The Russian nuclear doctrine has witnessed significant changes recently, as Moscow has expanded the circumstances under which it may resort to using its nuclear arsenal. This amendment represents a substantial escalation in the context of the ongoing war with Ukraine and reflects a shift in the Russian stance towards increasing threats. Given that Russia possesses the largest nuclear arsenal in the world, any changes to the frameworks for utilizing these capabilities raise widespread international concerns. Key indicators of this included the closure of U.S. and other embassies in Kyiv to avoid potential offensive actions. This comes amid the continued escalation between Moscow and Kyiv, along with Western support for the latter. In this context, essential questions arise about the main differences between the new amendments to the nuclear doctrine and the previous version, the motivations behind Russia’s recent decision, how it has been influenced by political shifts in the West, and to what extent Moscow may begin to implement its revised nuclear doctrine.
The Russian Nuclear Doctrine: Concept and Amendments
The nuclear doctrine is considered a set of policies and principles that define how a state uses nuclear weapons within the context of its national defense, whether in response to potential threats or as a means of deterrence. This doctrine includes specifying “when” and “how” nuclear weapons can be used and the circumstances that justify such actions, as well as establishing the necessary foundations to organize the military and political aspects of this usage. Naturally, nuclear doctrines vary between countries, with differences arising from the unique conditions and threats faced by each state, leading to some doctrines exhibiting reservations while others show expansion and leniency.
Looking back at the Russian case, we find distinct differences between the previous and the current doctrines following the amendments:
The Previous Nuclear Doctrine
The previous nuclear doctrine outlined two main conditions under which Russia had the right to use its nuclear capabilities:
- The first condition involved the right to use these weapons in the event of an attack on the country or its allies using ballistic missiles, challenging them with weapons of mass destruction or nuclear weapons. In such cases, Russia would have sufficient justification to defend itself using the same means used against it, with no other countries having the right to criticize its actions.
- The second condition pertained to situations in which the country faced an existential threat through significant attacks utilizing conventional weapons that could incapacitate the state’s ability to respond with its nuclear arsenal, thus threatening the existence of the state itself.
In addition to these two conditions, Russia was required to have sufficient information indicating that the country was about to face nuclear attacks or major strikes before it could use its nuclear arsenal. Although these conditions granted Russia the right to utilize its nuclear capabilities, they were characterized by a high degree of caution and restraint. Recently, with the outbreak of the current conflict with Ukraine, Putin has warned Western allies multiple times of his intention to amend the country’s nuclear doctrine. However, despite these warnings being repeated over more than two years of war, it was only recently that they aligned with the violation of the Western principle established from the outset—namely, not to support Ukraine with weapons that might provoke the Russian side and avoid direct confrontation with NATO.
New Amendments
The recent amendments have broadened the conditions under which Russia can act on its right to use nuclear weapons more than ever before and provided it with the legislative backing to launch a nuclear attack whenever Moscow deems it necessary, without needing information that signals imminent threats. In this context, the major amendments to the Russian nuclear doctrine include:
First Indication: Russia’s determination to utilize nuclear deterrence in the face of increasing threats; the amendment states Russia’s preparedness and resolve to employ nuclear weapons, asserting that such usage will ensure nuclear deterrence against threats, regardless of the types of weapons directed toward Russia. Now, it can resort to nuclear capabilities whether faced with drone attacks, cruise missiles, or other weapons.
Second Indication: Deterring non-nuclear states backed by nuclear powers; the amendment stipulates that aggression against Russia or its allies by a non-nuclear state, supported by a nuclear state, will be regarded as joint aggression warranting a nuclear response. This grants Russia the right to use nuclear weapons even if the aggression was conducted using conventional weapons, threatening its sovereignty. This adjustment serves as a clear message to Western allies possessing nuclear weapons who support Ukraine, as Russia now holds the right to escalate its dealings with them under its new approach.
Third Indication: Enhanced protection specifically for certain allies; the amendment states that Russia may resort to using nuclear weapons if its sovereignty or territorial integrity, or that of its allies such as Belarus, is seriously threatened. Russia has previously transferred tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, and under the new amendment, any threat to its neighbor Belarus, which is under Russian protection, will permit Russia to use its nuclear arsenal.
