Salafi Political Culture: The Dynamics of Compliance

عبد الحكيم أبو اللوز-Abdelhakim Aboullouz٭

Labbab Magazine 2024 -Salafism and its Compliance Political Culture

Translated by Mohamed SAKHRI

We summarize the political culture of Salafism in the term “compliance.” Salafism has been one of the most prominent forces supporting and serving political authority, remaining distant from engaging in political issues, especially social justice. The authority has consistently viewed Salafism as a conservative force that ensures social peace and stability in the short term. The changing interests of this authority have driven Salafism to adapt itself and subsequently re-employ its political culture in various directions, demonstrating its increasing political sensitivity. This allows for a political positioning that enables its material existence even under the most challenging conditions.

Through this, we attempt to explain Salafism’s capacity to produce a pragmatism that hides behind a dense veil of apolitical expressions, alongside interpreting the political system’s ongoing inclination to seek Salafist services. Our focus in this study connects closely with what we presented in our book “Salafi Movements in Morocco.” In its folds, we attempt to track the political behavior of the Moroccan Salafi movement. Our work here is to explore a Salafi political culture by interpreting this behavior, whether through linking aspects together or discovering new social interactions that are significant and meaningful.

In this work, we are guided by the contributions of an American researcher who has studied such movements; Brian Wilson compared various sects in North America and identified a classification categorizing them into seven classes, one of which pertains to our interest: the conversionist movements (Les sectes conversionistes). This involves a typical sect of committed evangelical Christianity, characterized by a unique worldview asserting the world’s corruption due to human depravity. Therefore, the world can be changed if we change the humans. The distinctive activities of such revivalist sects promote public calling. The general atmosphere within them tends to be emotionally charged without reaching an ascetic level, as the Christian sects emphasize the encouragement of evangelism and preaching globally.

It is noted that the conversionist sects oscillate between “rigor” and “compliance,” two variables tethered to the prevailing social climate today. The organismal forms of solidarity present in modern societies, and the social control exercised by official institutions, no longer favor the complete isolation of religious groups.

Consequently, we will attempt to address the Salafi movements in Morocco from the perspective of the political culture they produce, the ways they serve the interests of authority, the resources they acquire from this, and the interdependence of all this with the dynamics in Morocco’s religious and political fields.

Implicit Politics

Salafism is one of the concepts that are difficult to define due to its overuse in various and divergent contexts. Regardless, our previous studies have led us to an understanding of Salafism as a form of protest against the developments that have occurred on the religious level concerning both intellectual and ritual aspects.

Some of these tendencies concern the re-regulation of the religion at the doctrinal level, aiming for metaphysical and ethical rationalization of beliefs as they actually exist. Other tendencies focus on the re-regulation of religious rituals, standardizing their models, words, gestures, and procedures to maintain the original ritual activity against heresies.

Sociologically, this religious tendency manifests today in movements of a sectarian nature, defined as movements trying to ensure independence from prevailing social relationships. These social movements adopt a radical form of religiosity whereby they reject social and political institutions, seeking to maintain maximum freedom concerning what the official society observes in terms of religious habits and behaviors, drawing their rituals from different religious sects or from different interpretations of the official religion.

The lack of a political discourse among Salafi movements—the set of ideas and political conceptions logically related to analyzing the political reality and determining ways to address and influence it—has clearly posed an obstacle to studying the political relationships of Salafi movements. Additionally, their lack of a media platform that enables them to express political opinions has restricted most of their activities to teaching circles, publishing books, and other endeavors filled with religious preaching.

Most of what attracts the attention of Salafi movements is individual righteousness, rather than collective action aimed at worldly goals, which makes them movements that disdain politics and its dimensions, distancing themselves from it, similar to many religious movements that do not aim to seize power or revolutionize society. Some work to foster a community of true believers, exemplified by the “Lubavitch” group in the Christian world or the “Tablighi” movement in the Islamic world; they propose an alternative life formula wherein communal and familial solidarities are based on personal religious experience.

However, the absence of politics at the discourse level does not mean its complete absence; it belongs to another level, the daily practice, where we can find some of its meanings in interactions and social relations. In the West, the success of certain puritanical tendencies in generating significant material wealth has qualified them to negotiate with authorities from a position of strength. When these sects began contributing to wealth creation, a consciousness matured regarding them as new religious groups that could not be ignored politically.

Thus, despite their rejection of politics and reluctance to engage in it, nothing prevents Salafism from interpreting the current world and the conflicts, religious and worldly phenomena within it. This explains why the phenomenon has attracted the attention of various political currents and is used to outline national strategies and international policies. Therefore, we can rightly wonder how a religious sect distant from political affairs competes with other religious and secular ideologies.

Compliance… A Salafi Characteristic

If it is impossible to speak of a political discourse from Salafi trends, political compliance constitutes an organizing principle for their political behavior. Salafism compresses its political action into this principle, sidelining any detailed discussion about politics and its associated issues.

