Nigeria and its neighboring country Cameroon share several commonalities, including a border that stretches 1,975 kilometers from the tripoint at Lake Chad in the north to the Atlantic Ocean in the south. Both countries also possess intertwined historical narratives and a variety of ethnic groups residing along the border, notably in northwestern Nigeria and southwestern Cameroon, the latter of which is known as “Southern Cameroon” and “the Anglophone Regions.” The prevalence of the English language among the majority of inhabitants in these areas complicates the matters surrounding the separatist crises, which have escalated significantly in intensity and impact over the past few years.
This paper examines the separatist crises in Nigeria and Cameroon, exploring their underlying causes, the nature of cooperation among the various movements, and the implications of these crises within local, cross-border (Nigerian-Cameroonian), and regional contexts.
The Separatist Crisis in Nigeria
The roots of the separatist sentiment in Nigeria can be traced back to the colonial era, resulting from the diverse nature of pre-colonial states, empires, and communities that were forcibly merged under British colonial administration into a single entity called “Nigeria.” The calls for secession persisted following Nigeria’s independence, initially emerging from minority communities among the over 250 ethnic groups. However, the contemporary cries for separation are notably prominent among the three major ethnic groups—Hausa, Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the southwest, and Igbo in the southeast—accounting for more than half of Nigeria’s population and wielding significant power over state structures.
Active separatist movements in Nigeria include the “Republic of Oduduwa,” advocating for the Yoruba minority, the “Arewa Republic” movement in the North (with some considering the ongoing insurgency of Boko Haram also as an separatist agenda), and the “Niger Delta Liberation Front” and “Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta,” both of which seek independence for the “Niger Delta Republic” in the south. However, the “Indigenous People of Biafra” (IPOB) and its armed wing, the “Eastern Security Network,” represent the most significant factions linked to the prevailing separatist crisis in Nigeria.
The IPOB’s strength stems from its emergence as a descendant of the “Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra” (MASSOB), which has taken a non-violent approach towards its secessionist goals. The core area of IPOB’s activity is the southeastern region dominated by the Igbo ethnic group. The IPOB has allied itself with other separatist movements, including the armed “Niger Delta Avengers,” which operate in the Niger Delta area, home to over 40 ethnic groups, including Ijaw, Edo, and Urhobo.
A. The Current Crisis and Its Origins:
The current widely recognized separatist crisis originated during the presidency of Muhammadu Buhari, who is of the Fulani ethnicity. During his tenure, there was unprecedented incitement in southern Nigeria and its north-central region due to escalating violent confrontations between herders and farmers, accompanied by bloody attacks from armed bandits attributed to the Fulani ethnic group. There was a prevailing belief in those regions that Buhari’s government exhibited leniency towards the perpetrators of these crimes, leading, in 2021, to Yoruba activist Sunday Adeyemo Igboho calling for the expulsion of Fulani herders from Yoruba territories.
Subsequently, Sunday Adeyemo was arrested in July 2021 in neighboring Benin and did not gain his freedom until October 2023, following the ascension of current president Bola Tinubu, who is Yoruba. This development resulted in a relative decrease in separatist calls in southwestern Nigeria, especially as Yoruba separatist movements are less focused on historical grievances compared to the Igbo, who continue to evoke memories of the Nigerian Civil War, also known as the Biafran War, which occurred between July 6, 1967, and January 15, 1970.
Violent separatist incitement has taken on a different dimension in the southeast, where accusations of the north attempting to Islamize Nigeria and non-Muslim southern regions are prevalent. Additionally, the people of this region, particularly the Igbo, express feelings of marginalization by the Nigerian federation, echoing the old grievances that ignited the Nigerian Civil War, thereby facilitating the resurgence of the IPOB, which was founded in 2012 by Nnamdi Kanu with the aim of revitalizing “Biafra.” Following Buhari’s electoral victory in March 2015, IPOB’s activities surged, utilizing its media outlet, “Radio Biafra,” to propagate hate and incitement against the new government, with Kanu advocating violence as a means to achieve their separatist objectives and calling on the Igbo diaspora to provide weapons.
An armed group known as the “Niger Delta Avengers” surfaced publicly in March 2016. This group articulates the grievances of ethnicities in the oil-rich Niger Delta region, such as the Ijaw, who are the fourth-largest ethnic group in Nigeria, and who argue that most of the oil wealth disproportionately benefits other regions, while their own communities suffer severe environmental degradation from oil production, undermining their traditional livelihoods of fishing and farming.
It is noteworthy that the Igbo are also found in parts of the far south, particularly Port Harcourt, one of the major cities in the region. The ethnicities in the Niger Delta share similar feelings of marginalization within the Nigerian federation, further supporting the prominence of the IPOB in the far south. However, recent events have suggested that the armed separatist groups in the Niger Delta oppose the notion of being part of “Biafra” (the independent Igbo state), despite cooperating with Biafran movements.
