous la direction de Michel Coutu et Guy Rocher. L.G.D.J et les Presses de l’Université Laval

*) Popolo

The term Popolo refers to a part of the population of Italian municipalities between the 12th and 14th centuries that did not belong to the nobility and was particularly composed of merchants who became wealthy through the prosperity of trade in major Italian cities between the 11th and 14th centuries.

*) Zweckrational

24- Laurence McFalls: L’Etat bâtard: illégitimité et légitimation chez Max Weber dans La légitimité de l’Etat et du droit Autour de Max Weber, sous la direction de Michel Coutu et Guy Rocher. L.G.D.J et les Presses de l’Université Laval, p49

25- Economie et Société, p285.

In fact, the three types of social action do not correspond to the three types of domination, as Weber leaves one type of social action without a counterpart for legitimacy, where three types of legitimacy correspond to four types of domination, and this difference has sparked multiple interpretations. Raymond Aron, for example, argues that this is due to Weber’s terms being vague and floating, and his evidence for this is the appearance of another classification of his in another place for legitimate systems that correspond to the three types of social action, while Philippe Raynaud argues that the two classifications are not identical, as the first looks at legitimacy as it can be claimed by the dominant, while the second classification looks at legitimacy as it can be perceived by the dominated, and therefore, for him, rational legitimacy corresponds to both types of rational action related to a goal and related to a value. (See Raymond Aron’s aforementioned book, p555, and Philippe Raynaud’s aforementioned book, p158-159).

26- Bourdieu will take this intrinsic logic into consideration but with a reduction in the intensity of this intentionality in formulating his theory of habitus.

27- Economy and Society, p544-545, German edition.

28- Weber explains the rise and intensification of bureaucracy by the fact that it is (usually established at a lower cost and because) the decisive reason for the advancement of bureaucracy was always due to its technical superiority over all forms of organization (Economy and Society).

29- Economy and Society, p545, German edition.

30- Carlos Miguel Herrera: Comment assumer l’héritage wébérien sous Weimar ? Légitimité, démocratie, changement social dans La légitimité de l’Etat et du droit Autour de Max Weber, sous la direction de Michel Coutu et Guy Rocher. L.G.D.J et les Presses de l’Université Laval, p221.

31- Carlos Miguel Herrera says: “The reception of Weber’s ideas under the Weimar Republic was a political bet regarding the theory of the state.” The aforementioned reference, p214.

32- See an analysis of the different forms of reception of Weber’s political works in the aforementioned reference, p221-236.

4. W.Mommsen; Max Weber et la politique allemande 1890-1920 33- trad., Paris Puf coll “Sociologie”, 1986, p430.

34- Indeed, many have taken this step and explicitly linked Weber’s idea of charisma with the emergence of Adolf Hitler, such as Otto Koellreutter and Karl Löwith. See Mommsen, the aforementioned reference, p510-511. 35- Ibid, p 512-513.