Salafism presents a mode of religion used to maintain the status quo, combining strictness and puritanism on one side with compliance and submission on the other in the political realm. Thus, Salafism has exercised its advocacy with great flexibility, combining doctrinal rigidity and political pragmatism, showcasing significant adaptability to the political authority’s requirements while simultaneously maintaining its doctrinal rigidity.

Within the ideology of submission, we see a divergence among accommodating Salafi scholars. Some completely boycott any form of political participation, while others permit voting for the best candidate but do not accept Salafists’ integration into the political process. Scholars like Ibn Baz, Ibn Uthaymeen, and Al-Albani fall into this latter category.

Ibn Taymiyyah is considered the first to lay down the theoretical foundations for the principle of compliance. He did not give much importance to issues concerning the appointment of an imam or rebellion against him, nor to the legitimacy of governance. Instead, he emphasized the rights of both the imam and the governed, addressing in his work “Al-Siyasa Al-Shar’iyya” the rights of God and communal rights in general. In another book, he focused on individual rights, discussing the guarantees that the community provides for the individual, family, and public wealth.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s social and political theory was a direct product of his belief in prophethood and fundamentals. His understanding of the duty of obedience was consistent with his theory of monotheism. He included in the duties imposed on the community the imitation of the Prophet Muhammad and total submission to Islamic law.

Thus, the issue of state formation was secondary in Ibn Taymiyyah’s political doctrine. Whether the authority’s legitimacy was justified through divine appointment or through a nominal election lacked importance as long as the authority existed in practice. Ibn Taymiyyah’s tendency was realistic and opposed to the formalistic notion of election among Sunnis and the idealism of Shiites.

Regarding the issue of rebellion against rulers, Ibn Taymiyyah aligned with the majority of Sunnis and scholars, declaring the obligation to obey corrupt or ignorant rulers, as long as their orders do not constitute explicit violations of God’s law. For rebellion to be permissible or obligatory, the imam’s decisions must completely contradict binding legal rulings based on a clear text from the Quran and Sunnah, as well as the consensus of the early generations.

Unlike the scholars of Sunni tradition who elaborated on the issue of rebellion, Ibn Taymiyyah’s discourse on this matter was limited; he merely addressed it within the scope of securing benefits and repelling harms, stating that this is the wisdom that the legislator observed in prohibiting rebellion against commanders and recommending the avoidance of combat during civil strife. Even when those engaging in such actions believe they aim to enjoin good and forbid wrong. However, if removing an evil can only be achieved by an even greater evil, then removing it in that manner becomes an evil itself, and if goodness can only be realized through an evil whose harm exceeds that of the goodness, pursuing that good in that manner becomes egregious.

Consequently, the armed uprising called for by the Khawarij against every unjust imam is rejected in Ibn Taymiyyah’s school because every Muslim is prohibited from drawing his sword against another Muslim. Thus, political loyalty in this conservative scholar’s perspective is clear, where the governed possess the right to offer counsel to the imam individually, modeled after how the Prophet dealt with his companions.

Therefore, the principle of compliance is not a product of contemporary Salafism; rather, it lies at the heart of Islamic political theory. Although the specific social and political circumstances that constrained Ibn Taymiyyah crafted this principle of compliance, contemporary Salafi spokespeople often repeat this theory under the slogan “No denial, no abandonment, and no rebellion,” meaning that rebellion against the ruler has too many negative repercussions and holds no benefit for the Islamic community, regardless of their tyranny or injustice. “The injustice of the imam does not permit us to rebel against him, nor does it allow us to curse him or speak ill of him; we must advise him if we are among those who give sincere advice, and let it be a secret between us and him.” In the same vein, contemporary Salafism perceives that political engagement is not the prerogative of the general public but rather restricted to those of sound mind and influential authority. It asserts that participation by those without authority detracts from acquiring correct knowledge.

On a theoretical level, Salafism considers that it is excessive knowledge to formulate political theories and then discuss them, posing questions regarding who has the right to dismiss a ruler that does not abide by sharia law. Delving into that is far from the methodology of the righteous predecessors, who only engaged in matters upon their occurrence, and this is the method of calling that should be followed, not theorizing and building judgments based on imaginary perceptions. Hence, all of this does not render contemporary Salafism a political movement or an organization of any kind, although it forms what can be described as a “brotherhood” that refuses to engage in any opposing political activity, be it peaceful or violent, limiting its role to offering advice while voicing no responsibility for the closeness of Salafism to political Islamic movements or jihadist Salafi movements.

It is evident that contemporary Salafism confines itself to reiterating the traditional ideology propagated by ancient scholars when they asserted the necessity of complete obedience and the illegitimacy of declaring jihad or disobeying the ruler, leading the community into discord and serving the enemy. As such, the only available avenue for political action is advice, through consultation, within the bounds of sharia, distant from the language of imposition and denunciation.