B. The Shift to Violence:
The IPOB experienced a significant turning point in 2015 when security forces opened fire on peaceful demonstrators advocating for the independence of “Biafra.” This led to continued killings and mass arrests of the movement’s members and supporters throughout October, November, and December of that year. In 2017, the Nigerian government officially banned the IPOB. By late 2020, it had established an armed wing called the Eastern Security Network, which led the IPOB and other separatist groups into a gang war in southeastern Nigeria against the Nigerian government beginning in January 2021. This included attacks on government infrastructure, such as prisons and public buildings, resulting in casualties among many police officers. The most recent incident occurred in May 2024, when the Nigerian military attributed the killing of 11 individuals (6 civilians and 5 soldiers) to the IPOB during a “surprise” attack on a checkpoint in Abia State.
The Eastern Security Network enforces a widespread shutdown across southeastern states, especially since the arrest of its leader, Nnamdi Kanu, in Kenya and his extradition to Nigeria in June 2021. The movement has urged residents to stay home every Monday of the week and on every court appearance day for Kanu. Although Kanu announced through his lawyer in July 2023 that the stay-at-home order has been rescinded, the armed wing still enforces the order in many communities and cities throughout the region.
The Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon
The current separatist crisis in Cameroon is referred to as the “Ambazonia War,” the “Anglophone Crisis,” and the “Cameroonian Civil War.” Its roots can be traced back to the colonial period when Germany colonized Cameroon from 1884 to 1920. Following this, the territory fell under the occupation of French and British forces during World War I and was divided by the two colonial administrations into two regions: French Cameroon (now the majority of present-day Cameroon) and British Cameroon (which included Northern and Southern Cameroons). While French Cameroon gained independence as Cameroon on January 1, 1960, British Cameroons was placed under Nigerian rule, which only achieved independence from Britain on October 1 of the same year.
A significant proportion of the British Cameroons population preferred independence and the formation of their state; however, this choice was denied through a United Nations-sponsored referendum. The region (British Cameroon) was divided over its fate in the context of an independent Nigeria. After several interventions from the United Nations and political elites from both the Nigerian and Cameroonian sides, the northern region (of British Cameroon), predominantly Muslim, opted to join Nigeria (now known as the local government area of Sardauna in northern Nigeria), while the southern region (of British Cameroon), largely Christian, voted to join Cameroon (now referred to as the Northwestern and Southwestern Regions or the Anglophone Regions in Cameroon).
This division led to numerous judicial confrontations and violent conflicts, starting with the Cameroonian government’s 1961 appeal to the International Court of Justice against Northern Cameroons’ annexation to Nigeria, coupled with discontent among some southern residents over the union with Cameroon due to the dominance of Francophone systems and regions. Additionally, Cameroon prosecuted Nigeria in 1994 regarding the ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula, which Nigeria officially ceded in 2006. The tensions in the Anglophone Regions escalated further in 1972 when Cameroon’s president, Ahmadou Ahidjo, from the northern and Francophone region, abolished the federal system and removed regional autonomy that originally accommodated each region’s unique characteristics. Tensions further increased with the arrival of the current president, Paul Biya, in 1982 due to his deepenization of political centralization.
A. The Current Crisis, Movements, and Their Goals:
Prior to 2016, most demands from residents of the Anglophone regions in Cameroon centered around the restoration of regional autonomy under a federal Cameroon to address grievances linked to their distinctiveness from Francophone populations. Anglophones accused Francophone regions of monopolizing power despite the Anglophone regions’ wealth in multiple resources. The Anglophones account for only about 20 percent of Cameroon’s population.
In late 2016, the two Anglophone regions witnessed peaceful protests led by lawyers and teachers against being compelled by the central government to conduct business in French. The response from the Cameroonian government was a crackdown that resulted in clashes with police and civilian deaths, further inflaming public dissent against the government. By mid-2017, most Anglophones had shifted their demands from seeking regional autonomy to calling for outright independence from Cameroon amidst escalating violence between Cameroonian security forces and armed Anglophones.
On October 1, 2017, Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabi, leader of the “Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front” organization, proclaimed the independence of the Anglophone regions from Cameroon. On October 31, 2017, a temporary “Ambazonia Government” was formed, with Sisiku assuming the role of “President” of the so-called “Ambazonia.” By 2019, there were reportedly over 20 active armed separatist movements in the Anglophone regions, some of which are unrecognized. Among these groups, the “Ambazonia Defence Forces,” officially established on September 9, 2017, by the “Ambazonia Governing Council,” marked the commencement of what it called a “war of independence” through guerrilla warfare against government security forces.
