In May 2023, “L`Observatoire” published a book titled Macron-Putin: Dangerous Relations by Isabelle Lasserre, the deputy editor of the international section of Le Figaro, who has also been a correspondent in Russia and a war reporter. The book seeks to outline the relationship between French President Emmanuel Macron and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the context of the war in Ukraine, attempting to interpret the nature and consequences of their interactions. The author poses two main questions: What is the unique aspect of Franco-Russian relations that caused Macron, as the French president, to once again stumble over Russia’s double-dealing rhetoric? And can he change his approach now that he has seen Putin’s true face?
To answer these questions, the author divides her book into two main sections:
The Present that Repeats the Past (pages 11–124), which consists of six chapters, explores Macron’s reliance on phone diplomacy in his communication with Putin during the early stages of the Ukraine war. It then discusses the failure of Macron’s policy of resetting relations with Russia, a strategy he pursued since his first term, and the mistakes he made at the start of the war. The author dedicates a section to explaining how both Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky perceive Macron. The first part ends with an examination of the shifts in Macron’s Russian policy and assessments from Eastern European nations regarding these changes.
The Past that Explains the Present (pages 125–182) includes four chapters detailing the historical roots of Franco-Russian friendship, the ways previous French presidents dealt with Putin, and how France’s foreign policy has been influenced by anti-Americanism (L’Antiaméricanisme). It also covers the connections between the French and Russian military establishments.
Blind Trust
The book identifies several key indicators that suggest Putin deceived Macron, as shown through the following:
1. Difficulty in Predicting Russian Reactions: The book argues that Macron’s relationship with Putin revealed France’s ongoing ignorance of the complexities and motivations behind Russian diplomacy. This historical dilemma traces back to Tsar Peter IV, who betrayed France and caused it to lose the Seven Years’ War against Prussia, followed by Tsar Alexander I, who betrayed Napoleon in favor of Prussia, and finally Tsar Nicholas II, who dragged France into World War I. The book notes that French presidents after the fall of the Soviet Union, including Macron, consistently misjudge Russian reactions, often expecting them incorrectly.
2. Believing Putin’s Words During Phone Calls: Through a recount of the 21 phone calls between Macron and Putin since December 14, 2021—most of which lasted over an hour—the book uncovers the dynamics of their relationship. Early on, Macron’s phone calls with Putin were not criticized, as they were sometimes made at Zelensky’s request, and it was still unclear how well Ukraine would withstand the Russian advance. However, the book criticizes Macron for believing what Putin told him during these calls. An example is a February 20, 2022, conversation, just four days before Russia’s invasion, where Macron claimed a diplomatic victory, saying Putin had agreed to meet with U.S. President Joe Biden. Yet, the Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov denied the meeting the next day, and Russia invaded three days later, embarrassing France.
3. Macron’s Belief that Putin Could Be a Trusted Partner: After three personal meetings with Putin—two of which took place in France (one at the Palace of Versailles in 2017 and the other at Macron’s summer residence in Brégançon in 2019), with a third in St. Petersburg in 2018—Macron came to believe Putin could be a reliable partner. However, the book points out that the 2020 poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny should have served as an early warning of Putin’s true nature. When Macron called Putin about the incident, Putin implied that Navalny had poisoned himself, making a mockery of Macron. The book adds that Putin reportedly referred to Macron with the diminutive nickname “Macrontchik” (little Macron), which was also used by Kremlin-affiliated Russian media. According to the book, Putin had favored Macron’s right-wing rivals François Fillon and Marine Le Pen in the 2017 French presidential election, and Russian hackers had targeted Macron’s campaign.
4. Macron’s Confidence in His Ability to Influence Putin: Despite these warning signs, the book claims that Macron remained convinced for a long time that he could influence Putin by conveying messages like pushing for the West to include Russia in solving international problems, unlike what had happened in Iraq, Kosovo, and Libya. In reality, the book argues, Putin was deceiving Macron all along.
Excessive Idealism
The book highlights several factors that explain why Macron adopted a friendly stance toward Putin:
1. Macron’s Unrealistic Perception of Putin: The book states that those advocating a moderate approach toward Putin, including Macron, claim they do so in the name of realism. However, after Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine in February 2022, these individuals equally blamed both Russia and Ukraine for the situation. According to the book, they argue that NATO’s eastward expansion provoked Putin, who was merely defending his interests by invading Ukraine. This school of thought, prevalent in Europe and especially in France, has contributed to the “Western blindness” to the true nature of Putin’s regime. Scholars like John Mearsheimer in the U.S. and Hubert Védrine in France promoted the idea that Western nations overemphasized their values and neglected their national interests, failing to deal with the world as it is.