Salafism does not base its opposition to political engagement on explicit religious prohibitions but rather on a realistic interpretation of the inefficacy of partisan experiences and their priorities. Thus, it remains in complete harmony with the “paradigm of obedience,” forbidding any type of rebellion against the ruler or attempts to rise against him.

Therefore, the Salafi discourse in discussing reform returns to its religious sources, stating: “Engaging in political work now. While we do not deny it, we believe in a logical and sequential sharia process: we begin with creed, then worship, then correcting and educating behavior, until the day comes when we enter politics in its sharia sense.” The political movement before achieving “purification” and “education” will bring only negative results.

This perspective indicates how the Salafi discourse has retained a narrow view of scholars’ responsibilities in its general form, as developed within Islamic traditions. The primary responsibility of a knowledgeable individual was essentially limited to acquiring religious knowledge and utilizing it according to its prescribed methods, rather than seeking to change society. There exists no clear sense or awareness of collective goals to be achieved on a level lower than the entire Muslim community, while scholars’ responsibilities remain limited to religious reform.

From Politics to Abandoning Politics

Salafis attack the leaders of Islamic movements involved in political activities by stating: “What reform can come from those who are ignorant of the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah? And what reform is there for the community if not rectifying their creed and purifying it from superstitions, heresies, and the misinterpretations of the ignorant?” They advise theorists of Islamic work to be knowledgeable of the Quran and Sunnah, not leaving judgment to their experiences, minds, and inspirations. In general, Salafis recommend their followers to remain sincere to the Salafi creed regarding politics, even if they do not understand some positions that seem ambiguous, warning that non-commitment constitutes betrayal of the entire Salafi creed.

The validity of Salafi ideas derives from their being tailored to reality and not from being institutionally knowledgeable in a way that makes them suitable for reality. They do not stray from their peculiarities, which manifest in moral aspects related to dress, food, drink, and policies of human relations.

Those who do not accept the Salafi theory of total political submission join jihadist Salafism, noting that there should be no theological differences between the two groups; the difference primarily lies in the institutional stance of the activists. On the discourse level, and except for the issues of supporting global jihad and the stance towards non-Muslims, both trends converge on the priority of doctrinal reform and in their critical discourse against modern political values such as democracy and secularism.

In general, Salafism ends up disdainful of touching political matters, which remain a secondary interest compared to the primary task of moral and religious guidance—building an ideal society, fundamentally reliant on personal commitment to religious teachings. Unlike Islamists, who strive to achieve Islam collectively, Salafism relies on the individual, whose efforts should lead to salvation represented in pleasing God without depending on worldly success.

Thus, Salafism has inadvertently contributed to rallying support for authority, mobilizing its adherents to become exceedingly active in organizations far removed from direct political work. Consequently, compliance has become less costly for the authority than other religious movements that are active politically.

The Salafi interpretation of religion and religiosity lacks spirituality, marginalizes ethics, and renders individual responsibility for action and belief meaningless. The primary concern becomes merely showing religion superficially, pretending to possess piety and righteousness.

Ultimately, engaging in political thought and activity is unavoidable as a future phase, a call to regain authority over sacred and imagined traditions that should be worked to restore for a community believed to have abandoned its cultural roots.

Compliance in Political Positions

In pursuing the principle of compliance, Mohammed al-Maghrawi, the leader of the Call to the Quran and Sunnah organization, exonerates the state from the responsibility for the spread of heresies. Upon inaugurating one of the Quran houses linked to his association, he stated, “O brothers, Morocco is an Islamic country, and thanks to God, it is one of the oldest Islamic nations where Islam entered early. Islam here is not new; it came during the era of the Tabi’in, and Morocco welcomed it well. Islamic states have succeeded one another in this country, and every one of these states played a significant role in reviving the Quran and Sunnah.” The spread of heresies, he insists, stems mainly from active religious entities that have failed to take responsibility for combating heresies, with some even responsible for the existence of religious heresies, particularly those of popular and Sufi forms.

Al-Maghrawi’s compliance does not stop at responding to authority’s directions; he vigorously opposes all forms of social movements opposing authority, such as strikes and demonstrations, and anything that might incite turmoil in the nation and society, as obedience to the ruler is a cornerstone of his preaching.

“Change cannot be achieved through strikes,” notes al-Maghrawi, “but through drawing closer to God.” Therefore, he emphasizes to his followers a total rejection of anyone calling for causing disruptions in security, saying: “If you want the Quran houses to remain, keep them away from chaos and sedition.”

In general, to ensure political compliance for his organization, al-Maghrawi rejects any political involvement from his followers on all levels, claiming it negatively impacts the Salafi roots. According to him, “Engaging in politics is a doorway to factionalism, leading to unacceptable compromises, which in Salafi logic equate to betrayal of the roots. Other groups have shown a primary willingness to engage in politics, owing to their various references, which have caused disruption in their methodology and work, leading to the absence of a guiding principle.”