B. Recent Developments:
In January 2018, Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabi, the self-proclaimed leader of “Ambazonia,” who supported dialogue with Cameroonian president Paul Biya, was arrested along with 46 other separatists in the Nigerian capital, Abuja. A military court in Cameroon subsequently sentenced him and nine followers to life imprisonment on charges of terrorism, secession, and other offenses.
Amid the crisis in late 2019, the Cameroonian Parliament approved a bill granting “special status” to the Anglophone regions (Northwest and Southwest), providing greater autonomy for Anglophone residents in managing their local affairs. However, this attempt failed to quell the conflict or decrease violence from separatist forces, as leaders from the Anglophone regions argued that the national government had not sufficiently consulted them before establishing the bill, believing it would not result in any real change on the ground. This is due to the fact that while the special status created regional associations with broader powers compared to the authorities of Francophone regional councils, these associations remained weak and were subject to the control of governors appointed from the capital, Yaoundé. Furthermore, the government demonstrated a lack of interest in utilizing these regional associations to address identity, education, judicial, and linguistic matters raised by residents of the Anglophone regions.
Among the external initiatives seeking to appease the conflict were Canadian mediation efforts, which the Canadian Foreign Ministry stated in January 2023 it was ready to facilitate, but this stalled after the Cameroonian government issued a statement denying any request for external mediation in talks with separatists. Since then, fighting has persisted, with reports of deadly assaults leading to casualties exceeding 6,000 people and the internal displacement of over 900,000 individuals, with 60,000 seeking refuge abroad. One of the most recent attacks occurred in May 2024, when at least five members of the Cameroonian security forces were killed by armed separatists.
Cooperation Between Nigerian and Cameroonian Separatist Movements
There is an acknowledgment of actual alliances between the separatist movements in southern Nigeria and Cameroon, dating back to before 2010. Media reports have indicated that armed groups active in the Niger Delta, financed through revenues from stolen Nigerian oil—particularly the separatist “Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta”—were assisting the “Bakassi Movement for Self-Determination,” which is active along the Nigeria-Cameroon border, as well as the “Southern Cameroons Peoples Organization,” one of the older separatist movements in the Anglophone regions.
This cooperation has evolved in recent years, with a virtual meeting held on Facebook in April 2021 between Nnamdi Kanu, leader of the IPOB in southeastern Nigeria (part of which lies just 150 kilometers from the Anglophone regions in Cameroon), and Cho Ayaba, leader of the “Ambazonia Defence Forces,” the armed wing of the “Ambazonia Governing Council,” one of the key separatist organizations in the Anglophone regions. During this meeting, the leaders of both movements announced a military and strategic partnership aimed at “securing their shared borders and ensuring an open exchange of weapons, intelligence, and personnel.”
In September 2021, Cameroonian security officials confirmed a shift in the nature of the attacks conducted by separatist movements in the Anglophone regions since the crisis descended into violence in 2017. This assertion followed counterattacks by armed Anglophones that resulted in the deaths of 15 Cameroonian soldiers; in these attacks, the assailants for the first time employed advanced heavy weaponry, such as anti-tank missiles and rocket launchers, thereby enhancing the capabilities of these movements and prolonging their assaults on Cameroonian security forces.
Repercussions
The separatist crises affecting the neighboring countries of Nigeria and Cameroon have wide-ranging political, economic, security, and regional implications, which can be summarized as follows:
A. In the Case of Nigeria:
The presence of multiple separatist crises threatens Nigeria’s unity and political stability, especially as the incursion of “terrorists” and armed bandits from the north into the south, along with the recurring armed confrontations between Fulani herders and local farmers, occur without significant, tangible government intervention. This situation fosters a sense of injustice among some ethnic groups and diminishes their faith in the Nigerian federation, thus escalating separatist sentiments in various states and regions, or actions that may exacerbate instability, such as decisions by some northern governors to grant their residents the right to carry firearms for self-defense against “terrorist” attacks and armed bandits.
In recent years, Nigeria has also faced worsening economic crises and significant revenue losses, partly due to falling crude oil production, which has been impacted by factors such as insecurity in the Niger Delta resulting from the activities of armed groups and separatist movements in the region. This production decline reached 7% on a monthly basis in March 2024. Oil extracted from the Niger Delta constitutes around 90% of Nigeria’s revenue, including 95% of its export revenues and over 80% of government income.
Cities and communities in southeastern Nigeria have been grappling with economic stagnation for three years, suffering limited development and disruptions in the performance of local governments due to kidnappings, brutal killings, and attacks on educational institutions, security offices, and commercial centers. These violent acts are attributed to the operations of the Eastern Security Network affiliated with the IPOB.
B. In the Case of Cameroon:
The crisis in the Anglophone regions poses a threat to the rule of Cameroonian President Paul Biya, who is 91 years old and seeks an eighth presidential term despite widespread frustration among the younger population over his leadership. The recent developments linked to this crisis, such as civil disobedience and abandoned towns alongside Anglophones complying with school closures, all indicate a near consensus among Anglophones on the necessity of asserting their call for secession and a decline in their willingness to seek equitable integration with Francophone populations.