Fourth Indication: No hesitation in launching a nuclear attack against alliances; the amendment specifies that any aggression by a state from a military alliance against Russia or its allies is viewed as aggression from that entire alliance. In such cases, Russia reserves the right to employ nuclear weapons in response to any threats emerging from hostile military alliances.
Based on these recent amendments, it can be asserted that they reflect a significant shift in Moscow’s nuclear policy, providing greater flexibility in interpreting the circumstances necessitating nuclear weapon usage. They also signal clear implications for Western allies and NATO, indicating Russia can no longer overlook further violations of its established red lines, the latest being Ukraine’s use of long-range weaponry.
Motivations for Escalation: Western Threats and Political Shifts
The Russian amendment followed an American green light allowing Ukraine to use long-range weaponry—a measure European allies along with the U.S. have turned a blind eye to since the war’s inception but now welcome. This indicates a notable change in the American approach to the conflict. While Moscow has experienced significant military gains, with many estimates suggesting considerable support from its ally North Korea—estimated to be in the thousands and likely to increase—Kyiv remains incapable of securing similar support from its allies or achieving actual battlefield gains that could serve as leverage in potential future negotiations. Once Kyiv was permitted to utilize weapons capable of targeting deep within Russian territory, it swiftly launched attacks against Russian positions. This confirms the existence of Western technical and intelligence support, as Kyiv would not be able to use these weapons without the necessary backing.
In this context, one cannot separate the nearing departure of the Democratic administration from these developments, especially with the upcoming arrival of a Trump administration, which has reservations about Biden’s handling of Ukraine. Consequently, with concerns about a potential shift in the future American approach to the conflict—such as withdrawing support for Ukraine or negotiating on terms favoring Russia—the current American behavior can be understood. By allowing Kyiv to use advanced military capabilities, this could serve as a key leverage point in any upcoming arrangements led by the new Republican administration aimed at ending the war.
Between Deterrence and Geopolitical Complexities: Will Moscow Resort to the Nuclear Option?
The latest amendments give Russian decision-makers the authority to utilize nuclear weapons. Observing the ongoing reality on the ground, we find a considerable alignment between current events and the conditions outlined in the amendments, especially since Russia can now use nuclear weapons if it is faced with long-range attacks on its territory, which is happening today as Ukraine employs such weapons to strike within Russian territory.
However, from another perspective, it is not necessary for Russian decision-makers to act on their legislative authority for nuclear strikes immediately; numerous complexities and additional dimensions surround this issue. Notably, as of now, Russia remains the winning party in the war, having claimed nearly one-fifth of Ukrainian territory, which weakens the likelihood of a nuclear strike, even though the possibility remains.
Furthermore, the positions of major powers on this issue, particularly those that maintain good relations with Russia, cannot be ignored. China, for instance, has called for restraint and de-escalation. Despite its seemingly neutral public stance on the war, Beijing has significantly strengthened its ties with Russia over the past years. Nonetheless, this does not imply it would support any Russian attempts to use nuclear weapons in a conflict that would directly involve NATO, leading to various adverse consequences not only for Beijing but for countries worldwide—a scenario that China would not endorse.
Additionally, considering the timing, this period is marked by uncertainty. Europe and Russia await the arrival of a Republican administration in about two months, with expectations that a new vision for the conflict will emerge, potentially leaning toward resolution. Amid this uncertainty and anticipation concerning the Trump administration, these factors may prevent Moscow from implementing its revised nuclear doctrine and resorting to its nuclear capabilities.
Conclusion
The recent amendments to the Russian nuclear doctrine signify a shift in Moscow’s defense strategy, reflecting the potential use of nuclear weapons amidst current developments. However, the decision to act remains ensnared in geopolitical complexities, including the international positions of major powers like China and the United States. While Russia continues to secure territorial gains, political and military factors may inhibit its resort to nuclear options, even amidst persistent military escalations, pending the arrangements that the Trump administration may introduce, which could influence the dynamics of the conflict.
References
[1] Why Russia Is Changing Its Nuclear Doctrine Now, CSIS, 27/ 9/ 2024
https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-russia-changing-its-nuclear-doctrine-now
[2] What’s Russia’s nuclear doctrine and how did Putin change it?, FORTUNE, 20/11/2024
https://fortune.com/europe/2024/11/20/russia-nuclear-doctrine-how-did-putin-change-it/