Criticism of politics does not mean a complete abandonment of it; its foundations and culture are present within the limits where Salafis exhibit their comprehensive compliance. This is evident in how al-Maghrawi praises the Moroccan political system, stating that under it, the Salafi calling has flourished and spread.

In his opinion, only those who overindulged in the freedoms available have been deprived of liberty, failing to practically exploit the available margin of freedom effectively.

Negotiating through Compliance

Proudly, al-Maghrawi recounts various instances that demonstrate his compliance with the authority, such as never having proceeded against any of the Quran house attendees in a criminal file throughout the history of his calling; also, al-Maghrawi never participated in any elections, nor was his name ever listed in any electoral records. He did not hide attempts to politically co-opt him, saying: “Abdouh, the MP from the Istiqlal Party, had a story with us. When the local government of Sidi Youssef refused to give us a permit to build a Quran house, MP Abdouh intervened as a mediator to help us achieve our goal, but he asked for our support for the Istiqlal Party in the upcoming elections. The authority was alarmed; we explained the situation to them and no longer accepted formal contact with party entities.”

Al-Maghrawi’s positions are not merely compliant but supportive of everything the authority does. In fact, he has often acted on behalf of the authority against its political and ideological opponents. He mobilized the Quran houses to confront the rising Shia influence that began after the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran in the early 1980s, and he attacked Abdel Salam Yassine, leader of the Justice and Spirituality movement, particularly after Yassine revealed his oppositional stance towards the political regime in his letter “Islam or Deluge.” Undoubtedly, through these services, al-Maghrawi has found an ally in the authority.

He learned from this explicit alliance how to negotiate with the authority for specific demands, like allowing his organization to engage in isolated religious activities. Al-Maghrawi’s emphasis on ensuring security and maintaining it was not merely a claim dictated by the principle of compliance but rather a targeted aim designed to enhance his position as a mediator capable of restoring social peace in exchange for demands that correspond with his sect, primarily calling for isolated religious life.

The compliance response from al-Maghrawi and his followers extends beyond what has already been mentioned to another aspect which reflects his caution before issuing judgments regarding the jihadist Salafi file that threatened his stream’s material existence. He stated: “I have witnessed many events over forty years. Personally, in my follow-up of historical events, I always try to remain calm and safe in matters. Many reacted to the Khomeini issue when the revolution took place in Iran, but I always called for patience, asking: Are today’s Shia the same as yesterday’s? Concerning Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, many supported Saddam in this action, considering it jihad, but I again called for caution, stating: Saddam is known for killing scholars and innocents. When the September 11 incidents occurred, I was asked about my position. My answer was: I can comment on what happened five years later; I say that one should never hastily judge events lest one later becomes embroiled.”

Al-Maghrawi’s leadership enabled him to solidify compliance through various forms, illustrated by the expulsion of young follower Abdul Hakim Fakhri after he emailed the king on issues concerning polytheism, combating proselytization, socialism, and secularism, among others. He routinely expelled anyone showing signs of non-compliance with his organization’s ethos. Hence, he disavowed his follower Abdul Haq Ridwan, who exhibited tendencies towards jihadist Salafism, with al-Maghrawi proclaiming, “This Abdul Haq is not my associate; he is merely a bookstore owner. I previously advised him until he cried and promised to distance himself from this method, but he received nothing from me. I do not believe he is a qualified scholar; he is just an uneducated man who has never studied, and I advised him; he appeared to retract, only to turn back.”

Moreover, al-Maghrawi personally reported to the authorities about any follower deviating from the compliance line in his organization, disavowing his follower Youssef Soli, who had joined jihadist Salafism and was killed in Iraq, commenting: “This behavior is suicide and reflects a clear deviation from the Salafi methodology.”

On the morning of the May 16, 2003 terrorist events in Casablanca, he issued a statement on behalf of his organization denouncing what occurred, clearly indicating its contradiction with God’s law and the call for the association, in an attempt to eliminate suspicions of the organization’s involvement in the incidents. Therefore, following this, al-Maghrawi increased his scrutiny of the organization. He also made efforts to clarify that there was no follower from the association among those being pursued, as he viewed this as evidence of the sound methodology embraced by his organization, publicly asserting his principled adherence to moderation, moderation, and listening to the ruler.

A Salafi of the Far Right

Reiterating the principle of compliance, al-Maghrawi’s statements often affirm the wisdom of the state and the soundness of its approach toward addressing the Salafi file and its new variables. He asserted, “The state’s handling of the phase following May 16 was characterized by fairness, as it did not act recklessly and did not group everyone together as a means of targeting the preachers.”

Behind the principle of compliance, al-Maghrawi practiced politics in an unseen space; he re-established hidden alliances with officials of various ranks through which he sought to preserve the material existence of his religious stream.