Economically, the Anglophone regions contribute approximately 20% to Cameroon’s GDP. The foundational pillars of the local economy in the Anglophone regions include oil and timber production, cocoa, coffee, rubber, as well as intensive agriculture involving large government-owned farms along with smaller farms supplying Douala and countries in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa. The prevalence of violent activities and armed assaults in these areas thus has detrimental effects on the national economy and Cameroon’s revenues.
Evidence of this can be seen in the GDP growth rate that fell to 3.9% in 2019 from 5.8% in 2015 (prior to the current conflict’s onset in 2016). The internet outages caused by the crisis have cost the country approximately $846 million, given that Anglophone regions were among the most digitally connected in Cameroon. Restrictions on travel and widespread insecurity have prompted numerous local businesses to exit, disrupting the movement of people, goods, and services within the Anglophone regions.
C. Within the Regional Context:
The cooperation between armed separatist movements in Nigeria and Cameroon complicates the multifaceted challenges faced by the Nigerian and Cameroonian security forces in securing and monitoring their borders. A case in point occurred in December 2023, when a violent incursion into the Nigerian side of the border village of “Biligiti” was perpetrated by Cameroonian militants. The geographical positioning of Cameroon at the crossroads of West and Central Africa potentially provides these movements, particularly the “Ambazonia Defence Forces” and the IPOB, with safe havens to operate beyond the reach of both governments’ security forces, which have been notably absent and demonstrated limited knowledge of the terrain over the past six years prior to the violence.
Moreover, the separatist crises, particularly after escalating into sustained armed confrontations with connections between active movements in Cameroon and those operating in the Niger Delta, have the potential to complicate Nigeria’s insecurity at sea and exacerbate the piracy issue in the Gulf of Guinea, which stretches from Liberia to Angola, reflecting negatively on the shipping industry and the economies of various Gulf of Guinea coastal nations. This is particularly relevant since before the eruption of the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon in 2017, the Niger Delta had become an important hub for smuggling weapons to neighboring regions.
Despite the current relations between Nigeria and Cameroon oscillating between mistrust and calculated cooperation, it is anticipated that an increase in collaboration among separatists from both nations will elevate the security coordination levels between Abuja and Yaoundé to encompass developments related to the activities of armed separatists, as the existing coordination primarily aims to unify efforts against the Boko Haram group and permits security forces from both countries to cross borders, especially when pursuing armed movements in the north. However, the continued crises posed by Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province in the Lake Chad Basin, alongside emerging unrest in southeastern Nigeria resulting from escalating attacks by militarily cooperative armed separatist groups in both Cameroon and Nigeria, may impose additional burdens on security forces in both nations, potentially depleting their resources as they contend with multiple issues on various fronts.
Additionally, Nigeria and Cameroon’s relations with the West could be adversely affected by the increasing use of force and refusal of dialogue by both governments and most armed separatist organizations. Nigerian and Cameroonian security forces are accused of violating human rights in their dealings with separatists. Furthermore, Nigeria’s recent failures to procure weapons from the West are in line with allegations of human rights violations by its military, while UK politicians have been demanding clarifications from the Nigerian government regarding the detention of Nnamdi Kanu, the leader of the IPOB, since 2021, given his British citizenship despite being Nigerian by birth, criticizing Nigeria for denying him consular access.
Conclusion
The rise of separatist sentiments and the employment of threats and violence by separatist movements in Nigeria, Cameroon, and other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, paint a clear picture of the challenges to democratic culture and fragile governance. This situation reflects the adverse attitudes of many citizens and ethnic groups towards constitutional mechanisms for addressing their grievances and fulfilling their demands. In Nigeria, the federated system exists predominantly on paper and not in practice, while in Cameroon, the government seeks to tighten its grip on power through increased centralization. In both instances, the difficulty for certain regions and areas of the state to gain equitable access to power and resources fosters feelings of isolation and detachment among these regions, particularly when their uniqueness is disregarded.
Ultimately, resolving the current crises necessitates a reassessment of how the two governments approach these challenges and the establishment of political platforms that permit protesters to voice their concerns. In the Nigerian context, the head of state and other government officials, alongside state governors, should interpret the cries for independence as a warning of the dysfunction pervading the country and the pressing socio-economic issues that must be addressed to prevent further insurgencies. In the case of Cameroon, it is imperative to reform the special status granted to the Anglophone regions, beginning with intensive negotiations with the Anglophone community to address the shortcomings of the bill, which would enhance the autonomy of these regions and create the necessary momentum for reaching a lasting peace agreement. In this context, the African Union and other regional blocs and organizations can play a mediating role, facilitating dialogues and negotiations.
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