2. French Fascination with Great Empires: According to the book, the French tend to admire great empires, and Raymond Aron refers to those who advocate for moderation with Russia as “false realists.” True realists, he argues, believe in exerting pressure and building power balances to deter adversaries. The book criticizes the false realists for downplaying ideology in international relations and viewing Putin’s Russia as a normal state, akin to democratic ones. This leniency toward Russia, seen in Macron’s stance, has caused concern in Eastern Europe. The book suggests that this softness might become a defining feature of French foreign policy, potentially due to historical ties between the French and Russian militaries or France’s deep-seated political tradition, shared by both the right and left, of anti-Americanism.
3. Avoiding Military Confrontation with Russia: Another point of concern raised by the book is France’s hesitation to fully support Ukraine’s NATO membership, with some arguing that this reluctance is tied to France’s unwillingness to commit to Ukraine’s demand for the return of Crimea. France might fear finding itself at war with Russia should Ukraine attempt to reclaim Crimea by force, as an attack on a NATO member would compel the alliance to defend Ukraine.
4. Resistance to Shifting Europe’s Center of Gravity Eastward: The book concludes that Macron’s policy toward Russia might result in further territorial losses for Ukraine, just as Sarkozy’s approach toward Russia led to Georgia losing territory. Some even suggest that France and Germany do not want Ukraine to defeat Russia, as this could shift Europe’s center of gravity from the west to the east.
Negative Consequences
The book asserts that there are several negative consequences stemming from Putin’s deception of Macron, as illustrated below:
One significant consequence is the deterioration of Paris’s image in Central, Eastern, and Northern Europe. The book explains that if one examines Macron’s policy toward Ukraine since the onset of the Russian military intervention—characterized by his firm commitment to harsh sanctions against Russia and his military support for Ukraine, such as sending Caesar howitzers at the beginning of the conflict, which made a considerable difference on the battlefield, followed later by sending armored vehicles, with France being the first Western country to do so—there seems to be little to criticize in this regard, especially in comparison to Germany. However, the issue lies in Macron’s communication strategy. He made significant mistakes in the political rhetoric he adopted concerning the Ukrainian crisis, using phrases that were inappropriate, such as emphasizing in June 2022 the necessity of not humiliating Russia and underscoring in December 2022 the importance of providing security guarantees to Moscow. The book notes that such statements led to a decline in France’s image among Central, Eastern, and Northern European countries, and were weaponized by some parties against France in European forums, a phenomenon that has come to be known as “French Bashing.”
Another negative consequence is the weakening of Macron’s vision for Europe’s strategic autonomy. The book highlights that Macron’s insistence on playing a mediating role with Russia alienated Eastern European and Baltic states from France, thus undermining the idea of European strategic autonomy that Macron ardently champions. These countries viewed Macron’s approach as an attempt to distance them from the United States, which they consider the most reliable partner for their security needs. Consequently, Macron’s support for Ukraine, combined with his ambiguous stance toward Russia, adversely affected France’s aspirations to play a leading role in the European arena, despite possessing many attributes conducive to such a role.
Furthermore, the book argues that Macron’s ambitions for European leadership have been negatively impacted. It claims that while Emmanuel Macron is the most qualified individual to lead Europe, he squandered this opportunity due to his choice of words and his ambiguous positions regarding Russia. Although Macron attempted to correct these mistakes, this effort came too late, taking him a considerable amount of time to clearly affirm his desire for Ukraine to triumph and for Russia to be defeated. The book states that anyone aspiring to lead Europe today must take a decisive stance on the Ukrainian issue.
According to the book, Macron’s dilemma lies in his desire to present France as being equidistant from the major powers—the United States, China, and Russia—indicating that it does not automatically align with American policy. This stance is particularly concerning for Eastern European and Baltic states, which have yet to grasp the French perspective of wanting to be a balancing power in international affairs between a democracy-supporting entity like the United States and an authoritarian one like Russia.
In conclusion, the book emphasizes that France must undergo a radical transformation in its foreign policy, abandoning its unrealistic pursuit of being a “balancing power,” especially given Russia’s disregard for this approach, viewing it as a form of naïveté. The book stresses that this transformation should involve closer alignment with the positions of Central, Eastern, and Northern European countries, which have demonstrated greater capability than France in clearly understanding Russian policy. Additionally, France must shed any perception of “anti-Atlanticism,” convincing Eastern European nations that they need both Europe and NATO.
Source: Isabelle Lasserre, Macron–Poutine : Les Liaisons Dangereuses, (France: L`Observatoire, May 2023).