What we are observing represents unclear political aims that Salafism does not disclose or reveal, yet are densely present in daily practices and interactions with other actors. This opportunistic strategy has drawn considerable disdain from state scholars, who have labeled it a “confused sensitivity” regarding the constants of the nation, while their leaders have been disparaged as “Murji’ah,” “mercenary traders of dirhams and riyals” by a fervent oppressor Salafi faction.

Conservatism as a Cultural Fit for Authority

The authority has seen the accommodating Salafism as an excellent ally due to its low cost; it serves as an important tool against adversarial Islamist activists and acts as a structure contributing to preserving social peace by absorbing some manifestations of poverty and marginalization. Overall, it has become a direct intermediary between public authorities and marginalized social groups.

In contrast to opposing and revolutionary Islamist advocates, Salafis have benefited from state dreams seeing them as conservative forces that ensure social peace and stability in the short term. Thus, they provide services, cover school fees for children in Quranic schools, gather the unemployed in mosques for prayer, reorganize their presence, and engage in charitable activities that do not conflict with the required Islamic social values. These efforts, as is evident, compel them to reject protest behaviors and distance themselves from anything that would serve the agendas of jihadist Salafism.

This political alliance is inherently unequal as compliance is dictated by state strategy, compelling Salafism to align its goals and actions with the announced and clandestine policies of the authority, including steering clear of official politics. Consequently, the Salafi movements provide religious spaces that absorb a considerable reserve of enthusiasm and total devotion expressed through extreme piety and worship, aligned with a pacifying stance towards authority.

At the same time, politicians have found in the ritualistic and existential strictness embodied in the precise application of religious commands and committing oneself to worship a significant reserve of energies capable of complete dedication to opposing Islamic forces, particularly the Justice and Spirituality Movement, as if to say no one can claim conservatism better than them; they have the potential to articulate the views of politically inactive majorities and operate in a domain separate from that of Islamist communities. Accordingly, Salafi movements have secured their active existence.

The Authority Rectifies Its Ally

The relationship between Salafi movements and the authority has not remained stable, especially after discovering that Salafi ideology played a role in inspiring those behind the May 16, 2003 terrorist events in Casablanca. Some manifestations of Salafi piety appeared to have transformed into political violence, which understandably concerned the authority, which in turn began to punish those displaying this shift with harshness and brutality.

Despite the efforts made to convey positions reflecting compliance, the authority sought to cut back its ally’s influence, initially preventing students from spending the night in Quran houses affiliated with Salafi associations, which forced several Quran houses to halt their activities. At this point, al-Maghrawi’s reaction was to proactively halt some of the Quran houses linked to his organization, a preemptive measure aimed at reassuring the authority and conveying his understanding of the pressure it faced after the incidents. He undertook symbolic measures, including requiring his followers to wear traditional Moroccan clothing instead of Afghan attire.

During this period, various projections about the future of Salafism circulated within the authorities, demonstrating their trepidation about their ally. These projections included the Ministry of Awqaf overseeing the premises of Salafism, as well as appointing teachers in Quran houses and determining curricula, though these measures were not implemented. Thus, the Quran houses continued operating normally until they were closed a full year after the May 16, 2003 events. In 2004, new outlines of the state’s new religious policy emerged, placing Salafists within the ranks of those deviating from the state’s religious direction.

The cessation order was unofficially issued by the Minister of Interior, who directed the governor of Marrakech in this regard, but the authority did not apply legal means to prevent the activities of these organizations; rather, they pushed the leaders of these associations to cease their activities. In other words, they resorted to informal means outside of legal obligations, exploiting personal relationships previously established with these leaders, who had always supported and complied with the authority’s directives.

In light of this, the moment al-Maghrawi received the closure decree, he promptly closed all his premises, removing the signs from their doors. He was also compelled to relinquish the Quran houses he owned to the Ministry of Awqaf. However, the services al-Maghrawi had provided to the authority over 30 years allowed him to retain one center in Marrakech, which remains active today, without any changes to its Salafi-oriented activities.

Activism in the Public Sphere

As most trials concluded, the state began to contemplate new means to deal with Salafi thought and its carriers. The appointment of Ahmed Toufiq as Minister of Awqaf, known for his Sufi leanings and connections with the Qadiri-Boutchich movement, was a clear message that the state sought to sever ties with Wahhabi ideology as a conservative, compliant stream. The direction of this change became even clearer through the royal address on April 30, 2004, which laid out what he termed the “holistic and integrated strategy for rehabilitating the religious field.”

This address rendered religious regulation through three intertwined levels: religious rituals, creed, and organization. The actions taken were prompted by the need for stability and continuity amidst an environment characterized by internal conflict that had taken clearer forms following the May 16, 2003 events and accompanied efforts to respond to questions stemming from the content of creed itself and the necessity for traditional educational content to be made capable of resisting external influences. Thus, the new strategy relied more on the localization of Islam than on modernization—establishing a historically and geographically specified Moroccan Islam.

The implications of the new religious policy were only implemented radically against Salafi movements in September and October 2008—five years post the May 16, 2003 events—resulting in the closure of approximately 67 Salafi centers throughout Morocco.

The collective closure of Salafi centers raised questions about the rights and status of Salafism in the public sphere, provoking condemnation from numerous rights organizations, considering the decision a violation of the law and harmful to the freedom of cultural and associational work. There were also denunciations from both the Justice and Development Party and the Movement for Unity and Reform, along with national and local figures heading 15 cultural and Islamic associations, calling on the Minister of Interior to reopen the Quran houses to fulfill their educational and cultural messages.

On October 29, 2008, three parliamentary groups raised a question in the House of Representatives about the prohibition of Salafi associations, deeming the closure decision as “correct” as it sought to rectify a situation marked by an abuse of freedoms in producing a thought that is far from being modern. The Minister of Interior justified the decision as being appropriate, citing non-compliance with Law No. 01.13 regarding the institutions of traditional education issued in January 2002.

In November 2008, authorities expanded the scope of the ban to encompass various Islamic organizations with diverse orientations, which organized within a national demand movement, urging responsible authorities to lift the prohibition, warning in a joint statement against what they termed the “extension of extreme and morally deviant thought to youth whom their associations seek to protect from these dangerous pitfalls.” Seven national organizations submitted a demand memo to local authorities and the Ministry of Interior regarding the closure decision targeting them, later filing lawsuits.

With the Minister of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs present, the issue of Salafi organizations arose in the Moroccan Parliament, emphasizing the negative impact of the closure on Morocco’s external and religious reputation, particularly as it encompassed 67 Quran houses affiliated with 20 civil associations.

The file also drew the attention of secular legal sensitivities; in November 2008, the Moroccan Association for Human Rights condemned the decision to close Quranic schools affiliated with the Association for the Call to the Quran and Sunnah in Marrakech, considering the closure “an arbitrary administrative decision.” They expressed solidarity with al-Maghrawi’s association, asserting it was a victim of injustice.

In the realm of political Islam, the Forum for Human Rights supported the file, contending that the action lacked any legal justification. Furthermore, Islamist intellectuals signed petitions urging the Ministry of Interior to apologize for the errors committed regarding these centers.

Salafism Interprets the State’s Creed

In addition to legal activism, Salafism has opened the possibility of working from within the official religious space by interpreting its new parameters. It has renegotiated the constants of official religious politics (Ash’ari theology, Maliki jurisprudence, and Sufism), insisting on acknowledging them while not relinquishing its sectarian and doctrinal identity. It effectively utilizes the very general nature of discussion surrounding religious constants in official orientations. For instance, Salafis do not display sensitivity towards accepting the legal rulings of Malik as long as they represent scholarly interpretations, acknowledging that the essence of scholarly effort carries a degree of fallibility.

They direct their attention towards the doctrinal rather than jurisprudential aspects associated with the Imam, which they regard as the doctrinal Salafi orientation, allowing them to accuse the religious policy of failing to remain true to this doctrine. This critique is shared among both Salafi and Islamic trends.

Numerous Salafi scholars have not voiced these critiques as public protests; rather, they work to serve their religious orientation by linking Maliki interpretations to the fundamentals (returning to the Quran and Sunnah through the lens of the righteous predecessors). This strategy has enabled them to maintain their positions within official scholarly councils despite the stringent requirements for membership therein.

Salafism has exploited the inconsistencies of the new state religious policy. Despite the clear foundations upon which this policy was built, it contains, as is the case with any policy, undisclosed aspects and sometimes openly stated facets that may obscure more than they reveal. For instance, the application of this policy has shown that we do not clearly know who is responsible for enacting reforms in the religious field. While the Ministry of Awqaf is presented as the entity responsible for formulating and applying religious policy, in reality, it is merely one of several institutions overseeing the implementation of religious policy.

The measures accompanying the May 16, 2003 events clearly indicated that the new policy for managing religious affairs left a significant margin for the Ministry of Interior and its intelligence apparatuses to control the religious field, aiming to realize unexpressed objectives within the official discourse. Therefore, we understand why the Salafi movements file has remained restricted to these agencies, which have relied on their conservative security doctrine to resume unofficial communications with Salafis and include them in managing local religious fields, thereby again securing a maneuvering margin and renewing their field presence.

Conclusion

Interpreting the positions, behaviors, and social interactions of Salafism has allowed us to conclude elements of its political culture, branding it with compliance based on its reliance on the most conservative principles from a doctrinal perspective that is entirely subordinated to political authorities. Despite the publicly declared distance from politics, in practice, it has fostered spaces that absorb significant reserves of energy, enthusiasm, and total dedication expressed through excessive manifestations of piety and worship tailored towards a peaceful stance with authority.

Through its organizations, Salafism has contributed to mobilizing support for the authority, and although it has employed a lexicon of political rights after facing restrictions, it has not strayed from compliance, as Salafism presents itself as a possible interpretation of the state’s doctrinal and theological identity, firmly embedded within it.

After Salafism found justification for its compliance within the religious lexicon, it began to lean on a political rights discourse that references injustice while demanding rights—an indicative sign of “the expanding secular dimension within Salafi discourse.” Salafis have astutely recognized the state’s recent need for new services required of them, which is mobilizing support for the state’s new religious project, as long as they do not stray from the established rules that ensure national security. This religious movement has effectively positioned itself, intentionally, as an integral part of the power struggle, now serving as one of the instruments utilized by the authority in the political system’s strategy for both the present and the future.

• Abdelhakim Abou Ellouz, Salafist Movements in Morocco (Beirut, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Thesis Series 79, 2013).
• Bryan R. Wilson : Typologie des sectes dans une perspective dynamique et comparative. Archives des sciences sociales des religions. (Juillet- Décembre), 1963/16, p 49-63
• Abdelhakim Abou Ellouz, Salafist Movements in Morocco – Anthropological and Sociological Research (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2nd Edition, Thesis Series 79, 2013).
• Ibid., p. 40.
• Ibid., p. 43.
• This religious education is practiced in premises called Qur’anic houses and provides a kind of non-formal compensatory education, which provides educational opportunities for groups of all ages, school-age children who have not attended school, and then young people and adults who have been deprived of formal education opportunities for one reason or another. Abd al-Hakim Abu al-Luz: Salafi Movements, pp. 162-192.
• Wilson, Typologie des sectes, p 53
• We rely on the political anthropological current, one of whose most prominent figures is Georges Pagnier, who rejected the restriction of politics to state societies and generalized political existence to all social forms: symbolic, personal, ritual. For more information:

Balandier (J), Anthropologie politique, (Paris : PUF, 4éme édition, 1999)

• The example of Mennonistes in France and Quakers in Britain, for more information see:

Séguy (J), Sectes chrétiennes et développement. In, Archives des sciences sociale des religions, n◦ 131, Janvier – juin, 1962, p

• Abd al-Hakim Abu al-Luz, Salafi Movements, p. 370.
• Muhammad Abu Rumman, Muhammad Abu Rumman, Salafists and the Arab Spring, The Question of Religion and Democracy in Arab Politics, Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1st Edition, 2013, p. 31.
• Ibid., p. 18[1].
• In the foreground are the rights of God, which specializes in his absolute right to be the only idol, and the fact that God alone is the owner of this right, and the worship of God is not limited to the practice of some worship only, respect for all rights is ultimately respect for the rights of God, and the rights of the nation do not fall in any way as the rights of God fall… Henry Laoust, The Origins and Systems of Islam in Politics and Sociology. Translated by Muhammad Abd al-Azim Ali (Cairo: Dar al-Dawah, 1st edition, dt), p. 322.
• Ibid., p. 36[1].
• Ibid., p. 32[1].
• Ibid., p. 231.
• Ibn Taymiyyah, Minhaj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah fi Refuting the Words of the Fatalistic Shiites, edited by Muhammad Rashad Salem, (Medina: Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University, vol. 2, 1406-1986), p. 422.
• Muhammad al-Maghraoui, The People of Al-Ifak and Al-Bahtan Al-Radoun on the Sunnah and the Qur’an (Marrakesh: Dar Al-Qur’an Library, 1st Edition, 2001), p. 89.
• Ibid., p. 8.
• Ibid., p. 9.
• Mohamed al-Maghraoui, interview with al-Jarida al-Maghribiya Weekly, No. 142, December 26-January 1, 2003.
• Al-Albani, Al-Siyasa Al-Sharia, audio tape, recordings of the Association for the Call to the Qur’an and Sunnah No. 102/1.
• Azmi Bishara, in answer to the question: What is Salafism? (Doha-Beirut: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2018), p. 85.
• 23 Ibid., p. 87.
• In addition to their argument that obedience is obligatory, classical scholars have been separated by the pattern of exercising power and the conditions for access to it, an aspect that we do not find in Salafism. Abdel Hakim Abu Al-Louz: The Problem of Religion and Politics in Islamic Discourse, The Discourse of the Tunisian Ennahda Movement as a Model, (Cairo: Dara Roya, 2009), pp. 145-148.
• Salim ibn Eid al-Hilali, al-Fa’idat al-Hasan fi Hadith Thuban: The Collapse of Nations (Dar Ibn Affan, first edition, 2001), p. 115.
• Muhammad Abu Rumman, Salafists and the Arab Spring, p. 22.
• Al-Hilali, Al-Fa’id Al-Hassan, p. 116.
• A governing principle for Salafi action developed by Al-Albani, which means that the priority of Salafism is to purify Islamic beliefs from extraneous perceptions and to educate on correct beliefs.
• Dale Eckelman, Knowledge and Power in Moroccan Society, translated by Mohamed Afif (Rabat: Tariq Ibn Ziyad Center, 2000), p. 167.
• Muhammad al-Maghrawi, Our Need for the Sunnah, p. 4.
• Al-Hilali, Al-Fa’id Al-Hassan, p. 29.
• Olivier Roy, The Globalization of Islam, translated by Lara Maalouf, (Beirut: Dar Al-Saqi, 2003), p. 144.
• Salafi-jihadists consider the issues of liquidation, education, affliction, and jihad to be integrated into Salafism as an indivisible ideological unit.
• The Salafi-jihadi interpretations of the rulings of the dhimmis and their relegation to reality calls for carrying out operations against Jews and Christians, and the preponderance of interests and evils remains dependent on the appreciation of the influential sheikhs in this current, and their appreciation is the line between conviction of these rulings and their implementation.
• During their trials, Salafi-jihadi sheikhs expressed the idea of compliance with the authority, so that Omar al-Haddouchi (a former jihadist) said: “We are preachers, not revolutionaries, and issuing judgments is not our competence, we are preachers and not judges, as rulings are the prerogative of the Sultan and his deputies.” Fizazi (a former jihadist) also said that “changing evil by hand is not permissible for notables but for the Sultan, and the booty can only be in the abode of war. War is declared by the emir of the army of Islam,” Al-Ahdath newspaper, special issue on the events of May 16, 2003, September 8, 2003.
• Khaled Al-Hroub, Salafi Formations in Palestine: The Limits of an Environment De-Palestinianized. Within the collective author: Global Salafism, Contemporary Salafi Movements in a Changing World, edited by Roll Mir, translated by Muhammad Mahmoud Al-Tawbah (Beirut: Arab Network for Research and Publishing, 1st Edition, 2014), p. 324.
• Olivier Roy, The Globalization of Islam, p. 9.
• Muhammad al-Maghrawi, al-Ifak wal-Bahtan, p. 89.
• In order to preserve his compliance line, al-Maghraoui rejected the invitation to organize it to participate in the demonstration against the plan for the integration of women in development, in which all other Islamic sensitivities, including those sensitivities, participated.
• Muhammad al-Maghrawi, al-Ifak wal-Bahtan, p. 89.
• On the extension and geographical distribution of Salafism in Morocco, see: Abd al-Hakim Abu al-Luz, Salafi Movements, pp. 217-230.
• Muhammad al-Maghrawi, in interview with al-Sahidah Weekly, p. 142, December 26-January 1, 2003.
• With the exception of one time, when Maghraoui was pushed to do so on the occasion of the vote on the constitutional amendment amending the age of majority for the king in 1980.
• Mohamed al-Maghraoui, in interview with al-Jarida al-Maghribiya Weekly, p. 142, December 26-January 1, 2003.
• See some excerpts of this letter in Abd al-Hakim al-Fakhri’s interview with al-Sahida al-Maghribi Weekly, v.142, December 26-January 1, 2003.
• Ibid.
• Mohamed al-Maghraoui, in interview with al-Jarida al-Maghribia Weekly, No. 142, December 26-January 1, 2003.
• Ibid.
• Muhammad al-Fizazi, scholars, not agents, beware (Munir al-Tawhid wal-Jihad website),
  1. www.tawhed.ws
• On the markets from which Salafism delegates their followers and the fate of polarization, see: Abd al-Hakim Abu al-Luz, Salafi Movements, pp. 309-322.
• – Kepel (J), La revanche de Dieu. Juifs et musulmans à la reconquête du monde ( Pais: Seuil, 1991), p 33.
• Maxime Rowe Denson, The Phenomenon of Islamic Puritanism: An Attempt to Clarify, translated by Hashem Saleh, (Beirut: Journal of Contemporary Arab Thought, National Development Center, No. 22, 1985), p. 35.
• 35-Kepel (J), la revanche.. op.cit., p
• Ibid., p. 78.
• Al-Maghraoui justified this arrest by the heat of the summer, and that it was not dictated by the authorities, see his interview with the weekly newspaper, May 24, 2003.
• After the closure of the Qur’an houses, the Society’s website was activated, so lessons and lectures were broadcast actively on the Holy Quran Radio on the website of the Da’wa Society, maghrawi.net
• Before this period, local Islam did not have importance to the authority, but rather a rapprochement with Wahhabi Islam, and the evidence is that the state prevented Islamic movements from legitimate political movement for a long time and in return allowed other parties to preach freely within society. In this context, only the number of advocacy associations at the national level can be counted. Mohamed Ayadi et al., at a panel discussion on the May 16 events. See Socialist Union Newspaper, p. 7241, June 8, 2003.